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HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF<br />
UNITED<br />
STATES–JAPAN<br />
RELATIONS<br />
JOHN VAN SANT<br />
PETER MAUCH<br />
YONEYUKI SUGITA
HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES<br />
OF U.S. DIPLOMACY<br />
Edited by Jon Woron<strong>of</strong>f<br />
1. U.S. Diplomacy from the Civil War to World War I, by Kenneth J.<br />
Blume, 2005.<br />
2. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–China Relations, by Robert Sutter, 2006.<br />
3. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–Latin American Relations, by Joseph Smith, 2007.<br />
4. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Relations, by John Van Sant, Peter Mauch,<br />
and Yoneyuki Sugita, 2007.
<strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Dictionary</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Relations<br />
John Van Sant<br />
Peter Mauch<br />
Yoneyuki Sugita<br />
<strong>Historical</strong> Dictionaries <strong>of</strong> U.S. Diplomacy, No. 4<br />
The Scarecrow Press, Inc.<br />
Lanham, Maryland • Toronto • Plymouth, UK<br />
2007
SCARECROW PRESS, INC.<br />
Published in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America<br />
by Scarecrow Press, Inc.<br />
A wholly owned subsidiary <strong>of</strong><br />
The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.<br />
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706<br />
www.scarecrowpress.com<br />
Estover Road<br />
Plymouth PL6 7PY<br />
<strong>United</strong> Kingdom<br />
Copyright © 2007 by John Van Sant, Peter Mauch, and Yoneyuki Sugita<br />
All rights reserved. No part <strong>of</strong> this publication may be reproduced,<br />
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any<br />
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,<br />
without the prior permission <strong>of</strong> the publisher.<br />
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available<br />
Library <strong>of</strong> Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data<br />
Van Sant, John E., 1958–<br />
<strong>Historical</strong> dictionary <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> relations / John Van Sant, Peter<br />
Mauch, Yoneyuki Sugita.<br />
p. cm. — (<strong>Historical</strong> dictionaries <strong>of</strong> U.S. diplomacy ; no. 4)<br />
Includes bibliographical references.<br />
ISBN-13: 978-0-8108-5608-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)<br />
ISBN-10: 0-8108-5608-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)<br />
1. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–Foreign relations–<strong>Japan</strong>–Dictionaries. 2. <strong>Japan</strong>–Foreign<br />
relations–<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–Dictionaries. 3. <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>–Relations–<strong>Japan</strong>–Dictionaries. 4. <strong>Japan</strong>–Relations–<strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>–Dictionaries. I. Mauch, Peter (Peter Cameron) II. Sugita, Yoneyuki,<br />
1962– III. Title.<br />
E183.8.J3V36 2007<br />
327.7305203–dc22 2006028844<br />
� The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence <strong>of</strong> Paper<br />
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.<br />
Manufactured in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America.
Contents<br />
Editor’s Foreword Jon Woron<strong>of</strong>f vii<br />
Acknowledgments ix<br />
Reader’s Note xi<br />
Abbreviations and Acronyms xiii<br />
Chronology xv<br />
Map xl<br />
Images xlii<br />
Introduction 1<br />
THE DICTIONARY<br />
Appendix A <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Presidents and<br />
29<br />
Secretaries <strong>of</strong> State, 1789–2005 273<br />
Appendix B <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Ministers 277<br />
Bibliography 281<br />
About the Authors 299<br />
v
Editor’s Foreword<br />
Certainly the most important bilateral relationship <strong>of</strong> the latter half <strong>of</strong><br />
the 20th century into the early 21st is one <strong>of</strong> the most peculiar. Despite<br />
the disparity in size and population, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> have<br />
been the anchor <strong>of</strong> relations in East Asia, and Asia more broadly, sometimes<br />
having a worldwide impact. It is odd, first <strong>of</strong> all, because <strong>of</strong> the<br />
huge disproportion in size and population between the two, to say nothing<br />
<strong>of</strong> social and cultural differences. It is also odd in that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> was initially also much more dynamic economically and was actually<br />
willing to tolerate <strong>Japan</strong>’s rise to economic prominence through<br />
trade. But it is particularly unusual in that, just prior to its establishment,<br />
the two countries were at war and the former occupied the latter, and<br />
presently guarantees its defense. Yet, over the decades the ties have only<br />
grown stronger, and along with political, economic, and military links,<br />
there are increasingly close and amicable relations between the peoples,<br />
due to travel and cultural exchange, as well more recently as intermarriage<br />
and immigration.<br />
The significance and duration <strong>of</strong> this relationship also makes the<br />
<strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Dictionary</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>—<strong>Japan</strong> Relations one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
most important in the series. Beginning with <strong>of</strong>ficial and private contacts<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> in the first half <strong>of</strong> the 19th<br />
century, the authors include more than 150 years <strong>of</strong> political, military,<br />
economic, social, and cultural bilateral relations—including their multilateral<br />
contexts. Thus, the dictionary section includes, among other<br />
things, entries on a huge cast <strong>of</strong> actors, including presidents and prime<br />
ministers, secretaries <strong>of</strong> state and foreign ministers, diplomats and individual<br />
citizens, as well as major events, institutions, and organizations.<br />
But the overall trends are easier to see through the introduction, while<br />
the individual steps are traced over time in the chronology. The list <strong>of</strong><br />
vii
viii • EDITOR’S FOREWORD<br />
acronyms facilitates reading on foreign policy, and the bibliography<br />
provides many useful suggestions for further reading.<br />
This volume was written by an interesting team <strong>of</strong> specialists, an<br />
American, an Australian, and a <strong>Japan</strong>ese, each with somewhat different<br />
specializations and sometimes also a different angle, which helps provide<br />
a more balanced picture. John Van Sant is associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong><br />
history at the University <strong>of</strong> Alabama-Birmingham, with particular interest<br />
in 19th-century <strong>Japan</strong> and its international relations, and the author<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pacific Pioneers: <strong>Japan</strong>ese Journeys to America and Hawaii,<br />
1850–1880. Peter Mauch is a post-doctoral fellow <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Society<br />
for the Promotion <strong>of</strong> Science, presently studying at Kyoto University,<br />
and who is writing a biography <strong>of</strong> Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura.<br />
Yoneyuki Sugita is associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> American history at Osaka<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Foreign Studies and is the author <strong>of</strong> Pitfall or Panacea:<br />
The Irony <strong>of</strong> US Power in Occupied <strong>Japan</strong> 1945–1952 and co-editor <strong>of</strong><br />
Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth<br />
Century. This collaboration has provided us with a broad and deep view<br />
<strong>of</strong> a somewhat peculiar, but certainly crucial, team <strong>of</strong> players in an increasingly<br />
messy world situation.<br />
Jon Woron<strong>of</strong>f<br />
Series Editor
Acknowledgments<br />
We wish to thank Jon Woron<strong>of</strong>f, the series editor, for asking us to undertake<br />
this dictionary, for providing guidance throughout the writing and<br />
production, and for reviewing the entire manuscript and <strong>of</strong>fering valuable<br />
comments. We would also like to thank Dr. Robert Sutter for allowing us<br />
to use his Appendix B from <strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Dictionary</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–China<br />
Relations. John Van Sant thanks the University <strong>of</strong> Alabama–Birmingham<br />
and his colleagues in the Department <strong>of</strong> History for their continuous support<br />
for his teaching and research. Peter Mauch dedicates this dictionary<br />
to his parents, Russell and Norma Mauch, his wife, Tomoko, and his children,<br />
Joseph and Kyoko Mauch. Yoneyuki Sugita extends his gratitude to<br />
John McGlynn and John Garside for their valuable research and editorial<br />
assistance. He would never have completed this work without the warm<br />
and supportive family environment provided by his wife, Shoko, and our<br />
three children (Gakuto, Natsuki, and Kanato). Kudos to them!<br />
ix
Reader’s Notes<br />
Names in this work are cited in Western bibliographic order. Some<br />
terms within dictionary entries are in bold type to indicate additional<br />
entries. Unfamiliar <strong>Japan</strong>ese words are italicized.<br />
xi
Abbreviations and Acronyms<br />
AAA American Arbitration Association<br />
ACJUSER Advisory Council on <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Economic Relations<br />
ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement<br />
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution<br />
AJS America–<strong>Japan</strong> Society<br />
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America<br />
APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />
ASDF Air Self-Defense Force<br />
ASEAN Association <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asian Nations<br />
CART Common Agenda Roundtable<br />
CULCON U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Conference on Cultural and<br />
Educational Interchange<br />
DIC Defense Industry Commission<br />
EAEC East Asia Economic Caucus<br />
EAEG East Asia Economic Grouping<br />
EIBUS Export–Import Bank <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
EROA Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area<br />
ESB Economic Stabilization Board<br />
FSX Fighter Support X<br />
GARIOA Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Area<br />
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />
GHQ General Headquarters<br />
GS Government Section<br />
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency<br />
IFSEC Industry Forum for Security Cooperation<br />
IMF International Monetary Fund<br />
IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East<br />
JAIF <strong>Japan</strong> Atomic Industrial Forum<br />
JAS <strong>Japan</strong> America Society<br />
xiii
xiv • ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS<br />
JASC <strong>Japan</strong>-America Student Conference<br />
JBF <strong>Japan</strong> Business Federation<br />
JCAA <strong>Japan</strong> Commercial Arbitration Association<br />
JET <strong>Japan</strong> Exchange and Teaching<br />
JPC <strong>Japan</strong> Productivity Center<br />
JSDF <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Force<br />
JSP <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist Party<br />
JUSBC <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Business Council<br />
JUSWPC <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Wise Persons Committee<br />
Keidanren <strong>Japan</strong> Federation <strong>of</strong> Economic Organizations<br />
LDP Liberal Democratic Party<br />
MITI Ministry <strong>of</strong> International Trade and Industry<br />
MSA Mutual Security Agreement<br />
MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force<br />
NAJAS National Association <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>-America Societies<br />
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization<br />
NDC National Defense Council<br />
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association<br />
NGO non-governmental organization<br />
NPR National Police Reserve<br />
P-3 Common Agenda Public Private Partnership<br />
PRC People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China<br />
RFB Reconstruction Finance Bank<br />
ROC Republic <strong>of</strong> China<br />
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers<br />
SCAPIN Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers<br />
Instruction Note<br />
SCC <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Consultative Committee<br />
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization<br />
SII Structural Impediments Initiative<br />
SOFA <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Status-<strong>of</strong>-Forces Agreement<br />
USJBC U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council<br />
USTR <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Trade Representative<br />
YMCA Young Men’s Christian Association
Chronology<br />
1600 Ieyasu Tokugawa defeats his remaining enemies and establishes<br />
the Tokugawa Shogunate or bakufu (military government) in Edo.<br />
1603 Ieyasu Tokugawa is formally appointed as shogun by the emperor.<br />
1633–1639 Tokugawa bakufu issues maritime restrictions on contacts<br />
with Portuguese and Spanish, only allowing continued contact and trade<br />
with Dutch East India Company on Dejima Island in Nagasaki harbor.<br />
These restrictions are later known as sakoku, or “national seclusion,”<br />
and included prohibitions on Christianity.<br />
1700s Shogun Yoshimune Tokugawa (reigned 1716–1745) allows the<br />
Dutch East India Company to import Western books on medical and scientific<br />
subjects for <strong>Japan</strong>ese scholars.<br />
1776–1783 American Revolution against Britain results in the formation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America. American ships based in New England<br />
soon began trade relations with China.<br />
Late 1700s–Early 1800s Western ships from Russia, Britain, and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> occasionally arrive on <strong>Japan</strong>ese coasts demanding trade.<br />
Provisions <strong>of</strong> food and water are sometimes given by <strong>Japan</strong>ese, but all<br />
demands for trade relations are refused by domains and the Tokugawa<br />
bakufu.<br />
1825 Tokugawa bakufu issues the Expulsion Edict, strengthening national<br />
seclusion laws.<br />
1830 and 1835 <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government sends Edmund Roberts on<br />
missions to Asia to establish diplomatic and trade relations with several<br />
countries, including <strong>Japan</strong>. Roberts dies in Macao in 1835 before reaching<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
xv
xvi • CHRONOLOGY<br />
1833–1837 Famine throughout many areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1837 February–March: Heihachiro Oshio leads uprising in Osaka<br />
against the Tokugawa bakufu.<br />
1837 June–July: The Morrison Incident.<br />
1839–1841 The Opium War between Britain and China.<br />
1841 June: Manjiro Nakahama and four other <strong>Japan</strong>ese survivors <strong>of</strong><br />
a shipwreck are rescued by William Whitfield <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts.<br />
1845–1853 Pinnacle <strong>of</strong> “Manifest Destiny” in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Most<br />
<strong>of</strong> Southwest, West, and Pacific Coast north <strong>of</strong> Mexico and south <strong>of</strong><br />
Canada become territories or states <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
1846 27 May: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Navy Commodore James Biddle arrives<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>. Tokugawa bakufu refuses to negotiate for trade and diplomatic<br />
relations.<br />
1846–1848 Mexican–American War.<br />
1847–1848 Ranald MacDonald <strong>of</strong> Oregon Territory in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1848 January: Gold discovered in Alta California, Mexican territory,<br />
beginning the Gold Rush. February Treaty <strong>of</strong> Guadalupe Hidalgo ends<br />
the Mexican–American War. Texas, much <strong>of</strong> the American Southwest,<br />
and California become U.S. territories as a result <strong>of</strong> this treaty.<br />
1850 Taiping Rebellion begins in China, lasting until 1864.<br />
1850 9 September: California is formally admitted to <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
as the 31st state <strong>of</strong> the union.<br />
1851 January: Manjiro Nakahama returns to <strong>Japan</strong> after nine years<br />
in <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii.<br />
1851 March: Hikozo Hamada (later known as Joseph Heco) is shipwrecked<br />
in late 1850, rescued by the American vessel Auckland, and arrives<br />
in San Francisco in March 1851. He remained in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
until the fall <strong>of</strong> 1858.<br />
1853 8 July: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry enters<br />
Uraga Bay near Edo with four warships to present diplomatic and<br />
trade proposals to <strong>Japan</strong> from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government. Perry departs<br />
to return the following year for negotiations.
CHRONOLOGY • xvii<br />
1854 14 February: Perry returns to <strong>Japan</strong>, this time with eight<br />
warships. 31 March: Perry and Tokugawa government <strong>of</strong>ficials sign<br />
the Kanagawa Treaty, formally known as the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Friendship.<br />
1854–1855 Britain, France, Russia, Holland sign treaties <strong>of</strong> friendship<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>. Ports <strong>of</strong> Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki are opened to<br />
Westerners for limited trade.<br />
1855 Institute for Western Learning opened by Tokugawa government.<br />
Renamed Institute for the Study <strong>of</strong> Barbarian Books in 1857, then as the<br />
Institute for Development (Kaiseijo) in 1862. In 1877, the Kaiseijo becomes<br />
part <strong>of</strong> Tokyo University, the first modern university in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1856 The Tokugawa bakufu hires Charles Wolcott Brooks, an American<br />
businessman in San Francisco, as <strong>Japan</strong>’s consul general and commercial<br />
agent.<br />
1856 July: Townsend Harris arrives in <strong>Japan</strong> as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> consul<br />
general, the first American diplomat stationed in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1858 Naosuke Ii, daimyo <strong>of</strong> Hikone domain, appointed chief minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Tokugawa government, the most powerful position in the Tokugawa<br />
bakufu after the Shogun. 6 June: In Baltimore, Maryland, Joseph Heco<br />
(Hikozo Hamada) becomes the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese to become an American citizen.<br />
29 July: Townsend Harris and Togukawa bakufu ratify the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and Commerce. Britain, France, Holland, and<br />
Russia sign similar treaties with <strong>Japan</strong> by October. All <strong>of</strong> these treaties are<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially known as the Ansei Treaties, and un<strong>of</strong>ficially as the “unequal<br />
treaties.”<br />
1859 James Curtis Hepburn, Guido Verbeck, Francis Hall, and Eugene<br />
Van Reed arrive in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1860 January: The Tokugawa bakufu sends a delegation <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials,<br />
usually known as the Shogun’s Embassy, to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In May,<br />
President James Buchanon meets with Norimasa Muragaki, leader <strong>of</strong><br />
the delegation, and other Tokugawa bakufu <strong>of</strong>ficials at the White House.<br />
24 March: Naosuke Ii is assassinated in Edo by samurai upset at the<br />
Tokugawa bakufu’s agreements with Western countries.<br />
1861 15 January: Henry Heusken, secretary <strong>of</strong> the American Legation<br />
in Edo, is assassinated by anti-foreign samurai. 4 March: Abraham
xviii • CHRONOLOGY<br />
Lincoln is inaugurated president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 12 April: The<br />
American Civil War begins.<br />
1862 12 September: One English merchant is killed and two others<br />
are wounded by Satsuma samurai at Namamugi, Yokohama.<br />
1863 June–July: Choshu samurai fire on Western ships passing<br />
through Shimonoseki Straits. 15 August: British warships fire on<br />
Kagoshima, capital <strong>of</strong> Satsuma domain, in retaliation for the Namamugi<br />
Incident the previous year.<br />
1864 11 July: Shozan Sakuma is assassinated in Kyoto by anti-foreign<br />
samurai. August: A joint fleet <strong>of</strong> American, British, French, and British<br />
warships attack the Choshu domain capital <strong>of</strong> Hagi in retaliation for<br />
Choshu samurai firing on Western ships the previous year.<br />
1866 Satsuma and Choshu form an alliance against the Tokugawa<br />
bakufu. Yukichi Fukuzawa publishes Things Western. Niijima Jo, later<br />
known as Joseph Neeshima, arrives in Massachusetts.<br />
1867 January: Emperor Komei dies; his teenage son Mutsuhito becomes<br />
Emperor. August: Arinori Mori and several samurai-students<br />
from Satsuma travel to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from England to join the<br />
Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the New Life colony in New York. November: Tokugawa<br />
Shogun Yoshinobu (Keiki) cedes governing authority to the emperor.<br />
10 December: Ryoma Sakamoto is assassinated in Kyoto.<br />
1868 January–March: Tokugawa military forces lose decisive battles<br />
against Satsuma and Choshu at Toba, Fushimi, and Edo. Satsuma<br />
and Choshu take over government in the name <strong>of</strong> the emperor. February:<br />
Mutsuhito is formally enthroned as emperor; the Meiji Era<br />
(1868–1912) begins. 6 April: Charter Oath (Five Article Oath) issued<br />
by Emperor Meiji. May: American merchant Eugene Van Reed organizes<br />
a group <strong>of</strong> 150 <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers to work in Hawaii, causing a<br />
diplomatic crisis between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, the new Meiji government,<br />
and the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii. September: Imperial capital moved from<br />
Kyoto to Edo; Edo renamed Tokyo (“Eastern Capital”).<br />
1869 March: Ulysses S. Grant takes <strong>of</strong>fice as president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. April: Charles De Long arrives as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> minister to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. He returns to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in October 1873. May: <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
immigrants/refugees from Aizu arrive in northern California.
CHRONOLOGY • xix<br />
1870s Meiji Government hires “foreign experts” from <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and Europe to help establish new government institutions.<br />
1870 May–June: Taro Kusakabe (Rutgers College, New Jersey) and<br />
Niijima Jo (Amherst College, Massachusetts) become first <strong>Japan</strong>ese to<br />
graduate from American colleges. October: Arinori Mori is appointed<br />
chargé d’ affaires for <strong>Japan</strong> to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He arrives in Washington,<br />
D.C., in February 1871. August: <strong>Japan</strong> and Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii<br />
agree to Treaty <strong>of</strong> Friendship and Commerce.<br />
1871 December: Iwakura Mission departs for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
Europe. Members <strong>of</strong> this government mission return to <strong>Japan</strong> in September<br />
1873.<br />
1872 July–August: Maria Luz Incident between <strong>Japan</strong>, China, Peru,<br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
1873 Tokugawa-era ban against Christianity repealed. October: John<br />
Bingham arrives as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> minister to <strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until 1885.<br />
1874 Meirokusha Society established in Tokyo by Arinori Mori, Yukichi<br />
Fukuzawa, and others.<br />
1875 Niijima Jo, who returned to <strong>Japan</strong> the previous year, establishes<br />
Doshisha Eigakko, a Christian school in Kyoto. The school later becomes<br />
Doshisha University. Yukichi Fukuzawa publishes An Outline <strong>of</strong><br />
Civilization.<br />
1876 Kanghwa Treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and Korea. <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
participates in the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition. William E.<br />
Griffis publishes the first edition <strong>of</strong> The Mikado’s Empire.<br />
1877 Saigo Takamori leads the Satsuma Rebellion against the Meiji<br />
government. University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo established. American biologist Edward<br />
Morse undertakes first archaeological study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1878 Harvard philosopher Ernest Fenollosa arrives in <strong>Japan</strong> to take up<br />
position at Tokyo University. 14 May: Toshimichi Okubo, home minister<br />
<strong>of</strong> Meiji government, is assassinated by a former samurai.<br />
1879 April: The Ryukyu Kingdom becomes Okinawa Prefecture <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. June: Former American President Ulysses Grant and his wife<br />
Julia arrive in <strong>Japan</strong> for an extended visit.
xx • CHRONOLOGY<br />
1880 The first Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
is established in Tokyo. Two years later, the second YMCA is established<br />
in Osaka.<br />
1881 Okuma Shigenobu, an early promoter <strong>of</strong> relations with Western<br />
countries and popular member <strong>of</strong> the Meiji Government, is forced to<br />
resign.<br />
1882 <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress approves the Chinese Exclusion Act.<br />
Sutematsu Yamakawa (Oyama) graduates from Vassar College in New<br />
York.<br />
1883 Rokumeikan (Deer Cry Pavilion), an elaborate social hall, is built<br />
by the Meiji government for entertaining Western diplomats.<br />
1884 Ernest Fenollosa begins promoting <strong>Japan</strong>ese art in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. <strong>Japan</strong>, Hawaii, and <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> agree to an immigration system<br />
allowing <strong>Japan</strong>ese to work in Hawaii.<br />
1885 The cabinet system <strong>of</strong> government begins in <strong>Japan</strong>. Hirobumi<br />
Ito (prime minister), Kaoru Inoue (foreign minister), Arinori Mori (education<br />
minister), and several other cabinet ministers previously studied<br />
or traveled in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
1888 Mutsu Munemitsu is appointed as <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador in Washington,<br />
D.C.<br />
1889 Lafcadio Hearn arrives in <strong>Japan</strong>. 11 February: The Meiji Constitution<br />
is promulgated. Education Minister Arinori Mori is assassinated<br />
earlier on the same day.<br />
1890 Imperial Rescript on Education issued by <strong>Japan</strong>ese government.<br />
1892 Umeko Tsuda graduates from Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania.<br />
1893 American businessmen and <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military forces involved<br />
in overthrow <strong>of</strong> Hawaiian monarchy. Alice Mabel Bacon publishes<br />
A <strong>Japan</strong>ese Interior.<br />
1894 August–1895 March: First Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War.<br />
1895 17 April: Treaty <strong>of</strong> Shimonoseki ending Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War.<br />
1895 23 April: Triple Intervention <strong>of</strong> Russia, Germany, and France<br />
forces <strong>Japan</strong> to return Liaotung Peninsula to China.
1898 April–August: Spanish–American War. July: Hawaii is annexed<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. December: The Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris is signed.<br />
Spain cedes the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Cuba gains independence.<br />
1899–1902 Uprising against American occupation in Philippines.<br />
1899 September: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Hay announces<br />
“Open Door” policy concerning China.<br />
1900–1901 Boxer Rebellion in China. Seven countries, including the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>, send military forces to put down the rebellion.<br />
1900 3 July: U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Hay issues second Open<br />
Door notes.<br />
1902 30 January: Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance is concluded.<br />
1904 8 February: Outbreak <strong>of</strong> Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War.<br />
CHRONOLOGY • xxi<br />
1905 2 August: President Theodore Roosevelt approves Taft–Katsura<br />
Agreement. 5 September: Treaty <strong>of</strong> Portsmouth, mediated by President<br />
Roosevelt, ends Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War. 5–7 September: Hibiya Riots in<br />
Tokyo.<br />
1906 11 October: San Francisco School Board votes to segregate<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese schoolchildren.<br />
1907 27 February: Gentlemen’s Agreement is made by the governments<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and the city <strong>of</strong> San Francisco, and<br />
formalized one year later.<br />
1908 October: Great White Fleet arrives in Yokohama. 30 November:<br />
Root–Takahira Agreement is signed.<br />
1911 21 February: Signing <strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and<br />
Navigation.<br />
1914 August: World War I begins. 23 August: <strong>Japan</strong> declares war on<br />
Germany.<br />
1915 18 January: <strong>Japan</strong> conveys its Twenty-One Demands to China.<br />
11 May: U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State William Jennings Bryan announces<br />
non-recognition <strong>of</strong> forcible changes in status quo in China.
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1917 6 April: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> enters World War I. 2 November: Lansing–Ishii<br />
Agreement is concluded.<br />
1918 19 August: U.S. troops join their <strong>Japan</strong>ese counterparts in<br />
launching the Siberian Intervention<br />
1919 4 May: May Fourth Movement in Beijing. 28 June: Paris Peace<br />
Conference concludes with the signing <strong>of</strong> the Versailles Peace Treaty.<br />
1921 11 November: Washington Conference convenes.<br />
1922 6 February: Five Power Treaty ends naval arms race in the Pacific.<br />
13 November: In Ozawa v. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
Supreme Court decides that first-generation <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants are<br />
ineligible for U.S. citizenship.<br />
1924 1 July: Oriental Exclusion Act, part <strong>of</strong> 1924 Immigration Bill,<br />
is approved by <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress.<br />
1926 25 December: Hirohito becomes emperor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1927 20 June: Geneva Naval Conference convenes.<br />
1929 The <strong>Japan</strong>ese American Citizens League is founded in California.<br />
1930 21 January: London Naval Conference convenes. 14 November:<br />
Hamaguchi Osachi is shot by an ultra right-wing nationalist.<br />
1931 18 September: Manchurian Incident begins.<br />
1932 7 January: U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry Stimson announces<br />
non-recognition <strong>of</strong> forcible changes <strong>of</strong> status quo in China. 18 January:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese residents in Shanghai are attacked, sparking the Shanghai<br />
Incident. 18 February: <strong>Japan</strong> proclaims the independence <strong>of</strong><br />
Manchukuo (formerly Manchuria, China). June: Joseph Grew arrives<br />
in Tokyo as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He served until the attack<br />
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. November: Franklin Delano<br />
Roosevelt is elected president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
1933 24 February: After defending <strong>Japan</strong>’s actions in Manchuria at<br />
a Special Assembly meeting <strong>of</strong> the League <strong>of</strong> Nations in Geneva, Ambassador<br />
Yosuke Matsuoka and the entire <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation stage a<br />
walkout. 27 March: <strong>Japan</strong> formally announces its withdrawal from the<br />
League <strong>of</strong> Nations.
CHRONOLOGY • xxiii<br />
1934 17 April: <strong>Japan</strong> enunciates “Asian Monroe” Doctrine.<br />
1936 16 January: <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates withdraw from Second London<br />
Naval Conference. 26 February: February 26 Incident in Tokyo.<br />
25 November: <strong>Japan</strong> and Germany conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact.<br />
1937 7 July: Second Sino–<strong>Japan</strong> War begins with the Marco Polo<br />
Bridge incident near Beijing. August–November: <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Chinese<br />
(Nationalist) forces fight in Shanghai. Shanghai falls to <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
control on 8 November. 12 December: Panay Incident. 13 December:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops capture Nanjing, capital <strong>of</strong> Nationalist China. Atrocities<br />
committed by <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops until 1938 February are collectively<br />
known as the “Rape <strong>of</strong> Nanjing.”<br />
1938 21 October: <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops capture Canton. 3 November:<br />
Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe announces <strong>Japan</strong>’s policy <strong>of</strong> “A New<br />
Order in East Asia.”<br />
1939 26 July: U.S. announces its intention to abrogate its treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
commerce with <strong>Japan</strong>. 1 September: Germany invades Poland, beginning<br />
World War II in Europe.<br />
1940 22 September: <strong>Japan</strong> deploys military forces in northern<br />
French Indochina. 26 September: U.S. embargoes aviation gasoline,<br />
high-grade iron, and scrap metal. 27 September: <strong>Japan</strong>, Germany, and<br />
Italy conclude the Tripartite Alliance. 5 November: Franklin Delano<br />
Roosevelt is elected to a third term as U.S. president.<br />
1941 12 February: <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations commence.<br />
11 March: U.S. Congress passes Lend Lease Act. 13 April: <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
USSR sign neutrality treaty. 25 July: <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops invade southern Indochina.<br />
26 July: U.S. government freezes <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. 9–12 August: President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston<br />
Churchill meet for the Atlantic Conference. 18 October: Army General<br />
and War Minister Hideki To- jo- replaces Fumimaro Konoe as prime<br />
minister. 7 December: <strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces attack U.S. Pacific Fleet<br />
at Pearl Harbor and other military installations in Hawaii, plus Midway Island.<br />
8 December: <strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces attack the Philippines, Guam,<br />
Wake Island, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Thailand, and occupy international<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> Shanghai. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, and the Netherlands<br />
declare war on <strong>Japan</strong>. 9 December: China declares war on <strong>Japan</strong>, Germany,<br />
and Italy.
xxiv • CHRONOLOGY<br />
1942 19 February: President Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9066<br />
authorizing removal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans from West Coast <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 11 March: General Douglas MacArthur departs from the<br />
Philippines to set up a new command center in Australia. 9 April: American<br />
and Philippine forces surrender to <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops. 9–16 April:<br />
American and Philippine POWs forced to walk 50 miles in what became<br />
known as the “Bataan Death March.” 18 April: Doolittle Raid. 4–8 May:<br />
Battle <strong>of</strong> Coral Sea. 3 June: <strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces attack Aleutian Islands.<br />
3–6 June: Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway.<br />
1943 9 February: U.S. Marines and Navy capture Guadalcanal.<br />
18 April: U.S. planes ambush and kill <strong>Japan</strong>ese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto<br />
over the Solomon Islands. May: U.S. forces recapture the<br />
Aleutian Islands. 22 November: Cairo Conference convenes. 28 November:<br />
Teheran Conference convenes.<br />
1944 9 July: U.S. forces capture Saipan. 18 July: General Hideki To- jo- resigns as prime minister, and is succeeded by General Kuniaki Koiso.<br />
10 August: U.S. forces recapture Guam. 23–26 October: Battle <strong>of</strong> Leyte<br />
Gulf. November: Allied forces recapture Peleliu. B-29 bombers based in<br />
the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian, Guam) begin attacking <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1945 4–11 February: Yalta Conference. 4 March: Allied forces retake<br />
Manila. 9–10 March: Massive U.S. incendiary bombing <strong>of</strong> Tokyo.<br />
26 March: Allied forces capture Iwo Jima. 1 April–2 July: Battle <strong>of</strong><br />
Okinawa. 5 April: Admiral Kantaro Suzuki succeeds General Kuniaki<br />
Koiso as prime minister. 12 April: President Roosevelt dies and is succeeded<br />
by Harry S. Truman. 7 May: Germany surrenders to Allied forces.<br />
16 July: U.S. explodes the world’s first atomic bomb in a test near Alamogordo,<br />
New Mexico. 16 July–2 August: Potsdam Conference. 26 July:<br />
Potsdam Declaration issued by U.S., Britain, and China. The Soviet Union<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially joins the Potsdam Declaration on 8 August 1945. 28 July: Prime<br />
Minister Kantaro Suzuki rejects Potsdam Declaration. 6 August: Atomic<br />
bomb attack on Hiroshima. 8 August: Soviet Union declares war against<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>; Soviet troops begin invasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>-controlled Manchuria just after<br />
midnight on 8–9 August. 9 August: Atomic bomb attack on Nagasaki.<br />
14 August: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government notifies the Allied Powers that it surrenders.<br />
President Truman appoints General Douglas MacArthur as<br />
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). 15 August: Radio
CHRONOLOGY • xxv<br />
broadcast <strong>of</strong> Emperor Hirohito’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> the Potsdam Declaration.<br />
Kantaro Suzuki Cabinet resigns en masse. 17 August: Naruhiko Higashikuni<br />
Cabinet established; it lasts until 9 October 1945. 20 August:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces in Manchuria surrender to the Soviet Union.<br />
2 September: The <strong>of</strong>ficial surrender ceremony is conducted aboard the<br />
USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay with General MacArthur presiding. 6 September:<br />
President Truman approves “<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Initial Post-Surrender<br />
Policy” (directed to General MacArthur). 15 September: Allied Powers<br />
GHQ establishes its headquarters in Hibiya, Tokyo, at the Dai Ichi Seimei<br />
Sogo Building. 17 September: Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu resigns,<br />
succeeded by Shigeru Yoshida. 28 September: First meeting between<br />
General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito takes place. 10 October:<br />
About 500 political prisoners, including Kyuichi Tokuda, a<br />
prominent member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Communist Party, released from<br />
prison. 11 October: General MacArthur demands that Prime Minister Kijuro<br />
Shidehara amend the Constitution and implement the five major reforms.<br />
25 October: Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee<br />
established with Joji Matsumoto as chairman. 2 November: <strong>Japan</strong>ese Socialist<br />
Party established with Tetsu Katayama as secretary-general.<br />
6 November: GHQ directs zaibatsu dissolution. 9 November: <strong>Japan</strong> Liberal<br />
Party established with Ichiro Hatoyama as president. 16 November:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Progressive Party established with Chuji Machida as president (he<br />
becomes president on 18 November 1945). 9 December: GHQ directs<br />
land reform. 16 December: Fumimaro Konoe commits suicide. 17 December:<br />
Election-reform law enacted (including women’s suffrage).<br />
1946 1 January: Emperor Hirohito makes “declaration <strong>of</strong> human being,”<br />
rejecting his divinity. 4 January: GHQ directs purge <strong>of</strong> militarists.<br />
29 January: GHQ directs the cessation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese administration over<br />
Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands. 3 February: General MacArthur directs<br />
GHQ’s Government Section to make a draft <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution<br />
(completed on 10 February). 8 February: Matsumoto trial draft <strong>of</strong><br />
revision <strong>of</strong> the Constitution submitted to GHQ. It is rejected soon thereafter.<br />
19 February: Emperor Hirohito begins to travel around <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
22 February: After American demands, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government decides<br />
to accept the GHQ draft <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution. 6 March:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government publicly announces the outline <strong>of</strong> revised draft <strong>of</strong><br />
a <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution. 10 April: First postwar general election for the
xxvi • CHRONOLOGY<br />
Lower House. 22 April: Shidehara Cabinet resigns en masse. 29 April:<br />
Indictments <strong>of</strong> 28 Class-A war criminals announced. 3 May: International<br />
Military Tribunal for the Far East begins in Tokyo (informally<br />
known as Tokyo War Crimes Trials). 4 May: GHQ announces purge <strong>of</strong><br />
Ichiro Hatoyama, president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Liberal Party. 14 May: Foreign<br />
Minister Shigeru Yoshida becomes president <strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party.<br />
22 May: First Yoshida Cabinet established. 16 August: <strong>Japan</strong> Federation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Economic Organizations (Keidanren) established. 3 November: The<br />
new, postwar <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution is promulgated. 20 November:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Chamber <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho) established.<br />
1947 January: <strong>Japan</strong>ese workers call for a general strike. 31 January:<br />
General Douglas MacArthur orders the planned 1 February general<br />
strike stopped. 31 March: Democratic Party established. 31 March: Basic<br />
Education Law promulgated. 14 April: Anti-monopoly Law promulgated.<br />
25 April: 23rd general election held. 3 May: New <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution<br />
becomes effective. 18 May: Hitoshi Ashida becomes president<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Democratic Party and Kijuro Shidehara honorary president. 1<br />
June: Tetsu Katayama Cabinet established. It lasts until 10 March 1948.<br />
18 December: Elimination <strong>of</strong> Excessive Concentration <strong>of</strong> Economic<br />
Power Act promulgated.<br />
1948 10 March: Hitoshi Ashida Cabinet established. It lasts until<br />
15 October 1948. 15 March: Democratic Liberal Party established with<br />
Shigeru Yoshida as president. 20 March: Draper Mission comes to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> headed by Under Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Army William Draper. 18 May:<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> the Army announces the Draper Mission Report. 15 August:<br />
The Republic <strong>of</strong> Korea (ROK) is established in southern Korea.<br />
9 September: The Democratic People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> Korea is established<br />
in northern Korea. 15 October: Second Yoshida Cabinet established.<br />
12 November: Twenty-five Class-A war criminals are convicted<br />
at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. 9 December: U.S. government pulls<br />
back FEC 230 (the Elimination <strong>of</strong> Excessive Concentration <strong>of</strong> Economic<br />
Power Act). 24 December: GHQ announces that it will release<br />
19 war crime suspects including Nobusuke Kishi.<br />
1949 1 February: Joseph Dodge arrives in <strong>Japan</strong>. 16 February:<br />
Third Yoshida Cabinet established. 7 March: Joseph Dodge makes an
CHRONOLOGY • xxvii<br />
announcement about implementation <strong>of</strong> the nine-point economic stabilization<br />
principles. 25 April: Single foreign exchange rate ($1 = 360<br />
yen) implemented. 4 July: General MacArthur announces that <strong>Japan</strong> is<br />
a bulwark against the advance <strong>of</strong> communism. 1 October: Mao Zedong<br />
announces the foundation <strong>of</strong> the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China. 1 November:<br />
State Department announces that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is considering<br />
a peace treaty with <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1950 1 January: General MacArthur announces that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
constitution (Article Nine) does not deny <strong>Japan</strong>’s right to self-defense.<br />
6 April: President Truman appoints John Foster Dulles as a special foreign<br />
policy adviser to the secretary <strong>of</strong> state to negotiate a peace treaty<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>. 25 April–22 May: Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda visits the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 6 June: General MacArthur directs Prime Minister<br />
Yoshida to purge 24 top <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Communist Party.<br />
21 June–27 June: John Foster Dulles in <strong>Japan</strong>. 25 June: Korean War<br />
begins. 8 July: GHQ orders the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government to establish the<br />
National Police Reserve. 28 July: Red Purge begins. 10 August: the<br />
National Police Reserve Law is promulgated and becomes effective.<br />
24 November: Memorandum on the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Peace Treaty circulated<br />
by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to the Governments Represented on the Far Eastern<br />
Commission and released to the press on this date.<br />
1951 29 January–6 February: Dulles–Yoshida meetings in Tokyo.<br />
16 March: Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Dean Acheson expresses his wish that the<br />
Soviet Union will join a peace treaty with <strong>Japan</strong>. 11 April: President<br />
Truman dismisses General MacArthur as SCAP and appoints Matthew<br />
Ridgway as successor. 12 July: John Foster Dulles announces a draft <strong>of</strong><br />
the peace treaty with <strong>Japan</strong>. 8 September: San Francisco Peace Treaty<br />
signed. <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty signed on same date.<br />
1952 Fulbright Program begins in <strong>Japan</strong>. 9 April: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Fishing<br />
Treaty signed. 28 April: San Francisco Peace Treaty and <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Security Treaty becomes effective. 28 April: <strong>Japan</strong>–Taiwan Peace<br />
Treaty signed. 9 May: Ambassador Robert Daniel Murphy, first U.S.<br />
ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong> in the postwar era, assumes <strong>of</strong>fice. 16 June:<br />
Declaration <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Goverment on its <strong>United</strong> Nations membership.<br />
