Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan ... - Bakumatsu Films

CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. • 67
Churchill’s elation when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor was
real: “So we had won after all!”
Thereafter, Churchill was content to let the United States take the
lead in the war against Japan. In May 1944, he explained to the Commonwealth
prime ministers: “We must regard ourselves as junior
partners in the war against Japan.” Having acquiesced in America’s
preponderance of power in the Pacific theater of war, Churchill
played only a peripheral role in the decision to use the atomic bomb
against Japan. In 1944, he agreed with United States President
Franklin D. Roosevelt that, in the event the bomb became available,
it should be used against Japan. Then, after Washington in late June
1945 informed London of its intention to use the bomb some time in
August, Churchill approved “without a moment’s hesitation.” When
he met with President Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference,
Churchill again reiterated his belief in the efficacy of the bomb. On
this matter, Churchill seemed to recognize not only that the atomic
bomb would shorten the war against Japan, but that it could prove a
powerful diplomatic weapon vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
It is also worth noting that during the endgame of the war against
Japan, Churchill quietly pressed his American allies to modify the
unconditional surrender policy. At the Yalta Conference, he asked
Roosevelt whether a mitigation of the unconditional surrender policy
might shorten the war, although he was careful to add that on this
score his government was prepared to abide by Washington’s judgment.
He again raised the issue with Truman at Potsdam, although he
chose not to press the matter.
From the viewpoint of securing the postwar peace, Churchill
throughout the war was adamant that the British and their American
(and perhaps Soviet) allies must continue to work together. He was
anxious to see the United States obtain many of the islands for which
it was fighting the Japanese—including the Carolines, Marshalls, and
Marianas—if only because such would ensure against a return to the
isolationism that had hamstrung American foreign policymakers
throughout the 1930s. He was also convinced that Japan must be rendered
powerless to again threaten the peace and security of the Pacific,
and at one time spoke of the need to reduce Japanese industrial
centers to ashes. Churchill’s alignment with those who advocated a
harsh peace for Japan was somewhat mollified after its surrender. As