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Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

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94 • GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE<br />

colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. An expeditious response to the success<br />

with which Germany’s blitzkrieg had met in Europe, which, in<br />

turn, rendered defenseless British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions<br />

in Southeast Asia, it was deemed essential to <strong>Japan</strong>’s existence as<br />

an independent nation. For this purpose, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in<br />

late July 1940 determined that if favorable circumstances arose, it<br />

would use force in Southeast Asia as a means to the construction <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.<br />

On 1 August 1940, Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka publicly<br />

announced <strong>Japan</strong>’s intention to construct the Greater East Asian Co-<br />

Prosperity Sphere, and stated that it was logical to include French<br />

Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies within it. Within weeks,<br />

<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops had moved into northern Indochina. The <strong>United</strong><br />

<strong>States</strong>, among the few nations still able to exercise a decisive influence<br />

on <strong>Japan</strong>’s aggressive designs, signified its opposition by slapping<br />

a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade iron, and<br />

steel scrap. This pattern was more or less repeated in July 1941,<br />

when <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops occupied the entire Indochinese peninsula<br />

and Washington responded by freezing <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets and embargoing<br />

oil.<br />

Following Pearl Harbor, despite <strong>Japan</strong>ese appeals to Asian nationalism,<br />

the fundamentals <strong>of</strong> the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity<br />

Sphere remained bluntly utilitarian. Indeed, government leaders behind<br />

closed doors made reference not to the Greater East Asian Co-<br />

Prosperity Sphere, but to the “Imperial resource sphere.” Nonetheless,<br />

the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in November 1943 convened a<br />

Conference <strong>of</strong> Greater East Asia, with delegates from Manchukuo,<br />

the Nanjing regime in China, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and<br />

India in attendance. On 7 November, they released a joint statement<br />

that affirmed their commitment to such principles as coexistence and<br />

co-prosperity; respect for mutual autonomy and independence; and<br />

the abolition <strong>of</strong> racial discrimination. These were fine-sounding<br />

principles, but they were clearly honored in the breach by <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />

Any country, by them, the relentless American counter<strong>of</strong>fensive<br />

against <strong>Japan</strong>ese positions in the Pacific rendered <strong>Japan</strong>’s self-appointed<br />

position at the apex <strong>of</strong> the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity<br />

Sphere extremely vulnerable. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD<br />

WAR II.

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