10 July: <strong>Japan</strong>–American Trade Arbitration Agreement signed.<br />
8 September: First <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Economic Cooperation Council held.
xxviii • CHRONOLOGY<br />
16 September: <strong>Japan</strong>–American Business Arbitration Agreement<br />
signed. 15 October: Police Reserve Force formally established. 30 October:<br />
Fourth Yoshida Cabinet established.<br />
1953 27 July: Armistice ending Korean War. 5 October–30 October:<br />
Ikeda–Robertson Talks. 15 November: Vice President Richard Nixon<br />
arrives in <strong>Japan</strong>. 24 December: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Agreement on returning the<br />
Amami Islands to <strong>Japan</strong> signed.<br />
1954 First Godzilla movie released in <strong>Japan</strong>. 1 March: Lucky Dragon<br />
incident. 8 March: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Mutual Security Agreement signed.<br />
April–July: Geneva Conference on conflicts in Korea and Indochina. 11<br />
May: Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and Economic<br />
Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) repayment negotiations<br />
begin. 2 June: Self–Defense Forces Law and the Defense Agency Act<br />
enacted. 1 July: Self-Defense Forces Law and the Defense Agency Act<br />
become effective. Self-Defense Forces and the Defense Agency established.<br />
10 November: Joint Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister<br />
Yoshida and U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower.<br />
1955 18 January: President Eisenhower announces that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> will occupy Okinawa for indefinite duration. 21 January: Prime<br />
Minister Ichiro Hatoyama announces that <strong>Japan</strong> can have its own military<br />
forces for self-defense and <strong>Japan</strong> should establish an independent<br />
defense system. 2 March: Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Dulles announces the promotion<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–Southeast Asian trade in order to assist <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic<br />
revival. 10 May: Negotiations for Restoration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Assets<br />
in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> concluded. 7 June: <strong>Japan</strong> joins the General Agreement<br />
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 14 November: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Atomic<br />
Energy Agreement signed. 15 November: Liberal Democratic Party<br />
(LDP) established. 19 December: Atomic Energy Law and the Atomic<br />
Energy Commission <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> establishment law promulgated.<br />
1956 22 March: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Technology Information Exchange Agreement<br />
(for defense purposes) signed. 3 April: State law <strong>of</strong> discriminatory<br />
sales <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese textile products in State <strong>of</strong> Alabama passed. 9 May:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Reparations Agreement with the Philippines signed. 27 June:<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Ambassador John Allison announces that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
will not occupy Okinawa forever. 9 July: <strong>Japan</strong>, Germany Confiscated<br />
Properties Repayment Law enacted. 26 September: International Atomic<br />
Energy Agency Charter adopted by 70 countries, including <strong>Japan</strong>. 27 Sep
CHRONOLOGY • xxix<br />
tember: <strong>Japan</strong> announces voluntary restriction measure <strong>of</strong> exporting cotton<br />
products to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 18 December: <strong>Japan</strong> becomes the 80th<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> Nations.<br />
1957 30 January: Girard Incident in Gunma, <strong>Japan</strong>. 25 February:<br />
Douglas MacArthur II, nephew <strong>of</strong> General MacArthur, arrives as<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until 1961. 22 April:<br />
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi states at the meeting <strong>of</strong> the Lower<br />
House Budget Committee that Article Nine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution<br />
should be revised. 7 May: Prime Minister Kishi states at the meeting<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Upper House Cabinet Committee that it is reasonable to use<br />
nuclear power within the range <strong>of</strong> self-defense. 23 May: Koichiro<br />
Asakai becomes <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 21 June:<br />
Joint Communiqué <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. President<br />
Eisenhower issued. 28 September: <strong>Japan</strong>ese Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Affairs announces three diplomatic principles: focusing on the <strong>United</strong><br />
Nations, cooperation with the free world, and maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
status as an Asian country.<br />
1958 20 January: <strong>Japan</strong>–Indonesia peace treaty and reparations<br />
agreement signed. 25 July: <strong>Japan</strong> External Trade Organization (JETRO)<br />
established.<br />
1959 28 March: National Council for Blocking Revision <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty established.<br />
1960 19 January: New <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty signed in Washington,<br />
D.C. President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi issue a<br />
joint communiqué. June 19: Diet approves the new <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security<br />
Treaty despite intense opposition. Prime Minister Kishi resigns and<br />
is succeeded by Hayato Ikeda. 23 June: New <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security<br />
Treaty becomes effective.<br />
1961 20 January: John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as president <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 29 March: Edwin O. Reischauer is appointed <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until August 1966. 22 June: Joint<br />
Statement <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy. 13 December:<br />
First <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Science Committee meeting.<br />
1962 25 January: First meeting <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Conference<br />
on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON). 2 February:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. mutual tariff reduction agreement signed. 15 June: <strong>Japan</strong>ese
xxx • CHRONOLOGY<br />
government dispatches the first Okinawa inspection team to Okinawa.<br />
28 August: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Cosmos roundtable conference.<br />
1963 22 March: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. consular agreement signed. 19 November:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. satellite TV radio wave relay agreement. 22 November:<br />
President Kennedy is murdered in Dallas, Texas. Vice President Lyndon<br />
Johnson becomes president. 7 December: Tokyo District Court issues a<br />
decision that dropping the atomic bombs was a violation <strong>of</strong> international<br />
law, but rules against plaintiffs claims.<br />
1964 24 March: U.S. Ambassador Reischauer stabbing incident. 1<br />
April: <strong>Japan</strong> becomes an International Monetary Fund, Article VIII<br />
country. 28 April: <strong>Japan</strong> becomes a member <strong>of</strong> the Organization for<br />
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 19 June: Trans-<br />
Pacific Cable between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> opened. 28 August:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government approves <strong>of</strong> U.S. nuclear submarines calling at<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese harbors. 10 October: Tokyo Olympics opened on this date<br />
and concludes on 27 October 1964. 16 October: People’s Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
China announces a successful atomic bomb experiment. 3 November:<br />
Lyndon Johnson wins the U.S. Presidential election. 12 November:<br />
U.S. nuclear submarine (The Sea Dragon) calls at Sasebo Harbor.<br />
1965 10 February: Haruo Okada reveals in the Diet the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
Mitsuya contingency planning conducted in the Defense Agency.<br />
31 May: Prime Minister Eisaku Sato states that in case Okinawa is attacked,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government will dispatch Self-Defense Forces.<br />
22 June: Korea–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty restores diplomatic relations between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and South Korea. 29 July: B-52 strategic bombers leave Okinawa,<br />
and fly directly to South Vietnam to attack Viet Cong for the first<br />
time without prior consultation with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government. 19 August:<br />
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato makes the first prime ministerial visit<br />
to Okinawa. 24 August: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government decides to establish ministerial<br />
council for Okinawa problems. 28 December: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. civil<br />
aviation agreement revision negotiations concluded and signed.<br />
1966 14 February: Prime Minister Sato expresses approval <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier calling at <strong>Japan</strong>ese harbors. 8 November:<br />
U. Alexis Johnson becomes <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He<br />
serves until 1969.
CHRONOLOGY • xxxi<br />
1967 25 April: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government expresses its <strong>of</strong>ficial attitude<br />
that it is possible to export weapons as long as they are within the limits<br />
<strong>of</strong> self-defense. 4 May: Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S.<br />
Navy carry out joint exercises in the <strong>Japan</strong> Sea. 30 June: Kennedy<br />
Round <strong>of</strong> GATT final documents signed. 14 September: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Relationship Civilian Conference (Shimoda Conference) held. 15 November:<br />
Joint Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Sato and U.S.<br />
President Johnson that the Ogasawara Islands will be returned to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
within a year.<br />
1968 19 January: U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise<br />
along with nuclear-powered frigate calls at a <strong>Japan</strong>ese harbor for the<br />
first time. 19 January: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.–Ryukyu Consultative Committee<br />
formally established. 30 January: Prime Minister Sato explains three<br />
non-nuclear principles <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government. 26 February: New<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. atomic energy agreement effective for 30 years signed.<br />
27 March: U.S. Senate passes the fabrics import numerical allocation<br />
bill. 17 April: First round-table meeting among <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. legislative<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers held. 17 June: Liberal Democratic Party announce automatic<br />
extension <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. security treaty.<br />
1969 28 January: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Kyoto Conference on Okinawa and<br />
Asia sponsored by the study group on Okinawa military base problems.<br />
5 February: Masami Takatsuji, director <strong>of</strong> the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,<br />
states that <strong>Japan</strong>’s constitution does not prohibit the possession <strong>of</strong><br />
nuclear weapons. 18 April: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Agreement on Trust Island Territory<br />
in the Pacific Ocean (Micronesia Agreement) signed. 21 November:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> make a joint announcement that they<br />
have agreed on the restitution <strong>of</strong> Okinawa in 1972.<br />
1970 3 February: <strong>Japan</strong> signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.<br />
22 June: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. security treaty automatic extension becomes effective.<br />
21 October: Prime Minister Sato makes first speech at the UN<br />
by a <strong>Japan</strong>ese prime minister.<br />
1971 25 April: The New York Times reports that there was a secret<br />
agreement between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> about bringing nuclear<br />
weapons into <strong>Japan</strong>. 17 June: Agreement between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> concerning the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and the Daito Islands
xxxii • CHRONOLOGY<br />
signed. 1 July: <strong>Japan</strong>ese voluntary export restraint <strong>of</strong> fabrics toward the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> begins. 27 September: President Richard Nixon meets<br />
with Emperor Hirohito at Anchorage, Alaska. 10 November: U.S. Senate<br />
ratifies the Okinawa Restitution Agreement. 29 November: The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China announce that President<br />
Richard Nixon will pay a formal visit to People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China beginning<br />
on 21 February 1972.<br />
1972 7 January: Joint Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Sato and<br />
U.S. President Nixon. 24 January: Shoichi Yokoi, a World War II veteran,<br />
is found hiding on Guam years after the end <strong>of</strong> the war. 21 February:<br />
President Nixon arrives in Beijing and meets with Chairman Mao<br />
Zedong. 27 February: Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic<br />
<strong>of</strong> China and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> announced in Shanghai. 15 May:<br />
Okinawa formally returned to <strong>Japan</strong>ese sovereignty. 30 May: <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Red Army terrorists kill 24 people at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel. 1<br />
September: Joint Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka<br />
and U.S. President Nixon. 25 September: U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
William P. Rogers formally expresses American support for <strong>Japan</strong>’s becoming<br />
a permanent member <strong>of</strong> the UN Security Council. 29 September:<br />
Joint Communiqué <strong>of</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and the Government<br />
<strong>of</strong> the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China.<br />
1973 27 January: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
Vietnam (North Vietnam) sign the Paris Peace Accords. 24 September:<br />
U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry Kissinger expresses U.S. support <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s becoming a permanent member <strong>of</strong> the Security Council. 17 October:<br />
Organization <strong>of</strong> Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sets petroleum<br />
strategy in motion and the first oil crisis takes place.<br />
1974 15 July: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Agreement on Cooperation in Research<br />
and Development <strong>of</strong> Energy signed. 8 October: Former Prime Minister<br />
Eisaku Sato wins Nobel Peace Prize. 18 November: U.S. President<br />
Gerald Ford arrives in <strong>Japan</strong> and meets with Emperor Hirohito. 20 November:<br />
Joint Communiqué <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Tanaka and<br />
U.S. President Ford.<br />
1975 21 October: President Ford signs the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Amity bill<br />
into a law.
CHRONOLOGY • xxxiii<br />
1976 5 November: National Defense Council decides that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
defense-related expenditure should be limited to one percent <strong>of</strong> GNP.<br />
1977 20 May: <strong>Japan</strong> decides to voluntarily restrict exports <strong>of</strong> color<br />
TVs to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in accordance with the orderly marketing<br />
agreement (effective in July 1977, for three years). June: Former Senator<br />
Mike Mansfield arrives in Tokyo as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until December 1988.<br />
1978 12 August: <strong>Japan</strong>–China Peace and Friendship Treaty signed.<br />
5 December: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. agricultural products negotiations concluded.<br />
1979 1 January: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> establishes diplomatic relationship<br />
with People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China and breaks diplomatic ties with<br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> China (Taiwan). 15 February: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. agreement on<br />
educational exchanges signed. 15 May: Foreign exchange law, foreign<br />
trade control law, and law concerning foreign investment revised.<br />
28 June: Tokyo Summit opened; Tokyo Declaration adopted the following<br />
day. 24 August: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. textile agreement revision formally<br />
signed. 14 December: First meeting <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Wise Persons<br />
Committee begins.<br />
1980 25 April: A series <strong>of</strong> agreements <strong>of</strong> the GATT Tokyo Round become<br />
effective. 18 July: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. fishery product negotiations concluded.<br />
5 September: Trade Sub-committee <strong>of</strong> the U.S. House <strong>of</strong> Representatives<br />
requests <strong>Japan</strong> for voluntary export restraints on automobiles<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 17 September: Toyota, Nissan, and Honda accept<br />
voluntary export restraints on automobiles to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
1981 2 September: <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> agree in principle to<br />
hold trilateral trade conference and “<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. trade problem group”<br />
<strong>of</strong> comprehensive trade negotiations.<br />
1982 17 February: Tokyo Stock Exchange decides to open its doors<br />
to foreign securities. 17 August: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–China Joint Communiqué<br />
on <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Arms Sales to Taiwan announced.<br />
1983 14 January: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government revises its three principles<br />
on arms exports. 12 March: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. joint research on sea-lane defense<br />
starts. 8 November: Exchange <strong>of</strong> notes concerning <strong>Japan</strong>ese providing<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> with arms technology signed.
xxxiv • CHRONOLOGY<br />
1984 7 February: Five-year extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. environmental<br />
protection agreement. 6 November: First meeting <strong>of</strong> the Joint Military<br />
Technology Commission held in Tokyo. 4 December: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
decides to establish foreign policy ministerial council.<br />
1985 2 January: Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and President<br />
Ronald Reagan hold discussions. 28 January: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. viceministerial-level<br />
talks for promoting opening <strong>Japan</strong>ese market agree to<br />
begin Market Oriented Sector Selective (MOSS) consultation in four<br />
economic sectors: forest products, telecommunications equipment and<br />
services, electronics, and medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. 26<br />
March: Ministry <strong>of</strong> International Trade and Industry (MITI) decides to<br />
continue voluntary restraints on export <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese-made automobiles<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 26 March: U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Caspar<br />
Weinberger requests <strong>Japan</strong> as well as Western nations to join research<br />
and development <strong>of</strong> the Strategic Defense Initiative at the North Atlantic<br />
Treaty Organization conference. 11 April: Council <strong>of</strong> Organization<br />
for Economic Cooperation and Development requests <strong>Japan</strong>’s effort<br />
to open markets; <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and Europe make a joint<br />
announcement <strong>of</strong> pursuing persistent economic growth and employment<br />
expansion without inflation. 22 September: Announcement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ministers <strong>of</strong> finance and Central Bank governors <strong>of</strong> France, Germany,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> Kingdom, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> (Plaza Accord).<br />
1986 13 February: MITI makes an announcement to continue voluntary<br />
export restraints on automobiles to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 7 April:<br />
Maekawa Report submitted to Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.<br />
30 April: U.S. House <strong>of</strong> Representatives passes a comprehensive trade<br />
bill including the Gephardt clause that requires countries with trade surplus<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to reduce the surplus by 10 percent every<br />
year. 2 September: The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1986 on Semiconductor<br />
Products. 8 September: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government makes an <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
decision to participate in Strategic Defense Initiative research. 3 October:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. tobacco negotiations concluded with complete abolishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s tariff.<br />
1987 23 April: New Maekawa Report submitted.<br />
1988 13 January: Joint Statement by President Ronald Reagan and<br />
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> on Economic Issues. 10 Au
CHRONOLOGY • xxxv<br />
gust: President Reagan’s compensation bill for <strong>Japan</strong>ese–Americans interned<br />
during World War II. 29 August: First <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. intellectual<br />
property rights conference held in Hawaii. 20–21 September: Both<br />
houses <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Diet unanimously vote against liberalization <strong>of</strong> rice.<br />
29 November: <strong>Japan</strong> and U.S. governments sign exchange <strong>of</strong> notes and<br />
memorandum for joint development <strong>of</strong> fighter support X (FSX).<br />
1989 7 January: Emperor Hirohito dies. His son, Akihito, becomes<br />
the new emperor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. 26 May: President George H. W. Bush proposes<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) to consult on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s trade barriers. 26 June: Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Howard Baker’s Address<br />
on “A New Pacific Partnership.” 4 September: First meeting <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative held in Tokyo. 6 November:<br />
First meeting <strong>of</strong> Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference<br />
held in Canberra. 9 November: The Berlin Wall comes down. 30 November:<br />
First meeting <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. super computer expert conference<br />
held in Tokyo.<br />
1990 17 January: The Ministry <strong>of</strong> International Trade and Industry<br />
announces that <strong>Japan</strong> will continue its voluntary export restraint <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese automobiles to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1990. 9 February: Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> Defense Dick Cheney announces that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> does not<br />
desire an improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese defense capabilities. 14 February:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. steel trade agreement signed in Washington, D.C., and becomes<br />
effective. 28 June: The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative<br />
talks is concluded with a final report. 2 August: Iraq invades<br />
Kuwait, beginning the Persian Gulf War. 8 August: Iraq announces the<br />
annexation <strong>of</strong> Kuwait. The following day, the <strong>United</strong> Nations declares<br />
the annexation invalid. 29 August: The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government announces<br />
provision <strong>of</strong> funds for multinational forces in the Gulf War.<br />
1991 17 January: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> attacks Iraq. Prime Minister<br />
Kaifu expresses <strong>Japan</strong>’s “firm support” for the multinational forces.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> refuses to send combat troops, but helps pay costs <strong>of</strong> the war and<br />
sends minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. 8 March: Gulf War ends in a<br />
cease-fire. 25 April: <strong>Japan</strong>ese government makes a formal decision to<br />
dispatch a <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Forces minesweeper sweeper to the<br />
Persian Gulf. 11 June: New <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor Arrangement<br />
concluded. 26 December: The Soviet Union is formally dissolved.
xxxvi • CHRONOLOGY<br />
1992 9 January: Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Bush announce<br />
the Tokyo Declaration on the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Global Partnership<br />
and an Action Plan for expansion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s imports <strong>of</strong> U.S.-made auto<br />
parts to US$19 billion by 1994. 11 February: <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
Canada, and Russia sign the North Pacific salmon preservation treaty.<br />
June: Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) International Cooperation<br />
Law is enacted. August: PKO International Peace Cooperation Law becomes<br />
effective. 17 September: First group <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese self-defense<br />
force troops dispatched to Cambodia.<br />
1993 12 February: North Korea notifies the UN Security Council<br />
that it will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because<br />
<strong>of</strong> its dissatisfaction with nuclear inspection by the International Atomic<br />
Energy Agency. 7 July: President Bill Clinton announces the new Pacific<br />
community vision in a speech at Waseda University, <strong>Japan</strong>. 9 July:<br />
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and President Clinton announce the<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Framework for a New Economic<br />
Partnership. September: Former Vice President Walter Mondale<br />
arrives in Tokyo as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until<br />
December 1996. 10 July: Joint Statement on the <strong>Japan</strong>–<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
Framework for a New Economic Partnership by Prime Minister Kiichi<br />
Miyazawa and President Clinton.<br />
1994 1 February: First North Pacific security trilateral forum held in<br />
Tokyo by experts from <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and Russia. 11 February:<br />
Joint News Conference by President Clinton and Prime Minister<br />
Morihiro Hosokawa. 12 August: The Advisory Group on Defense Issues<br />
under Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issues the Modality <strong>of</strong><br />
the Security and Defense Capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>: The Outlook for the 21st<br />
Century. 21 October: Agreed Framework between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
America and the Democratic People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> Korea signed.<br />
1995 13 February: <strong>Japan</strong>ese baseball player Hideo Nomo joins Los<br />
Angeles Dodgers. 27 February: <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Security Strategy for the<br />
East Asia–Pacific Region (Nye Report) announced. 2 May: Hideo<br />
Nomo becomes the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese player in U.S. Major Leagues in more<br />
than 30 years. 16 May: Settlement <strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Conflict on Automobile<br />
and Auto Parts Trade, Statement by Ambassador Micky Kantor.<br />
15 August: Prime Minister Murayama issues a statement on the 50th
CHRONOLOGY • xxxvii<br />
Anniversary <strong>of</strong> the end <strong>of</strong> World War II. The statement says, “During a<br />
certain period in the not too distant past, <strong>Japan</strong>, following a mistaken<br />
national policy advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression,<br />
caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people <strong>of</strong><br />
many countries, particularly to those <strong>of</strong> Asian nations.” He also expresses<br />
“pr<strong>of</strong>ound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance<br />
extended to <strong>Japan</strong> by the countries <strong>of</strong> the world, beginning with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America.” 4 September: Three American servicemen<br />
abduct and rape an Okinawan schoolgirl. The crime renews tensions<br />
about the U.S. military presence in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1996 March: China carries out a missile firing exercise in the Taiwan<br />
Strait, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the area<br />
around Taiwan. 12 April: Washington and Tokyo agree on the return <strong>of</strong><br />
the Futenma Base in Okinawa to <strong>Japan</strong>. 17 April: <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Joint Declaration<br />
on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century. 2 December: Security<br />
Consultative Committee approves <strong>of</strong> the Special Action Committee<br />
on Okinawa Final Report. 15 December: Conclusion <strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> insurance<br />
consultations.<br />
1997 23 September: Completion <strong>of</strong> review <strong>of</strong> Guidelines for U.S.–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation.<br />
1998 20 September: Washington and Tokyo conclude a basic agreement<br />
on joint research into the Theater Missile Defense initiative. 23 November:<br />
The Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>States</strong> issues the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Security<br />
Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region. 5 December: The Security<br />
Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> approved “<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Technology Research concerning<br />
Ballistic Missile Defense.” 22 December: Introduction <strong>of</strong> an intelligence-gathering<br />
satellite is adopted at a Cabinet meeting.<br />
1999 24 May: Relevant Laws for a Review <strong>of</strong> the Guidelines for<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation (U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> New Guidelines) enacted.<br />
16 August: the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong>ese governments <strong>of</strong>ficially agree<br />
on a U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Joint Technological Study concerning Ballistic Missile<br />
Defense.<br />
2000 11 October: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> issues Special Report The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership.
xxxviii • CHRONOLOGY<br />
2001 20 January: George W. Bush is inaugurated as president <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. 9 February: The USS Greenville submarine collides<br />
with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese fishing training vessel Ehime Maru, killing nine people<br />
aboard the Ehime Maru. 26 April: Junichiro Koizumi becomes<br />
Prime Minister <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. 30 June: U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Economic Partnership<br />
for growth<br />
5 July: Former Senator Howard Baker arrives in Tokyo as <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. He serves until February 2005. 11 September:<br />
Terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania<br />
kill more than 3,000 people, including 2,900 Americans and 26 <strong>Japan</strong>ese.<br />
29 October: Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enacted.<br />
2002 26 August: Assistant Secretary <strong>of</strong> State James Kerry informs<br />
former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that North Korea is suspected<br />
<strong>of</strong> developing nuclear weapons secretly. September: 50th anniversary<br />
<strong>of</strong> the signing <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 17 September:<br />
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits North Korea and signs the<br />
Pyongyang Declaration.<br />
2003 16 March: Vice President Dick Cheney mentions possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s nuclear armament. 20 March: Invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq begins. 27 March:<br />
Defense Agency Director Shigeru Ishiba states at the Lower House Committee<br />
on National Security that even though North Korea possesses nuclear<br />
weapons, <strong>Japan</strong> will depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella without<br />
possessing its own nuclear weapons. May: At a summit meeting with<br />
President Bush, Prime Minister Koizumi pledges to dispatch the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. 6 June: Laws on war contingencies enacted.<br />
26 July: Special legislation calling for assistance in the rebuilding <strong>of</strong> Iraq<br />
by which the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Forces are dispatched to Iraq enacted.<br />
6 November: Signing <strong>of</strong> the New <strong>Japan</strong>–US Income Tax Convention. December:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> decides to adopt Missile Defense (MD) system. In making<br />
a new National Defense Program Outline, the Defense Department decides<br />
the U.S. basic policy to reduce its front-line equipment.<br />
2004 16 January: Based on the Special legislation calling for assistance<br />
in the rebuilding <strong>of</strong> Iraq, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government dispatches the<br />
advance party <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Ground Self-Defense Force to Iraq. February:<br />
The first <strong>of</strong> more than 600 <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Force troops begin arriving<br />
in Iraq to assist the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> coalition military. 20 February:
CHRONOLOGY • xxxix<br />
Signing <strong>of</strong> the agreement between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America<br />
on Social Security. 24 February: The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government decides<br />
the outline <strong>of</strong> the seven legislations to deal with military emergencies. 27<br />
February: Signing <strong>of</strong> agreement amending Acquisition and Crossservicing<br />
Agreement. 1 October: <strong>Japan</strong>ese baseball superstar Ichiro<br />
Suzuki, playing for the Seattle Mariners, breaks the 84-year-old Major<br />
League Baseball record for hits in one season. 19 November: The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.–Korea Dialogue “Future <strong>of</strong> Korean Peninsula and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.–Korea Security Cooperation” held in Tokyo, <strong>Japan</strong>. 9 December:<br />
One-year extension <strong>of</strong> stationing the <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces<br />
in Iraq approved in a Cabinet meeting. 10 December: Koizumi Cabinet<br />
Meeting stipulates new National Defense Program Outline. The Meeting<br />
also approves the midterm defense buildup program from 2005 to 2009.<br />
2005 1 August: House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert visits <strong>Japan</strong> with six<br />
Members <strong>of</strong> Congress, and met with Speaker Yohei Kono. Speaker<br />
Hastert also has separate meetings with other <strong>Japan</strong>ese leaders including<br />
Prime Minister Koizumi. 26 October: <strong>Japan</strong> extends Anti-Terrorism Special<br />
Measures Law for another year until November 2006. 27 October:<br />
Deputy Under Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Richard Lawless announces that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has accepted a proposal by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Defense Agency to<br />
relocate the military assets currently based at Futenma Air Station on the<br />
island <strong>of</strong> Okinawa, <strong>Japan</strong>. 8 December: Exchange <strong>of</strong> Recommendations<br />
for Fifth-Year Dialog under “the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Regulatory Reform and<br />
Competition Policy Initiative”; One-year extension <strong>of</strong> stationing the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces in Iraq approved at a Cabinet meeting.<br />
2006 21 February: U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns announces<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> will end its decades-old ban on the import <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />
fresh potatoes. 9 March: Air Force Lieutenant General Henry “Trey”<br />
Obering, director <strong>of</strong> the Missile Defense Agency, testifies before a<br />
House Armed Services subcommittee hearing that <strong>Japan</strong> emerges as<br />
America’s largest missile defense partner. 20 March: Australia–<strong>Japan</strong>–<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Joint Statement (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue).
Introduction<br />
The most important bilateral relationship in Asia since the end <strong>of</strong> World<br />
War II is assuredly between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. In fact, many<br />
foreign relations experts claim that the most important bilateral relationship<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has with any country in the world is with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Despite the rising geopolitical and economic importance <strong>of</strong><br />
China, U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations have remained paramount for well over 50<br />
years and are likely to remain that way well into the 21st century.<br />
This important bilateral relationship might seem odd because the<br />
U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong> are different in several ways. The U.S. is a continentsize<br />
superpower while <strong>Japan</strong> is an island country with a relatively small<br />
military force. The U.S. has a “melting pot” population descended<br />
mostly from Europe, Latin America, and Africa, whereas <strong>Japan</strong>’s population<br />
is more than 98 percent ethnic <strong>Japan</strong>ese. Traditional culture and<br />
ideals <strong>of</strong> the U.S. are mostly derived from the European Renaissance<br />
and Enlightenment, while <strong>Japan</strong>’s traditional culture was adopted from<br />
China and Korea, and then adapted to indigenous <strong>Japan</strong>ese influences.<br />
Not surprisingly, the above differences have contributed to political,<br />
economic, racial, and even military clashes between the two countries<br />
since formal relations began in the 1850s.<br />
Yet, these and other differences are <strong>of</strong>ten more complementary than<br />
divisive, and contribute to overall stability in East Asia. Despite the terribly<br />
destructive Korean (1950–1953), Vietnam (1965–1975), and Cambodian<br />
(1975–1979) wars, there have been no wars between the major<br />
powers in East Asia (U.S., Russia, China, and <strong>Japan</strong>) since 1945 due in<br />
large part to the stabilizing political, military, and economic influences<br />
<strong>of</strong> the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong>. In addition, interregional and international trade<br />
between all countries in the region has dramatically expanded due to a<br />
large extent to the same stabilizing influences <strong>of</strong> the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
1
2 • INTRODUCTION<br />
Geographically, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is 25 times the size <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> is about the same size as the state <strong>of</strong> Montana. This does not<br />
mean <strong>Japan</strong> is a “small” nation in size; it means the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> is unusually<br />
large. Only the nations <strong>of</strong> Russia, Canada, and China are geographically<br />
larger than the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. By way <strong>of</strong> international comparison,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> is geographically larger than the countries <strong>of</strong> England,<br />
Germany, Italy, or both Koreas. As <strong>of</strong> 2004, the population <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was more than 280 million, and for the last hundred<br />
years has been approximately twice the size <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s population.<br />
Nevertheless, <strong>Japan</strong>’s current population <strong>of</strong> nearly 130 million is<br />
greater than the populations <strong>of</strong> France, England, Germany, or Mexico.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s geography and population are “small” in comparison to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, but compared to most <strong>of</strong> the world’s nations, <strong>Japan</strong>’s geographic<br />
territory and its population are relatively large.<br />
There are five themes to consider while examining the historical relationship<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. First, since the 1850s,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> has tried to maintain a stabilizing balance between the dichotomy<br />
<strong>of</strong> “<strong>Japan</strong>ese spirit, Western learning.” This is both a philosophical and<br />
practical approach to adapting, adopting, and sometimes rejecting Western<br />
standards and institutions while simultaneously maintaining <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
historic and cultural East Asian heritage. Second, since the 1850s the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has maintained a vision <strong>of</strong> “Manifest Destiny.” After expanding<br />
its territory on the North American continent, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
has sought to expand its political, economic, and cultural influence<br />
throughout the globe. Third, there is a continuing struggle to reconcile<br />
the political and economic relationship between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. This struggle sometimes erupts into serious clashes, including<br />
racially motivated discrimination and especially the bitter Pacific War<br />
between 1941 and 1945. Fourth, the political and economic struggle between<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten involves the relationship each<br />
country has with China. Finally, despite the differences between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> indicated above, <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American people<br />
as individuals have <strong>of</strong>ten maintained an amicable relationship for most<br />
<strong>of</strong> the past 150 years. Politicians, “patriotic” organizations, novelists,<br />
and media commentators sometimes hurl jingoist “<strong>Japan</strong> bashing” or<br />
“America bashing” denunciations, particularly during periods <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
and political tensions. Yet, many <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Americans display<br />
mutual understanding, friendship, and significant interest in the<br />
history, culture, language, and society <strong>of</strong> one another’s country.
INTRODUCTION • 3<br />
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, CIRCA 1850<br />
During the 19th century, individual <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Americans encountered<br />
one another for the first time, and the mid-1850s, the two governments<br />
began formal diplomatic relations. The first individual contacts and start<br />
<strong>of</strong> diplomatic relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> were conditioned<br />
by their respective societies and worldviews <strong>of</strong> the era. What kind<br />
<strong>of</strong> countries were the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> during the 1850s?<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was not really “united” by 1850. The northern<br />
states <strong>of</strong> the mid-Atlantic and New England regions were industrializing.<br />
They were building factories powered by steam and coal, and improving<br />
the roads, bridges, and canals to create the infrastructure <strong>of</strong> a<br />
modernizing, industrializing society. Meanwhile, most <strong>of</strong> the southern<br />
states remained in a semi-feudal social and economic system largely dependent<br />
on the forced labor <strong>of</strong> African American slaves who produced<br />
agricultural commodities <strong>of</strong> cotton, sugar, tobacco, and rice. The northern<br />
states had a mixed, industrializing economy while the southern<br />
states were not industrializing and remained almost exclusively dependent<br />
on agriculture, which in turn depended on slave labor.<br />
At the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the Mexican–American War in 1848, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> militarily and diplomatically conquered the vast southwestern and<br />
western territories <strong>of</strong> Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California at the<br />
expense <strong>of</strong> Mexico and Native American tribes. Slavery became an even<br />
more divisive political issue with regards to whether these new territories—soon<br />
to become states—would allow slaves and slave owners.<br />
From the late 18th century, many northerners despised the existence<br />
<strong>of</strong> slavery for both political and moral reasons. They did not necessarily<br />
believe in the equality <strong>of</strong> all races; but they did believe that human<br />
slavery was both immoral and unlawful. By the early 19th century, all<br />
New England states and most mid-Atlantic states outlawed slavery<br />
within their borders. The Compromise <strong>of</strong> 1850 called for an equal number<br />
<strong>of</strong> slave states and non-slave states among the newly conquered territories,<br />
but ultimately failed to resolve the issue. In 1852, Harriet<br />
Beecher Stowe’s novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, shocked northerners and<br />
infuriated southerners with its depiction <strong>of</strong> the cruelty <strong>of</strong> slavery in the<br />
southern <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision in<br />
1857, John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859, and the election <strong>of</strong><br />
Abraham Lincoln as President in 1860 also significantly contributed to<br />
the “impending crisis” that erupted into the American Civil War.
