11.12.2012 Views

Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

IKEDA–ROBERTSON TALKS • 111<br />

cating tolerance and patience, and proposing a plan to double national<br />

income. Ikeda governed <strong>Japan</strong> for four years from 1960 to<br />

1964, during which he cemented the postwar recovery and entered<br />

into the stage <strong>of</strong> rapid economic growth.<br />

IKEDA–ROBERTSON TALKS. Hayato Ikeda, who was then chair<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party’s Policy Research Council, served as Prime Minister<br />

Shigeru Yoshida’s special envoy during approximately four<br />

weeks <strong>of</strong> talks with Walter Robertson, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assistant secretary<br />

<strong>of</strong> state for the Far East, in Washington, D.C., in October 1953.<br />

The significance <strong>of</strong> these talks is that they led to the formulation <strong>of</strong><br />

basic principles that would guide <strong>Japan</strong>’s increase <strong>of</strong> its defense capabilities.<br />

For example, concerning ground forces, <strong>Japan</strong> proposed<br />

putting 180,000 troops in uniform, whereas the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> insisted<br />

on 325,000 troops. During the talks, Ikeda presented four major reasons<br />

why <strong>Japan</strong> could achieve modest but not drastic increases in its<br />

defense capabilities:<br />

1. Legal constraints: It would be impossible to amend the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />

constitution, especially Article Nine, during the foreseeable<br />

future.<br />

2. Political constraints: Because <strong>of</strong> a thorough peace education<br />

program conducted by the Occupation authorities, a sentiment<br />

<strong>of</strong> “not taking up arms” had become prevalent among young<br />

people suitable for military service.<br />

3. Economic constraints: <strong>Japan</strong> at that time needed not a program<br />

<strong>of</strong> rearmament but economic growth and social security.<br />

4. Physical constraints: Even if <strong>Japan</strong> made plans to expand its<br />

Police Reserve Force (in effect, a standing army), it could not<br />

recruit enough people. As a result <strong>of</strong> the “peace education” program,<br />

very few young people exhibited an interest in voluntarily<br />

enlisting in the Police Reserve Force. If <strong>Japan</strong> were forced<br />

to proceed with a rapid expansion <strong>of</strong> the police force, that might<br />

encourage ideologically suspect people to join the Force. Moreover,<br />

the constitution clearly prohibited conscription.<br />

<strong>Japan</strong> convinced the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to accept a compromise: <strong>Japan</strong><br />

would increase the size <strong>of</strong> Police Reserve Force to 180,000 within<br />

three years, starting with an increase <strong>of</strong> 30,000 in the first year alone.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!