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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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NOMURA–GREW CONVERSATIONS • 191<br />

NIXON SHOCK. The Nixon shock is the fact that on 15 August 1971,<br />

President Richard Nixon announced cessation <strong>of</strong> conversion <strong>of</strong> dollars<br />

to gold. This was a major change in the framework <strong>of</strong> international<br />

finance.<br />

Since the late 1960s, because <strong>of</strong> skyrocketing war expenses for the<br />

Vietnam War and <strong>of</strong> the implementation <strong>of</strong> the “Great Society,” the<br />

<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> suffered from economic overheating: a fiscal deficit,<br />

acceleration <strong>of</strong> inflation, and an expansion <strong>of</strong> the trade deficit. President<br />

Nixon needed more and more fiscal expenditure in order to continue<br />

the Vietnam War and maintain domestic employment. In order<br />

to overcome these difficulties, he abandoned the fixed exchange rate<br />

regime and shifted to a floating exchange rate regime.<br />

In order to adjust exchange rate, in December 1971, a financial<br />

ministerial meeting was held at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington,<br />

D.C. The exchange rate from yen to dollars was highly appreciated<br />

from 360 yen to 308 yen to the dollar, an appreciation <strong>of</strong><br />

16.88 percent. Combined with the Oil Shock in 1973, that is, the Organization<br />

<strong>of</strong> Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unilaterally<br />

raising crude oil prices and the shock this policy gave to the international<br />

economy, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy experienced “the worst economic<br />

depression in postwar history” and recorded negative growth<br />

for the first time since the war.<br />

NOMURA–GREW CONVERSATIONS. The administration <strong>of</strong> President<br />

Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1939 announced its intention to<br />

abrogate the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation. A<br />

blunt response to <strong>Japan</strong>’s widening <strong>of</strong> its sphere <strong>of</strong> military activities<br />

in the China Incident, it meant that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would be in a<br />

position from January 1940 to impose trade sanctions on <strong>Japan</strong>. Aware<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s dependence on trade with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign<br />

Minister Kichisaburō Nomura in November–December 1939<br />

entered conversations with American Ambassador Joseph Grew with<br />

an eye to laying the foundations for a new treaty <strong>of</strong> commerce.<br />

Having assumed the foreign minister’s post at the behest <strong>of</strong> Prime<br />

Minister Nobuyuki Abe in September 1939—at virtually the same<br />

time that World War II began in Europe—Nomura warned his cabinet<br />

colleagues <strong>of</strong> the necessity <strong>of</strong> conciliating the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. To<br />

this end, he sought their commitment to a policy <strong>of</strong> respecting China’s

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