4 • INTRODUCTION<br />
This was also the era <strong>of</strong> “Manifest Destiny,” the widespread belief<br />
among Caucasian Americans that they had a God-given right to continental<br />
expansion from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast. In January<br />
1848, James Marshall was building a sawmill in Coloma in the then-<br />
Mexican territory <strong>of</strong> California when he discovered gold. By the end <strong>of</strong><br />
the year, Marshall’s discovery launched the “Gold Rush,” arguably the<br />
most significant historical event <strong>of</strong> the American West. The Gold Rush<br />
transformed the West, especially California, into a mining, agricultural,<br />
and industrial power attracting people and capital from all over the<br />
world, including Asia.<br />
By the time <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Navy Commodore Matthew Perry sailed<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>, the growing economic and social disparity between northern<br />
and southern states, the increasingly divisive issue <strong>of</strong> slavery, territorial<br />
expansion on the North American continent, and the transformation <strong>of</strong><br />
the American West by the Gold Rush were the primary features <strong>of</strong> national<br />
life for most Americans. Although not a major world power by<br />
1850, the expanding <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> increasingly attracted the attention <strong>of</strong><br />
Europeans, including Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx. The country<br />
was growing in population (primarily through immigration from Europe),<br />
expanding its already vast territory, and developing its natural resources,<br />
industries, and technologies.<br />
In 1850, <strong>Japan</strong> was not an industrializing country. There were handcraft,<br />
agricultural, and fishing industries in many parts <strong>of</strong> the country,<br />
but not large-scale heavy industries requiring inanimate sources <strong>of</strong> energy,<br />
such as steam power. <strong>Japan</strong> had an advanced artistic, architectural,<br />
and philosophical culture for well over a thousand years, and an advanced<br />
administrative system run by the Tokugawa shogun’s bakufu<br />
government that kept relative peace for over 200 years. <strong>Japan</strong> was relatively<br />
urbanized, with more than 20 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese living in cities.<br />
The major cities <strong>of</strong> Osaka, Kyoto, and especially Edo compared favorably<br />
with Paris, Berlin, and New York <strong>of</strong> the same era.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> up to the 1850s is <strong>of</strong>ten described as “feudal” because <strong>of</strong> its<br />
hereditary, Confucian-based hierarchical class system <strong>of</strong> samurai, farmers,<br />
artisans, and merchants. The samurai—including domain leaders (the<br />
daimyō), their retainers, and all <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate government—were<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s warrior class. Numbering less than 10 percent <strong>of</strong><br />
the population, the samurai were an unproductive class that lived <strong>of</strong>f<br />
stipends. They were the privileged and the powerful <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. They were
INTRODUCTION • 5<br />
also increasingly disunited by the 1850s. The majority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
population were peasants; farmers and fishermen who produced agricultural<br />
goods that sustained the entire population. Artisans, those who made<br />
items by hand, and the merchants were the other two levels <strong>of</strong> this Confucian<br />
hierarchy and who, like most samurai, lived in the larger cities. Not<br />
part <strong>of</strong> this four-level hierarchy were those in “special” categories, such<br />
as imperial family members; priests (Buddhist and Shinto); Ainu native<br />
people; the burakumin who handled animal products, disposed <strong>of</strong> human<br />
corpses, and did other “outcaste” work; and foreigners.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> the mid-19th century is <strong>of</strong>ten described as “isolated” because<br />
it did not engage in substantial foreign relations. This view is<br />
somewhat misleading. Such relations had existed extensively before the<br />
1600s, and then in a limited manner from the 1630s to the 1850s. A policy<br />
known as sakoku (“national seclusion”) significantly restricted the<br />
country from foreign relations in the early 17th century. However, the<br />
sakoku policy was primarily directed at Portugal and Spain. The Dutch,<br />
Koreans, Okinawans, and especially the Chinese maintained trade and<br />
contact with <strong>Japan</strong> throughout much <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa Era (1600–1868).<br />
Nevertheless, <strong>Japan</strong>’s contact with the West during most <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa<br />
Era was limited to Dutch traders in Nagasaki, and to Dutch books<br />
on science and medicine. During the Euro–American era <strong>of</strong> scientific,<br />
political, and industrial revolutions <strong>Japan</strong> had very little contact with<br />
the West. By 1850, <strong>Japan</strong> was both an ancient and advanced culture, especially<br />
in the arts, architecture, philosophy, and administrative systems.<br />
But its economic and military power, and its knowledge <strong>of</strong> science<br />
and technology needed for large-scale industrialization was far<br />
behind even a middle power, such as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Tokugawa <strong>Japan</strong> was a highly structured society, divided by class and<br />
hierarchy. The Tokugawa shogun, at the apex <strong>of</strong> all samurai, controlled<br />
the country and domain lords, the daimyō, through the shogunate government<br />
(also known as the bakufu). Yet, during the first half <strong>of</strong> the 19th<br />
century, internal political and social strains were weakening Tokugawa<br />
bakufu power. Lower and middle rank samurai felt their talents were being<br />
squandered while their stipends were reduced. Daimyō from powerful<br />
domains were increasingly frustrated at being controlled, spied<br />
upon, and taxed by shogunate authorities in Edo. Prolonged famines in<br />
the 1830s led to an upsurge in rebellions against Tokugawa authorities,<br />
especially Oshio Heiachiro’s rebellion in Osaka in 1837.
6 • INTRODUCTION<br />
At this vulnerable historical moment, the West knocked on <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
door. Russian, British, and American ships began appearing <strong>of</strong>f <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
coasts. The China trade and North Pacific whaling drew most <strong>of</strong> these<br />
ships close to <strong>Japan</strong>’s shores. <strong>Japan</strong> turned down their occasional requests<br />
for trade and diplomatic contact because it violated the centuries-old<br />
sakoku policy. After the Opium War <strong>of</strong> 1839–1841 between the British<br />
and the nearby Middle Kingdom <strong>of</strong> China, it became obvious to foresighted<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese scholars and <strong>of</strong>ficials that someday the increasingly<br />
powerful Westerners would not take “no” for an answer to their demands.<br />
THE FORMATIVE YEARS<br />
The first direct contacts between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> were<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailors, most notably Manjiro Nakahama, Hikozo<br />
Hamada (later known as Joseph Heco), and the adventurer Ranald Mac-<br />
Donald from the Pacific Northwest Territory. Their sojourns and experiences<br />
provided the first direct knowledge between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government initially sent Edmund Roberts<br />
in 1832, and then Commodore James Biddle in 1846 on missions to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> to investigate the possibility <strong>of</strong> beginning diplomatic and trade relations.<br />
Roberts died <strong>of</strong> cholera in Macao and never arrived in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
while Biddle sailed away after the shogunate politely, yet firmly refused<br />
his requests. Following the Mexican–American War <strong>of</strong> 1846–1848 and<br />
the discovery <strong>of</strong> gold in California in 1848, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> acquired<br />
vast areas <strong>of</strong> the American southwest and California from Mexico.<br />
Across the Pacific Ocean from China, where the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had already<br />
established trade and diplomatic relations, and near North Pacific<br />
whaling areas frequented by New England whaling ships, <strong>Japan</strong> became<br />
increasingly significant to American political and economic interests.<br />
U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry was sent to <strong>Japan</strong> to make<br />
a concerted effort to establish relations with <strong>Japan</strong>. In July 1853, he<br />
sailed into Uraga Bay near Edo with four large warships and hundreds<br />
<strong>of</strong> armed sailors. Two <strong>of</strong> the ships were steam frigates fitted with coalfired<br />
engines and belched black smoke while chugging up the bay. The<br />
wooden hulls <strong>of</strong> all four American ships were painted with dark sealant<br />
to prevent the wood from rotting. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese called them “the black<br />
ships,” a symbolic harbinger <strong>of</strong> death. Perry delivered a letter from
INTRODUCTION • 7<br />
President Millard Fillmore to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government. In addition to<br />
establishing a formal diplomatic relationship between the two countries,<br />
President Fillmore’s letter outlined three specific objectives the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> government desired from <strong>Japan</strong>. First, the Americans wanted<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s assurance that shipwrecked sailors found on <strong>Japan</strong>’s shores<br />
would be aided and cared for until an American vessel arrived to retrieve<br />
them. Second, with the advent <strong>of</strong> steamships, Americans wanted<br />
to use one or more ports in <strong>Japan</strong> for coal, along with water and other<br />
provisions for use by their ships in the Asia Pacific region. Finally, they<br />
sought to establish trade relations with <strong>Japan</strong> in the belief that commerce<br />
between the two countries would be <strong>of</strong> mutual benefit. Aware<br />
that shogunate <strong>of</strong>ficials would need time to consider the proposals,<br />
Perry and the American fleet left for the Ryukyu Islands and China after<br />
informing the <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials that they would return within one<br />
year for an answer.<br />
Perry returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in February 1854 with eight warships. There<br />
is no firm evidence he directly threatened to use force to secure a treaty,<br />
but the presence <strong>of</strong> such firepower was an obvious “gunboat diplomacy”<br />
factor during negotiations. Tokugawa shogunate <strong>of</strong>ficials were<br />
confronted with a serious dilemma: they had to make an agreement with<br />
Perry despite the opposition <strong>of</strong> most daimyō. After negotiations started,<br />
a measure <strong>of</strong> friendliness and goodwill developed between Americans<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>ese. American sailors wandered around the area, and local<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese villagers soon lost their fear and crowded to see the big,<br />
funny-looking barbarians from the West. American sailors and lowerlevel<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials spent much time eating and drinking together,<br />
while Perry and top <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials argued and negotiated.<br />
In the end, <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials agreed to protect shipwrecked sailors<br />
and provide the ports <strong>of</strong> Shimoda and Hakodate for depots <strong>of</strong> coal and<br />
other provisions for American vessels. However, they steadfastly refused<br />
to establish commercial trade relations with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Perry sailed away with the Kanagawa Treaty, the first formal government<br />
agreement between <strong>Japan</strong> and a Western country. Perry’s<br />
1853–1854 mission and the Kanagawa Treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> unleashed a deluge <strong>of</strong> longstanding, internal discontent<br />
within <strong>Japan</strong>. From 1853 to 1868, political intrigue, assassinations, an<br />
increasingly strained relationship between the Tokugawa shogun in Edo<br />
and the imperial court in Kyoto, and finally civil war between pro-
8 • INTRODUCTION<br />
Tokugawa and pro-Restoration forces ended with the downfall <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate and the emergence <strong>of</strong> the Meiji imperial government.<br />
The first resident American diplomat sent to <strong>Japan</strong> was Townsend<br />
Harris. He negotiated the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and<br />
Commerce <strong>of</strong> 1858, which included commercial trading rights and<br />
extraterritorial rights for Americans living in designated areas in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
This was the first <strong>of</strong> the Ansei Treaties, also known as the “unequal<br />
treaties,” between <strong>Japan</strong> and Western countries. Henry Heusken, a<br />
Dutch-born American citizen, was Harris’s indispensable assistant and<br />
translator at the American consulate in Kanagawa. Heusken also assisted<br />
other countries negotiate treaties and agreements with <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Tragically, Heusken was murdered by anti-foreign ronin in 1861.<br />
Soon after completion <strong>of</strong> the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and Commerce,<br />
the Tokugawa shogun decided to send an embassy <strong>of</strong> government<br />
representatives to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to <strong>of</strong>ficially ratify the treaty in<br />
Washington, D.C. The leader <strong>of</strong> the 1860 Embassy was Norimasa<br />
Muragaki, a conservative samurai <strong>of</strong>ficial who <strong>of</strong>ten complained during<br />
the trip about the barbarian ways <strong>of</strong> Americans. Shaking hands, dancing,<br />
casual dress (i.e., business suits) by President James Buchanan and<br />
other American <strong>of</strong>ficials, and being introduced to wives and daughters<br />
<strong>of</strong> American <strong>of</strong>ficials at receptions upset Muragaki and other conservative<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation. Other members <strong>of</strong> the delegation,<br />
such as Yukichi Fukuzawa and Manjiro Nakahama, liked the relatively<br />
egalitarian, informal ways <strong>of</strong> the Americans.<br />
The Shogun’s Embassy attracted a great deal <strong>of</strong> attention in 1860. It<br />
was the first time practically anyone in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> could see and<br />
meet <strong>Japan</strong>ese. At hotels in San Francisco, Washington, New York, Baltimore,<br />
and Philadelphia, the lobbies were mobbed with Americans<br />
wanting to see the diplomats from the “mysterious” country <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong><br />
wearing their elegant kimonos with top-knot hair styles. Walt Whitman<br />
wrote a poem titled, “A Broadway Pageant,” in honor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and Asia<br />
after watching a welcoming parade for the <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomats in New<br />
York. There were troubling incidents: some American newspapers made<br />
fun <strong>of</strong> short <strong>Japan</strong>ese with “funny clothes and funny rituals,” and two<br />
samurai swords were stolen from one <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomat’s hotel room.<br />
But overall the trip was a success and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomats were welltreated—and<br />
nearly all their expenses paid for by the American gov-
ernment. Even the dour, conservative Muragaki later told his wife that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese should stop referring to Americans as barbarians.<br />
When the <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomats returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1861, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> erupted into the American Civil War (1861–1865), the bloodiest war<br />
in American history with more than 600,000 deaths. <strong>Japan</strong>, too, was nearing<br />
a state <strong>of</strong> civil war over the crisis between domains supporting a<br />
“restoration” <strong>of</strong> imperial rule and others trying to reform and revitalize the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate. Naosuke Ii, who approved the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Amity and Commerce and second only to the shogun in the Tokugawa hierarchy,<br />
was assassinated in early 1861. <strong>Japan</strong>’s relationship with the West,<br />
particularly what many considered to be the “unequal treaties” between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and Western countries, was a major factor in the burgeoning political<br />
crisis—a crisis that included assassinations <strong>of</strong> Westerners and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
deemed to be “pro-West.” Muragaki, Fukuzawa, Joseph Heco, and other<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese with significant experience with the West lived in fear <strong>of</strong> attack<br />
during the early 1860s. By the mid-1860s, the crisis became more anti-<br />
Tokugawa than anti-foreign and erupted into domestic civil war. After losing<br />
significant battles against the anti-Tokugawa forces in late 1867 and<br />
early 1868, the last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, bowed to the inevitable<br />
and turned over governing authority to the emperor, ending two and a half<br />
centuries <strong>of</strong> rule by the Tokugawa shogunate. Thus began the Meiji Era,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s entrance into the industrial and modern age.<br />
Knowledge Shall Be Sought Throughout the World<br />
So As to Strengthen the Foundations <strong>of</strong> Imperial Rule<br />
INTRODUCTION • 9<br />
Charter Oath, Issued by Emperor Meiji, 1868<br />
In 1871, <strong>Japan</strong> sent many <strong>of</strong> the Meiji government’s highest <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
on an extended mission led by Prince Tomomi Iwakura to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and Europe. Earlier, the government sent Arinori Mori to Washington<br />
as <strong>Japan</strong>’s first resident diplomat to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and to<br />
make advance preparations for the Iwakura Embassy. Its primary objective<br />
was to re-negotiate the “unequal treaties” <strong>of</strong> the 1850s the previous<br />
Tokugawa government signed with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and several European<br />
countries (Britain, France, Holland, Germany, and Russia). The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the European countries politely refused to re-negotiate<br />
the treaties because they believed <strong>Japan</strong> did not have a system <strong>of</strong> laws up
10 • INTRODUCTION<br />
to Euro–American standards. The Euro–American refusal to re-negotiate<br />
the treaties upset many <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s leaders.<br />
The second objective <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura Embassy was to study the political,<br />
economic, educational, military, and scientific institutions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
West for the purpose <strong>of</strong> adapting useful elements <strong>of</strong> these institutions in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. This objective was more successful. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomats<br />
were impressed with America’s education system, with Britain’s parliamentary<br />
government and navy, and with Germany’s army and constitutional<br />
monarchy. They were impressed with France’s architectural and<br />
artistic heritage. Likewise, the presence <strong>of</strong> diplomats from <strong>Japan</strong> began<br />
a “Japonisme” movement among many American and European artists.<br />
During the 1870s, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government employed hundreds <strong>of</strong><br />
Americans and Europeans as instructors for their technical expertise in establishing<br />
Western-oriented institutions in <strong>Japan</strong>. William E. Griffis and<br />
David Murray, from Rutgers College in New Jersey, William Smith Clark,<br />
and Mary Eddy Kidder were among the Americans who came to <strong>Japan</strong> as<br />
instructors. Starting in the early 1860s, hundreds <strong>of</strong> students from <strong>Japan</strong><br />
traveled to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe for university studies. These students<br />
brought knowledge <strong>of</strong> the West back to <strong>Japan</strong>. Arinori Mori and Hirobumi<br />
Ito were among the earliest students, as was Jo Niijima, a Christian<br />
missionary and founder <strong>of</strong> Doshisha University in Kyoto. As a result <strong>of</strong><br />
their transnational and cross-cultural educations and experiences, these<br />
early <strong>Japan</strong>ese students became a crucial element in expanding <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the West and in expanding American knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
In 1879, former President Ulysses S. Grant and his wife Julia visited<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> during a long, round-the-world tour. His two terms as president<br />
from 1868 to 1876 were plagued by scandals, a bad economy, and problems<br />
in the wake <strong>of</strong> the American Civil War. Nevertheless, Grant was<br />
hailed everywhere in the world as the hero <strong>of</strong> the Civil War, including<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>. Grant spent several weeks in <strong>Japan</strong> sightseeing and had general<br />
discussions on political matters with <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials, including<br />
Emperor Meiji.<br />
IMPERIAL KINSHIP, 1900–1908<br />
In 1894, war erupted between <strong>Japan</strong> and China over issues relating to<br />
control <strong>of</strong> Korea. The Korean peninsula is strategically centered among
INTRODUCTION • 11<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, China, and the Russian Far East, and these countries regularly<br />
competed for control over Korea. Too weak to defend itself by the late<br />
19th century, Korea was at the mercy <strong>of</strong> its bigger and more powerful<br />
neighbors. <strong>Japan</strong> defeated the decaying Qing Dynasty <strong>of</strong> China in this<br />
“First Sino–<strong>Japan</strong> War” and gained control over the Korean Peninsula<br />
as a condition <strong>of</strong> the Shimonoseki Treaty <strong>of</strong> 1895. <strong>Japan</strong> then participated<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and European powers in putting down the<br />
Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, and earned international praise for its<br />
military discipline.<br />
Less than four years later, <strong>Japan</strong> went to war against Russian military<br />
forces stationed in China and Manchuria in the Russo-<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong><br />
1904–1905. On land, the Russian and <strong>Japan</strong>ese armies were nearly<br />
evenly matched. At sea, however, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Imperial Navy completely<br />
destroyed the Russian Fleet. <strong>Japan</strong>’s victory over Russia demonstrated<br />
the success <strong>of</strong> the policies <strong>of</strong> industrialization and modernization<br />
adopted during the early Meiji Era. <strong>Japan</strong>, a relatively small nation, had<br />
defeated the huge Russian Empire! The early 20th-century was also an<br />
era <strong>of</strong> so-called scientific racism, a widespread but absurd idea that<br />
races had a scientific hierarchy with Caucasians at the top and Asians<br />
close to the bottom. According to “scientific racism,” the Asian nation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> should never have defeated a white nation, such as Russia.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s victory stunned much <strong>of</strong> the world, and Tokyo soon became a<br />
hub for Asian students and activists who wanted to learn how to build<br />
an economy and military that could stand up to the Western powers colonizing<br />
their countries.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> became a major power at nearly the same time. It<br />
formally gained control <strong>of</strong> Hawaii and defeated the decaying Spanish<br />
imperial forces in Cuba and in the Philippines between 1898 and 1903.<br />
The situation in Hawaii involved political negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong> because<br />
<strong>of</strong> the large number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants on the islands. The<br />
military and diplomatic victories by <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the<br />
1890s and early 1900s demonstrated to the world that both countries<br />
were rising powers, while some European countries, particularly Russia<br />
and Spain, were declining.<br />
By the closing years <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> had emerged as imperialist powers in Asia and the Pacific. They<br />
were not alone. Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and France were all<br />
playing their part in an imperial scramble whose focus unmistakably
12 • INTRODUCTION<br />
rested with China. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Hay in 1899<br />
and again in 1900 issued his famed Open Door notes, which warned<br />
against both encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and restrictions on<br />
American trade in that country. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government, which was<br />
eyeing Russian encroachments in the Chinese territory <strong>of</strong> Manchuria<br />
and the Korean peninsula, responded favorably to the Open Door notes.<br />
Far more significant from Tokyo’s point <strong>of</strong> view, however, was the conclusion<br />
in January 1902 <strong>of</strong> the Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance. This strengthened<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s hand vis-à-vis Russia to a far greater extent than did agreements<br />
concerning the Open Door. Even so, Foreign Minister Jūtarō<br />
Komura throughout 1903 assiduously kept American <strong>of</strong>ficials informed<br />
<strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong> his negotiations with Russia. Thus, when the Russo–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese War broke out in February 1904, Tokyo knew that it was not<br />
only allied to the world’s foremost power, but that it also had the sympathy<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Acting on this perception, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in February 1904<br />
dispatched Kentarō Kaneko to Washington. A graduate <strong>of</strong> Harvard University<br />
who had long known President Theodore Roosevelt, Kaneko<br />
quietly sounded Roosevelt out on the prospect <strong>of</strong> the latter <strong>of</strong>fering his<br />
good <strong>of</strong>fices to bring an end to the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War. It was a sagacious<br />
move. The vehemently anti-Russian Roosevelt believed <strong>Japan</strong><br />
was fighting America’s war, and Kaneko saw no need to disabuse him<br />
<strong>of</strong> this notion. Against this promising backdrop, Kaneko broached with<br />
Roosevelt <strong>Japan</strong>’s terms <strong>of</strong> peace with Russia, among which were included<br />
a free hand not only in Korea but also in southern Manchuria.<br />
Roosevelt proved amenable. In August 1905, he approved the so-called<br />
Taft–Katsura Agreement, according to whose terms the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and <strong>Japan</strong> agreed to respect each other’s possessions in Asia and the Pacific.<br />
At the same time, Roosevelt mediated an end to the Russo–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese War, and in so doing oversaw the transfer to <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> Korea,<br />
southern Manchuria, and southern Sakhalin.<br />
Roosevelt’s sponsorship <strong>of</strong> the Portsmouth Peace Conference marked<br />
the zenith <strong>of</strong> the spirit <strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese cooperation in the period<br />
1900–1909. If both the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American governments sought to<br />
define their interests on a complementary basis, however, there was also<br />
an abiding awareness <strong>of</strong> the potential for friction. One need look no further<br />
than the fact that both the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Navy and the Imperial<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy (in 1906 and 1907, respectively) designated each other
INTRODUCTION • 13<br />
their hypothetical enemies. Roosevelt, too, was concerned that victory<br />
in the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War might propel <strong>Japan</strong> onto a course frankly<br />
adverse to American interests in the Philippines and Hawaii. In the immediate<br />
aftermath <strong>of</strong> the war, <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers revealed themselves<br />
no less distrustful <strong>of</strong> American designs on their newly gained<br />
sphere <strong>of</strong> influence. When the great railway builder Edward H. Harriman<br />
in October 1905 <strong>of</strong>fered to purchase what was to become the South<br />
Manchurian Railway, Foreign Minister Jūtarō Komura argued successfully<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> raise its own money so as to strengthen its hard-earned<br />
foothold in southern Manchuria.<br />
Harriman—and his financial partners on Wall Street—may have been<br />
impressed, but Roosevelt was not unduly perturbed. In his estimation,<br />
Manchuria was <strong>of</strong> peripheral interest to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Although not<br />
blind to the potential presented by Chinese markets, Roosevelt rather<br />
welcomed <strong>Japan</strong>’s preoccupation with the continent because, in his calculations,<br />
it served to lessen the possibility <strong>of</strong> a U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese clash in<br />
the Pacific. In other words, he hoped that by engaging their respective<br />
interests in areas separate from each other, U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations<br />
might remain on a harmonious footing.<br />
This was the basic framework in which <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American policymakers<br />
worked throughout the remainder <strong>of</strong> this period. Roosevelt<br />
was no less infuriated than was the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government when in 1906<br />
the San Francisco School Board segregated <strong>Japan</strong>ese school children.<br />
His response was tw<strong>of</strong>old. On the one hand, he managed to convince<br />
Californian authorities to rescind the <strong>of</strong>fensive segregation order. On<br />
the other, he finalized with Ambassador Keikichi Aoki a deal known as<br />
the Gentlemen’s Agreement, according to whose terms the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government agreed to curb immigration to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
In the meantime, Roosevelt resigned himself to the fact that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> did not possess the wherewithal to defend the Philippines. In<br />
1908, he moved the Pacific base from Manila to Hawaii. Having conceded<br />
by this act that the Philippines were militarily indefensible, Roosevelt<br />
sought to protect them by other means. It was fitting that the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> this period should be marked by the so-called Root–Takahira Agreement<br />
<strong>of</strong> November 1908. By this agreement, both nations agreed to respect<br />
China’s independence and integrity—the Open Door—while at the<br />
same time respecting each other’s possessions in the region. This meant<br />
that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> recognized <strong>Japan</strong>’s possessions in Korea and
14 • INTRODUCTION<br />
Manchuria, while <strong>Japan</strong> recognized American possessions in Hawaii and<br />
the Philippines.<br />
RIVALRY OVER CHINA, 1909–1921<br />
Roosevelt left the presidency in 1909, and with him went any goodwill<br />
generated by the Root–Takahira Agreement. Roosevelt’s hand-picked<br />
successor, William Howard Taft, dispensed with Roosevelt’s policies<br />
and instead chose to challenge <strong>Japan</strong>’s predominant position in southern<br />
Manchuria. Underlying this policy was the Taft administration’s<br />
faith in the power <strong>of</strong> the American dollar, as well as a belief in the compatibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> American and Chinese interests. Generally referred to as<br />
“dollar diplomacy,” this policy’s defining moment came in late 1909,<br />
when an American banking group gained Chinese approval to build a<br />
railway that would run part <strong>of</strong> the way parallel to <strong>Japan</strong>’s South<br />
Manchurian line. As if this were not enough to challenge <strong>Japan</strong>’s position<br />
on the continent, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Philander Knox immediately<br />
raised the stakes by proposing that China—replete with funds provided<br />
by a consortium <strong>of</strong> major powers—buy the Russian-owned railway in<br />
northern Manchuria and <strong>Japan</strong>’s South Manchurian line. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government responded by reaching an agreement with Russia that provided<br />
for cooperation over railways and railway finance in Manchuria.<br />
The British, for their part, refused to climb aboard Knox’s neutralization<br />
scheme. Roosevelt was aghast. Taft had needlessly antagonized the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese, and in the process had driven them into the arms <strong>of</strong> the Russians.<br />
This phase <strong>of</strong> dollar diplomacy was as spectacular for its audacity<br />
as for its failure.<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations worsened considerably after the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />
World War I. China was again at issue. Having entered the war ostensibly<br />
as Britain’s ally, <strong>Japan</strong> fought not for its allies’ survival but for such objectives<br />
as the seizure <strong>of</strong> German possessions in China and the Pacific, and<br />
ultimately, economic and political hegemony over all <strong>of</strong> China. In pursuit<br />
<strong>of</strong> this second objective, Foreign Minister Takaaki Katō in January 1915<br />
handed to Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai the so-called Twenty-One Demands.<br />
The administration <strong>of</strong> U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, which<br />
clung to an ill-defined policy <strong>of</strong> goodwill and friendship toward China,<br />
protested vigorously. The British, recognizing that their imperial interests
in China were being threatened by their ally, repeatedly urged <strong>Japan</strong> to<br />
drop the more onerous <strong>of</strong> its demands. <strong>Japan</strong> did so, and eventually gained<br />
China’s begrudging acceptance. The damage to U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations,<br />
however, was palpable. <strong>Japan</strong>’s renewed commitment to the Open Door<br />
principle in 1917 by means <strong>of</strong> the Lansing–Ishii Agreement did little to assuage<br />
American distrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese motives. Nor did joint U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
participation in the Siberian Intervention bring a halt to the two nations’increasingly<br />
acrimonious relations.<br />
The antagonism was brought into full relief at the Paris Peace Conference<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1919. Here, Wilson launched a concerted assault on the imperialist<br />
practices that had led inexorably to a world war, and championed instead<br />
a new diplomacy whose defining characteristics were the spread <strong>of</strong><br />
democracy and the encouragement <strong>of</strong> free trade throughout the world; the<br />
destruction <strong>of</strong> German militarism; and great power cooperation within a<br />
League <strong>of</strong> Nations. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation remained entirely out <strong>of</strong> step<br />
with Wilson’s “new diplomacy.” It saw its most important task at the peace<br />
conference as the retention <strong>of</strong> all German rights and concessions on<br />
China’s Shantung peninsula, and threatened to walk out if these demands<br />
were not met. Wilson capitulated. He did refuse, however, to insert a racial<br />
equality clause in the League <strong>of</strong> Nations charter. Furthermore, despite the<br />
hopes for disarmament that statesmen—including Wilson—expressed<br />
both during the war and in its aftermath, <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and<br />
Great Britain found themselves embroiled in the immediate postwar era in<br />
a costly and dangerous naval arms race.<br />
JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND<br />
THE WASHINGTON SYSTEM, 1921–1930<br />
INTRODUCTION • 15<br />
The Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> November 1921–February 1922 marked<br />
a significant turning point in U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations. Delegates to the<br />
conference were inspired by a spirit <strong>of</strong> compromise and goodwill. Various<br />
treaties and agreements were concluded, the most important <strong>of</strong><br />
which were the Five Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty. The former<br />
halted the naval arms race in the Pacific by setting a ratio <strong>of</strong> 5:5:3<br />
in capital ship strength for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong><br />
(and a lesser ratio for France and Italy), while the latter gave solemn<br />
treaty form to the traditional American policy <strong>of</strong> the Open Door.
16 • INTRODUCTION<br />
Naval disarmament, non-interference in the internal affairs <strong>of</strong> China,<br />
and peaceful competition for that nation’s markets and resources were<br />
the hallmarks <strong>of</strong> what became known as the Washington System. All this<br />
was underlined by growing U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese economic interdependence,<br />
which dictated the necessity <strong>of</strong> friendship as the basic framework <strong>of</strong> the<br />
two nations’ relations. Nevertheless, there were problems. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> Congress in 1924 prohibited <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration in its entirety<br />
in what is known as the Oriental Exclusion Act. Although politicians and<br />
statesmen on both sides <strong>of</strong> the Pacific continued to speak <strong>of</strong> the spirit <strong>of</strong><br />
the Washington Conference, there can be little doubt the Oriental Exclusion<br />
Act undermined U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations for years to come.<br />
There was also widespread dissatisfaction within <strong>Japan</strong>ese naval circles<br />
with the disarmament system. Led by the impetuous Kanji Katō,<br />
these <strong>of</strong>ficers opposed Navy Minister (and chief delegate to the Washington<br />
Conference) Tomosaburō Katō’s contention that war with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must be avoided. In 1923, they included in the Imperial<br />
National Defense Policy a statement that war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was<br />
“inevitable.” The revolt against the Washington System simmered<br />
throughout the 1920s, and exploded at the time <strong>of</strong> the London Naval<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1930. At that time, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government—including<br />
the policymaking nucleus within the Navy Ministry—indicated its acceptance<br />
<strong>of</strong> a formula that sought to extend the naval disarmament system<br />
to incorporate auxiliary vessels. However, Kanji Katō (who by this<br />
time had been appointed chief <strong>of</strong> the Navy General Staff) remained irreconcilable,<br />
and sparked a months-long struggle that split the Navy.<br />
The rise <strong>of</strong> nationalism in China presented yet another challenge to<br />
the Washington System. By means <strong>of</strong> the treaties and agreements concluded<br />
at the Washington Conference, <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and the<br />
other powers regulated their competition in China and the Pacific, but<br />
these agreements did nothing to account for the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> an<br />
emerging national consciousness in China. Largely interchangeable<br />
with anti-imperialism, this national consciousness was directed against<br />
the Washington system powers. The Chinese were virtually unanimous<br />
in their condemnation <strong>of</strong> the unequal treaties (fixed tariff and extraterritoriality)<br />
that the powers had forced upon China in the 19th century<br />
and which the Washington Conference perpetuated. Popular boycotts<br />
repeatedly broke out against Western and <strong>Japan</strong>ese business interests in<br />
China. Most disturbingly from Tokyo’s perspective, Chiang Kai-shek,<br />
who by 1929 had succeeded somewhat in unifying China, refused to
INTRODUCTION • 17<br />
recognize the validity <strong>of</strong> past treaties and agreements relating to<br />
Manchuria. Several Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese military clashes ensued, although<br />
Kijūrō Shidehara returned to the foreign minister’s post in 1929 no less<br />
convinced than he had been previously <strong>of</strong> the continued efficacy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Washington Conference system. In 1930, <strong>Japan</strong> extended formal recognition<br />
to the new Chinese government <strong>of</strong> Chiang Kai-shek, and decided<br />
to cooperate with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Britain on the question <strong>of</strong> abrogating<br />
extraterritoriality in China.<br />
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Washington system came from the<br />
American stock market crash on 29 October 1929 and the subsequent<br />
Great Depression. Its reverberations were felt around the world, although<br />
the situation in <strong>Japan</strong> was particularly acute. Lacking in raw materials,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> relied on foreign trade to pay for them. With the onset <strong>of</strong> the Great<br />
Depression, however, its Washington system partners—most notably the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain—lost their enthusiasm for free trade. The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress in June 1930 passed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act,<br />
imposing the highest rates on imports in the 20th century. The system <strong>of</strong><br />
free trade that held the Washington system together suddenly unraveled.<br />
THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR AND THE PACIFIC WAR<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s invasion <strong>of</strong> Manchuria in September 1931 marked the beginning<br />
<strong>of</strong> the end <strong>of</strong> the Washington Conference system. By this action, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese military signaled its disregard for both the principle <strong>of</strong> noninterference<br />
in China’s internal affairs and the notion <strong>of</strong> cooperation among<br />
the great powers. Worse still, the civilian government in Tokyo proved utterly<br />
powerless to restrain the military. By January 1932, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> government concluded that <strong>Japan</strong> was no longer a partner for stability<br />
in Asia and the Pacific, and Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry Stimson informed<br />
both <strong>Japan</strong> and China that the American government refused to<br />
recognize any changes in China brought about by force and in violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Open Door policy. When the League <strong>of</strong> Nations formally refuted<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s contention that Manchuria—which <strong>Japan</strong> called “Manchukuo”—<br />
was an independent nation, <strong>Japan</strong> quit the League <strong>of</strong> Nations. The final<br />
nail in the c<strong>of</strong>fin <strong>of</strong> the Washington Conference system came in 1934<br />
when the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy determined to end the era <strong>of</strong> naval limitation.<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations considerably worsened after <strong>Japan</strong>ese and<br />
Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing in July
18 • INTRODUCTION<br />
1937. The so-called China Incident, which Prime Minister Fumimaro<br />
Konoe hoped to bring to an early conclusion with a preponderance <strong>of</strong><br />
force, quickly developed into a deadly quagmire, including <strong>Japan</strong>ese attacks<br />
on Shanghai and Nanjing, causing widespread death to Chinese<br />
civilians. In early 1938, Konoe announced that henceforth his government<br />
would deal with Chiang only on the battlefield and at the surrender<br />
table. Later that year, Konoe proclaimed to the world that <strong>Japan</strong> sought<br />
the construction <strong>of</strong> a “new order” in East Asia. Konoe’s “new order” envisioned<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, the puppet state <strong>of</strong> Manchukuo, and China (under a collaborationist<br />
government in Nanjing) bound together. Washington responded<br />
by announcing in July 1939 its intention to abrogate the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation. Because <strong>Japan</strong>’s economic<br />
well-being continued to depend on close commercial relations<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, such a measure clarified American opposition to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s policy <strong>of</strong> aggression in China. In taking this step, however,<br />
Washington had committed itself to nothing final. The application—or<br />
non-application—<strong>of</strong> economic sanctions would depend on subsequent<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese actions.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government for a time sought to conciliate the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. The most notable attempt toward this end occurred from September<br />
1939 to January 1940 when Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura<br />
served as foreign minister. However, in the summer <strong>of</strong> 1940, German<br />
armies overran Western Europe, leaving the resource-rich regions <strong>of</strong><br />
Southeast Asia defenseless. With the advent <strong>of</strong> Konoe’s second cabinet<br />
in July 1940, attentions in Tokyo duly turned to the conclusion <strong>of</strong> an alliance<br />
relationship with Nazi Germany. As if to underscore its intentions<br />
in negotiating an alliance with the Germans, <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in late<br />
September advanced into northern French Indochina. Washington regarded<br />
the defense <strong>of</strong> Britain as vital to its own survival, viewed Nazi<br />
Germany as a quasi-enemy, and responded to <strong>Japan</strong>’s actions by slapping<br />
a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade iron, and steel<br />
scrap for <strong>Japan</strong>. In September 1940, the <strong>Japan</strong>–Germany–Italy Tripartite<br />
Pact was formally concluded after negotiations led by Yosuke Matsuoka,<br />
the American-educated foreign minister <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
The tone for the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese negotiations <strong>of</strong> 1941 had thus been set.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was allied explicitly with Nazi Germany, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
was allied—in fact, if not yet in name—with Great Britain. <strong>Japan</strong> had<br />
decided on an opportunistic policy <strong>of</strong> advancing into Southeast Asia, and
INTRODUCTION • 19<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> determined to respond to any advances by increasing<br />
economic pressures on <strong>Japan</strong>. At the same time, the administration <strong>of</strong><br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded Germany as the greatest threat<br />
to American security. It thus trod a delicate diplomatic line toward the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese. On the one hand, there was an unmistakable display <strong>of</strong> firmness<br />
toward <strong>Japan</strong>’s hegemonic aspirations. On the other, there was a determined<br />
effort not to shut the door on the possibility <strong>of</strong> rapprochement<br />
should the <strong>Japan</strong>ese dissociate themselves from Adolf Hitler and his<br />
brand <strong>of</strong> militaristic aggression.<br />
The outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Soviet–German war in June 1941 provided the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government with a golden opportunity to follow the latter<br />
course. After all, Hitler had launched his assault on the Soviet Union<br />
without first informing his alliance partner. <strong>Japan</strong>, however, had never<br />
seriously contemplated this possibility. The Soviet threat to the north<br />
having been removed, policymakers in Tokyo determined to undertake<br />
further advances into French Indochina. There was widespread recognition<br />
that such a step carried with it the possibility <strong>of</strong> war with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy, which would bear the brunt<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fighting if war did break out, was particularly belligerent. For its<br />
part, the Roosevelt administration cracked <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomatic codes<br />
and was privy to <strong>Japan</strong>’s determination to occupy Indochina. In late<br />
July, it froze <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The economic pressure<br />
quickly escalated on 1 August when Washington embargoed highoctane<br />
gasoline as well as crude oil. In the meantime, <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops<br />
occupied the Indochinese peninsula in its entirety.<br />
The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese negotiations continued in Washington, although<br />
any chance <strong>of</strong> diplomatic success was scuttled by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese occupation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Indochina, especially Vietnam. Neither the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Army nor the<br />
Navy held out any hope for rapprochement with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Attitudes<br />
in Washington, too, had hardened. Konoe sought to break the deadlock<br />
by floating the idea <strong>of</strong> a summit meeting with Roosevelt, although<br />
his unwillingness—or inability—to define the terms to which he might<br />
agree at any such meeting merely served to further arouse the Roosevelt<br />
administration’s suspicions. Konoe’s idea <strong>of</strong> a summit meeting collapsed,<br />
and so did his cabinet. General Hideki Tojo did not assume the prime<br />
minister’s post with the immediate intention <strong>of</strong> taking his country to war<br />
against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Yet, his cabinet never seriously contemplated<br />
the painful diplomatic concessions required to avoid that outcome.
