Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

136 • JAPAN–U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT
was automatically enacted on 19 June 1960 without any discussion in
the Upper House, However, widespread Japanese domestic opposition
to the revisions, along with anti-Kishi and anti-U.S. demonstrations,
forced U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to cancel a planned visit
to Japan. In order to restore political calm, the Kishi government resigned
en masse in July 1960. See also NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
BLOCKING REVISION OF JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY;
SHIGEMITSU–DULLES MEETING.
JAPAN–U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT. In September
1986, the Japan–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement was concluded between
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and
U.S. Department of Commerce for the purpose of expanding the foreign
share of semiconductor sales in the Japanese market. However,
in March 1987, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on Japanese
imports because officials in Washington made a determination
that Japan was failing to abide by the terms of the semiconductor
agreement.
To resolve the dispute, Japan and the United States entered into a
new round of semiconductor trade negotiations. In July 1991, a second
Japan–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement was reached. Unlike the
first agreement, the new agreement contained a numerical target: by
the end of 1992, sales of foreign semiconductors were expected to account
for 20 percent of all semiconductor sales in the Japanese market.
The duration of the second agreement was five years. In spring
1993, Japan was able to verify that the foreign share of the Japanese
semiconductor market was above 20 percent. In December 1994,
MITI formally announced the end of semiconductor trade friction between
Japan and the U.S., stating that Japan had achieved its promise
of increasing market-entry opportunities for foreign semiconductor
(namely, U.S.) makers and had created a domestic market
environment conducive to permitting competition from foreign makers
over the long term.
When the second Japan–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement expired in
1996, the U.S. share of the Japanese semiconductor market was 26 percent.
The United States insisted on extending the agreement in order to
continue controlled trade with numerical market share targets, while
Japan regarded this as no longer unnecessary. Based on the under-