Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films
JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE • 145 students. By the end of the 19th century, several hundred Japanese had studied at American high schools and colleges, including West Point and the U.S. Naval Academy. The number of Japanese students in the United States gradually increased throughout the 20th century, except during World War II when Japanese citizens and even many American citizens of Japanese ancestry were forced to stop their studies by the United States government, despite the objections of many college presidents. By the early 1990s, the number of Japanese students in America exceeded 40,000. Many Japanese K–12 students are the children of Japanese businessmen at American-based factories, such as Honda, Nissan, Sony, etc., while Japanese college students decide to attend an American college for both educational and social reasons. Many Japanese graduate and post-graduate students attend American colleges to study business or one of the sciences. Japanese students can be found at almost any sizeable university or college in America, with the largest number on the West Coast and in the Northeastern United States. See also IMMIGRATION; MAKINO, NOBUAKI; MATSUDAIRA, TADAATSU; MORI, ARINORI; MURRAY, DAVID; NAGAI, SHIGEKO; NIIJIMA, JO; NITOBE, INAZO; TSUDA, UMEKO; UCHIMURA, KANZO; YAMAKAWA, SUTEMATSU. JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT). The United States established a liberal, multilateral world economic structure in the postwar era centered on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Japan joined the IMF and the IBRD in August 1952 without much difficulty. However, it was very difficult to join GATT. Because the Japanese economy depended on foreign trade, Tokyo had a strong interest in GATT even during the occupation. In July 1952, 10 months after signing the peace treaty, Tokyo applied to join GATT; however, Great Britain objected to Japan’s membership, insisting that Japan should carry out formal multilateral tariff negotiations. Consequently, Japan’s accession to GATT was pending. In 1953, Japan became a pro tempore member of GATT and acquired the right to participate in GATT conferences. In October 1954, GATT made a resolution to start tariff negotiations with Japan. Finally, in
146 • JAPAN’S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES September 1955, Japan joined GATT as a full member. The United States strongly endorsed Japan’s accession to GATT because Japan’s economic independence based on multilateral liberal trade would be beneficial for the United States to fight the Cold War. In contrast, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain strongly opposed Japan’s accession because of their bad experience regarding Japan’s export thrust with its low-price textile goods to the world market in the 1930s. In the end, Japan had to accept the imposition of GATT Article 35, Non-application of the Agreement Between Particular Contracting Parties, stipulating that “A contracting party may withhold application of its schedule of tariff concessions, or the entire agreement, from another contracting party with which it has not entered into tariff negotiations.” In short, Japan was excluded from the nondiscriminatory principle of GATT. By the mid-1960s, the four major European countries mentioned previously repealed their application of GATT Article 35 in return for Japan’s acceptance of voluntary export restraint, and still, in the 1960s, about 40 countries, including underdeveloped ones (such as Chad in Africa) applied Article 35 to Japan. Tokyo had to deal with the discriminatory status resulting from GATT Article 35 until the World Trade Organization (WTO) came into being 1995 as the successor to GATT. See also GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT). JAPAN’S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. These are the principles of not producing, not possessing, and not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan. On 11 December 1967, at a meeting of the Lower House Budget Committee, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato clearly stated these three non-nuclear principles for the first time. He reconfirmed them in an administrative policy speech made at the Diet in January 1968. In November 1971, a Lower House plenary session adopted a resolution of the three principles. It is habitually suspected that U.S. naval vessels and combat aircraft are equipped with nuclear weapons, but Tokyo argues that as long as Washington offers no prior consultation, they do not carry nuclear weapons. On 30 May 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda stated that because of changes in the international situation, Japan’s non-nuclear principles might be altered. This statement sparked controversy; overwhelming Japanese sentiment is still opposed to possessing nuclear weapons. See also NUCLEAR ENERGY.
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JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE • 145<br />
students. By the end <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, several hundred <strong>Japan</strong>ese had<br />
studied at American high schools and colleges, including West Point<br />
and the U.S. Naval Academy. The number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese students in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> gradually increased throughout the 20th century, except<br />
during World War II when <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens and even many American<br />
citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese ancestry were forced to stop their studies by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government, despite the objections <strong>of</strong> many college presidents.<br />
By the early 1990s, the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese students in America<br />
exceeded 40,000. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese K–12 students are the children <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese businessmen at American-based factories, such as Honda, Nissan,<br />
Sony, etc., while <strong>Japan</strong>ese college students decide to attend an<br />
American college for both educational and social reasons. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
graduate and post-graduate students attend American colleges to<br />
study business or one <strong>of</strong> the sciences. <strong>Japan</strong>ese students can be found at<br />
almost any sizeable university or college in America, with the largest<br />
number on the West Coast and in the Northeastern <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. See<br />
also IMMIGRATION; MAKINO, NOBUAKI; MATSUDAIRA,<br />
TADAATSU; MORI, ARINORI; MURRAY, DAVID; NAGAI,<br />
SHIGEKO; NIIJIMA, JO; NITOBE, INAZO; TSUDA, UMEKO;<br />
UCHIMURA, KANZO; YAMAKAWA, SUTEMATSU.<br />
JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON<br />
TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> established a<br />
liberal, multilateral world economic structure in the postwar era centered<br />
on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International<br />
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction<br />
and Development (IBRD). <strong>Japan</strong> joined the IMF and the<br />
IBRD in August 1952 without much difficulty. However, it was very<br />
difficult to join GATT.<br />
Because the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy depended on foreign trade, Tokyo<br />
had a strong interest in GATT even during the occupation. In July<br />
1952, 10 months after signing the peace treaty, Tokyo applied to join<br />
GATT; however, Great Britain objected to <strong>Japan</strong>’s membership, insisting<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> should carry out formal multilateral tariff negotiations.<br />
Consequently, <strong>Japan</strong>’s accession to GATT was pending. In<br />
1953, <strong>Japan</strong> became a pro tempore member <strong>of</strong> GATT and acquired<br />
the right to participate in GATT conferences. In October 1954, GATT<br />
made a resolution to start tariff negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong>. Finally, in