20 • INTRODUCTION<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces struck Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with dramatic<br />
suddenness on 7 December 1941. The early months <strong>of</strong> the war were<br />
wildly successful for <strong>Japan</strong>, capturing Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya,<br />
the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Ceylon, and the Philippines from the<br />
Americans, British, and Dutch. Then in June 1942, American forces<br />
sank four <strong>Japan</strong>ese naval carriers and destroyed some 300 planes in the<br />
Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway. In January 1943, American forces recaptured<br />
Guadalcanal. Thereafter, American forces gradually rolled back <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
territorial gains in Southeast Asia and the Pacific—though not in<br />
China—and in the spring <strong>of</strong> 1945 captured Okinawa. Most major<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese cities, including Tokyo, were razed by conventional and firebombings.<br />
After the <strong>Japan</strong>ese cabinet refused the surrender terms <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
in the Potsdam Declaration, the cities <strong>of</strong> Hiroshima and Nagasaki<br />
were destroyed by the world’s first atomic attacks on 6 August and 9<br />
August. Soon after the atomic bombing <strong>of</strong> Nagasaki and the Soviet<br />
Union’s invasion <strong>of</strong> Manchuria, Emperor Hirohito carefully and publicly<br />
announced <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender on 15 August 1945. On 30 August,<br />
the first occupation troops arrived on <strong>Japan</strong>’s shores, opening a new<br />
chapter in U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations.<br />
THE OCCUPATION ERA, 1945–1952<br />
After <strong>Japan</strong>’s defeat at the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> played<br />
a leading role in implementing the Allied Occupation policies in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
led by General Douglas MacArthur. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, its wartime allies,<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>ese supporters also put in place constitutional, political,<br />
and educational reforms in the first two and a half years <strong>of</strong> the Occupation.<br />
Washington then changed course and worked to establish a selfsufficient<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese economy. In February 1949, Joseph Dodge, an<br />
American economic adviser, imposed a politically unpopular austerity<br />
program called the Dodge Line in order to balance the <strong>Japan</strong>ese budget.<br />
The Dodge Line was a major turning point in the Occupation. It transformed<br />
the state-managed economy into a market-oriented, export-led<br />
economy. The fate <strong>of</strong> the Dodge Line depended on the revival <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
foreign trade; unfortunately, this was not achieved for some time<br />
because <strong>of</strong> a worldwide depression in 1949. Southeast Asian countries<br />
were <strong>Japan</strong>’s natural market because <strong>of</strong> their great demand for industrial<br />
goods and their proximity. Establishing a regional economic linkage,
however, required political stability in Asia. Accordingly, by 1949, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had focused its attention on bringing political stability to<br />
Southeast Asia, as a prerequisite for <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic recovery.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> also emphasized demilitarization in the early<br />
stages <strong>of</strong> the Occupation. Because this left <strong>Japan</strong> defenseless, Washington<br />
realized that to guarantee <strong>Japan</strong>’s security the U.S. would have to<br />
maintain military bases and armed forces on the <strong>Japan</strong>ese islands and,<br />
in 1951, the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Security Treaty was signed. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> compelled <strong>Japan</strong> to accept American bases on the former’s territory,<br />
and to agree, reluctantly, to rearm.<br />
The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, had a positive effect<br />
on the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy. The Chinese Communists’ intervention in the<br />
war and their military successes enhanced China’s prestige in Asia,<br />
even though hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Chinese “volunteer” soldiers<br />
were killed in Korea. As China’s status increased, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> believed<br />
that it would be difficult to retain <strong>Japan</strong>’s pro-American orientation<br />
unless it made strenuous efforts to preserve its own prestige. In<br />
Asia, China and America were close allies during World War II, but<br />
when the Communists came to power in 1949 the two countries became<br />
bitter enemies. As this situation left <strong>Japan</strong> as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ principal<br />
Asian ally, Washington did its utmost to reinforce the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance,<br />
primarily by means <strong>of</strong> economic and military measures.<br />
POST-OCCUPATION ECONOMIC RELATIONS<br />
INTRODUCTION • 21<br />
During the 1950s, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> tried to reduce <strong>Japan</strong>’s trade deficit<br />
and integrate the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy with those <strong>of</strong> the Western bloc.<br />
Washington expected that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade<br />
(GATT) would provide <strong>Japan</strong> with economic benefits; however, <strong>Japan</strong><br />
could not enjoy the full benefits <strong>of</strong> the GATT because <strong>of</strong> restrictions imposed<br />
by other member states. Moreover, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> itself restricted<br />
the possible expansion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese trade by severely constricting<br />
relations with China.<br />
In spite <strong>of</strong> these difficulties, four factors helped <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic<br />
development in the early post-Occupation period. First, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
tolerated <strong>Japan</strong>’s restrictions on imports and foreign investment, because<br />
few American businesses regarded the <strong>Japan</strong>ese market as important.<br />
Second, Washington facilitated <strong>Japan</strong>ese access to the American market
22 • INTRODUCTION<br />
by opposing demands for protectionist measures that were coming from<br />
less competitive, labor-intensive industries in various U.S. states. Third,<br />
American military spending in <strong>Japan</strong> and in other parts <strong>of</strong> Asia helped<br />
revitalize the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy. Fourth, <strong>Japan</strong> was able to concentrate<br />
on economic growth because it was not hampered by excessive defense<br />
spending. During the 1950s, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> suffered from<br />
trade friction only in certain sectors, including textiles and general merchandise.<br />
The American textile industry was especially hard hit by heavy<br />
importation <strong>of</strong> cheap <strong>Japan</strong>ese products. In January 1956, <strong>Japan</strong> began to<br />
adopt voluntary export restraints. These restraints achieved the protectionists’<br />
goal <strong>of</strong> limiting the number <strong>of</strong> commodities coming from <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
while they preserved the spirit <strong>of</strong> free trade.<br />
As American hegemonic status gradually declined in the late 1960s,<br />
Washington could no longer keep its domestic markets open to <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
goods. The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese textile negotiations between 1969 and<br />
1971, which were designed to restrain imports <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese textiles into<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, were symbolic incidents <strong>of</strong> this era. Americans were<br />
alarmed to realize that <strong>Japan</strong> had recovered from World War II so<br />
quickly and that, by the early 1970s, <strong>Japan</strong>ese industries had become<br />
competitive with U.S. industries.<br />
In the mid-1980s, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> started to focus serious attention<br />
on <strong>Japan</strong> as an economic competitor because <strong>of</strong> its increasing trade<br />
deficits and increasing trade surpluses in <strong>Japan</strong>. Washington emphasized<br />
not only reducing <strong>Japan</strong>ese imports to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, but also<br />
expanding U.S. exports to <strong>Japan</strong>. In addition, it focused on unfair <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
trade practices, considering it imperative to change the domestic<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese system. By the late 1980s, <strong>Japan</strong> had an enormous trade surplus<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, while the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was running a huge<br />
deficit. Between September 1989 and June 1990, Washington and<br />
Tokyo devised the Structural Impediments Initiative as a way to mitigate<br />
such trade problems. Unlike earlier trade agreements, this one dealt<br />
with structural issues instead <strong>of</strong> focusing on particular items.<br />
POST-OCCUPATION SECURITY RELATIONS<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Security Treaty <strong>of</strong> 1951 had two major problems.<br />
First, it gave the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> the right to station its military
INTRODUCTION • 23<br />
forces in <strong>Japan</strong>, but it did not specifically oblige the U.S. to defend<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> or to consult with it over military operations. Second, the treaty<br />
allowed the American military forces to repress domestic rioting, a potential<br />
violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s sovereignty. In 1960, a new U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Security<br />
Treaty was concluded that abrogated the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ right to<br />
intervene in domestic rioting and specified that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assumed<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial responsibility for <strong>Japan</strong>’s defense. In turn, <strong>Japan</strong> was obligated<br />
to protect U.S. installations in <strong>Japan</strong> if they were attacked.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> did not become directly involved in the Vietnam War, but as a<br />
dependable ally <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, it made significant contributions<br />
and reaped enormous economic benefits. Okinawa became a base for<br />
B-52s and a training base for U.S. Marines. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> used its<br />
bases on mainland <strong>Japan</strong> for logistics, supplies, training, and rest and<br />
recreation. Withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to<br />
promote closer military cooperation with <strong>Japan</strong>. In November 1978, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> began to review various aspects <strong>of</strong> military cooperation,<br />
such as emergency defense legislation and logistic support.<br />
THE 1990s AND AFTERWARD: ECONOMIC FIELD<br />
The Cold War structure and America’s preeminence in the world<br />
brought stability to post–World War II U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations. The<br />
Cold War caused <strong>Japan</strong> to depend on the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> strategically, and<br />
U.S. hegemony brought both military protection and economic wellbeing<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. However, the decline <strong>of</strong> U.S. economic and military<br />
hegemony after the late 1960s and the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War in the early<br />
1990s undermined the basis <strong>of</strong> stability in the countries’ relations.<br />
During the 1990s, the U.S. economy revived, primarily because <strong>of</strong><br />
the information technology (IT) revolution and to the rapid development<br />
<strong>of</strong> IT-related industries, while <strong>Japan</strong> began a decade-long era <strong>of</strong><br />
deep political and economic turmoil. In July 1993, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Liberal<br />
Democratic Party, the long-term ruling party, lost its majority in<br />
the Diet, ending its 38-year control <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese politics. A series <strong>of</strong><br />
weak coalition governments followed, none bringing political stability,<br />
which exacerbated <strong>Japan</strong>’s economic recession. Economic crises in<br />
Southeast Asian countries in 1997 further aggravated <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic<br />
conditions.
24 • INTRODUCTION<br />
In the 1990s, in order to redress trade imbalances, <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> stressed macroeconomic concerns, area-specific issues,<br />
structural problems, and a results-oriented approach. Washington demanded<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> set minimum numerical targets for increases <strong>of</strong> imports,<br />
arguing that because the <strong>Japan</strong>ese market was closed, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> had severe difficulty in expanding its exports to <strong>Japan</strong>. <strong>Japan</strong><br />
strongly opposed this request on the grounds that it could lead to managed<br />
trade, and insisted that U.S. firms conduct more effective market<br />
research and produce goods suitable for <strong>Japan</strong>ese consumers.<br />
The gross domestic products (GDPs) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong><br />
combined constituted approximately 40 percent <strong>of</strong> the world’s total<br />
GDP, and their economic assistance made up about 50 percent <strong>of</strong> the total<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> aid. Since U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese economic relations will continue<br />
to have a decisive impact on the health <strong>of</strong> the global economy, the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Twenty-first Century Committee was established in July<br />
1996 as a bilateral, private-sector forum for dialogue and the consideration<br />
<strong>of</strong> policy proposals. Moreover, the two nations have worked together<br />
on such global threats as the deterioration <strong>of</strong> the earth’s environment,<br />
communicable diseases, natural calamities, and terrorism.<br />
THE 1990s: MILITARY FIELD<br />
In April 1990, in response to a request from the U.S. Congress, the<br />
George H. W. Bush administration issued its strategy for East Asia, “A<br />
Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the<br />
21st Century.” This document laid out the main points <strong>of</strong> the Bush administration’s<br />
view <strong>of</strong> the post–Cold War situation. The report stated<br />
that the 1990s would probably mark a turning point for political conditions<br />
in the Asia–Pacific region. Meanwhile, members <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Congress,<br />
who saw the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War as a reason to cut unnecessary<br />
defense spending, began demanding a reduction <strong>of</strong> U.S. military forces<br />
in East Asia, primarily those in South Korea and <strong>Japan</strong>. In 1992, the<br />
White House announced a second strategy document for East Asia that<br />
reaffirmed the plan for gradual troop reductions decided in 1990.<br />
Nevertheless, the 1990s were an unstable decade for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
relations, a time during which the two countries searched for a new<br />
principle to determine the orientation <strong>of</strong> their relationship. The Persian<br />
Gulf War <strong>of</strong> 1991 confirmed the importance <strong>of</strong> the U.S. bases in <strong>Japan</strong>.
INTRODUCTION • 25<br />
There was a great deal <strong>of</strong> American public and un<strong>of</strong>ficial government<br />
criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> for not sending any military forces—even for possible<br />
non-combat operations—during the war itself. The $13 billion paid<br />
by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government afterward did little to assuage American<br />
criticism. The war led the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to restructure its strategic policy<br />
toward Asia as a whole. Between August 1994 and February 1995,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> began to jointly seek a way to redefine the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance. Both countries assumed that conditions <strong>of</strong> instability<br />
would persist in the Asia-Pacific region, despite the end <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Cold War. Alongside their concerns about stability and various other<br />
problems was the recognition that the Asia–Pacific region had the greatest<br />
economic growth potential <strong>of</strong> any region in the world. Both countries<br />
were convinced that a U.S. military presence would be indispensable<br />
to assure regional security. Their joint analysis went so far as to<br />
conclude that the basing <strong>of</strong> U.S. military forces in <strong>Japan</strong> was a crucial<br />
factor in maintaining the U.S. posture <strong>of</strong> global military preparedness<br />
and quick response, based on the use <strong>of</strong> a flexible array <strong>of</strong> options to react<br />
to developments in international hot spots. The two countries concluded<br />
that the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance would continue to make a crucial<br />
contribution to the maintenance <strong>of</strong> stability in the Asia-Pacific region.<br />
For its part, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> emphasized the view that this alliance was<br />
important for maintaining forward-deployed forces and a regional balance<br />
<strong>of</strong> power in East Asia, and for defusing new local threats that had<br />
emerged. Consequently, <strong>Japan</strong> was expected to play an active role with<br />
respect to regional security matters within the context <strong>of</strong> its alliance<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
The way in which the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance was to be redefined was<br />
spelled out in February 1995, when the U.S. Defense Department released<br />
its third East Asia strategy review, known as the Nye Report.<br />
This report underscored the importance <strong>of</strong> security in the Asia–Pacific<br />
region and proclaimed that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> intended to keep a military<br />
force <strong>of</strong> 100,000 in the region, <strong>of</strong> whom 60,000 would be stationed in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. It reconfirmed the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relationship as the necessary foundation<br />
for both U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region and overall<br />
U.S. global strategy. The Nye Initiative defined U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relations<br />
as the most important bilateral relationship in Asia, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
security as the linchpin <strong>of</strong> U.S. security policy there.<br />
In April 1996, President Bill Clinton held a summit with Prime Minister<br />
Ryutaro Hashimoto and they signed the “<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Joint Declaration
26 • INTRODUCTION<br />
on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century.” In May 1999, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Diet passed legislation supporting the guidelines. <strong>Japan</strong> formally approved<br />
conducting military-related action outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, including<br />
rear-area logistic support, but not active combat operations, to enhance its<br />
own security interests.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s neighbors, especially China, are closely watching the expanding<br />
role <strong>of</strong> the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese alliance in the Asia–Pacific area, and they<br />
worry that <strong>Japan</strong> might again become a great military power even while<br />
China is dramatically increasing its military spending as a result <strong>of</strong> its rapidly<br />
growing economy. Yet, in the post–Cold War era, Washington redefined<br />
the security treaty with <strong>Japan</strong> to maintain a military presence in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> partly because it intends to avoid a revival <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese militarism.<br />
THE GRASS ROOTS: CULTURAL AND<br />
EDUCATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS<br />
Cultural and educational exchanges are a significant part <strong>of</strong> the relationship<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Despite political and economic<br />
clashes <strong>of</strong> the past few decades, grassroots relationships are as<br />
strong as ever between the two countries. There are over 100<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies (JAS) in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. Each<br />
JAS society includes business people, corporations, academics, politicians,<br />
community leaders, and students as members who promote<br />
strong relations and mutual understanding between the two countries.<br />
Sister Cities International, headquartered in Washington, D.C., includes<br />
more than 100 sister-cities between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, from<br />
large cities to small, rural towns. Most individual members travel every<br />
other year to meet and visit with members from their sister city. Some<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> sister cities have scholarships and other programs and opportunities<br />
<strong>of</strong> mutual benefit. A similar organization with dozens <strong>of</strong><br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> chapters is People to People International (PPI).<br />
Begun in 1987, the <strong>Japan</strong> Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program has<br />
had thousands <strong>of</strong> young American college graduates participate as assistant<br />
teachers and instructors in elementary, middle, and high schools<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>. Each teacher serves for one year, and may choose to serve for<br />
up to three years. Education and cultural experiences vary, but the vast<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> young Americans on the JET Program stay for more than<br />
one year. Funded primarily by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government through the
INTRODUCTION • 27<br />
Foreign Ministry, it was originally established in the midst <strong>of</strong> the Kokusaika<br />
(“internationalization”) movement in the 1980s, and has since become<br />
a prestigious and competitive program for young Americans and<br />
other Westerners. Since the late 1940s, the renowned Fulbright Program<br />
has provided fellowships to nearly 6,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese and more than 2,000<br />
Americans to pursue academic and cultural studies. Most Fulbright fellows<br />
have been lecturers, researchers, graduate students, or language instructors<br />
in either <strong>Japan</strong> or the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Numerous <strong>Japan</strong>ese students have gone to universities and colleges<br />
in America since the late 1860s. Currently, almost 50,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese students<br />
are at American colleges. Although <strong>Japan</strong>ese students can be<br />
found at almost any college in America, nearly 25 percent attend colleges<br />
in California. Two-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese college students are undergraduates,<br />
20 percent are graduate students, and 13 percent are enrolled<br />
in ESL (English as a Second Language) programs. Relatively fewer<br />
Americans have attended <strong>Japan</strong>ese colleges and universities, but thousands<br />
<strong>of</strong> American college students have studied <strong>Japan</strong>ese culture and<br />
language, participated in study abroad programs, or have done graduate<br />
research in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Hollywood films are popular in <strong>Japan</strong>, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese watch American<br />
TV soap operas and dramas while many young Americans are hooked<br />
on <strong>Japan</strong>ese-produced anime films and manga comic books. Since the<br />
1950s, American baseball players have played on <strong>Japan</strong>ese teams, and<br />
some <strong>Japan</strong>ese pr<strong>of</strong>essional teams have been led by American managers.<br />
Recently, <strong>Japan</strong>ese players have joined Major League Baseball<br />
teams and become stars in both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
restaurants are located in practically every city in America, though they<br />
are not quite as ubiquitous as McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken,<br />
and Starbucks in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY<br />
At the end <strong>of</strong> June 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited<br />
Washington for a meeting with President George W. Bush, taking with<br />
him the sad statistics <strong>of</strong> the country’s economy. <strong>Japan</strong> faced its highest<br />
level <strong>of</strong> deflation since the Great Depression <strong>of</strong> the 1930s, and accumulated<br />
government debt had risen to more than 130 percent <strong>of</strong> gross<br />
national product. Banks were the most important problem for Koizumi
28 • INTRODUCTION<br />
and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy. Nonperforming loans amounted to hundreds<br />
<strong>of</strong> billions <strong>of</strong> dollars. Koizumi openly expressed his deep pro-U.S. position<br />
in public, looking for solid outside support to implement his potentially<br />
unpopular reform agenda. President Bush, for his part, demonstrated<br />
his clear support for Koizumi’s economic structural reform<br />
policy. North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear research programs,<br />
and especially the al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the<br />
Pentagon in September 2001 further promoted military cooperation between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese relationship continues<br />
to be one <strong>of</strong> the most important bilateral relationships in the 21st<br />
century, especially in the Asia–Pacific area. The peace and stability <strong>of</strong><br />
the Asia–Pacific area in the 21st century depend on U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>ese cooperation<br />
and their efforts to contain destabilizing factors in this area.<br />
On 29 October 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was<br />
enacted. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese Maritime Self-Defense Force began to supply<br />
fuel to U.S. ships in the northern part <strong>of</strong> the Indian Ocean in December<br />
2001. This law was extended for two years in November 2003, and extended<br />
again for one year in November 2005. Over this period, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defence Forces have been acting in a supportive role in<br />
the Indian Ocean.<br />
In August 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary <strong>of</strong> State James Kerry informed<br />
former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that North Korea<br />
was suspected <strong>of</strong> secretly developing nuclear weapons. However, On<br />
17 September 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went ahead and<br />
visited North Korea and signed the Pyongyang Declaration.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> also supports U.S. policies toward Iraq. On 26 July 2003, Special<br />
legislation calling for assistance in the rebuilding <strong>of</strong> Iraq was enacted.<br />
In December 2003, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government formulated a basic<br />
plan. On 16 January 2004, based on this law and plan, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
dispatched an advance party <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Ground Self-Defense<br />
Force to Iraq. <strong>Japan</strong> dispatched approximately 600 members <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Ground Self-Defense Force to As-Samawah, Iraq, to set up water<br />
supply, recovery and development <strong>of</strong> public facilties, and medical support.<br />
In December 2004, the law stationing the <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense<br />
Forces in Iraq was extended for one year. In December 2005, the basic<br />
plan was extended for one year. <strong>Japan</strong> decided to spend up to $5 billion<br />
for reconstruction assistance <strong>of</strong> Iraq. In short, <strong>Japan</strong> has been helping<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in Iraq, both in terms <strong>of</strong> economic cooperation and <strong>of</strong><br />
reconstruction <strong>of</strong> Iraq by the Self-Defence Force.
The <strong>Dictionary</strong><br />
– A –<br />
A BROADWAY PAGEANT. Also known as “The Errand-Bearers,” this<br />
is a poem written by Walt Whitman to commemorate the visit <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Shogun’s Embassy to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1860. On 16 June 1860,<br />
Whitman watched the parade on New York City’s Broadway Avenue<br />
featuring the <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials and wrote the poem shortly afterward.<br />
The poem begins with this stanza:<br />
Over sea, hither from Niphon [Nippon], Courteous, the Princes <strong>of</strong> Asia,<br />
swart-cheek’d princes First-comers, guests, two-sworded princes,<br />
Lesson-giving princes, leaning back in their open barouches, bareheaded,<br />
impassive This day they ride through Manhattan . . .<br />
The lengthy, free-verse poem expounds on the glories not only <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, but all <strong>of</strong> Asia. Originally published in the New York Times on<br />
27 June 1860, the poem later appeared in editions <strong>of</strong> Whitman’s<br />
Leaves <strong>of</strong> Grass.<br />
ABCD ENCIRCLEMENT. With the opening shots <strong>of</strong> the Manchurian<br />
Incident in 1931, <strong>Japan</strong> turned to a policy <strong>of</strong> enlarging its sphere <strong>of</strong><br />
influence on the Asian continent by the use <strong>of</strong> force. Chiang Kaishek’s<br />
stubborn refusal to surrender following the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War (1937–1945) notwithstanding, American opposition<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>’s militaristic adventurism provided Tokyo with its principal<br />
stumbling block. This was brought home with startling clarity<br />
when in July 1939 Washington announced its intention to abrogate the<br />
two nations’ Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation—a move that<br />
threatened to cut <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong>f from vital American commodities, including<br />
especially scrap steel and petroleum. After a brief period in which<br />
it tried to accommodate American concerns, <strong>Japan</strong> in the summer <strong>of</strong><br />
29
30 • ABE, NOBUYUKI<br />
1940 began eyeing the resource-rich colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast<br />
Asia, which had been left defenseless by Germany’s war against their<br />
colonial masters in Europe. A necessary corollary <strong>of</strong> any drive into<br />
Southeast Asia, it eventually was agreed, was a military alliance with<br />
Germany and Italy. It also was agreed that the <strong>Japan</strong>–Germany–Italy<br />
Tripartite Pact—signed in September 1940—would have the added<br />
effect <strong>of</strong> providing <strong>Japan</strong> with leverage against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The<br />
actual effect was just the opposite.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> regarded Great Britain’s survival in its war<br />
against Germany as essential to its own security, and it refused to<br />
countenance the possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> aiding Germany by threatening<br />
Britain’s Far Eastern possessions. Herein lay the origins <strong>of</strong> the socalled<br />
ABCD encirclement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The first concrete step toward<br />
ABCD encirclement came in late April 1941, when American,<br />
British, and Dutch <strong>of</strong>ficers confirmed the three nations’ collaboration<br />
in the event <strong>of</strong> war in the Pacific. They also agreed to incorporate<br />
China into their strategic planning.<br />
More immediately, ABCD encirclement aimed at the economic<br />
strangulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The administration <strong>of</strong> President Franklin D.<br />
Roosevelt in September 1940 retaliated to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese occupation <strong>of</strong><br />
northern Indochina by slapping a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline,<br />
high-grade iron, and steel scrap. The cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister<br />
Fumimaro Konoe turned instead to the Dutch East Indies. The subsequent<br />
negotiations with Dutch <strong>of</strong>ficials yielded no success and, in<br />
June 1941, Tokyo recalled its ambassador. Within weeks, <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
troops occupied southern Indochina. The Roosevelt Administration<br />
froze all <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and a complete economic<br />
embargo on <strong>Japan</strong> ensued. The British and the Dutch soon followed<br />
suit and the economic ABCD encirclement was completed.<br />
See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
ABE, NOBUYUKI (1875–1953). Born in 1875, Nobuyuki Abe graduated<br />
from the Military Academy in 1897. In 1902, he was admitted to<br />
the army’s War College, a sure sign that he had been marked as one<br />
<strong>of</strong> the army’s best and brightest. His education at the War College interrupted<br />
by the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War, Abe was not graduated until<br />
1907. He was subsequently posted to Germany—the preferred posting<br />
for the army’s most promising junior <strong>of</strong>ficers—and, a few years
ABSOLUTE SPHERE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE • 31<br />
later, proceeded to Austria. He participated in the Siberian intervention<br />
following World War I, and was appointed vice army minister in<br />
1928. Promoted to the rank <strong>of</strong> admiral in 1933, he was placed on the<br />
army’s reserve list soon after the February 26 Incident <strong>of</strong> 1936. He<br />
served as ambassador to China in from April to December 1940, and<br />
was governor general <strong>of</strong> Korea when <strong>Japan</strong> surrendered unconditionally<br />
to the Allied powers in August 1945.<br />
Abe perhaps will be best remembered for his brief tenure as prime<br />
minister from August 1939 until January 1940. Coinciding neatly<br />
with Adolf Hitler’s invasion <strong>of</strong> Poland, which in turn plunged Europe<br />
into war, Abe proclaimed neutrality in the European conflict. He was<br />
confronted, however, by the steady worsening <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s diplomatic<br />
relations with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Just prior to the inauguration <strong>of</strong><br />
Abe’s cabinet, Washington had responded to <strong>Japan</strong>’s ongoing war in<br />
China by announcing its intention to abrogate the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation. In accordance with the terms<br />
<strong>of</strong> the treaty, this would become effective in January 1940 unless<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> in the meantime could ameliorate U.S. policy. Working toward<br />
that end, Abe personally saw to it that Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura,<br />
who was widely trusted within the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, was appointed<br />
foreign minister. But, Nomura’s appointment could not <strong>of</strong>fset<br />
the obstructionism <strong>of</strong> the army, which was singularly unwilling to accommodate<br />
American demands regarding China, and Abe’s cabinet<br />
resigned days before the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> commerce treaty expired.<br />
ABSOLUTE SPHERE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE (1943). The wild<br />
military success that <strong>Japan</strong> achieved in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor<br />
came to an abrupt end with the Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway in June 1942.<br />
Suffering defeat after defeat on the battlefield, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
in September 1943 delineated its “absolute sphere <strong>of</strong> imperial<br />
defense,” which incorporated the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands,<br />
the inner South Pacific, western New Guinea, and Burma. Presumably,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> would do everything within its power to ensure that it<br />
would not retreat from this position, although Chief <strong>of</strong> the Navy<br />
General Staff Admiral Osami Nagano raised a storm when, at the<br />
very time that the Absolute Sphere <strong>of</strong> Imperial Defense was established,<br />
he frankly admitted that he could not “assure the future <strong>of</strong> the<br />
war situation.”
32 • ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT<br />
Nagano’s terse assessment revealed <strong>Japan</strong>’s military and strategic<br />
bankruptcy some two years before it finally surrendered. Foreign<br />
Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu seized this pessimistic atmosphere to<br />
assert that diplomacy <strong>of</strong>fered <strong>Japan</strong> its only hope. He outlined four<br />
points that he deemed crucial to <strong>Japan</strong>’s future. First, <strong>Japan</strong> must<br />
strengthen its cooperation with Germany. Second, peace must be<br />
maintained with the Soviet Union. Third, peace with China must be<br />
secured. Fourth, <strong>Japan</strong> must end its interference in the internal affairs<br />
<strong>of</strong> nations throughout East Asia, leaving to them actual control <strong>of</strong><br />
their governments and economies.<br />
Held to its own standards, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government failed in every<br />
respect. It proved utterly unable to prevent the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> (and its<br />
allies) from penetrating the absolute sphere <strong>of</strong> imperial defense, it did<br />
nothing to strengthen cooperation with Germany, it was unable to<br />
stop the Soviet Union from entering the war, it could not reach peace<br />
with China, and it did nothing to liberate the region from overt colonial<br />
controls. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT<br />
(ACSA). The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> was concluded in April 1996 and<br />
became effective the following October. In the event the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Self-Defense Force (JSDF) asks the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> or U.S. military<br />
forces ask <strong>Japan</strong> to provide either goods or services, either would be<br />
obligated to accede to the other side’s request for goods or services. In<br />
July 2004, this agreement was revised to encompass aiding each other<br />
in the event <strong>of</strong> a military attack, promoting the efforts <strong>of</strong> the international<br />
community to contribute to international peace and security,<br />
providing relief for large-scale natural disasters, and other purposes.<br />
The revised agreement also allowed both countries to provide each<br />
other with ammunition in emergency contingencies in areas surrounding<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. In predictable military attacks, when the JSDF provide the<br />
U.S. forces with goods and services, the revised ACSA makes it possible<br />
for the JSDF to use arms for self-defense. The revised ACSA<br />
also allows an overseas JSDF mission to exchange goods and services<br />
with U.S. forces that are also abroad. In regard to the JSDF dispatch<br />
to Iraq in 2004, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government decided to apply the revised<br />
ACSA, a first for an overseas JSDF mission. See also DEFENSE.
