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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE • 165<br />

Several factors combined to ensure the London Naval Conference’s<br />

successful conclusion, although the most important <strong>of</strong> these<br />

was Anglo–American conciliation. Some months before the conference<br />

opened, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with<br />

<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Herbert Hoover in the White House, where<br />

the two men reached mutual understanding on the issue <strong>of</strong> naval limitation.<br />

In this way, the recrimination that had characterized Anglo–American<br />

relations since the Geneva Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1927<br />

was dispelled, and the Anglo–American dispute that had broken up<br />

the Geneva Conference was resolved before the London Conference<br />

was convened.<br />

The most protracted negotiations that took place at the London<br />

Naval Conference were those between U.S. Senator David Reed and<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to Great Britain Matsudaira Tsuneo (parallel<br />

talks were also held between Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry L. Stimson<br />

and former Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō). The <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates’<br />

negotiating position was informed by the so-called Three Basic<br />

Principles, which the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in November 1929<br />

had adopted as basic policy. The principles regarded as necessary a<br />

70 percent ratio for <strong>Japan</strong> (vis-à-vis the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great<br />

Britain) in auxiliary vessel strength; called for a 70 percent ratio visà-vis<br />

the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in heavy cruisers; and maintained that <strong>Japan</strong><br />

should be able to possess submarines totaling 78,000 tons. They<br />

achieved in large part these objectives, and, on 14 March, sent a complicated<br />

plan to Tokyo that gave <strong>Japan</strong> a cruiser strength approximately<br />

70 percent <strong>of</strong> that <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain, and<br />

allowed <strong>Japan</strong> to maintain its 78,000 tons in submarines.<br />

In Tokyo, the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi was receptive<br />

to this plan. The core policymaking group within the Navy<br />

Ministry—Vice Navy Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin, chief <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Naval Affairs Bureau Hori Teikichi, and chief Navy Ministry adjutant<br />

Koga Mineichi—were also willing to accept the plan. Prime Minister<br />

Hamaguchi, on 1 April, cabled his government’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> the plan<br />

to the conferees, and, on 22 April, the London Naval Treaty was<br />

signed.<br />

For both the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy and government, the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the<br />

conference was messy and complicated. The Navy command, led by<br />

Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Admiral Kanji Katō and his vice-chief, Vice Admiral

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