AGREEMENT ON RESTORATION OF JAPANESE ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES • 33<br />
AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES<br />
OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND<br />
THE DAITO ISLANDS. At the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. summit held in November<br />
1969, an agreement was reached that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments<br />
would enter formal negotiations to achieve early restitution<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands to <strong>Japan</strong>. They signed an<br />
agreement restituting these islands to <strong>Japan</strong> on 17 June 1971 and it became<br />
effective two months after the signing. Washington and Tokyo<br />
exchanged instruments <strong>of</strong> ratification in March and May 1972, and<br />
Okinawa was <strong>of</strong>ficially restituted to <strong>Japan</strong>. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> abandoned<br />
all the rights over the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands<br />
based on the stipulation in Article Three <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco Peace<br />
Treaty concluded on 8 September 1951. <strong>Japan</strong> took over the territories<br />
<strong>of</strong> all these islands and all the rights.<br />
When Okinawa was restituted, in accordance with Article Seven <strong>of</strong><br />
this agreement, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government paid a total amount <strong>of</strong> $320<br />
million to the U.S. government as a special expenditure. As for the<br />
Senkaku Islands (the Diaoyu Islands), which have been the cause <strong>of</strong><br />
a territorial dispute between China and <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Ministry<br />
<strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs takes the <strong>of</strong>ficial view that the Senkaku Islands<br />
were included in the region that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> returned, in accordance<br />
with this agreement on Okinawa.<br />
AGREEMENT ON RESTORATION OF JAPANESE ASSETS IN<br />
THE UNITED STATES. The Agreement on Restoration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was concluded in 1955 between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> stipulating that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would<br />
restore <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> that were frozen during<br />
the Pacific War. Those <strong>Japan</strong>ese private corporations that had private<br />
assets abroad gathered together to establish a group requesting<br />
restoration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and this group<br />
consistently lobbied U.S. Congress. Insisting that “private assets<br />
have nothing to do with conflicts between two nations,” they vehemently<br />
requested that the U.S. government restore their private assets.<br />
They also argued that because <strong>Japan</strong>ese trade firms’ assets in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> were the result <strong>of</strong> peaceful investment for many years,<br />
restoration <strong>of</strong> these assets would promote <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. friendship.<br />
There was a precedent in that Italian assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> were
34 • AINU<br />
restored based on a special agreement after concluding a peace treaty<br />
with Italy. Acting on this precedent as well as consistent effort <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese corporations, the U.S. government agreed to this request.<br />
See also WORLD WAR II.<br />
AINU. <strong>Historical</strong>ly, the Ainu are the indigenous peoples <strong>of</strong> northern<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. After the Shakushain Uprising <strong>of</strong> 1669 against the <strong>Japan</strong>ese,<br />
the Ainu came under control <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate and have<br />
lived primarily on the island <strong>of</strong> Hokkaido (known as Ezo during the<br />
Tokugawa Era). Generally considered to be hunters, fishers, and<br />
gatherers, recent evidence demonstrates that the Ainu have also been<br />
agriculturalists throughout most <strong>of</strong> their history. In 1869, the new<br />
Meiji government established the Hokkaido Colonization Bureau, or<br />
Kaitakushi, to promote economic development in Hokkaido and assimilate<br />
the Ainu into the modernizing world. Horace Capron, former<br />
commissioner <strong>of</strong> agriculture <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, was a key<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the Hokkaido Colonization Bureau from 1872 to 1875.<br />
Because <strong>of</strong> increased contact with <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Russians in the first<br />
half <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, the loss <strong>of</strong> control over traditional hunting<br />
and fishing areas, and then the assimilation policies <strong>of</strong> the Meiji government<br />
after 1868—partially based on policies <strong>of</strong> the American Bureau<br />
<strong>of</strong> Indian Affairs—the Ainu succumbed to poverty and disease.<br />
Similar to American Indians, there are few full-blooded Ainu still living.<br />
See also CLARK, WILLIAM SMITH.<br />
AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT OF 1969. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> concluded the Air Transport Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1969 in Tokyo on<br />
12 November 1969, based on Article 12 <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco Peace<br />
Treaty. This was <strong>Japan</strong>’s first ever private air transport agreement. It<br />
established air routes and provided the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> with<br />
bilateral rights to operate airline businesses and make regular landings<br />
at airports in each country.<br />
AIZU COLONY. See WAKAMATSU COLONY.<br />
AIZU DOMAIN (FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE). Widely regarded<br />
and feared as a warrior region, Aizu was a domain in northern <strong>Japan</strong><br />
during the Tokugawa Era (1600–1868). The headquarters and castle
AKIYAMA, SANEYUKI • 35<br />
town <strong>of</strong> Aizu was Wakamatsu, now the city <strong>of</strong> Aizu-Wakamatsu.<br />
The lord <strong>of</strong> Aizu, Katamori Matsudaira, and his samurai warriors<br />
were the last major supporters <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogun, fighting the<br />
bloody Boshin War against the imperial forces from Satsuma and<br />
Choshu domains until surrendering in the fall <strong>of</strong> 1868. A few people<br />
from Aizu migrated to California in 1869 and 1870 in an attempt to<br />
start a tea and silk colony. The Aizu region was incorporated as<br />
Wakamatsu Prefecture in 1871, and integrated into Fukushima Prefecture<br />
five years later. See also WAKAMATSU COLONY.<br />
AKIYAMA, SANEYUKI (1868–1918). A disciple <strong>of</strong> the celebrated<br />
naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Saneyuki Akiyama emerged<br />
in the early 1900s as an extraordinarily influential naval tactician and<br />
doctrinaire. He graduated top <strong>of</strong> his 1890 Naval Academy class. He<br />
participated in the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1894–1895, after which<br />
he left for an extended period <strong>of</strong> study in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Unable<br />
to enroll in the Naval War College at Newport—where, because planning<br />
for war against <strong>Japan</strong> had begun, <strong>of</strong>ficers from that nation were<br />
no longer welcome—Akiyama approached Mahan directly. Mahan<br />
provided Akiyama with a list <strong>of</strong> works in naval history, which the<br />
young <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficer read voraciously. He also sought and received<br />
permission to serve as a foreign observer aboard an American vessel<br />
during the Spanish–American War <strong>of</strong> 1898.<br />
In 1902, Akiyama was appointed instructor on tactics and strategy<br />
at <strong>Japan</strong>’s own Naval War College, where he instituted a systematic<br />
study <strong>of</strong> naval warfare. Impressed by the U.S. Navy’s meticulous<br />
planning processes, he insisted on a rational and scientific approach<br />
to any planning for naval operations. Most significantly, he adopted<br />
what was standard practice in the U.S. Navy: war-gaming, where exercises<br />
were conducted on large tables with models and markers to<br />
simulate real combat conditions.<br />
During the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905, Akiyama was assigned<br />
as staff <strong>of</strong>ficer with Commander-in-Chief Heihachirō Tōgō’s<br />
Combined Fleet. Soon after the war, he devoted his energies to the<br />
navy’s most pressing issue: the designation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as hypothetical<br />
enemy number one. Once World War I broke out, however,<br />
he split with the majority <strong>of</strong> his naval colleagues to stress the centrality<br />
<strong>of</strong> China to <strong>Japan</strong>’s future. In a further deviation from the thinking
36 • AMERICA FIRST COMMITTEE<br />
<strong>of</strong> the majority <strong>of</strong> his naval colleagues, Akiyama saw no threat in<br />
America’s wartime plans to build a navy “second to none.” Arguing<br />
that the immense American naval buildup was a response to European<br />
issues rather than any sensed need to coerce <strong>Japan</strong>, Akiyama placed<br />
much more emphasis on the potential for a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American clash<br />
over China.<br />
AMERICA FIRST COMMITTEE. The America First Committee<br />
was one <strong>of</strong> the more notable examples <strong>of</strong> isolationism in pre–Pearl<br />
Harbor America. Established in late 1940, it fought a losing battle<br />
against the internationalism <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Franklin D.<br />
Roosevelt.<br />
Following the stunning success, which the German armies<br />
achieved in subjugating Western Europe in the summer <strong>of</strong> 1940, Roosevelt<br />
began to regard a total German victory over Europe as a direct<br />
threat to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. By entering into a military alliance with<br />
Germany, <strong>Japan</strong> in September 1940 willingly identified itself as part<br />
<strong>of</strong> this threat, particularly as it related to the colonial regions <strong>of</strong><br />
Southeast Asia.<br />
Roosevelt’s response was elaborate in design. Germany’s defeat<br />
was accorded the highest priority, for which purpose the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> should extend all possible material and moral aid to Germany’s<br />
opponents (most notably Great Britain). <strong>Japan</strong> would be confronted<br />
with a two-pronged approach <strong>of</strong>, on the one hand, opposition to its<br />
hegemonic aspirations, and on the other, the possibility <strong>of</strong> improved<br />
relations with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, should it first dissociate itself from<br />
Adolf Hitler’s brand <strong>of</strong> militaristic aggression. In particular, the Roosevelt<br />
administration sought to ensure that <strong>Japan</strong> did not militarily<br />
threaten British colonial possessions in the Far East. Having reached<br />
these fundamental assumptions, Roosevelt had significant segments<br />
<strong>of</strong> public opinion both with him and against him.<br />
Of the voices arrayed against him, the most effective was the<br />
America First Committee. The brainchild <strong>of</strong> R. Douglas Stuart, a student<br />
<strong>of</strong> Yale Law School, its inaugural press release <strong>of</strong> 4 September<br />
1940 enunciated four basic principles. First, it stressed that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must build an impregnable defense for itself. Second,<br />
it maintained that no foreign power—nor group <strong>of</strong> powers—could<br />
successfully attack a prepared America. Third, it emphasized that
AMO – DOCTRINE • 37<br />
American democracy could be preserved only by keeping out <strong>of</strong> the<br />
war. Fourth, it argued that aid “short <strong>of</strong> war”—as the Roosevelt administration<br />
was extending to Great Britain—not only weakened the<br />
national defense but also threatened to involve America in war<br />
abroad.<br />
Over the following months, the American First Committee organized<br />
itself into local chapters. By the end <strong>of</strong> February 1941, it had<br />
some 650 embryonic chapters, and had distributed some 1.5 million<br />
leaflets, 750,000 buttons, and 500,000 bumper stickers. It was going<br />
strong up to the afternoon <strong>of</strong> the Pearl Harbor attack.<br />
AMERICA–JAPAN SOCIETY, INC. The America–<strong>Japan</strong> Society<br />
(AJS) was founded in Tokyo on 13 April 1917. Kentaro Kaneko, the<br />
first <strong>Japan</strong>ese person to graduate from Harvard University and author<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Meiji Constitution, became the AJS’s first president. The AJS<br />
is one <strong>of</strong> the oldest non-government, non-pr<strong>of</strong>it organizations in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Its primary purpose is to promote mutual understanding between<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> through educational, cultural, economic,<br />
social, and public affairs programs, and to provide a forum to<br />
discuss issues concerning U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations. The AJS also serves<br />
as the headquarters <strong>of</strong> the National Association <strong>of</strong> America–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Societies, which consists <strong>of</strong> 29 societies across <strong>Japan</strong> (as <strong>of</strong> October<br />
2005). Moreover, the AJS has been active in promoting close relationships<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. See also<br />
JAPAN AMERICA SOCIETY.<br />
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861–1865). After decades <strong>of</strong> contention<br />
and compromise over issues related to the slavery <strong>of</strong> Africans in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, many Southern slaveholding states seceded from the<br />
Union upon the election <strong>of</strong> Abraham Lincoln in November 1860. War<br />
began in South Carolina in April 1861 and continued until April 1865.<br />
More than 600,000 soldiers and civilians on both sides were killed<br />
during the conflict, making the Civil War the deadliest war in American<br />
history. President Lincoln was assassinated by a Southern sympathizer<br />
on 15 April 1865. See also GRANT, ULYSSES S.<br />
AMŌ DOCTRINE. On 17 April 1934, the chief <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign<br />
Ministry’s Information Division Amō Eiji issued a provocative
38 • AMO – DOCTRINE<br />
public statement subsequently dubbed the Amō Doctrine. Seeking to<br />
define <strong>Japan</strong>’s role as the sole guarantor <strong>of</strong> peace in East Asia, he declared<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> would oppose any joint action by European nations<br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on behalf <strong>of</strong> China, even if it took the form <strong>of</strong><br />
financial and technical assistance. “We oppose, therefore,” he<br />
warned, “any attempt on the part <strong>of</strong> China to avail herself <strong>of</strong> the influence<br />
<strong>of</strong> any other country to resist <strong>Japan</strong>.” In addition, <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would oppose any action by an individual nation that would disturb<br />
the peace and order <strong>of</strong> East Asia.<br />
It is clear that Amō issued this statement without the authorization<br />
<strong>of</strong> his Foreign Ministry superiors. To be sure, he was merely paraphrasing<br />
an earlier instruction issued by Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota,<br />
in which Hirota had referred to <strong>Japan</strong>’s “mission” in East Asia<br />
and its determination to maintain peace and order in that part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world “on its own responsibility, acting alone.” If anything, Hirota’s<br />
wording was stronger than that <strong>of</strong> Amō, yet the foreign minister had<br />
expressed himself behind closed doors. In any case, Hirota knew<br />
nothing <strong>of</strong> the statement until it was printed in the newspapers on 18<br />
April. He subsequently sought to reassure Washington that <strong>Japan</strong> had<br />
no intention <strong>of</strong> injuring that nation’s rights and interests in East Asia.<br />
Coming on the heels <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s invasion <strong>of</strong> Manchuria and its subsequent<br />
withdrawal from the League <strong>of</strong> Nations, the Amō doctrine<br />
might have been expected to arouse American <strong>of</strong>ficialdom. The ideas<br />
it expressed were clearly inimical to American interests in China. At<br />
the same time (if the policy debates within the State Department <strong>of</strong>fer<br />
an accurate yardstick), nor was the U.S. government willing to antagonize<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. The result was a somewhat oblique message delivered<br />
to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government on April 29. It contained reference<br />
to the Nine-Power Treaty (which was signed at the Washington<br />
Conference and confirmed the independence and integrity <strong>of</strong> China<br />
as well as the Open Door), together with a restatement <strong>of</strong> respect for<br />
the “rights, the obligations, and the legitimate interests” <strong>of</strong> others and<br />
the expectation <strong>of</strong> similar respect in return. There was also mention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the so-called “good neighbor policy,” which is perhaps best defined<br />
as non-interventionism in China and a multilateral sharing <strong>of</strong><br />
regional defense responsibilities.<br />
In light <strong>of</strong> this, it seems fair to assume that the Amō doctrine exercised<br />
an ambiguous effect over <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations. Cer-
ANGLO–JAPANESE ALLIANCE • 39<br />
tainly, a <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficial had drawn a clearly defined line in the<br />
sand—a line that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government was unlikely to accept.<br />
Yet the subsequent efforts <strong>of</strong> Foreign Minister Hirota, as well as<br />
the measured response <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government, suggests (if<br />
nothing else) that a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American clash in 1933 was by no<br />
means inevitable.<br />
ANAMI, KORECHIKA (1887–1945). Korechika Anami entered the<br />
Military Academy in December 1904. His foreign experience was<br />
limited to a two-year stint along the Mongolian–Soviet border from<br />
1923, and a seven-month stint in France from August 1927. Having<br />
been promoted to lieutenant general in 1938, he was appointed vice<br />
war minister in 1939. In this position, he played a leading role in the<br />
dispatch <strong>of</strong> Colonel Hideo Iwakuro to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 1941 <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations.<br />
Anami was appointed war minister in April 1945. Along with Chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Army General Staff General Yoshijirō Umezu and Chief <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Naval General Staff Soemu Toyoda, he refused to concede defeat in<br />
World War II. Anami’s arguments essentially boiled down to two interlinked<br />
premises. First, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese home islands remained secure<br />
under the protection <strong>of</strong> the army. Second, the army could deal a decisive<br />
blow to any invading forces, thereby affording <strong>Japan</strong> a card with<br />
which to bargain at the end-<strong>of</strong>-war negotiating table. His opposition to<br />
surrender in no way subsided after the atomic bombs against Hiroshima<br />
and Nagasaki in August 1945, and it was only the emperor’s<br />
decision in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the bombs that forced him to back down.<br />
Anami almost immediately tendered his resignation as a cabinet minister<br />
and committed suicide by seppuku (also called hari-kiri).<br />
ANGLO–JAPANESE ALLIANCE. This treaty between Great Britain<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong> was concluded in 1902, renewed in 1905, again in 1911,<br />
and was terminated on 17 August 1923. It provided the mainstay <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s foreign and military policies during the course <strong>of</strong> its existence,<br />
and (at least initially) served to strengthen Britain’s hand in the Far<br />
East. The alliance was originally concluded as a bulwark against Russian<br />
expansion into the region. Most significant from the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
point <strong>of</strong> view, the alliance specifically recognized that <strong>Japan</strong> was “interested<br />
to a peculiar degree in Korea.” By this term, Britain helped to
40 • ANSEI TREATIES<br />
seal Korea’s fate as a <strong>Japan</strong>ese colony. At the same time, the alliance<br />
ensured that, in the event <strong>of</strong> war with Russia, <strong>Japan</strong> could rely on<br />
benevolent neutrality on the part <strong>of</strong> Britain and on active British participation<br />
should a fourth power enter the war on Russia’s side.<br />
In August 1905, the terms were revised and broadened so as to provide<br />
for the defense <strong>of</strong> British interests in India and a more precise<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s hegemony in Korea, and its term was extended<br />
to 10 years. The advantages for Britain, which, from 1905 onward,<br />
withdrew its battleships from the Far East so as to meet the emerging<br />
threat <strong>of</strong> Germany, were obvious. Fresh from its victory over Russia,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, too, regarded the renewed alliance a triumph. Not only would<br />
the alliance secure <strong>Japan</strong> against diplomatic isolation, but it also<br />
oversaw the rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> to a position as the dominant naval power<br />
in the Far East.<br />
The third Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese agreement <strong>of</strong> 13 July 1911 was a considerably<br />
weaker treaty than those that preceded it. Britain was increasingly<br />
anxious to cement its deepening ties with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, and was well aware that that nation had become vaguely suspicious<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The terms <strong>of</strong> the alliance thus excluded the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> from its purview, which meant that Britain would not militarily<br />
aid its ally in the event <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American war. The growing<br />
weakness <strong>of</strong> the alliance was clearly evidenced after the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />
World War I. At a time when British attentions were entirely focused<br />
on the defeat <strong>of</strong> Germany, <strong>Japan</strong> pursued policy objectives in China<br />
that were clearly to the detriment <strong>of</strong> British interests.<br />
It was hardly surprising that negotiations for drawing up revised<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> the alliance, which was liable to lapse in 1921, never eventuated.<br />
Instead, at the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, a<br />
Four-Power Convention was signed between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great<br />
Britain, <strong>Japan</strong>, and France. Far short <strong>of</strong> a military alliance, it committed<br />
the contracting parties to nothing more than consultations in<br />
the event <strong>of</strong> difficulties. With the exchange <strong>of</strong> ratifications on 17 August<br />
1923, the Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance came to an end.<br />
ANSEI TREATIES. Beginning with the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity<br />
and Commerce finalized by Townsend Harris and Naosuke Ii in<br />
July 1858, the Ansei Treaties include similar treaties agreed to between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and Holland, Britain, France, and Russia by October
ANTI-COMINTERN PACT • 41<br />
1858. Provisions <strong>of</strong> these treaties included opening several <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
ports to foreign trade and foreign residents, establishment <strong>of</strong> diplomatic<br />
legations, tariffs, and extraterritorial rights for foreigners in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. The Tokugawa shogunate reluctantly agreed to these treaties<br />
without imperial approval, provoking a political crisis in <strong>Japan</strong> that<br />
was not resolved until the overthrow <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa government in<br />
1868. As <strong>Japan</strong> was negotiating from a position <strong>of</strong> weakness, these<br />
treaties are <strong>of</strong>ten called “the unequal treaties.” See also MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.<br />
ANTI-COMINTERN PACT (1936). Germany and <strong>Japan</strong> concluded<br />
the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936, and Italy joined the<br />
pact some 12 months later. By the terms <strong>of</strong> the pact, the contracting<br />
parties were obligated to inform each other about the activities <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Communist International (or Comintern) and to consult with each<br />
other so as to coordinate their preventive policies against it. It also included<br />
an additional secret agreement that provided for a limited alliance<br />
between Germany and <strong>Japan</strong> against the Soviet Union.<br />
Through an intermediary, German Foreign Minister Joachim von<br />
Ribbentrop in May or June 1935 suggested to the military attaché in<br />
Berlin, Colonel (later General) Hiroshi Ōshima, the possibility <strong>of</strong> a<br />
defensive alliance between Germany and <strong>Japan</strong> against the Soviet<br />
Union. He again raised the topic some 12 months later. The Army<br />
General Staff in Tokyo subsequently dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel<br />
Tadaichi Wakamatsu to Berlin, and the Anti-Comintern Pact emerged<br />
from the ensuing negotiations. It is worth noting that neither the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign Ministry nor the German Foreign Office knew anything<br />
<strong>of</strong> these negotiations.<br />
Because the Anti-Comintern Pact specifically targeted the Soviet<br />
Union, <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomats invited other nations—most notably<br />
Great Britain—to adhere to its terms. The American reaction to the<br />
pact, however, was resoundingly negative. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Cordell<br />
Hull’s principal Far Eastern adviser, Stanley Hornbeck, suggested<br />
that “if <strong>Japan</strong> continued to pursue the course and to apply the methods<br />
to which her armed forces were more and more committing her,<br />
there would come sooner or later a collision, ‘war,’ between that<br />
country and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.” To be sure, Hornbeck was more forthright<br />
than were most other American policymakers. Nonetheless, the
42 • ANTI-TERRORISM SPECIAL MEASURES LAW<br />
nation’s war planners at about the same time began planning for a<br />
possible war against both Germany and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
ANTI-TERRORISM SPECIAL MEASURES LAW. This law was<br />
enacted on 29 October 2001, promulgated and became effective on 2<br />
November 2001. In relation to the series <strong>of</strong> terrorist attacks that took<br />
place in New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001, this<br />
law stipulates the ways in which <strong>Japan</strong> assists the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
other foreign countries for their sanctions against Afghanistan. It is a<br />
law as temporary legislation with a two-year term limit. This law<br />
consists <strong>of</strong> 13 articles and a supplementary provision. The law was<br />
groundbreaking because it enabled the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government to dispatch<br />
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad during wartime.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s logistical support included mid-ocean refueling <strong>of</strong> U.S. navy<br />
ships and those <strong>of</strong> other foreign countries in the Indian Ocean and the<br />
Arabian Sea by supply vessels <strong>of</strong> the Maritime Self-Defense Force<br />
(MSDF), assisting transportation <strong>of</strong> materials and soldiers between<br />
military bases including U.S. bases in <strong>Japan</strong> by the Air Self-Defense<br />
Force, and search and rescue activities. In November 2001, Tokyo dispatched<br />
Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean. In October<br />
2003, this law was extended for two years; in October 2005, the law<br />
was extended again for one more year. See also DEFENSE.<br />
ARITA–GREW CONVERSATIONS. From 10 June 1940, Foreign<br />
Minister Hachirō Arita and Ambassador Joseph C. Grew entered<br />
conversations with an eye to effecting a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American diplomatic<br />
rapprochement. The American objective in these talks was colored<br />
by the success that the German armies achieved in Europe.<br />
Through Grew, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> State Department hoped to prevent<br />
both a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–German alliance and a <strong>Japan</strong>ese advance into the defenseless<br />
colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. For his part, Arita hoped<br />
to revive the two countries’ treaty <strong>of</strong> commerce and navigation, which<br />
Washington had abrogated six months earlier in response to <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
aggression in China. It became readily evident throughout the course<br />
<strong>of</strong> the conversations that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would not consider such a<br />
step until <strong>Japan</strong> first renounced the use <strong>of</strong> force. The conversations<br />
broke down in July 1940, and soon thereafter the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Admiral<br />
Mitsumasa Yonai collapsed. Its successor cabinet, which included
ARITA, HACHIRO – • 43<br />
Yōsuke Matsuoka as foreign minister, showed more enthusiasm for<br />
a German alliance than for rapprochement with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The<br />
Arita–Grew conversations thus ended without yielding any tangible<br />
results. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
ARITA, HACHIRŌ (1884–1965). A graduate <strong>of</strong> Tokyo Imperial University’s<br />
law school, Arita entered the Foreign Ministry in 1909. After<br />
serving in China, Ottawa, and Honolulu, in 1918, Arita joined the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In the early<br />
post–World War I period, Arita assumed diplomatic posts in Thailand,<br />
Washington, and Peking, before being appointed head <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau in 1927. From this position, Arita led<br />
a powerful group within the ministry known as the Asia Faction. It<br />
included within its ranks such influential <strong>of</strong>ficials as Mamoru<br />
Shigemitsu, Masayuki Tani, and Toshio Shiratori. In October 1930,<br />
Arita was appointed minister to Austria and thus was out <strong>of</strong> the country<br />
when the Manchurian Incident occurred. He returned to Tokyo<br />
in May 1932 as vice foreign minister, only to resign the post 12<br />
months later. He was appointed ambassador to Belgium in November<br />
1933. At this time, he summarized his worldview in a letter to Shiratori:<br />
“We should proceed at once to drive Communist Russia out <strong>of</strong><br />
China and then gradually exclude Britain, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and<br />
other nations.” In other words, Arita firmly believed that <strong>Japan</strong> was<br />
to be the sole arbiter <strong>of</strong> China’s fate.<br />
He was appointed ambassador to China in February 1936, although<br />
following the February 26 Incident, he assumed the foreign<br />
ministership in the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Kōki Hirota (April 1936–February<br />
1937). In this position, he strived to strengthen <strong>Japan</strong>’s political and<br />
economic control over China, with varying degrees <strong>of</strong> success. He<br />
subsequently served as foreign minister in the first Fumimaro Konoe<br />
cabinet (October 1938–January 1939), the Kiichiro Hiranuma<br />
cabinet (January 1939–August 1939), and the Mitsumasa Yonai cabinet<br />
(January 1940–July 1940). His record as foreign minister is ambiguous.<br />
On the one hand, he firmly opposed strengthening the existing<br />
Anti-Comintern Pact to make <strong>of</strong> it a full-fledged military<br />
alliance aimed at the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain. On the other<br />
hand, he put Washington on notice that Tokyo would brook no interference<br />
in its efforts to establish political hegemony over China.
44 • ARTICLE NINE<br />
ARTICLE NINE. The present <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution is an amendment<br />
to the Constitution <strong>of</strong> the Empire <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. It was promulgated<br />
on 3 November 1946 and went into effect on 3 May 1947. Article<br />
Nine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution expressly stipulates pacifism, one<br />
<strong>of</strong> the three principles <strong>of</strong> the constitution. Article Nine alone forms<br />
Chapter Two <strong>of</strong> the constitution. Article Nine consists <strong>of</strong> three major<br />
elements: renunciation <strong>of</strong> war, no possession <strong>of</strong> military forces, and<br />
denial <strong>of</strong> the right <strong>of</strong> belligerency. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution is called<br />
a “peace constitution” because <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> the preamble to the<br />
constitution and Article Nine.<br />
Article Nine states, in part: “Aspiring sincerely to an international<br />
peace based on justice and order, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people forever renounce<br />
war as a sovereign right <strong>of</strong> the nation and the threat or use <strong>of</strong><br />
force as means <strong>of</strong> settling international disputes.<br />
“In order to accomplish the aim <strong>of</strong> the preceding paragraph, land,<br />
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.<br />
The right <strong>of</strong> belligerency <strong>of</strong> the state will not be recognized.”<br />
There are four major interpretations <strong>of</strong> Article Nine.<br />
1. <strong>Japan</strong> renounces any act <strong>of</strong> war or the possession <strong>of</strong> military<br />
forces, including the right <strong>of</strong> self-defense.<br />
2. <strong>Japan</strong> renounces any act <strong>of</strong> war or the possession <strong>of</strong> military<br />
forces for that purpose; however, <strong>Japan</strong> does not renounce its<br />
sovereign right <strong>of</strong> self-defense.<br />
3. Both acts <strong>of</strong> war and military forces are permitted within the<br />
limits <strong>of</strong> self-defense.<br />
4. <strong>Japan</strong> has the right to individual self-defense, but collective<br />
self-defense is unconstitutional.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government’s <strong>of</strong>ficial interpretation <strong>of</strong> Article Nine<br />
has been changing. At first, the government took the view that the<br />
constitution prohibited any military forces and even war for selfdefense.<br />
However, as the Korean War precipitated <strong>Japan</strong>ese remilitarization,<br />
the government took the stand that the constitution prohibited<br />
only aggressive war, excluding war for self-defense. Moreover,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces constituted minimum “forces” not the<br />
“military forces” prohibited by the constitution. As for the right <strong>of</strong><br />
collective defense approved by the <strong>United</strong> Nations, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially argues that <strong>Japan</strong> has this right but <strong>Japan</strong> shall not<br />
exercise it. See also JAPANESE CONSTITUTION.
ATLANTIC CONFERENCE • 45<br />
ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS. In July 1997, a currency crisis in Thailand<br />
precipitated an Asian currency crisis centered on the Association<br />
<strong>of</strong> Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In August 1997, <strong>Japan</strong> took<br />
the initiative in advocating a proposal to establish an Asian Monetary<br />
Fund (AMF). In the postwar era, <strong>Japan</strong> had been dependent on the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in terms <strong>of</strong> economic, security, and diplomatic relations.<br />
Tokyo regarded the Asian currency crisis as an opportunity to<br />
acquire relative autonomy from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and emphasized its<br />
belongingness to Asia. Unfortunately, this AMF proposal was<br />
aborted primarily because <strong>of</strong> strong U.S. objections and China’s indifference.<br />
Then, <strong>Japan</strong> made announcements <strong>of</strong> cooperation loan<br />
plans with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the<br />
Asian Development Bank. In October 1998, <strong>Japan</strong> issued an active<br />
proposal to provide Asia with $30 billion and in December the same<br />
year, another plan to prepare $600 billion in total for the next three<br />
years as special yen credits.<br />
ATLANTIC CONFERENCE. In August 1941, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President<br />
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston<br />
Churchill met secretly for a conference at Argentia, Newfoundland.<br />
Upon the conference’s conclusion, the two leaders <strong>of</strong>ficially<br />
proclaimed their wartime political objectives—even though the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had not formally entered World War II—by means <strong>of</strong><br />
the much-publicized Atlantic Charter. Notable among its objectives<br />
were the Anglo–American leaders’ eschewal <strong>of</strong> “aggrandizement,<br />
territorial or other”; their desire “to see no territorial changes that<br />
[did] not accord with the freely expressed wishes <strong>of</strong> the people concerned”;<br />
and their respect for “the right <strong>of</strong> all peoples to choose the<br />
form <strong>of</strong> government under which they will live.”<br />
The meeting’s more immediate effect was to confirm and strengthen<br />
the Anglo–American de facto alliance that had emerged in opposition<br />
to the German–<strong>Japan</strong>ese–Italian Tripartite Pact. Nowhere was this<br />
more evident than in the two leaders’ discussions on policy toward<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Churchill urged upon Roosevelt a joint declaration that “any<br />
further encroachment by <strong>Japan</strong> in the Southwest Pacific” would produce<br />
a situation in which Britain and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> “would be compelled<br />
to take countermeasures even though these might lead to war”<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and the two nations. In spite <strong>of</strong> his opposition to <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
aggression, Roosevelt was less convinced <strong>of</strong> an ultimatum’s utility.
46 • ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS<br />
Over the previous 12 months, his administration had adopted everhardening<br />
policies toward <strong>Japan</strong>’s hegemonic aspirations in the Far<br />
East, yet it had always sought to leave that nation something other than<br />
a stark choice between war and peace. Roosevelt saw no pressing need<br />
to abandon that policy at Churchill’s behest. He proposed instead to revive<br />
a proposal he had floated in an earlier conversation with the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese ambassador, whereby if <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops withdrew from<br />
French Indochina, Washington would seek to settle remaining issues<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>. Only if and when the <strong>Japan</strong>ese failed to respond to this proposal<br />
and instead undertook further aggression, would Roosevelt respond<br />
with measures that “might result in war between the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>.” This might not have been as firm as Churchill had<br />
hoped, but Roosevelt had committed the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to an everstiffening<br />
program <strong>of</strong> deterrence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese expansion in the Far East.<br />
After returning to Washington, Roosevelt further watered down his<br />
statement. In a meeting with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese ambassador Admiral<br />
Kichisaburō Nomura on 17 August, Roosevelt stated that if <strong>Japan</strong><br />
undertook any further aggression Washington would take the steps<br />
necessary to safeguard the rights and interests <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He<br />
also informed the ambassador that he was willing to see a resumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> negotiations between the two countries (which had broken down after<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops had occupied southern Indochina in July).<br />
ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS (AUGUST 1945). After the research<br />
and development <strong>of</strong> uranium and plutonium-based atomic weapons<br />
in a top-secret program known as the Manhattan Project, <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> political and military decision-makers approved two atomic<br />
bomb attacks. The first atomic bomb attack was on the city <strong>of</strong> Hiroshima<br />
on 6 August 1945; the second, three days later on the city <strong>of</strong><br />
Nagasaki. The attack on Hiroshima killed approximately 200,000<br />
people, while the attack on Nagasaki killed over 80,000 people. Both<br />
cities are port cities, and had some military-related installations. But<br />
over 90 percent <strong>of</strong> the dead and injured were civilians. Hours before<br />
the attack on Nagasaki, the Soviet Army began its invasion <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese-controlled Manchuria in northern China. On 15 August<br />
1945, Emperor Hirohito made an announcement <strong>of</strong> surrender ending<br />
the war. See Also ATOMIC BOMBING DEBATE; PACIFIC<br />
WAR; WORLD WAR II.
ATOMIC ENERGY BASIC LAW • 47<br />
ATOMIC BOMBING DEBATE. America’s atomic bomb attacks<br />
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 continue to spark<br />
heated historical controversy. The fundamental issue that has divided<br />
scholars is whether the use <strong>of</strong> atomic bombs against Hiroshima and<br />
Nagasaki was necessary to achieve victory in the war against <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
The traditional interpretation insists that the decision to bomb Hiroshima<br />
and Nagasaki was informed by an aversion to the huge<br />
losses in American lives that an invasion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese home islands<br />
entailed, and this was only heightened by the Battle <strong>of</strong> Okinawa.<br />
The revisionist interpretation argues that <strong>Japan</strong> in any event<br />
was near defeat and that the atomic bombing <strong>of</strong> Hiroshima and Nagasaki<br />
was informed less by military necessities than by an attempt<br />
to intimidate the Soviet Union.<br />
A reading <strong>of</strong> those works that make extensive use <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
source materials reveals a different set <strong>of</strong> controversies. One line <strong>of</strong><br />
argument put forth in the late 1990s takes direct issue with the revisionist<br />
argument that—with or without Hiroshima and Nagasaki—<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was on the brink <strong>of</strong> defeat. This argument maintains that although<br />
defeat is a military fait accompli, surrender is an act <strong>of</strong><br />
political decision-making. It concludes that the bombing <strong>of</strong> Hiroshima<br />
and Nagasaki made it possible for a hopelessly divided <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
to reach the political decision for surrender. A separate line <strong>of</strong><br />
argument takes issue with this interpretation, concluding that the single<br />
most crucial issue in <strong>Japan</strong>’s decision to surrender was not the<br />
atomic attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki but the Soviet Union’s<br />
entry into the war. See also ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS.<br />
ATOMIC ENERGY BASIC LAW. This law promulgated on 19 December<br />
1955 regulates the use <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy in <strong>Japan</strong>. The stated<br />
aim <strong>of</strong> the law is to promote the general welfare <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens,<br />
improve the standard <strong>of</strong> living by securing future energy resources,<br />
advancing academic research, and promoting industrial development.<br />
Use <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy is strictly limited to peaceful purpose and is<br />
guided by three principles: self-determination, democracy, and openness.<br />
In order to ensure safe use <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy, the law stipulates<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> should implement its own independent government policies<br />
for regulating nuclear energy under a process that is democratic<br />
and open to the public.
48 • ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM<br />
ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM. The Atomic Industrial Forum was<br />
established on 1 March 1956 as the only comprehensive nuclear energy<br />
forum in the private sector. As <strong>of</strong> April 2004, the forum has 80<br />
staff members. Some <strong>of</strong> its main activities are comprehensive research<br />
into and development <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy, hosting information<br />
exchanges, gathering opinions to achieve and formulate consensus<br />
policy proposals, providing input into the governmental planning and<br />
promotion <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy development and usage policies, and<br />
promoting vigorous development <strong>of</strong> the national economy and social<br />
welfare. Forum activities are based on the importance <strong>of</strong> utilization<br />
<strong>of</strong> isotope and nuclear radiation as well as on <strong>Japan</strong>’s pledge to make<br />
peaceful use <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy. In 1960, the International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency (IAEA) authorized the forum to be a consultative body,<br />
the first private organization awarded this status. The forum sends<br />
delegates to meetings <strong>of</strong> non-governmental organizations and the<br />
IAEA general assembly. It maintains mutual cooperative and collaborative<br />
relationships with atomic industrial forums and nuclear energy-related<br />
institutions in many countries, such as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
Great Britain, France, Germany, South Korea, Russia, and China. In<br />
addition, as a private-sector organization that has volunteered to promote<br />
relationships with developing countries, especially those in<br />
Asia, the forum established an International Cooperation Center in<br />
1983 and an Asian Cooperation Center in 1999.<br />
AZUMA. See STONEWALL, CSS.<br />
– B –<br />
BACON, ALICE MABEL (1858–1918). Raised in an anti-slavery<br />
family in Connecticut, Alice Mabel Bacon worked and taught at the<br />
Hampton Institute in Virginia, one <strong>of</strong> the first educational institutions<br />
specifically for African Americans and American Indians. She later<br />
founded Deephaven Camp in New Hampshire, a Christian and literary<br />
summer resort, where many <strong>of</strong> her students from Hampton Institute<br />
worked to pay for tuition. Her interest in <strong>Japan</strong> began when her<br />
family hosted Sutematsu Yamakawa, one <strong>of</strong> five <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls<br />
brought to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> by the Iwakura Mission in 1872, to live
BASEBALL • 49<br />
and be educated in America. Along with Yamakawa, Umeko Tsuda,<br />
another <strong>of</strong> the five <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls from the Iwakura Mission and later<br />
the most well-known proponent <strong>of</strong> education for <strong>Japan</strong>ese women,<br />
became a close friend <strong>of</strong> Alice Mabel Bacon. Bacon traveled to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
in the 1890s and early 1900s to write and teach. For two years, she<br />
taught daughters <strong>of</strong> the political nobility at the Peer’s School in<br />
Tokyo. Her books, especially A <strong>Japan</strong>ese Interior (1893) and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Girls and Women (1902), were widely read in both <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. See also YATOI.<br />
BAKER, HOWARD HENRY, JR. (15 NOVEMBER 1925– ).<br />
Howard Baker served as U.S. Senator from Tennessee from 1967 to<br />
1985 and as White House chief <strong>of</strong> staff to President Ronald Reagan<br />
from 1987 to 1989. Then, he served as U.S. ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
from 2001 to 2005. During his incumbency, multiple terrorist attacks<br />
took place in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on 11 September 2001. Ambassador<br />
Baker had to carry out delicate negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong> concerning<br />
the dispatch <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Forces vessels to the Indian<br />
Ocean. On 29 October 2001, Tokyo enacted the Anti-Terrorism<br />
Special Measures Law that enabled the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government to dispatch<br />
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad during wartime. In November<br />
2001, Tokyo dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force to<br />
the Indian Ocean.<br />
On March 2003, the U.S. invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq began. Ambassador<br />
Baker played an important role in encouraging the Junichiro<br />
Koizumi Cabinet to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. On 26 July 2003,<br />
Tokyo enacted the Special legislation calling for assistance in the<br />
rebuilding <strong>of</strong> Iraq by which the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Forces were<br />
dispatched to Iraq. On 16 January 2004, Tokyo dispatched an advance<br />
party <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Ground Self-Defense Force to Iraq.<br />
Ambassador Baker also conducted negotiations to gain Tokyo’s<br />
acceptance <strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> Missile Defense (MD). In December<br />
2003, <strong>Japan</strong> decided to adopt the MD system.<br />
BASEBALL. Baseball is one <strong>of</strong> the four major pr<strong>of</strong>essional sports in<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> along with American football, basketball, and ice<br />
hockey. In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings was established as the<br />
first pr<strong>of</strong>essional baseball team in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> (later, Reds).
50 • BATTLE OF MIDWAY<br />
Baseball is also very popular in <strong>Japan</strong>. It is said that in 1871, H. Wilson,<br />
an American teacher in <strong>Japan</strong>, brought baseball to <strong>Japan</strong> for the<br />
first time. In 1935, the Tokyo Giants was established as the first pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
baseball team, followed by the Osaka Tigers in the same<br />
year and five other teams in 1936.<br />
In 1905, the Waseda University baseball team visited the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> as the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese baseball team. In 1908, the University <strong>of</strong><br />
Washington baseball team went to <strong>Japan</strong> as the first mainland American<br />
team to travel to <strong>Japan</strong>. In 1908, the Reach All-American team, the<br />
first American pr<strong>of</strong>essional baseball team, stopped in <strong>Japan</strong> during<br />
their world tour. Although the team consisted mostly <strong>of</strong> Minor League<br />
(AAA) players, they won all 17 games against <strong>Japan</strong>ese university and<br />
club teams. In 1913, the Chicago White Sox and New York Giants, the<br />
first Major League baseball teams to visit the country, came to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
on their Around the World Tour. The teams played two exhibitions<br />
against each other and then played against Keio University. The American<br />
collaborative team made a landslide victory over Keio by a score<br />
<strong>of</strong> 16-3. In 1922, the Major League Baseball sent an All-Star team to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> for the first time. Surprisingly, on 19 November, this team experienced<br />
the only Major League loss in 88 pre–World War II baseball<br />
games in <strong>Japan</strong> against the Mita Club, consisting <strong>of</strong> Keio University<br />
alumni. American teams visited <strong>Japan</strong> eight times before World War II.<br />
The San Francisco Seals, a Minor League team (AAA), came to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
for the first time in the post–World War II era in 1949. In the postwar<br />
era, American teams visited <strong>Japan</strong> 28 times, constantly generating mutual<br />
love for baseball.<br />
Many current and former major leaguers, as well as minor league<br />
players, have joined <strong>Japan</strong>ese pr<strong>of</strong>essional baseball teams. Nowadays,<br />
however, more and more <strong>Japan</strong>ese players become major leaguers.<br />
The first <strong>Japan</strong>ese major leaguer was Masanori Murakami,<br />
who joined the San Francisco Giants in 1964. Hideo Nomo became<br />
the second <strong>Japan</strong>ese major leaguer in 1995. Now, some <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
players are leading major league players such as Nomo, Ichiro<br />
Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, and Tadahito Iguchi.<br />
BATTLE OF MIDWAY (JUNE 1942). <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces met with wild<br />
success in the early stages <strong>of</strong> the Pacific War. Within weeks <strong>of</strong> Pearl<br />
Harbor, <strong>Japan</strong> had captured Guam and Wake Island. Then, in early
BATTLE OF OKINAWA • 51<br />
1942, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East<br />
Indies, and the Malayan peninsula fell into <strong>Japan</strong>ese hands. <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
forces seemed to advance almost at will.<br />
Seen against this backdrop, the massive <strong>Japan</strong>ese reverses in the<br />
Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway <strong>of</strong> 4–6 June 1942 represented a significant turning<br />
point in the war. Commander-in-Chief <strong>of</strong> the Combined Fleet Admiral<br />
Isoroku Yamamoto had long argued that seizure <strong>of</strong> the Midway<br />
Atoll—which lay only 1,300 miles north <strong>of</strong> Hawaii—would “immobilize<br />
the enemy fleet and simultaneously advance our strategic<br />
bases.” In aiming at the destruction <strong>of</strong> the American fleet, Yamamoto<br />
hoped to force Washington to the negotiating table. The chances <strong>of</strong><br />
victory at Midway may have been slight, but in Yamamoto’s estimation,<br />
they represented <strong>Japan</strong>’s only chance <strong>of</strong> emerging victorious in<br />
war over its infinitely more powerful enemy. The gamble did not pay<br />
<strong>of</strong>f. Admiral Chester Nimitz on 4 and 5 June 1942 caught the enemy<br />
aircraft refueling on their carriers. More than 300 <strong>Japan</strong>ese planes<br />
were destroyed and four carriers were sunk. The heart <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s carrier<br />
striking force had been destroyed, and with it had gone many <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s best veteran pilots and naval crewmen.<br />
In a word, the Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway decisively reversed <strong>Japan</strong>’s war fortunes.<br />
Its production capacity was such that it was not easily able to replace<br />
the ships and planes lost at Midway, which, in turn, meant that<br />
the navy was largely unable to launch any new <strong>of</strong>fensives. In short,<br />
Midway put <strong>Japan</strong> on the defensive. This was a posture, which, given<br />
America’s superior industrial strength and resource base, <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
leaders had sought desperately to avoid. So far as the American leadership<br />
was concerned, Midway bought them breathing space in the Pacific,<br />
which, in turn, allowed them to maintain their prioritization <strong>of</strong> the<br />
defeat <strong>of</strong> Germany. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
BATTLE OF OKINAWA (APRIL–JUNE 1945). The three-month<br />
Battle <strong>of</strong> Okinawa from 1 April to 21 June 1945 was one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
bloodiest battles in the Pacific theater <strong>of</strong> World War II. It was the<br />
last in a series <strong>of</strong> operations—including the capture <strong>of</strong> the Mariana<br />
Islands (9 July 1944), the battle <strong>of</strong> Leyte Gulf (October 1944), the invasion<br />
<strong>of</strong> Luzon (commenced January 1945), and the battle <strong>of</strong> Iwo<br />
Jima (February–March 1945)—preliminary to the assault on the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese home islands. Well aware <strong>of</strong> that fact, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese were
52 • BIDDLE, COMMODORE JAMES<br />
prepared to defend the island. Allied invading forces first had to contend<br />
with hundreds <strong>of</strong> kamikaze pilots, who destroyed or disabled 28<br />
ships and killed some 5,000 sailors. The Allies coped with the<br />
kamikaze, and also sank the enormous battleship Yamato, along with<br />
3,000 <strong>of</strong> its crew in the largest single loss <strong>of</strong> life in naval history.<br />
Initially, the ground invasion proved relatively easy. This was because<br />
the defending forces, numbering some 100,000 soldiers, chose<br />
not to defend Okinawa’s beaches or its relatively flat central and<br />
northern portions. Instead, they established defensive positions in the<br />
mountainous southern portion <strong>of</strong> the island. The fighting that ensued<br />
was slow and bloody. <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops killed 10,000 Americans in<br />
two army and two marine divisions, and wounded 30,000 more. Virtually<br />
all <strong>Japan</strong>ese soldiers involved in the defense <strong>of</strong> Okinawa perished,<br />
as did 100,000 Okinawans. There can be no doubt that the brutality<br />
<strong>of</strong> this battle left American forces and planners with a grim<br />
foreboding concerning the shape that any invasion <strong>of</strong> the home islands<br />
might take. For their part, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese leadership was now<br />
confronted by the imminence <strong>of</strong> the invasion <strong>of</strong> the home islands. To<br />
punctuate this point, the Soviet Union on 5 April had announced its<br />
intention not to renew the two nations’ neutrality treaty. See also PA-<br />
CIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
BIDDLE, COMMODORE JAMES (1783–1848). Sent on a mission<br />
to East Asia by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government, Commodore James<br />
Biddle arrived in Edo Bay in 1846 with two U.S. Navy ships, the<br />
Columbus and the Vincennes, to inquire about establishing diplomatic<br />
and trade relations with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government. Although<br />
deliberately bumped by a <strong>Japan</strong>ese sailor, Biddle and his crew were<br />
well-treated by the Tokugawa shogunate. However, <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
politely and firmly refused Biddle’s request to establish diplomatic<br />
and trade relations. Biddle and his ships continued on to China<br />
for the second phase <strong>of</strong> his mission, where he successfully negotiated<br />
a trade treaty between China and the U.S. government. Seven years<br />
after Biddle’s unsuccessful attempt in <strong>Japan</strong>, Washington sent Commodore<br />
Matthew Perry with four large warships and several times<br />
more sailors to convince <strong>Japan</strong> to begin trade and diplomatic relations<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Commodore James Biddle was the<br />
brother <strong>of</strong> Nicholas Biddle, government <strong>of</strong>ficial and financier who
BINGHAM, JOHN A. • 53<br />
served as president <strong>of</strong> the Bank <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the late 1820s<br />
and 1830s. See also ROBERTS, EDMUND.<br />
BILATERAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT BETWEEN<br />
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Atomic<br />
Energy Agreement was <strong>Japan</strong>’s first international agreement concerning<br />
nuclear energy. Under the agreement, which took effect in<br />
December 1955, the U.S. provided <strong>Japan</strong> with atomic power reactors<br />
for the first time in the country’s history. Two research reactors<br />
(the JRR-I and JRR-II) were delivered and placed under the control<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Atomic Energy Research Institute. Also, the U.S. supplied<br />
enriched uranium to be used as fuel for the reactors, but with<br />
the stipulation that spent fuel had to be returned to the U.S. government,<br />
which in principle prevented <strong>Japan</strong> from engaging in fuel reprocessing.<br />
In 1958, the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement was revised to<br />
allow <strong>Japan</strong> to undertake fuel reprocessing at atomic energy facilities<br />
at the discretion <strong>of</strong> the U.S. government. In February 1968, the agreement<br />
was revised again to allow <strong>Japan</strong> the freedom to engage in fuel<br />
reprocessing under safeguard agreements that were jointly decided<br />
by the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong> governments. A 1973 modification to the<br />
agreement substantially raised the ceiling on the amount <strong>of</strong> enriched<br />
uranium the U.S. would deliver to <strong>Japan</strong>. The agreement was last updated<br />
in July 1988 to allow the introduction <strong>of</strong> a comprehensive consent<br />
method: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> stipulate certain conditions<br />
and as long as these conditions are met, pre-consent rights in reprocessing<br />
and regulation rights <strong>of</strong> the provider government with respect<br />
to nuclear materials can be approved en mass. Consequently, <strong>Japan</strong><br />
can undertake stable operations <strong>of</strong> the nuclear fuel-cycle plan with a<br />
long-term perspective.<br />
BINGHAM, JOHN A. (1815–1900). Bingham was elected as a <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> Congressman from Ohio from 1855 to 1863 and 1865 to 1873,<br />
and played a leading role in the impeachment trial <strong>of</strong> President Andrew<br />
Johnson. In 1873, President Ulysses S. Grant appointed Bingham<br />
as minister to <strong>Japan</strong>, where he served for nearly 12 years until<br />
1895, an unusually long time. During his years in <strong>Japan</strong>, Bingham<br />
dealt with treaty, trade, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration issues.
54 • BLACK SHIPS<br />
BLACK SHIPS (IN JAPANESE, KUROFUNE). A widely used<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese term describing the four ships commanded by U.S. Navy<br />
Commodore Matthew Perry when he first arrived in <strong>Japan</strong> in July<br />
1853. Two <strong>of</strong> the four ships, the Mississippi and the Susquehanna,<br />
were steam frigates and produced black smoke, while all four ships<br />
had darkened hulls. As these ships were much larger and potentially<br />
more dangerous than any previous vessels in <strong>Japan</strong>ese waters, “black<br />
ships” was both a literal reference to color and a symbolic reference<br />
to death. See also TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE.<br />
BONIN ISLANDS. See OGASAWARA ISLANDS.<br />
BORAH, WILLIAM (1865–1940). Senator William E. Borah <strong>of</strong> Idaho<br />
was elected to the Senate in 1907, where he served until his death in<br />
February 1940. A powerful orator, he first took interest in foreign affairs<br />
in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> World War I, emerging as a die-hard isolationist<br />
who bitterly opposed American entry into the League <strong>of</strong> Nations.<br />
The “Idaho lion,” as he was known, firmly believed that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must avoid foreign entanglements. He was also convinced<br />
that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ought to set a moral example to the<br />
world.<br />
Borah was an unpredictable character. For instance, in 1921, he introduced<br />
to Congress a resolution urging disarmament upon his own<br />
country and the other powers (most notably Britain and <strong>Japan</strong>). Having<br />
set the stage for the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, he<br />
subsequently denounced that conference for having gone beyond the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> naval arms limitation, to include Far Eastern political issues.<br />
Appointed chairman <strong>of</strong> the powerful Senate Foreign Relations<br />
Committee in 1924, Borah championed the cause <strong>of</strong> isolationism. In<br />
1927, he nonetheless came out in support <strong>of</strong> the Kellogg–Briand<br />
Pact, which attempted to outlaw war. Borah once remarked that it<br />
was “the only kind <strong>of</strong> a treaty the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> could sign” with the<br />
rest <strong>of</strong> the world.<br />
Borah did not, however, abandon his isolationist instincts. In 1934,<br />
he insisted that America would not be isolated economically, “but in<br />
all matters political, in all commitments <strong>of</strong> any nature or kind . . . we<br />
have been free, we have been independent, we have been isolationist.”<br />
Along with Senator Key Pittman in 1935, Borah authored a bill re-
BOXER UPRISING • 55<br />
quiring the president, in the event <strong>of</strong> a foreign war, to forbid arms<br />
shipments to both belligerents without distinction for attacker and attacked.<br />
He belittled arguments for an accelerated naval buildup so as<br />
to counter the growing <strong>Japan</strong>ese threat, arguing in 1938 that “however<br />
much we may disapprove <strong>of</strong> what is going on in the Orient, there is,<br />
to my mind, no probability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> attacking the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.” Borah<br />
remained isolationist to the bitter end. He died in February 1940.<br />
BOSHIN WAR. Lasting from early 1868 to mid-1869, the Boshin War<br />
was a civil war fought between the primarily northern domains that<br />
supported the Tokugawa shogunate and the Satsuma and Choshuled<br />
domains fighting to unify <strong>Japan</strong> under a new imperial government<br />
led by Emperor Meiji. The last Tokugawa shogun ceded power to<br />
the emperor in late 1867, but many supporters <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa government,<br />
led by Aizu domain, regarded the establishment <strong>of</strong> the new<br />
Meiji imperial government as a coup d’etat by the Satsuma and<br />
Choshu domains. Though initially outnumbered by their opponents,<br />
the “imperial forces” <strong>of</strong> Satsuma and Choshu and their allies defeated<br />
the steadfast Tokugawa supporters with improved military tactics and<br />
Western firearms, especially Armstrong cannons, mostly obtained<br />
from European and American merchants. See also MEIJI RESTORA-<br />
TION; TOKUGAWA, YOSHINOBU.<br />
BOXER UPRISING. The Boxer Uprising erupted in 1900. A massive<br />
uprising against the foreign and Christian presence in China, the<br />
Boxers first targeted foreign missionaries and their Chinese converts<br />
in Shantung province, but their aims soon broadened to include the<br />
elimination from China <strong>of</strong> all foreign influence. Attacking foreign<br />
rails and property along the way, the Boxers advanced against the imperial<br />
capital <strong>of</strong> Peking and laid siege to the legation quarter. The outside<br />
world’s contacts with the legation quarter were cut, and it was<br />
feared for some weeks that all foreign diplomats and foreign residents<br />
may have perished.<br />
The Boxers convinced themselves that they had magic powers that<br />
made them invulnerable. They were soon disabused <strong>of</strong> this notion. The<br />
foreign powers dispatched troops—including 13,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops,<br />
8,100 Russian troops, 5,800 British troops, 4,000 American troops, and<br />
2,100 French troops—who possessed overwhelming military force.
56 • BROOKS, CHARLES WOLCOTT<br />
Order was soon restored, and the Chinese government agreed to the<br />
payment <strong>of</strong> an indemnity for foreign lives lost and properties destroyed.<br />
It also agreed to punish those responsible for the attacks on<br />
foreigners and to permit the foreign powers to police the railroad line<br />
connecting Peking with the coast near Tientsin.<br />
So far as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government was concerned, a far more<br />
intractable problem rested with the possibility that the uprising might<br />
provide such nations as <strong>Japan</strong>, Russia, Britain, and France with a pretext<br />
for partitioning China into so-called spheres <strong>of</strong> influence. Although<br />
this process had been going on for some time already—Washington<br />
had put itself on record as opposing the partition <strong>of</strong> China in<br />
the first <strong>of</strong> its Open Door notes in 1899—the presence <strong>of</strong> foreign<br />
troops on Chinese soil greatly increased the likelihood <strong>of</strong> swollen imperial<br />
ambitions. In order to ward <strong>of</strong>f this possibility, Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
State John Hay issued the second <strong>of</strong> his Open Door notes, which<br />
specifically and unequivocally expressed U.S. respect for China’s<br />
“territorial and administrative integrity.” Diplomatic notes, however,<br />
held little water in the face <strong>of</strong> Russian determination to remain in<br />
Manchuria. There can be little doubt that, in the minds <strong>of</strong> Washington’s<br />
policymakers, Russia’s opportunistic expansionism compared<br />
unfavorably with <strong>Japan</strong>’s seeming compliance with the Open Door<br />
policy. This proved invaluable to <strong>Japan</strong> once the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
War broke out, for <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Theodore Roosevelt<br />
proved a ready and reliable friend for <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
BROOKS, CHARLES WOLCOTT (1833–1885). American owner <strong>of</strong><br />
a trading company in San Francisco having business interests in California,<br />
the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii, China, and <strong>Japan</strong>. In addition to operating<br />
his trading business during Gold Rush era San Francisco, in<br />
1858, Brooks was appointed by the Tokugawa shogunate as its commercial<br />
agent and consul general for <strong>Japan</strong> in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, a position<br />
he continued to serve until 1873 under the new Meiji government.<br />
Brooks arranged commercial transactions for <strong>Japan</strong>, looked<br />
after castaway <strong>Japan</strong>ese sailors brought to San Francisco, and made<br />
arrangements for both the Shogun’s Embassy <strong>of</strong> 1860 and the<br />
Iwakura Mission <strong>of</strong> 1871–1873. In 1876, Brooks published an informative<br />
work on <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailors, titled <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Wrecks Stranded and Picked Up Adrift in the North Pacific Ocean.
BRYAN, WILLIAM JENNINGS • 57<br />
BROTHERHOOD OF THE NEW LIFE. A Christian utopian community<br />
founded by Thomas Lake Harris in 1860 in New York and<br />
lasting until his death in 1906. Several <strong>Japan</strong>ese samurai students in<br />
England in the mid-1860s were influenced by Laurence Oliphant, a<br />
British diplomat, to travel to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and join the Brotherhood<br />
<strong>of</strong> the New Life. Among the young <strong>Japan</strong>ese who joined were<br />
Arinori Mori, Kiyonari Yoshida, Kanaye Nagasawa, and Junzo<br />
Matsumura. In 1875, Harris moved the Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the New<br />
Life to Fountaingrove, near Santa Rosa, California. By then, only<br />
two <strong>Japan</strong>ese remained as devoted members <strong>of</strong> this utopian community.<br />
See also CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN.<br />
BROWN, SAMUEL ROBBINS (1810–1880). Christian missionary<br />
and educator. After missionary and education work in China, Samuel<br />
Brown spent two decades in <strong>Japan</strong> (1859–1879) as an educator and<br />
missionary for the Dutch Reformed Church <strong>of</strong> America. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials in both the Tokugawa shogunate and the succeeding<br />
Meiji government were wary <strong>of</strong> Christianity, but Brown gained their<br />
trust and was allowed to teach and engage in missionary work despite<br />
the political and social turbulence in <strong>Japan</strong> during the 1860s and<br />
1870s. See also CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN.<br />
BRYAN, WILLIAM JENNINGS (1860–1925). An Illinois lawyer,<br />
William Jennings Bryan ran unsuccessfully as the Democratic party<br />
candidate for president in 1896, 1900, and 1908. He subsequently<br />
served as President Woodrow Wilson’s secretary <strong>of</strong> state from 1913<br />
until 1915. He brought to the position little knowledge <strong>of</strong> international<br />
affairs, and contented himself with judging foreign politics<br />
from a moral point <strong>of</strong> view.<br />
When, on 19 August 1914, <strong>Japan</strong> declared war against Germany—<br />
thereby entering World War I—Bryan almost immediately reminded<br />
Tokyo <strong>of</strong> the American pledge to support “the independence and integrity<br />
<strong>of</strong> China and the principle <strong>of</strong> equal opportunity for the commerce<br />
and industry <strong>of</strong> all nations.” <strong>Japan</strong>, however, was not listening.<br />
Early in 1915, it secretly presented China with the infamous Twenty-<br />
One Demands, which, if accepted in their entirety, would have made<br />
<strong>of</strong> China a virtual <strong>Japan</strong>ese protectorate. When Washington learned<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s move, Bryan responded by warning Tokyo that the U.S.
58 • BUCHANAN, JAMES<br />
government remained committed to its traditional Open Door policy<br />
toward China. At the same time, he acknowledged that “territorial<br />
contiguity” created special relationships between <strong>Japan</strong> and China.<br />
Then, in May 1915, Bryan notified both Tokyo and Peking that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> refused to recognize any agreement that threatened the<br />
Open Door policy. In other words, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was not committed<br />
to China per se; rather, it was committed to protecting its own<br />
vital interests in that beleaguered country.<br />
At the same time that Bryan was lodging formal protests with the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government over its infringements <strong>of</strong> the Open Door, he<br />
was pleading with President Wilson to remain neutral in World War<br />
I. Wilson disregarded Bryan’s advice, and adopted an ever harder line<br />
toward Germany. In an apparent—and ultimately failed—effort to<br />
mobilize domestic peace sentiment against the administration’s policies,<br />
Bryan resigned on 9 June 1915.<br />
BUCHANAN, JAMES (1791–1868). President <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
from 1857 to 1861, James Buchanan previously served as secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> state and minister to Great Britain. In 1857, he met the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
castaway sailor Joseph Heco, also known as Hikozo Hamada. In<br />
1860, President Buchanan met with <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials from the<br />
Shogun’s Embassy in Washington, D.C.<br />
BUCK, ALFRED E. (1832–1902). An <strong>of</strong>ficer in the Union Army during<br />
the American Civil War, Alfred Buck later served as U.S. Congressman<br />
from Alabama even though he was a native <strong>of</strong> Maine.<br />
He was appointed in 1897 as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> minister to <strong>Japan</strong> and died<br />
at his post in Tokyo in 1902. During his service in Tokyo, the<br />
Spanish–American War, the American annexation <strong>of</strong> Hawaii, the<br />
Boxer Rebellion in China, and Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Hay’s “Open<br />
Door Notes” were issues <strong>of</strong> concern between the American and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese governments.<br />
BUDDHISM. Originating in India with Siddharta Gautama—the Buddha—around<br />
500 BCE, Buddhism entered <strong>Japan</strong> by way <strong>of</strong> Korea and<br />
China in the late 500s CE. Imperial family members and warrior clans<br />
adopted various Buddhist beliefs associated with Mahayana Buddhism<br />
over the next several centuries, which also spread to many <strong>of</strong>
BURMA ROAD • 59<br />
the common people. Tendai, Pure Land, True Pure Land, Shingon,<br />
Nichiren, and Zen have long been the most widespread Buddhist sects<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>, while Sokka Gakkai is a more recent and growing Buddhist<br />
movement in <strong>Japan</strong>, with many followers in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Although<br />
most Buddhist sects in <strong>Japan</strong> include the core Buddhist beliefs<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, transmigration <strong>of</strong> the<br />
soul, and nirvana, Buddhism in <strong>Japan</strong> incorporates indigenous <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
cultural and philosophical beliefs. Traditional Shinto, for example,<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten overlaps and complements Buddhism in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
BUNMEI KAIKA. See CIVILIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT.<br />
BURMA ROAD. After <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces captured much <strong>of</strong> China’s<br />
coastline during 1938, and Chiang Kai-shek moved his capital to the<br />
inland city <strong>of</strong> Chungking, the Burma Road constituted the principal<br />
route <strong>of</strong> supply from the outside world to China. Throughout the first<br />
half <strong>of</strong> 1940, <strong>Japan</strong> sought to pressure its British counterpart (which<br />
was Burma’s colonial master) into closing the road. In this endeavor,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government was aided immeasurably by Adolf Hitler’s<br />
stunning military successes across Western Europe in the summer <strong>of</strong><br />
1940. Unable to face <strong>of</strong>f against both Germany and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese, the<br />
cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Winston Churchill in July 1940 agreed to<br />
close the Burma Road for three months.<br />
By September 1940, however, Churchill was increasingly optimistic<br />
concerning the courses open to his nation both in Europe and<br />
in the Far East. In part a product <strong>of</strong> Churchill’s confidence in Washington’s<br />
willingness to involve itself actively in world politics, his<br />
cabinet judged that they should reopen the Burma Road once the<br />
three-month period ended in October. After that time, shipments from<br />
America, and smaller amounts from Britain, were resumed. For Chiang<br />
Kai-shek, this was indeed good news.<br />
If this was good news for Chiang, it did not last. Soon after the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, they advanced<br />
into Burma and Rangoon fell to them on 7 March. Until <strong>Japan</strong>’s control<br />
<strong>of</strong> Burma was broken, China could receive supplies only from<br />
“Over the Hump” flights from India. By the time that Burma was recaptured,<br />
Chiang Kai-shek had fallen out <strong>of</strong> power calculations in the<br />
Far East.
60 • CAIRO CONFERENCE<br />
– C –<br />
CAIRO CONFERENCE. In November and December 1943, <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston<br />
Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met at<br />
Cairo to discuss their nations’ war against <strong>Japan</strong>. Chiang pressed his<br />
allies to launch an amphibious assault in the Bay <strong>of</strong> Bengal to coincide<br />
with a Chinese intervention in Burma. Churchill was uninterested.<br />
Roosevelt was sympathetic, although his sympathy did not<br />
translate into any commitments on this score. Unable to <strong>of</strong>fer anything<br />
immediate to Chiang, Roosevelt instead assured the Chinese<br />
leader that his nation would recover its territorial integrity following<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s defeat. In a declaration that the three statesmen issued on 1<br />
December, they emphasized their determination to expel <strong>Japan</strong> from<br />
all territories it had “taken by violence and greed,” and the Allies further<br />
specified that, “<strong>Japan</strong> shall be stripped <strong>of</strong> all the islands in the<br />
Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
First World War in 1914, and that all the territory <strong>Japan</strong> has stolen<br />
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores,<br />
shall be restored to the Republic <strong>of</strong> China.” They also promised that<br />
Korea would become free and independent “in due course.” Although<br />
silent on the future <strong>of</strong> Okinawa, this declaration put <strong>Japan</strong>ese leaders<br />
on notice that their enemies were driven by the objective <strong>of</strong> reducing<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> territorially to the position it had occupied at the outset<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Meiji era some 100 years earlier. See also PACIFIC WAR;<br />
WORLD WAR II.<br />
CALIFORNIA. California is connected to Asia and <strong>Japan</strong> by the geographic<br />
proximity <strong>of</strong> the Pacific Ocean, and ports such as San Francisco<br />
and Los Angeles have been hubs <strong>of</strong> Asian trade and immigration<br />
since the 1850s when large numbers <strong>of</strong> Chinese and later<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrated to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Formerly the Mexican territory <strong>of</strong> Alta California, California became<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1850, soon after the discovery <strong>of</strong><br />
gold and the end <strong>of</strong> the Mexican–American War. The Gold Rush attracted<br />
people from all over the world to travel to California and find<br />
their fortune in “the golden state.” Most people did not find a fortune,<br />
but many stayed and transformed California into a state with a di-
CAPRON, HORACE • 61<br />
verse population and economy. Many people soon realized that California’s<br />
land, particularly the Central Valley, is superb for many kinds<br />
<strong>of</strong> agriculture. Beginning in the 1920s, the motion picture industry in<br />
Hollywood and Southern California added another dimension to the<br />
state’s diversity, as did the shipbuilding and military bases that<br />
sprang into existence during World War II. High-tech and computerrelated<br />
industries inland from the Bay Area (“Silicon Valley”) have<br />
attracted people and capital since the 1950s. California is the most<br />
populous <strong>of</strong> the 50 states, and is the third largest in area (Alaska and<br />
Texas are larger).<br />
Yet, California has also been a center <strong>of</strong> racial controversy and<br />
source <strong>of</strong> discriminatory, race-based laws, such as the Chinese Exclusion<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> 1882, segregation <strong>of</strong> Asian schoolchildren in San<br />
Francisco in 1906, Alien Land Laws <strong>of</strong> the 1910s, the Oriental Exclusion<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> 1924, and the internment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
during World War II. The largest <strong>of</strong> the internment camps (formally<br />
known as War Relocation Camps) was located at Manzanar,<br />
California.<br />
Despite the discrimination faced by <strong>Japan</strong>ese from the 19th century<br />
to the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, more <strong>Japan</strong>ese and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
live in California than any other state, and more <strong>Japan</strong>ese students<br />
attend colleges in California than any other state as well. In<br />
addition to <strong>Japan</strong>ese American businesses and farms throughout the<br />
state, <strong>Japan</strong>ese-owned corporations are a significant portion <strong>of</strong> California’s<br />
economy.<br />
CAPRON, HORACE (1804–1885). Horace Capron led a cavalry unit<br />
during the American Civil War, and later served as a special representative<br />
<strong>of</strong> the president for Indian Affairs. A specialist in cotton<br />
mills and agricultural technology, Capron became commissioner <strong>of</strong><br />
agriculture <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1867. He resigned this cabinetlevel<br />
position in 1871 to lead a team <strong>of</strong> Americans and <strong>Japan</strong>ese employed<br />
by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government to work with the Hokkaido Colonization<br />
Bureau (Kaitakushi) to improve the agricultural and<br />
economic development <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s large northern island. Capron was<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the highest-pr<strong>of</strong>ile “foreign experts” ( yatoi) in <strong>Japan</strong> during<br />
the early Meiji Era. He returned to Washington, D.C., in 1875, where<br />
he continued to advocate <strong>Japan</strong>’s interests until his death in 1885.
62 • CASTAWAY SAILORS, JAPANESE<br />
CASTAWAY SAILORS, JAPANESE. With their small, coastal ships<br />
blown by storms into the vast Pacific Ocean, only a few <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
castaway sailors were rescued and ultimately returned to <strong>Japan</strong>. According<br />
to the “closed country” (sakoku) laws <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa Era<br />
(1600–1868), it was punishable by death for <strong>Japan</strong>ese to return home<br />
if they had been abroad—even by accident. Although this law was<br />
rarely enforced, in the Morrison Incident <strong>of</strong> 1835, three <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
castaways were not allowed back on <strong>Japan</strong>ese soil and were obliged<br />
to return to Hong Kong. <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailors in the first half <strong>of</strong><br />
the 19th century who were allowed to return, such as Otokichi, Manjiro,<br />
and Joseph Heco, were the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese to observe American<br />
social, political, and cultural customs and report their observations to<br />
their fellow <strong>Japan</strong>ese.<br />
CASTLE, WILLIAM R., Jr. (1878–1963). William Castle was an influential<br />
American diplomat who consistently saw <strong>Japan</strong> as a force<br />
for stability in the Far Eastern region. His influence reached its peak<br />
during the administration <strong>of</strong> President Herbert Hoover.<br />
Born in Honolulu, William Castle graduated from Harvard University<br />
in 1900. He held various administrative posts at Harvard until<br />
he was appointed director <strong>of</strong> the Bureau <strong>of</strong> Communications <strong>of</strong> the<br />
American Red Cross in World War I. At the end <strong>of</strong> the war, he was<br />
appointed special assistant to the State Department, and served from<br />
1921 to 1927 as chief <strong>of</strong> the Department’s Division <strong>of</strong> West European<br />
Affairs. In 1927, he was promoted to assistant secretary <strong>of</strong> state.<br />
Three years later, Castle’s close friend President Herbert Hoover<br />
named him special ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. Possessed <strong>of</strong> the belief that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> represented a force for order in East Asia, Castle openly and<br />
unashamedly labeled himself a “friend <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.” His ambassadorial<br />
posting came at a crucial time, coinciding as it did with the First London<br />
Naval Conference. Henry L. Stimson, chairman <strong>of</strong> the U.S.<br />
delegation to that conference, later admitted that Castle’s actions as<br />
ambassador helped secure <strong>Japan</strong>’s agreement to the London Naval<br />
Treaty.<br />
Castle returned to Washington in 1931 to succeed Joseph Cotton as<br />
under secretary <strong>of</strong> state. Almost immediately, he was faced with the<br />
unwelcome prospect <strong>of</strong> the Manchurian Incident. Entirely out <strong>of</strong><br />
step with his direct superior, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry L. Stimson,
CHIANG KAI-SHEK • 63<br />
Castle argued that <strong>Japan</strong>’s control on Manchuria was to be preferred<br />
over that <strong>of</strong> China. During the ensuing months, Castle successfully<br />
opposed economic sanctions against <strong>Japan</strong>, and exercised a vital influence<br />
over the so-called Stimson Doctrine <strong>of</strong> nonrecognition <strong>of</strong><br />
conquests <strong>of</strong> aggression, restricting it to nonrecognition <strong>of</strong> “treaties<br />
affecting American rights which might be secured through military<br />
pressure <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> on China.”<br />
In late 1931, after Cameron Forbes resigned as ambassador to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, Castle worked behind the scenes to have Joseph C. Grew, the<br />
ambassador to Turkey, appointed to Tokyo. He took personal charge<br />
<strong>of</strong> preparing Grew for his new assignment, which included introducing<br />
him to the State Department’s premier <strong>Japan</strong> expert in Eugene H.<br />
Dooman. Republican to the core, Castle left the State Department<br />
soon after Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president in 1933.<br />
Castle emerged in the early postwar period as an influential member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the American Council on <strong>Japan</strong>, a pressure group that wielded<br />
some influence in the remaking <strong>of</strong> postwar <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
CHARTER OATH. Issued on 6 April 1868 by the new Meiji government,<br />
the oath included five articles, the last stating that, “Knowledge<br />
shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations<br />
<strong>of</strong> imperial rule.”<br />
CHIANG KAI-SHEK (1887–1975). Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek<br />
led China throughout its long war against <strong>Japan</strong>. Irascible, arrogant,<br />
and stubborn, he confounded foreign observers—including American<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>ese—with his all-consuming commitment to the eradication<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chinese communism, and his simultaneous pursuit <strong>of</strong> anti-<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese resistance.<br />
By the late 1920s, Chiang had risen to a position <strong>of</strong> leadership in<br />
China. He faced serious domestic opposition from the Chinese Communists,<br />
various warlords, and a rival faction <strong>of</strong> his own Kuomintang.<br />
He chose not to respond with force to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese invasion <strong>of</strong><br />
Manchuria in 1931, preferring instead to concentrate on consolidating<br />
his control over the rest <strong>of</strong> China. This changed after the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />
the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War in July 1937. Although <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops met<br />
with considerable battlefield successes, Chiang retreated to China’s interior<br />
and from there directed the fight against the <strong>Japan</strong>ese. Prime
64 • CHINA INCIDENT<br />
Minister Fumimaro Konoe in January 1938 announced that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government would deal with Chiang only on the battlefield and at<br />
the surrender table. Washington responded by extending loans to Chiang<br />
in an attempt to keep him in the fight. In 1941, President Franklin<br />
D. Roosevelt allowed American airmen to resign from their service to<br />
form a “volunteer” air force in China known as the Flying Tigers.<br />
Chiang, who had long nursed visions <strong>of</strong> a Sino–American alliance,<br />
was understandably elated when in December 1941 the <strong>Japan</strong>ese attacked<br />
Pearl Harbor. He also could not help but be impressed by<br />
Roosevelt’s repeated statements to the effect that China would<br />
emerge as one <strong>of</strong> the postwar world’s great powers. Chiang became<br />
disillusioned, however, as it soon became obvious that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> had little in the way <strong>of</strong> concrete assistance to provide China.<br />
As one observer has noted, China received all <strong>of</strong> the praise and some<br />
<strong>of</strong> the loyalty due an ally, but little <strong>of</strong> the substance.<br />
It should be noted that Chiang did nothing to help his cause. Determined<br />
to keep his forces intact for a future clash with the Chinese<br />
Communists, Chiang throughout 1943–1944 turned a blind eye as<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops launched <strong>of</strong>fensives in Burma and China. This led<br />
one American Foreign Service <strong>of</strong>ficer in late 1943 to suggest that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> could “accomplish [its] immediate objective in Asia—<br />
the defeat <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>—without him.” By mid-1944, if not earlier, Roosevelt<br />
agreed with this prognosis.<br />
CHINA INCIDENT. See SINO–JAPANESE WAR.<br />
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT (1882). Passed by the U.S. Congress<br />
in response to labor unions, farmers, and politicians from Western<br />
states complaining that Chinese immigrants were taking too many<br />
jobs from American citizens and white immigrants. Initially set for<br />
10 years, the act was modified in 1892 and then made permanent in<br />
1902. It was finally repealed during World War II. The Chinese Exclusion<br />
Act did not affect <strong>Japan</strong>ese; but in 1924, the U.S. Congress<br />
passed the Oriental Exclusion Act that prohibited nearly all <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
immigration.<br />
CHOSHU DOMAIN (YAMAGUCHI PREFECTURE). A warriordominated<br />
domain on southern Honshu Island led by the descendants
CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN • 65<br />
<strong>of</strong> Motonari Mori. Its primary castle town was Hagi. Choshu was a<br />
leading advocate <strong>of</strong> the violent “revere the emperor, expel the barbarian”<br />
movement <strong>of</strong> the 1850s and 1860s. In 1863, Choshu fired on<br />
Western ships passing through the Shimonoseki Straits. After the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate failed to settle the matter, an armada <strong>of</strong> American,<br />
British, French, and Dutch ships attacked Hagi the following<br />
year. Choshu quickly agreed to a settlement with the Westerners.<br />
Along with samurai from Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen domains,<br />
Choshu overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate and its allies in early<br />
1868, resulting in the Meiji Restoration. During the Meiji Era,<br />
many top leaders <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s government, such as Hirobumi Ito, were<br />
from Choshu. In 1871, Choshu domain was formally incorporated<br />
into Yamaguchi Prefecture.<br />
CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN. Spanish and Portuguese missionaries in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> during the 16th century converted some <strong>Japan</strong>ese to Christianity,<br />
especially on the southern island <strong>of</strong> Kyushu. From the late 16th<br />
century, however, <strong>Japan</strong>ese were forbidden to convert to Christianity,<br />
primarily because the central government believed Christianity was a<br />
threat to its political power. A small number <strong>of</strong> European missionaries<br />
and several <strong>Japan</strong>ese converts to Christianity were executed in the<br />
late 16th and early 17th centuries. Because <strong>of</strong> increased contact with<br />
Westerners during the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, the anti-Christian<br />
policies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> became the subject <strong>of</strong> diplomatic disputes. After<br />
discussions among members <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura Mission, their American<br />
and European counterparts, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese college students in<br />
America, the Meiji government <strong>of</strong>ficially dropped the prohibition on<br />
Christianity in 1873. There have been no central government laws<br />
against Christianity since 1873, but during the patriotic movement <strong>of</strong><br />
1880s and during World War II, Christianity and pacifist Buddhism<br />
were <strong>of</strong>ten denounced by <strong>Japan</strong>ese ultranationalists.<br />
Despite considerable efforts <strong>of</strong> Western missionaries and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Christian leaders, less than 2 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese identify themselves<br />
as Christians. However, Western missionaries and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Christians<br />
have had a notable influence since the beginning <strong>of</strong> the Meiji<br />
Era in establishing schools, colleges, hospitals, and programs to assist<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese in need. See also BROTHERHOOD OF THE NEW<br />
LIFE; BROWN, SAMUEL ROBBINS; CLARK, WILLIAM
66 • CHURCHILL, WINSTON S.<br />
SMITH; DOSHISHA UNIVERSITY; KIDDER, MARY EDDY; NI-<br />
IJIMA, JO; UCHIMURA, KANZO.<br />
CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. (1874–1965). From 10 May 1940 until<br />
27 July 1945 (and again from October 1951 until April 1955), Winston<br />
Churchill served as Great Britain’s prime minister. An eloquent<br />
public speaker (and writer), Churchill was possessed <strong>of</strong> an immense<br />
energy and steadfastness, qualities that enabled him to carry Britain<br />
through some <strong>of</strong> its darkest days in World War II.<br />
Born in 1874 to a British father and American mother, Churchill as<br />
a 21-year-old joined the army. This gained him considerable experience<br />
abroad, until 1900, when he embarked on a career in politics.<br />
Elected to parliament in 1900, he served over the ensuing years as under<br />
secretary <strong>of</strong> state for the colonies, home secretary, first lord <strong>of</strong> the<br />
admiralty, minister <strong>of</strong> munitions, secretary <strong>of</strong> state for war, secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> state for air, secretary <strong>of</strong> state for the colonies, and chancellor <strong>of</strong><br />
the exchequer. In the late 1930s, he emerged as a fierce critic <strong>of</strong><br />
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policies toward<br />
Adolf Hitler. He marked his rise to the prime minister’s <strong>of</strong>fice by<br />
claiming that his people would fight to the bitter end rather than see<br />
their country occupied by Nazi Germany. He forged an intimate relationship<br />
with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, based at least<br />
partly on the hard political calculation that Britain could emerge victorious<br />
only if the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> were willing to bring its immense<br />
power to bear upon Germany.<br />
Through 1941, Churchill inevitably viewed <strong>Japan</strong>ese intentions<br />
through the prism <strong>of</strong> Britain’s fight for survival against the Axis.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s alliance relationship with Nazi Germany signified clearly<br />
that nation’s intentions toward the colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia.<br />
Britain, however, did not have the resources at its disposal to simultaneously<br />
fight Germany and strengthen the defenses <strong>of</strong> its Far Eastern<br />
colonial outposts. Churchill thus found himself almost wholly dependent<br />
on Washington. This placed him in an awkward position, for<br />
although he could do little to strengthen Britain’s stance in the Pacific,<br />
he recognized the need to encourage every initiative that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> might take against <strong>Japan</strong>. Not only would this serve to<br />
buttress Britain’s exposed position in the Far East, but it might also<br />
serve to facilitate American entry into the war against Germany.
CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. • 67<br />
Churchill’s elation when the <strong>Japan</strong>ese attacked Pearl Harbor was<br />
real: “So we had won after all!”<br />
Thereafter, Churchill was content to let the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> take the<br />
lead in the war against <strong>Japan</strong>. In May 1944, he explained to the Commonwealth<br />
prime ministers: “We must regard ourselves as junior<br />
partners in the war against <strong>Japan</strong>.” Having acquiesced in America’s<br />
preponderance <strong>of</strong> power in the Pacific theater <strong>of</strong> war, Churchill<br />
played only a peripheral role in the decision to use the atomic bomb<br />
against <strong>Japan</strong>. In 1944, he agreed with <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt that, in the event the bomb became available,<br />
it should be used against <strong>Japan</strong>. Then, after Washington in late June<br />
1945 informed London <strong>of</strong> its intention to use the bomb some time in<br />
August, Churchill approved “without a moment’s hesitation.” When<br />
he met with President Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference,<br />
Churchill again reiterated his belief in the efficacy <strong>of</strong> the bomb. On<br />
this matter, Churchill seemed to recognize not only that the atomic<br />
bomb would shorten the war against <strong>Japan</strong>, but that it could prove a<br />
powerful diplomatic weapon vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.<br />
It is also worth noting that during the endgame <strong>of</strong> the war against<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, Churchill quietly pressed his American allies to modify the<br />
unconditional surrender policy. At the Yalta Conference, he asked<br />
Roosevelt whether a mitigation <strong>of</strong> the unconditional surrender policy<br />
might shorten the war, although he was careful to add that on this<br />
score his government was prepared to abide by Washington’s judgment.<br />
He again raised the issue with Truman at Potsdam, although he<br />
chose not to press the matter.<br />
From the viewpoint <strong>of</strong> securing the postwar peace, Churchill<br />
throughout the war was adamant that the British and their American<br />
(and perhaps Soviet) allies must continue to work together. He was<br />
anxious to see the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> obtain many <strong>of</strong> the islands for which<br />
it was fighting the <strong>Japan</strong>ese—including the Carolines, Marshalls, and<br />
Marianas—if only because such would ensure against a return to the<br />
isolationism that had hamstrung American foreign policymakers<br />
throughout the 1930s. He was also convinced that <strong>Japan</strong> must be rendered<br />
powerless to again threaten the peace and security <strong>of</strong> the Pacific,<br />
and at one time spoke <strong>of</strong> the need to reduce <strong>Japan</strong>ese industrial<br />
centers to ashes. Churchill’s alignment with those who advocated a<br />
harsh peace for <strong>Japan</strong> was somewhat mollified after its surrender. As
68 • “CIVILIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT”<br />
the trials <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese war criminals was set in motion, Churchill (who<br />
had been voted out <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice) remarked that it was “stupid” to hand<br />
“prominent people” when the Allies needed <strong>Japan</strong>ese cooperation.<br />
“CIVILIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT” (BUNMEI KAIKA).<br />
A phrase <strong>of</strong>ten used in the 1870s to indicate the admiration and <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> Western cultural and social life in the “new” <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Meiji Era. Yukichi Fukuzawa, Arinori Mori, Amane Nishi, and<br />
the Meirokusha group <strong>of</strong> intellectuals are <strong>of</strong>ten associated with the<br />
idea <strong>of</strong> “civilization and enlightenment.”<br />
CLARK, WILLIAM SMITH (1825–1886). Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> chemistry<br />
and zoology at Amherst College in Massachusetts during the 1850s<br />
and 1860s, Clark served with the Union Army during the American<br />
Civil War, and later in several appointed political positions in Massachusetts.<br />
From 1867 to 1878, he was president <strong>of</strong> the Massachusetts<br />
Agricultural College, which later became the University <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts—Amherst.<br />
Clark was hired by the Meiji government in<br />
1876 to work with the Hokkaido Colonization Bureau (Kaitakushi)<br />
for the agricultural development <strong>of</strong> Hokkaido, and to establish Sapporo<br />
Agricultural College, which later became Hokkaido University.<br />
When teaching <strong>Japan</strong>ese students agricultural techniques, he emphasized<br />
Christian principles, and is therefore regarded as both an education<br />
specialist and missionary during his one year in <strong>Japan</strong>. As he<br />
was departing Sapporo, Clark reportedly told his students, “Boys, be<br />
ambitious.” The phrase became an inspiration for many young <strong>Japan</strong>ese,<br />
and is still widely known in <strong>Japan</strong> today. See also CAPRON,<br />
HORACE; YATOI.<br />
CLASS SYSTEM IN JAPAN. The formal, hereditary, Confucianderived<br />
class system in <strong>Japan</strong> during the Tokugawa Era<br />
(1600–1868) was divided into four major groups: samurai, farmer,<br />
artisan, and merchant (shi-nō-kō-shō in <strong>Japan</strong>ese). At the top <strong>of</strong> this<br />
system were the samurai and their families, who were less than 10<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the overall population <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The top samurai were the<br />
shogun; ranking members <strong>of</strong> the shogun’s government, known as the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate; and daimyō, the feudal lords. Farmers, or<br />
peasants, were the largest proportion, with around 70 percent <strong>of</strong> the
CONFUCIANISM • 69<br />
population, while artisans and merchants comprised most <strong>of</strong> the remainder<br />
<strong>of</strong> this hierarchy. Although formally despised because they<br />
were considered unproductive members <strong>of</strong> society, many merchants<br />
amassed considerable wealth and exercised influence during the<br />
Tokugawa Era. Imperial family members, Buddhist and Shinto<br />
priests, burakumin (so-called hamlet people), Ainu, and foreigners<br />
were outside the formal class system and considered special categories.<br />
The system was abolished in 1872; but most top government<br />
positions throughout the Meiji Era (1868–1912) were held by men<br />
from samurai families. See also MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
COLLATERAL FUND OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN. As a<br />
special counterpart yen fund budget, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government incorporated<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese yen equivalent <strong>of</strong> the total amount <strong>of</strong> U.S. assistance<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government was able to use this fund<br />
under the supervision <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Commander for the Allied<br />
Powers (SCAP). This fund is called the Collateral Fund <strong>of</strong> U.S. Assistance<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. Joseph Dodge, President Harry S. Truman’s special<br />
envoy to <strong>Japan</strong> to stabilize <strong>Japan</strong>ese inflation, ordered the establishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fund. The total amount <strong>of</strong> funding in the first year<br />
amounted to 140 billion yen. It was used for railroads, telecommunications,<br />
and direct investment in private corporations. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
cabinet decided the outline for the use <strong>of</strong> the Collateral Fund on 12<br />
April 1949. The Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) made a plan<br />
<strong>of</strong> operation as an integral part <strong>of</strong> a comprehensive fund scheme. In<br />
reality, however, the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Finance managed and operated the<br />
counterpart fund.<br />
CONFUCIANISM. Based on the ancient teachings <strong>of</strong> Confucius,<br />
Mencius, and later Zhu Xi <strong>of</strong> China, Confucianism has been part <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s social, political, and cultural heritage from the late 500s CE.<br />
Emphasizing the values <strong>of</strong> benevolence, sincerity, harmony, proper<br />
order, self-discipline, and education, Confucianism is not actually a<br />
religion but an ethical value system that has been widely observed by<br />
East Asians for more than 2,000 years. During the Tokugawa Era,<br />
Confucian values were used to maintain the class system. Confucian<br />
values <strong>of</strong>ten overlap with Buddhism (particularly Zen Buddhism)<br />
and Shinto in <strong>Japan</strong>. See also CLASS SYSTEM IN JAPAN.
70 • COTTON CREDIT<br />
COTTON CREDIT. In 1951, the Export–Import Bank <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> (EIBUS) decided to provide <strong>Japan</strong> with $765 million in credit<br />
for 13 years for purchasing U.S. cotton. The first cotton credit was<br />
awarded in December 1951. The EIBUS continued to provide cotton<br />
credits until the arrangement came to an end with the 14th and last<br />
credit <strong>of</strong>fering in July 1964. The first 10 blocks <strong>of</strong> cotton credit were<br />
handled by the Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and the last four blocks were handled<br />
by the Tokyo Bank. The U.S. goal in this credit arrangement was to<br />
promote exports <strong>of</strong> U.S. cotton by providing <strong>Japan</strong> and other countries<br />
with the financial assistance to purchase cotton. The first block<br />
<strong>of</strong> cotton credit awarded <strong>Japan</strong> in December 1951 was valued at $40<br />
million. Another block <strong>of</strong> $40 million was given in May 1953 followed<br />
by $60 million in December 1953. These initial three credit<br />
blocks, which functioned as revolving funds, helped to improve<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s foreign exchange situation. <strong>Japan</strong> also concluded the fourth<br />
cotton credit with the sum <strong>of</strong> $60 million in August 1954. Throughout<br />
the 1950s, the overall impact <strong>of</strong> these credits aided in facilitating<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s economic growth. The agreement also assisted <strong>Japan</strong>’s shipping<br />
industry by stipulating that, in principle, cotton shipped from the<br />
U.S. to <strong>Japan</strong> should be handled by either U.S. or <strong>Japan</strong>ese cargo<br />
ships (though not less than 50% <strong>of</strong> cotton cargo was to be handled by<br />
U.S. ships).<br />
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND<br />
THE UNITED STATES. When an alleged criminal flees abroad,<br />
where <strong>Japan</strong>ese national sovereignty has no authority, the investigative<br />
authorities cannot arrest that person. Consequently, <strong>Japan</strong> makes<br />
treaties with foreign countries concerning criminal extradition. The<br />
Criminal Extradition Treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> became<br />
effective in March 1980. Following the conclusion <strong>of</strong> this<br />
treaty, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government enacted a Law on Extradition. When<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> is requested to extradite a foreign fugitive staying in <strong>Japan</strong>, the<br />
request would be forwarded along with related papers from the Ministry<br />
<strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs through the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors’<br />
Office to the Tokyo High Court. This court will then examine<br />
whether it is appropriate or not to extradite the alleged criminal. Unless<br />
the alleged criminal has <strong>Japan</strong>ese nationality or may be involved<br />
in a political crime, the Tokyo High Court in principle approves <strong>of</strong>
the extradition. When the Tokyo High Court decides the extradition,<br />
the alleged criminal will be sent to an investigative institution in the<br />
requested country. Besides the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong> has also concluded<br />
a criminal extradition treaty with South Korea.<br />
– D –<br />
DEFENSE • 71<br />
DAIMYŌ. The title given to lords <strong>of</strong> large domains from the 1300s until<br />
1871. The size <strong>of</strong> domain and position <strong>of</strong> the daimyō relative to the<br />
shogun determined their place in the hierarchy <strong>of</strong> political and military<br />
leaders. During the Tokugawa Era (1600–1867), most daimyō<br />
were forced to obey regulations and restrictions established by the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate. When U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew<br />
Perry and other Westerners began arriving in <strong>Japan</strong> in the 1850s,<br />
long-frustrated daimyō took advantage <strong>of</strong> the opportunity to launch an<br />
ultimately successful movement to overthrow the Tokugawa bakufu.<br />
See also AIZU DOMAIN; CHOSHU DOMAIN; CLASS SYSTEM<br />
IN JAPAN; MEIJI RESTORATION; SATSUMA DOMAIN.<br />
DE LONG, CHARLES (1832–1878). <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> minister to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
from 1869 to 1873. On several occasions, De Long formally complained<br />
to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government about still-existing anti-Christian<br />
laws, which were finally repealed in 1873. Temporarily acting as the<br />
Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii’s chief representative in <strong>Japan</strong>, De Long negotiated<br />
and signed the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and Commerce between Hawaii<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong> in 1871. De Long also accompanied and assisted the<br />
Iwakura Mission during its journey in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He also<br />
recognized <strong>Japan</strong>’s claim <strong>of</strong> sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands<br />
(Okinawa) on behalf <strong>of</strong> the U.S. government. See also CHRIS-<br />
TIANITY; MARIA LUZ INCIDENT.<br />
DEFENSE. After World War I, <strong>Japan</strong> found it beneficial to cooperate<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. This cooperation led to the success <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Washington Conference (1921–1922). However, the economic depression<br />
and subsequent establishment <strong>of</strong> economic blocs in the<br />
1930s pressured <strong>Japan</strong> into resorting to military force to advance into<br />
China. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> opposed <strong>Japan</strong>’s advance to China. In order
72 • DEFENSE<br />
to resist U.S. pressure to leave China, <strong>Japan</strong> concluded the Tripartite<br />
Pact in September 1940 and was getting ready to drive into Southeast<br />
Asia in order to access the region’s rich natural resources.<br />
In response, <strong>Japan</strong> was faced with the ABCD encirclement in<br />
April 1941. American, British, Chinese, and Dutch <strong>of</strong>ficials agreed to<br />
collaborate to strangle <strong>Japan</strong> economically.<br />
Finally, in December 1941, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese military attacked Pearl<br />
Harbor—the start <strong>of</strong> the Pacific War. <strong>Japan</strong> had some success early<br />
on, but the Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway in June 1942 was a turning point. U.S.<br />
forces captured islands that <strong>Japan</strong> had occupied, such as the Mariana<br />
Islands and Iwo Jima. Finally, from April to June 1945, the Battle <strong>of</strong><br />
Okinawa, one <strong>of</strong> the bloodiest battles <strong>of</strong> the war, took place. Finally,<br />
President Harry S. Truman resorted to Atomic bomb attacks in August<br />
1945. The Pacific War ended on 15 August 1945.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the major purposes <strong>of</strong> the Allied Occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> was<br />
the demilitarization that culminated in inserting Article Nine, the socalled<br />
war-renunciation clause, in the new <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution<br />
that was promulgated and became effective on 3 May 1947. Pacifist<br />
sentiment was widespread among the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people.<br />
However, the emergence <strong>of</strong> the Cold War in the late 1940s, and especially<br />
the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Korean War in June 1950, prompted talks<br />
on <strong>Japan</strong>ese defense. As U.S. military forces were poured into the<br />
Korea War, GHQ established the National Police Reserve on 10 August<br />
1950 in order to defend <strong>Japan</strong>. On 8 September 1951, immediately<br />
after the signing <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty was concluded. This latter became effective<br />
along with the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> also urged <strong>Japan</strong> to increase its defense capabilities. On 26<br />
April 1952, the Marine Police was established as an arm <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong><br />
Coast Guard. On 1 August, the <strong>Japan</strong> Guard (Hoancho) was formed<br />
to govern the National Police Reserve and the Marine Police.<br />
Nevertheless, <strong>Japan</strong> adopted the Yoshida Doctrine. Tokyo made<br />
every effort to maintain a delicate balance between accommodating<br />
pressure from Washington to increase its defense forces, on the one<br />
hand, and its pursuit <strong>of</strong> economic recovery, on the other. At the<br />
Ikeda–Robertson Talks in October 1953, despite insistent and consistent<br />
U.S. pressure, Ikeda agreed only an incremental increase in its<br />
defense forces. On 8 March 1954, Washington and Tokyo signed the
DEFENSE • 73<br />
Mutual Security Agreements. On 9 June 1954, two major pieces <strong>of</strong><br />
defense-related legislation, the Defense Agency Act and the Self-<br />
Defense Forces Law, were promulgated, and they became effective<br />
on 1 July. Subsequently, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government established the Defense<br />
Agency, and the Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-<br />
Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force were inaugurated.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty was revised on 19 January 1960<br />
in order to make the alliance more equal, and it became effective on<br />
23 June 1960. In November 1978, the Guidelines for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Defense Cooperation were formulated in order to “create a solid basis<br />
for more effective and credible U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> cooperation.” However,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government has an <strong>of</strong>ficial interpretation <strong>of</strong> Article<br />
Nine that although, as a sovereign nation, <strong>Japan</strong> has the right <strong>of</strong><br />
collective self-defense, Article Nine will not permit the authorization<br />
<strong>of</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> this right, nor will it allow the dispatch <strong>of</strong> the Self-<br />
Defense Forces (SDF) abroad.<br />
The Gulf War in 1991 precipitated a heated debate about appropriate<br />
ways in which <strong>Japan</strong> can make an international contribution. In<br />
April 1991, after the war was already over, Tokyo decided to send<br />
SDF minesweepers to the Gulf. In June 1992, the Peace-Keeping<br />
Operations (PKO) International Cooperation Law was enacted<br />
and it became possible for the SDF to participate in PKO abroad. On<br />
29 October, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted<br />
enabling Tokyo to dispatch the SDF abroad during wartime. In November<br />
2001, Tokyo, in fact, dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense<br />
Force to the Indian Ocean. On 6 June 2003, laws on war contingencies<br />
were enacted. On 26 July 2003, special Self-Defense Forces<br />
were dispatched to Iraq.<br />
Even though the ratio <strong>of</strong> defense spending against Gross Domestic<br />
Product (GDP) is relatively low in global terms, about 1 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
GDP, <strong>Japan</strong>’s defense budget is the third largest in the world, after the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Russia. For the fiscal year 2006, <strong>Japan</strong>’s defense<br />
budget was 4,814 billion yen. As <strong>of</strong> March 2005, there were about<br />
234,000 SDF members comprising about 147,000, 45,000, and 44,000<br />
in the Ground SDF, Air SDF, and Marine SDF, respectively. As <strong>of</strong> 2004,<br />
there were about 400,00 American servicepersons stationed in <strong>Japan</strong>, <strong>of</strong><br />
which 18,000 members stay in Okinawa. Washington and Tokyo<br />
agreed that 8,000 members would move to Guam from Okinawa. See
74 • DEFENSE AGENCY ACT<br />
also ABCD ENCIRCLEMENT; ABSOLUTE SPHERE OF IMPER-<br />
IAL DEFENSE (1943); ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING<br />
AGREEMENT (ACSA); ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS (AUGUST<br />
1945); BATTLE OF MIDWAY (JUNE 1942); BATTLE OF OKI-<br />
NAWA (APRIL–JUNE 1945); DEFENSE AGENCY ACT; DEFENSE<br />
INDUSTRY COMMISSION OF THE JAPAN BUSINESS FEDERA-<br />
TION; DEFENSE-RELATED MINISTERS ROUND-TABLE CON-<br />
FERENCE; GIRARD INCIDENT; IKEDA–ROBERTSON TALKS;<br />
INDUSTRY FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION (IFSEC);<br />
JAPAN–U.S. ADMINISTRATION AGREEMENT; JAPAN–U.S.<br />
FLEET LOAN AGREEMENT; JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY CONSUL-<br />
TATIVE COMMITTEE (SCC); JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY,<br />
REVISION NEGOTIATIONS; JAPAN–U.S. STATUS-OF-FORCES<br />
AGREEMENT (SOFA); JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF FSX; MA-<br />
RINE POLICE; MITSUYA KENKYU; MUTUAL SECURITYAGREE-<br />
MENTS (MSAs); NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR BLOCKING REVI-<br />
SION OF THE JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY; NATIONAL<br />
DEFENSE COUNCIL (NDC); NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE;<br />
PEACE IN VIETNAM! CITIZENS’ COALITION; PRIOR CONSUL-<br />
TATION; SELF-DEFENSE FORCES LAW; SHIGEMITSU–<br />
DULLES MEETING.<br />
DEFENSE AGENCY ACT. The Defense Agency Act became effective<br />
on 9 June 1954. It stipulates the inauguration <strong>of</strong> the Defense<br />
Agency. It also lays down the Agency’s <strong>of</strong>ficial role, the clear domain<br />
<strong>of</strong> duty necessary to fulfill this role, and the organization necessary<br />
to carry out administration effectively. The law established for the<br />
first time the Defense Agency as an extra-ministerial bureau <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Cabinet <strong>of</strong>fice. It created a new appointment: the Director <strong>of</strong> the Defense<br />
Agency. The role <strong>of</strong> the Defense Agency includes maintaining<br />
a peaceful, independent and secure <strong>Japan</strong>. In order to achieve these<br />
goals, the Defense Agency controls and operates the Ground Self-<br />
Defense Force, Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Air Self-Defense<br />
Force, as well as assuming administrative responsibilities for related<br />
affairs. See also DEFENSE; SELF-DEFENSE FORCES LAW.<br />
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COMMISSION OF THE JAPAN BUSI-<br />
NESS FEDERATION. The <strong>Japan</strong> Economic Federation (Nihon
DEJIMA • 75<br />
Keizai Dantai Rengokai: Keidanren) and the <strong>Japan</strong> Federation <strong>of</strong><br />
Employers’Associations (Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei: Nikkeiren)<br />
were integrated into the <strong>Japan</strong> Business Federation (Nihon Keizai<br />
Dantai Rengokai: JBF) in May 2002. The JBF comprises 1,645<br />
member corporations and business organizations, among them, some<br />
90 major foreign-financed corporations, 131 major industry-classified<br />
national organizations, and 47 local economic organizations (as<br />
<strong>of</strong> 26 May 2005). The Defense Industry Commission (DIC) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
JBF summarizes the views on the business world in order to reflect<br />
their opinions in the National Defense Program Outline and the midterm<br />
defense buildup program. The DIC serves as <strong>Japan</strong>’s secretariat<br />
in the Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (IFSEC), a forum<br />
established in January 1997 that aims to provide the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and<br />
U.S. defense industries with opportunities to have a dialogue and to<br />
make policy recommendations to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments.<br />
See also DEFENSE.<br />
DEFENSE-RELATED MINISTERS ROUND-TABLE CONFER-<br />
ENCE. The Ichiro Hatoyama administration decided to establish a<br />
Defense-Related Ministers Round-Table Conference on 2 August<br />
1955. A bill to establish this conference was submitted to the 22nd<br />
special Diet session, but it was not passed. As a result, the conference<br />
was established as a prime minister’s advisory committee. It was responsible<br />
for examining various defense-related issues at a ministerial<br />
level upon request. In August 1955, the conference approved the “Six-<br />
Year Defense Program.” This program would increase the size <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Ground Self-Defense Force to 180,000 people provided that the<br />
U.S. ground forces pulled out within three years. In 1956, another bill<br />
to provide this advisory committee with a legal base was submitted to<br />
the Diet. On 2 July 1956, the conference became the “National Defense<br />
Conference” and was established within the cabinet.<br />
DEJIMA (NAGASAKI PREFECTURE). A relatively small, manmade<br />
island in Nagasaki harbor where Dutch and European merchants<br />
working for the Dutch East India Company were allowed to work and<br />
live during most <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa Era. The island and the Europeans<br />
living on it were restricted and kept under tight surveillance by guards<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate. Dejima became symbolic <strong>of</strong> the sakoku
76 • DODGE LINE<br />
(“national seclusion”) policies <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa government. See also<br />
DUTCH LEARNING.<br />
DODGE LINE. The Dodge Line was a series <strong>of</strong> fiscal and monetary<br />
austerity policies carried out in <strong>Japan</strong> in March 1949. The policies<br />
were based on a nine-point economic stabilization program that General<br />
Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers<br />
(GHQ/SCAP) showed to <strong>Japan</strong> in December 1948, and SCAP was<br />
insistent on strict adherence. The nine-point directive ordered <strong>Japan</strong><br />
to: balance the consolidated budgets; increase tax collection efficiency;<br />
restrict the increase <strong>of</strong> credit extension; control wages; control<br />
prices; control foreign trade; maximize exports by improving allocation<br />
and rationing systems; increase industrial and mining<br />
production; and increase the efficiency <strong>of</strong> the food collection program.<br />
In order to stabilize the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy based on the ninepoint<br />
program, President Harry S. Truman sent Joseph M. Dodge,<br />
president <strong>of</strong> the Detroit Bank, to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1949. Dodge forcefully laid<br />
down the so-called Dodge Line, consisting <strong>of</strong> the following measures:<br />
balancing the consolidated budget; more efficient tax collection;<br />
tight credit; reducing wage and price increases; controlling<br />
trade; allocating supplies to exporters; replacing the RFB with yen<br />
counter part funds; establishing a single exchange rate; and decreasing<br />
the amount <strong>of</strong> currency circulation. In March 1949, Dodge made<br />
a budget proposal based on rigid balance in the consolidated budget,<br />
including those <strong>of</strong> general, special, other government-related institutions,<br />
and local governments, which would result in a 156.7 billion<br />
yen surplus. The Dodge Line, in fact, rapidly achieved the balanced<br />
budget; however, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy severely suffered from deflation,<br />
a large amount <strong>of</strong> unemployment, and general economic deterioration.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy could not return to growth until<br />
the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Korean War brought economic windfall to <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. President William Howard Taft (1909–1913)<br />
once explained that his foreign policy was driven by the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
“substituting dollars for bullets.” In practice, Taft’s dollar diplomacy<br />
aimed not only to use diplomacy to advance America’s foreign business<br />
interests, but inversely to use dollars abroad to promote American<br />
diplomacy.
DOLLAR DIPLOMACY • 77<br />
As it related to the Far East, Taft’s dollar diplomacy represented a<br />
repudiation <strong>of</strong> the policies <strong>of</strong> his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt.<br />
Whereas Roosevelt was willing to recognize <strong>Japan</strong>’s predominant<br />
position in northern China—as evidenced by, most notably, the<br />
Root–Takahira Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1908—Taft sought to challenge<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s position by means <strong>of</strong> expanded American economic activities<br />
in China. This, in turn, it was hoped, would increase America’s political<br />
leverage. Because the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> remained committed to the<br />
Open Door, a central tenet <strong>of</strong> which was the maintenance <strong>of</strong> China’s<br />
territorial integrity, Taft apparently believed that he was acting not<br />
only in American but also Chinese interests.<br />
In October 1909, an American banking group that included J. P.<br />
Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb, secured Chinese approval to build a railway<br />
that would run part <strong>of</strong> the way parallel to <strong>Japan</strong>’s South Manchurian<br />
line. So long as <strong>Japan</strong> had maintained sole control <strong>of</strong> the transportation<br />
system in southern Manchuria, it exerted strategic domination<br />
over the region. The challenge that the new railway project posed to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese interests in Manchuria was obvious.<br />
Taft’s secretary <strong>of</strong> state, Philander C. Knox, quickly raised the<br />
stakes. In November–December 1909, he sent notes to <strong>Japan</strong>, Russia,<br />
France, Germany, and Great Britain, demanding the neutralization <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese railways in southern Manchuria and Russian railways in<br />
northern Manchuria. He hoped that the major powers—<strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
Russia excluded—would make available to the Chinese government<br />
the necessary funding to purchase the neutralized railways. Very few<br />
in Tokyo needed reminding that such a scheme would serve to end<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s strategic domination <strong>of</strong> southern Manchuria.<br />
Various factors combined to ensure the failure <strong>of</strong> Knox’s initiative.<br />
Knox counted heavily on British receptivity to the railway<br />
neutralization scheme, but this was hardly likely given the alliance<br />
relationship that Britain shared with <strong>Japan</strong>. Britain, moreover, was<br />
increasingly interested in strengthened ties with Russia to <strong>of</strong>fset<br />
the German threat. It should, then, have come as no surprise when<br />
the British did not climb aboard Knox’s scheme. At the same time,<br />
Knox drove <strong>Japan</strong> and Russia closer together. The two nations in<br />
July 1910 reached an agreement whereby Manchuria was divided<br />
into a Russian sphere in the north and a <strong>Japan</strong>ese sphere in the<br />
south. <strong>Japan</strong>’s position in southern Manchuria seemed further
78 • DOOLITTLE RAID<br />
entrenched when the American banking group-backed railroad<br />
failed to materialize.<br />
DOOLITTLE RAID. Almost immediately after the <strong>Japan</strong>ese attack on<br />
Pearl Harbor, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Franklin D. Roosevelt had<br />
called for a bombing raid against Tokyo. Vengeance obviously colored<br />
Roosevelt’s motives, but he was also informed by a belief in the<br />
applicability <strong>of</strong> air power against <strong>Japan</strong>. In any case, the president got<br />
his wish when, on 18 April 1942, Captain James Doolittle led 16<br />
B-25 bombers <strong>of</strong>f the carrier Hornet and launched a surprise attack<br />
against Tokyo, Kobe, Nagoya, Yokosuka, and Yokohama. None <strong>of</strong><br />
the planes were shot down. Instead they flew on to China, with one<br />
plane landing in the Soviet Union (where its crew was interned). The<br />
physical damage to <strong>Japan</strong>ese cities was minimal, although the effects<br />
<strong>of</strong> the so-called Doolittle Raid were tangible. On the one hand, it provided<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>—whose forces had been soundly defeated by<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese enemy in almost every battle since Pearl Harbor—with<br />
a much-need morale boost. On the other, it painted a grim picture<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>ese wartime leaders <strong>of</strong> the future shape <strong>of</strong> the war. In an<br />
effort to prevent further carrier-based air attacks against <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
Commander-in-Chief <strong>of</strong> the Combined Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto<br />
hastened plans for <strong>of</strong>fensives against Port Moresby and<br />
Midway. These were the first significant losses in battle sustained by<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and represented the beginning <strong>of</strong> the end for <strong>Japan</strong> in<br />
World War II.<br />
DOSHISHA UNIVERSITY. A private, Christian college founded in<br />
1875 by Jo Niijima, also known as Joseph Hardy Niishima, a <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Christian minister who lived and studied in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
from 1865 to 1874. Though it struggled to survive in its early years,<br />
Doshisha University currently has more than 20,000 undergraduate<br />
and graduate students in its many programs and attracts many international<br />
students and international faculty. Doshisha is located near<br />
the former imperial palace in Kyoto, <strong>Japan</strong>. See also CHRISTIAN-<br />
ITY; HARDY, ALPHAEUS.<br />
DULLES, JOHN FOSTER (1888—1959). John Foster Dulles was<br />
born in Washington, D.C., the son <strong>of</strong> a Presbyterian minister. He was<br />
educated at Princeton University, the Sorbonne in Paris, and George
DUTCH LEARNING • 79<br />
Washington University Law School. He joined the New York City<br />
law firm <strong>of</strong> Sullivan & Cromwell, where he specialized in international<br />
law. In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson appointed Dulles as<br />
legal counsel to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> delegation to the Paris Peace Conference<br />
following the end <strong>of</strong> World War I. Dulles later returned to<br />
practicing law, but, in 1945, he was asked to serve as adviser to<br />
Arthur H. Vandenberg at the San Francisco Conference to help draft<br />
the preamble to the <strong>United</strong> Nations Charter. Dulles also attended the<br />
<strong>United</strong> Nations General Assembly as a <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> delegate in<br />
1946, 1947, and 1950. In 1951, President Harry S. Truman appointed<br />
Dulles as ambassador at large to negotiate the peace treaty with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, along with a U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> security pact, both <strong>of</strong> which were<br />
signed on 8 September 1951.<br />
Dulles was chosen to be secretary <strong>of</strong> state during the presidency <strong>of</strong><br />
Dwight D. Eisenhower, serving in that position from 1953 to 1959.<br />
Dissatisfied with the Truman policy <strong>of</strong> containing communism that<br />
had become the centerpiece <strong>of</strong> U.S. foreign policy, Dulles advocated<br />
a more aggressive stance, which included the U.S. engaging in collective<br />
security with its allies, the development <strong>of</strong> a large arsenal <strong>of</strong><br />
nuclear weapons as part <strong>of</strong> a strategy <strong>of</strong> “massive retaliation” in case<br />
a nuclear attack against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> or its allies, and political<br />
and military brinkmanship with the Soviet Union and China to defend<br />
against communist advances. Some <strong>of</strong> his main accomplishments<br />
during his service in the Eisenhower administration were<br />
strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the<br />
1952 creation <strong>of</strong> the Australia, New Zealand, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America<br />
(ANZUS) Treat; and the 1954 establishment <strong>of</strong> the Southeast Asia<br />
Treaty Organization (SEATO), consisting <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Australia,<br />
Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,<br />
and Thailand, which was intended to provide the nations <strong>of</strong> Southeast<br />
Asian with collective security against aggression. In the Suez Canal<br />
crisis <strong>of</strong> 1956, Dulles opposed Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel<br />
Nasser’s efforts to nationalize the canal and was highly critical <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Anglo–French–Israeli military campaign to wrest control <strong>of</strong> the canal<br />
back from Egypt. See also SHIGEMITSU—DULLES MEETING.<br />
DUTCH LEARNING (RANGAKU, IN JAPANESE). During most <strong>of</strong><br />
the Tokugawa Era, Dutch language books on “practical sciences,”<br />
such as medicine and astronomy, were the only Western books allowed
80 • EAST ASIA ECONOMIC CAUCUS<br />
into <strong>Japan</strong>, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese studies <strong>of</strong> the West became known as “Dutch<br />
learning.” Until the 1850s, when <strong>Japan</strong>ese began to have contact with<br />
Westerners (such as Americans, British, Russians, and French), <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
scholars wanting to learn <strong>of</strong> the West struggled to read Dutch. See<br />
also DEJIMA; FUKUZAWA, YUKICHI; SAKUMA, SHOZAN;<br />
SAKOKU.<br />
– E –<br />
EAST ASIA ECONOMIC CAUCUS (EAEC). The East Asia Economic<br />
Caucus was established as an internal organization within the<br />
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) on 10 December<br />
1990. The EAEC emerged as a response to a call by Prime Minister<br />
Mahathir Mohamad <strong>of</strong> Malaysia to establish an independent<br />
East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG). Under Mahathir’s proposal,<br />
the EAEG would seek to develop policy cooperation in the interest<br />
<strong>of</strong> promoting Asian regional trade and investment. He suggested that<br />
the members <strong>of</strong> the EAEG be the ASEAN countries plus <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Indochina. Mahathir<br />
put forth this proposal because <strong>of</strong> his distrust <strong>of</strong> the APEC as an organization<br />
lead by the developed nations and his opposition to the<br />
U.S. and European Union-led Uruguay Round <strong>of</strong> the General<br />
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. He believed<br />
that if ASEAN nations cooperated with <strong>Japan</strong>, China, and<br />
newly industrializing economies (NIES), they would be able to deal<br />
with Europe and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on an equal basis. Mahathir not<br />
only proposed to challenge the economic dominance <strong>of</strong> the West but<br />
to also promote the superiority <strong>of</strong> “Asian values” over Western values.<br />
In his view, Asian economic development was a result <strong>of</strong> those<br />
“Asian values” that emphasized order and stability, discipline, family<br />
and social responsibility, industry, frugality, thriftiness, and<br />
group centeredness. It was his belief that the values held in the West<br />
were the causes <strong>of</strong> economic stagnation, increased crime, sliding educational<br />
standards, and destruction <strong>of</strong> the family in Western countries.<br />
In making this comparison <strong>of</strong> values, Prime Minister Mahathir<br />
was criticizing the framework that held that “Western values are<br />
equal to world universal values.”
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION BOARD • 81<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was highly critical <strong>of</strong> and annoyed by Mahathir’s<br />
argument. It believed that if the EAEG flourished, it might be<br />
possible to build a strong economic bloc in East Asia, led by an economically<br />
powerful <strong>Japan</strong>, that would serve as an alternative core <strong>of</strong><br />
world economic growth. <strong>Japan</strong> expressed interest in Mahathir’s proposal,<br />
but faced with strong pressure from Washington, it decided to<br />
reject his ideas, instead opting to turn the EAEG concept into a subsidiary<br />
organization <strong>of</strong> the APEC.<br />
“EASTERN ETHICS, WESTERN SCIENCE.” A political slogan first<br />
articulated by Shozan Sakuma in the 1850s as a dualistic approach to<br />
dealing with <strong>Japan</strong>’s internal and external problems. “Eastern ethics”<br />
meant a re-emphasis on Confucian values while “Western science”<br />
meant the study and adoption <strong>of</strong> science, technology, and organizational<br />
structures that developed in several Western countries since the Industrial<br />
Revolution. By the 1880s, this phrase was transformed into the<br />
more nationalistic call for “<strong>Japan</strong>ese spirit, Western technology”. See<br />
also CIVILIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT; FUKUZAWA, YU-<br />
KICHI; IWAKURA MISSION; MEIJI ERA; MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION BOARD (ESB). The Economic Stabilization<br />
Board was responsible for the overall economic planning<br />
and management in occupied <strong>Japan</strong>. The Board was set up for a temporary<br />
period in August 1946 because it was necessary to have an organization<br />
that would coordinate the operations <strong>of</strong> several ministries<br />
in a strong and integrated fashion in order to overcome the economic<br />
crisis immediately after World War II. The ESB was the core institution<br />
for promoting the Priority Production System in order to<br />
contain inflation and to promote production.<br />
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was<br />
pleased with the achievements <strong>of</strong> the ESB and, in March 1947, SCAP<br />
asked the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government to expand its function and allow it to<br />
take more powerful actions in economic and financial control. In July<br />
1947, an economic emergency measure was approved at a cabinet<br />
meeting based on which the ESB assumed primary responsibility for<br />
planning concrete economic policies. Also in July 1947, the ESB<br />
compiled the first Economic Survey <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. In 1948, the ESB analyzed<br />
the possible impact <strong>of</strong> setting a single foreign exchange rate.
82 • EDO<br />
In August 1952, the ESB was abolished. In its place, the Economic<br />
Planning Council was established. This was an external organ <strong>of</strong> the<br />
General Administrative Agency <strong>of</strong> the cabinet. It assumed responsibility<br />
for planning and adjusting fundamental economic policies, investigating<br />
economic trends, for long-term economic planning. In<br />
July 1955, the Economic Council Agency was changed into the Economic<br />
Planning Agency <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
EDO. The capital city <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate. In 1868, the name<br />
was changed to Tokyo, “Eastern Capital,” when the newly enthroned<br />
Emperor Meiji moved his government to the city. See also KYOTO.<br />
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066. See INTERNMENT.<br />
EXPULSION EDICT OF 1825. Because <strong>of</strong> increased sightings and<br />
contact with Western ships, primarily Russian and British, the Tokugawa<br />
shogunate reemphasized and strengthened the sakoku (“national<br />
seclusion”) regulations against allowing Western ships safe<br />
harbor with this edict. See also TOKUGAWA ERA.<br />
– F –<br />
FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT. On 26 February 1936, <strong>Japan</strong> faced the<br />
largest uprising <strong>of</strong> its modern existence. Some 1,400 troops seized the<br />
center <strong>of</strong> Tokyo and announced that they would not retreat until a new<br />
cabinet, led by General Jinzaburō Mazaki as prime minister and General<br />
Sadao Araki as home minister, was formed. At the same time, assassination<br />
squads murdered Lord Privy Seal Admiral Makoto Saitō,<br />
Inspector General <strong>of</strong> Military Education General Jōtarō Watanabe,<br />
and Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi. They also targeted—but<br />
for various reasons were unable to kill—Prime Minister Admiral<br />
Keisuke Okada, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Kantarō Suzuki, and<br />
Count Nobuaki Makino. Although the young rebels maintained that<br />
they were acting to separate the emperor from his “evil advisers,” their<br />
actions did not meet with the Throne’s approbation. Largely because<br />
Emperor Hirohito vociferously expressed his opposition to the uprising,<br />
the army high command ordered the suppression <strong>of</strong> the rebellion.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE ALLOCATION SYSTEM • 83<br />
The February 26 Incident marked the last significant act <strong>of</strong> army<br />
insubordination. It did not, however, lessen the army’s influence in<br />
domestic <strong>Japan</strong>ese politics. To the contrary, a clique dedicated to<br />
long-term, large-scale economic planning came to dominate the<br />
army’s upper echelons. At the same time, army budgets increased by<br />
more than 30 percent as <strong>of</strong>ficials sought to both lessen internal army<br />
factionalism and prepare for greater war. After the February 26 Incident,<br />
as one observer has noted, the future <strong>of</strong> the army rested with<br />
cool-headed, bureaucratic figures like General Hideki Tōjō.<br />
FENELLOSA, ERNEST (1853–1908). American sociologist who<br />
also studied art at the Boston Museum <strong>of</strong> Fine Arts, Ernest Fenellosa<br />
arrived in <strong>Japan</strong> in 1878 and taught philosophy at Tokyo Imperial<br />
University for several years. He became interested in studying and<br />
collecting <strong>Japan</strong>ese art, and helped found the Tokyo School <strong>of</strong> Fine<br />
Arts. He returned to Boston and dramatically increased the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
art collection at the Boston Museum <strong>of</strong> Fine Arts. After spending another<br />
three years in <strong>Japan</strong> from 1897 to 1900, he took up an academic<br />
position at Columbia University in New York. Fenellosa’s<br />
collections and publications introduced and popularized <strong>Japan</strong>ese art<br />
among Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See also<br />
YATOI.<br />
FILLMORE, MILLARD (1800–1874). Serving as vice president,<br />
Millard Fillmore unexpectedly assumed the highest <strong>of</strong>fice when<br />
President Zachery Taylor suddenly died <strong>of</strong> gastroenteritis on 9 July<br />
1850. As president from July 1850 to March 1853, Fillmore and his<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Daniel Webster ordered Commodore Matthew<br />
Perry to lead a U.S. Navy squadron to <strong>Japan</strong> and negotiate the<br />
Kanagawa Treaty, formally known as the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Friendship.<br />
FOREIGN EXCHANGE ALLOCATION SYSTEM. Prior to 1964,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s export management regulations stated that allocations <strong>of</strong> foreign<br />
exchange to pay for imports required permission from the Minister<br />
<strong>of</strong> International Trade and Industry (MITI). This regulatory<br />
arrangement was called the foreign exchange allocation system.<br />
Based on revisions to foreign exchange and trade management laws
84 • FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPECIAL QUOTA SYSTEM<br />
made when <strong>Japan</strong> became an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article<br />
8 nation at the end <strong>of</strong> March 1964, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
abolished the foreign exchange allocation system and replaced it with<br />
a new import quota system. Under this new system, <strong>Japan</strong> would not<br />
allow the import <strong>of</strong> certain items not regulated by import quotas established<br />
by MITI. Imports <strong>of</strong> crude oil and petroleum products were<br />
subject to the foreign exchange allocation system prior to 1964, but<br />
starting in that year, they became automatic approval items; that is,<br />
items that could be imported freely under <strong>Japan</strong>’s foreign exchange<br />
and trade management systems.<br />
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPECIAL QUOTA SYSTEM. The foreign<br />
exchange special quota system went into effect on 20 August 1953. It<br />
exists to prevent discriminative dealings in terms <strong>of</strong> commodities or<br />
currencies in export by simplifying foreign exchange allocation procedures.<br />
Regardless <strong>of</strong> the export item, exporters are allowed to use<br />
10 percent <strong>of</strong> the foreign currencies earned from exports for importing<br />
certain types <strong>of</strong> cargo that might otherwise face difficultly in being<br />
awarded a foreign exchange allocation or payment for specific invisible<br />
items, such as transportation expense, to go abroad.<br />
Consequently, procedures for regulating foreign exchange allocation<br />
were simplified. When <strong>Japan</strong> obtained the status <strong>of</strong> an Article Eight<br />
nation in the IMF in March 1964, the foreign exchange special quota<br />
system was abolished. Instead, <strong>Japan</strong> adopted an import quota system.<br />
Specific items could not be imported unless such importation<br />
was within import quotas set by the Ministry <strong>of</strong> International Trade<br />
and Industry.<br />
FUKOKU KYOHEI. See RICH NATION, STRONG ARMY.<br />
FUKUZAWA, YUKICHI (1835–1901). From a low-ranking samurai<br />
family on Kyushu Island, Yukichi Fukuzawa moved to Osaka to<br />
study the Dutch language and Western science. He established his<br />
own school in Edo (later Tokyo) in 1858, which emphasized English<br />
after he realized Americans and British were more numerous than<br />
Hollanders. In 1860, Fukuzawa was chosen to accompany the<br />
Shogun’s Embassy to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In 1862 and 1867, he traveled<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe on Tokugawa shogunate mis-
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE • 85<br />
sions. As a result <strong>of</strong> his Western studies and experiences, he wrote<br />
Conditions <strong>of</strong> the West in 1866, which became a bestseller in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
He later wrote The Encouragement <strong>of</strong> Learning, A Theory <strong>of</strong> Civilization,<br />
and other works primarily on the West, education, and equality<br />
<strong>of</strong> opportunity. In the 1870s, Fukuzawa helped establish the<br />
Meirokusha Society <strong>of</strong> scholars advocating Westernization and practical<br />
knowledge as the paths for a New <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> political and economic<br />
strength. “Civilization and enlightenment” (Bunmei Kaika)<br />
became a well-known slogan for Fukuzawa and others who advocated<br />
such Westernizing policies. Fukuzawa later established the Jiji<br />
Shimpo newspaper; in 1890, the school he originally founded in 1858<br />
was transformed into Keio University, which remains to the present<br />
day as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s premier universities. In recognition <strong>of</strong><br />
Fukuzawa’s prominence as a philosopher, writer, and educator, his<br />
picture is on the 10,000 yen bill. See also MEIJI ERA.<br />
– G –<br />
GANNENMONO. Literally, “first year people,” the gannenmono refers<br />
to the group <strong>of</strong> 150 <strong>Japan</strong>ese who traveled to the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii<br />
in 1868—the first year <strong>of</strong> the Meiji Era—to work as laborers on<br />
sugar cane plantations. Eugene Van Reed, an American businessman<br />
living in Yokohama, made the arrangements between the <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers<br />
and the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii. The new Meiji government in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> complained to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Hawaiian governments<br />
that it had not given its approval for the gannenmono arrangement. A<br />
settlement was soon reached between the three governments, which<br />
included bringing some <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers back to <strong>Japan</strong>. Despite<br />
the hard work on sugar cane plantations and the sometimes<br />
harsh treatment by American and European plantation owners, most<br />
<strong>of</strong> the gannenmono ultimately chose to stay in Hawaii, and many <strong>of</strong><br />
their descendants still live on the Hawaiian Islands.<br />
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT).<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the important lessons from World War II was that establishing<br />
multilateral and liberal trade rules would be essential in order to<br />
maintain peace and stability around the world. Based on this idea,
86 • GENERAL HEADQUARTERS/SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS<br />
and led by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, in October 1947, 23 nations signed the<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an international<br />
agreement designed to expand trade and deal with trade conflicts<br />
among GATT members. GATT’s basic ethos was to promote liberal,<br />
multilateral, and non-discriminatory trade. GATT came into effect in<br />
January 1948 and <strong>Japan</strong> joined in 1955. Along with the International<br />
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction<br />
and Development (IBRD), GATT underpinned the Bretton Woods<br />
framework in the post–World War II era. From its establishment,<br />
there were eight rounds <strong>of</strong> multilateral GATT negotiations. From<br />
1947 to 1993, advanced countries’ tariff rates on mined products and<br />
manufactured goods were cut from an average <strong>of</strong> 40 percent down to<br />
3 percent, and the volume <strong>of</strong> trade <strong>of</strong> physical goods increased about<br />
14-fold. At the end <strong>of</strong> 1993, 114 nations were members <strong>of</strong> GATT. In<br />
January 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded<br />
GATT. GATT covered trading <strong>of</strong> only physical goods, while WTO<br />
deals with not only physical goods but also services and intellectual<br />
property rights. As <strong>of</strong> 2005, 148 nations are WTO members.<br />
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS/SUPREME COMMANDER FOR<br />
THE ALLIED POWERS (GHQ/SCAP). GHQ/SCAP is a central<br />
administrative institution for the allied powers that occupied <strong>Japan</strong> after<br />
World War II. On 26 July 1941, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> created General<br />
Headquarters for the U.S. Army Forces Far East (GHQ/USAFFE)<br />
in Manila, Luzon, The Philippines, and appointed Major Douglas<br />
MacArthur as commander. After the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Pacific War,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> landed in Luzon, and after the fall <strong>of</strong> the Corregidor Fortress,<br />
the USAFFE lost its unified command. On 18 April 1942, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand concluded<br />
an agreement to establish General Headquarters for a unified<br />
front forces for the Allied Powers in Southwestern Pacific Area<br />
(GHQ/SWPA) and appointed MacArthur as Commander-In-Chief <strong>of</strong><br />
the Allied Forces. On 3 April 1945, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> established General<br />
HQs, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (GHQ/AFPAC) in order to<br />
unify command authority for the Army forces in the Pacific area and<br />
appointed MacArthur as commander-in-chief. Consequently,<br />
GHQ/AFPAC and GHQ/SWPA came to coexist at this point. Because<br />
occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> was an occupation <strong>of</strong> a high-level non–Western
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS/SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS • 87<br />
European country, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> required a large-scale institution.<br />
Consequently, on 5 August 1945, Washington established the Military<br />
Government Section (MGS) within GHQ/AFPAC. On 15 August<br />
1945, President Harry Truman appointed MacArthur as Supreme<br />
Commander for the Allied Powers to give authority to implement surrender<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> the Potsdam Declaration. GHQ/SWPA was demolished.<br />
MacArthur was both commander-in-chief for AFPAC and<br />
supreme commander for the Allied Powers for occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
On 30 August 1945, MacArthur arrived at Atsugi, Kanagawa. On 2<br />
September, an instrument <strong>of</strong> surrender was signed by the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> on the battleship Missouri. On 17 September 1945,<br />
MacArthur moved GHQ/AFPAC from Yokohama to Tokyo. In order<br />
to govern more than 70 million <strong>Japan</strong>ese people with different languages,<br />
customs, and traditions, the MGS required a large number <strong>of</strong><br />
highly skilled civilian administrators. Consequently, the Economic<br />
and Scientific Section (ESS) and the Civil Information and Education<br />
Section (CIE) became separate institutions from the MGS on 15 September<br />
1945 and 22 September 1945, respectively.<br />
Finally, on 2 October 1945, the MGS was dissolved and General<br />
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers<br />
(GHQ/SCAP) was established with the general staff section and the<br />
special staff section. The general staff section consisted <strong>of</strong> four parts:<br />
G1 (personnel), G2 (intelligence), G3 (operation), and G4 (logistics).<br />
The special staff section consisted <strong>of</strong> nine sections: Legal Section<br />
(LS), Public Health and Welfare (PHW), Government Section (GS),<br />
Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), Natural Resources Section (NRS),<br />
Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), Civil Information and Education<br />
Section (CIE), Statistical and Reports Section (SRS), and Civil<br />
Communications Section (CCS). GS took the initiative in promoting<br />
demilitarization and democratization; however, GS severely confronted<br />
G2 in terms <strong>of</strong> methods and orientation <strong>of</strong> U.S. occupation<br />
policies in <strong>Japan</strong>. GS with many New Dealers in the section tended<br />
to support progressive forces in <strong>Japan</strong>, such as the Tetsu Katayama<br />
and Hitoshi Ashida administrations, while G2 supported the Shigeru<br />
Yoshida administrations. The special staff section expanded to 11<br />
sections in January 1946 and 14 sections in the end.<br />
General MacArthur came to serve concurrently as Supreme Commander<br />
for the Allied Powers and Commander-in-chief for AFPAC.
88 • GENERAL HEADQUARTERS/SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS<br />
On the one hand, as the former, MacArthur had to obey orders <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Far Eastern Commission (FEC), established in February 1946, consisting<br />
<strong>of</strong> 11 countries: the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, China, the Soviet<br />
Union, France, India, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New<br />
Zealand, and the Philippines (Burma and Pakistan joined later in November<br />
1949). Washington, D.C., hosted the FEC while it established<br />
its local agency in Tokyo called the Allied Council for <strong>Japan</strong> (ACJ) in<br />
April 1946. In theory, the FEC was the supreme policy decisionmaking<br />
institution, the ACJ was a consultative agency for MacArthur,<br />
and he was supreme commander to implement the FEC’s decisions;<br />
however, in practice, things did not go as smoothly as the theory indicated.<br />
The FEC had the authority <strong>of</strong> sending directives to MacArthur,<br />
but because the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet<br />
Union held veto power, the FEC in reality did not function well. As a<br />
way to break the stalemate, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> took the advantage <strong>of</strong> its<br />
authority <strong>of</strong> issuing “interim directive in case <strong>of</strong> emergency” to carry<br />
out its occupation policy. On the other hand, as commander-in-chief<br />
for AFPAC, MacArthur had to obey the directives from Washington.<br />
This double commissions sometimes put MacArthur in an awkward<br />
position; however, he, in reality, took advantage <strong>of</strong> his two assignments<br />
to carry out occupation policies effectively.<br />
GHQ/SCAP adopted indirect governance: to give directives and orders<br />
to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government and let it carry out actual policies to<br />
govern the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people. Two primary purposes <strong>of</strong> GHQ/SCAP<br />
were demilitarization and democratization. For this purpose,<br />
GHQ/SCAP implemented a series <strong>of</strong> severe reforms, such as women’s<br />
suffrage, enactment <strong>of</strong> labor union laws, educational system reform,<br />
abolition <strong>of</strong> oppressive legal system, zaibatsu dissolution, agrarian<br />
land reform, formulation <strong>of</strong> a new constitution, and more reforms.<br />
On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out. As the war situation<br />
went against the <strong>United</strong> Nations forces led by the U.S. forces when the<br />
Chinese communist army entered the war in October 1950, General<br />
MacArthur strongly demanded bombing China and even using atomic<br />
bombs against China. His hawkish demands precipitated serious conflicts<br />
with President Truman. The president finally relieved MacArthur<br />
from command <strong>of</strong> SCAP on 11 April 1951. Lieutenant General<br />
Matthew Bunker Ridgway succeeded MacArthur and assumed SCAP<br />
on 16 April 1951. Ridgway was promoted to general in May 1951.
GENTLEMEN’S AGREEMENT • 89<br />
GHQ/SCAP continued until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into<br />
force on 28 April 1952. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE (1927). Held from 28 June to 4<br />
August 1927, the Geneva Naval Conference was a failed attempt on<br />
the part <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong> to extend the<br />
naval limitations agreements originally reached at the Washington<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. In the years after the Washington Conference<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, <strong>Japan</strong> and Great Britain had concentrated their efforts<br />
on building those vessels that remained outside the system <strong>of</strong><br />
naval limitation, namely cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. U.S.<br />
President Calvin Coolidge—who was no less fiscally minded than<br />
was Congress—had refrained from building these vessels, and by<br />
1927, was alarmed at the prospect <strong>of</strong> losing parity with Britain and superiority<br />
over <strong>Japan</strong>. Not wishing to be drawn into an arms race, President<br />
Herbert Hoover sought instead to fix limits for auxiliary craft,<br />
and he invited Britain, <strong>Japan</strong>, France, and Italy to meet in Geneva in<br />
the summer <strong>of</strong> 1927. The Geneva Naval Conference was a conspicuous<br />
failure. France and Italy refused to attend. The American and<br />
British delegates wrangled over large versus small cruisers, and the<br />
conference broke down because <strong>of</strong> their inability to compromise.<br />
Convinced <strong>of</strong> the need to avoid a ruinous naval arms race with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain, Plenipotentiary Admiral Makoto<br />
Saitō made every effort to make the conference a success, mediating<br />
between his British and American counterparts. He had entered the<br />
conference informed by the objective <strong>of</strong> avoiding any increase in the<br />
actual existing strength <strong>of</strong> each power, and aimed at a 70-percent ration<br />
in surface vessels vis-à-vis the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain.<br />
The American–British split threatened these objectives. This was amply<br />
evidenced by an immense naval authorization bill that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> Navy General Board submitted to the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives<br />
in 1929. Although the bill was ultimately withdrawn, it called for the<br />
construction (over a nine-year period) <strong>of</strong> 25 heavy cruisers, nine destroyer<br />
flotilla leaders, 32 submarines, and five aircraft carriers.<br />
GENTLEMEN’S AGREEMENT (1908). In February 1908, President<br />
Theodore Roosevelt and <strong>Japan</strong>ese ambassador Viscount Aoki Keikichi<br />
concluded the so-called gentlemen’s agreement. A cooperative
90 • GIRARD INCIDENT<br />
attempt to curb <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>—which,<br />
it was hoped, would remove a cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American friction—it<br />
continued in force until 1924, when the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress<br />
passed the prohibitive National Origins Act, better known as<br />
the Oriental Exclusion Act.<br />
The gentlemen’s agreement was a response to racist, anti-<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
(anti-Asian) sentiment that raged in California as <strong>Japan</strong>ese nationals<br />
in the early 1900s entered the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in considerable numbers.<br />
The matter came to a head when, in 1906, the San Francisco school<br />
board barred <strong>Japan</strong>ese school children (along with their Chinese and<br />
Korean counterparts) from the city’s regular public schools, requiring<br />
that they attend a segregated oriental public school. Chafing at the<br />
segregation <strong>of</strong> its citizens, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government lodged an <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
protest with Washington.<br />
In his annual message <strong>of</strong> 1906, President Roosevelt called the<br />
board’s act a “wicked absurdity.” He subsequently summoned San<br />
Francisco school <strong>of</strong>ficials to the White House and dictated a deal: rescind<br />
the segregation order in return for a <strong>Japan</strong>ese promise to curb<br />
immigration to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It took 18 months before he finalized<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials the gentlemen’s agreement on 18 February<br />
1908. Its key provisions stipulated that <strong>Japan</strong> would refuse passports<br />
to laborers going to the mainland <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> (which it had<br />
been doing since 1900); and it would make no objection if <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
nationals were barred from entering the mainland <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from<br />
intermediate points, such as Hawaii, Canada, or Mexico. Put into effect<br />
by an executive order, the gentlemen’s agreement succeeded—in<br />
the short term—in pouring oil over the turbulent waters <strong>of</strong> race and<br />
immigration.<br />
GIRARD INCIDENT. The Girard Incident <strong>of</strong> 1957 was a criminal<br />
case in which a 46-year-old <strong>Japan</strong>ese housewife, named Naka Sakai,<br />
was collecting scrap metal on an <strong>of</strong>f-limits U.S. Army shooting range<br />
located in Somogahara, Gunma Prefecture. She was shot and killed<br />
on 30 January 1957 by a 21-year-old non-commissioned American<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer, William S. Girard. According to Girard’s testimony, he lured<br />
Sakai closer to him and shot her close up, at about 10 meters, with an<br />
empty cartridge case from a grenade launcher. At first, the U.S. forces<br />
insisted that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has jurisdiction over such incidents.
GOVERNMENT AID AND RELIEF IN OCCUPIED AREAS • 91<br />
But there was a furious public outcry over the killing in <strong>Japan</strong>, and<br />
this led to a jurisdictional dispute between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. The incident illuminated the real situation regarding the restricted<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese sovereignty under the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Status-<strong>of</strong>-<br />
Forces Agreement. A <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. joint commission was set up to<br />
discuss the issue, but it could not reach any agreement. Finally, taking<br />
hardening <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese public opinion on the issue into consideration,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> saved the situation not by making any interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Status-<strong>of</strong>-Forces Agreement, but by<br />
taking a special measure <strong>of</strong> “not using jurisdiction” over this particular<br />
incident.<br />
On 18 May 1957, the prosecutor indicted Girard with charges <strong>of</strong> injury<br />
resulting in death. American people expressed resentment at this<br />
development. Girard’s elder brother filed a lawsuit to the Federal district<br />
court seeking habeas corpus for Girard. On 18 June, the Federal<br />
district court gave a decision forbidding Girard’s extradition to <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government appealed this court ruling. At last, on<br />
11 July 1957, the Federal Supreme Court rejected a lower court decision<br />
and approved <strong>Japan</strong>ese jurisdiction over the Gerard incident.<br />
On 26 August 1957, the Girard incident trial began at the Maebashi<br />
district court. The prosecutor demanded a five-year prison term for<br />
the accused with charges <strong>of</strong> injury resulting in death. On 19 November<br />
1957, the court handed down a sentence <strong>of</strong> three years in prison<br />
with a probation period <strong>of</strong> four years. Despite this extraordinarily<br />
light sentence, the prosecutor did not appeal this court ruling, while<br />
Girard accepted it. After the court ruling, Girard returned to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> with his <strong>Japan</strong>ese wife. The U.S. military forces did not<br />
make any formal compensation payment; instead, it paid only<br />
620,000 yen as consolation payment. Subsequent to this incident,<br />
U.S. military personnel committed crimes in various places in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
See also DEFENSE.<br />
GOVERNMENT AID AND RELIEF IN OCCUPIED AREAS<br />
(GARIOA). This term describes aid assistance that was funded by the<br />
U.S. military budget given to <strong>Japan</strong> and Germany to help both countries<br />
economically recover following the end <strong>of</strong> World War II. The<br />
aid was used to pay for emergency supplies <strong>of</strong> daily necessities such<br />
as food, clothing, and pharmaceuticals needed in occupied areas. The
92 • GRANT, ULYSSES S.<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> established two major funds to handle reconstruction<br />
costs in postwar occupied areas: the Government Aid and Relief in<br />
Occupied Area (GARIOA) fund and the Economic Rehabilitation in<br />
Occupied Area (EROA) fund. <strong>Japan</strong> received money for relief and reconstruction<br />
from both funds, first from the GARIOA fund starting in<br />
1946 and then from the EROA fund starting in 1949. The total amount<br />
received was $1.8 billion, <strong>of</strong> which $1.3 billion were provided interest<br />
free. These counterpart funds (pr<strong>of</strong>its from selling commodities<br />
bought by GARIOA and EROA funds) became capital sources <strong>of</strong> lowinterest<br />
loans to be used for funding such economic recovery activities<br />
as currency stability and investment in national infrastructure<br />
(railroads, electric power generation and communications, marine<br />
transportation, and coal mining). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> concluded<br />
an agreement in 1962 that stipulated that <strong>Japan</strong> would repay<br />
the aid provided by the two funds by giving aid to developing countries<br />
and subsidizing <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. cultural exchange activities. See also<br />
PACIFIC WAR.<br />
GRANT, ULYSSES S. (1822–1885). General in the Union Army during<br />
the American Civil War and president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from<br />
1869 to 1877. After serving two terms as president, during which he<br />
met with members <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura Mission, Grant and his wife Julia<br />
took a long-planned world tour for the next two years. Hailed as the<br />
hero <strong>of</strong> the American Civil War and treated as if he were a visiting<br />
head <strong>of</strong> state wherever he went in Europe and Asia, Grant arrived in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> in early 1879 and spent several months in the country. They<br />
were treated exceptionally well in <strong>Japan</strong>, in part because <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
leaders wanted to gain international respect by demonstrating to the<br />
former American president that their country had significantly progressed<br />
in many areas <strong>of</strong> political, social, and cultural life. While in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, Grant was asked to arbitrate a dispute over possession <strong>of</strong> Okinawa<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and China, and he decided in <strong>Japan</strong>’s favor. In<br />
discussions with Emperor Meiji and other <strong>Japan</strong>ese leaders, Grant<br />
made it clear he believed <strong>Japan</strong> to be an equal to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and Europe and wished the Ansei Treaties, also known as the “unequal<br />
treaties,” forced on <strong>Japan</strong> in the 1850s to be revised on an equitable<br />
basis.
GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE • 93<br />
GREAT WHITE FLEET. After the Spanish–American War <strong>of</strong> 1898,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> emerged as a power to be reckoned with. Central to<br />
the nation’s rise was the strength <strong>of</strong> its navy. In 1904, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> possessed the world’s fifth largest navy, and had risen to second<br />
place in 1907. Much <strong>of</strong> the fleet’s expansion was directly attributable<br />
to President Theodore Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for naval<br />
strength. In July 1907, Roosevelt decided to flex his nation’s naval<br />
muscle, directing the service to embark on what became one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
most impressive peacetime naval demonstrations <strong>of</strong> all time.<br />
After numerous port calls throughout Latin America—which<br />
through the so-called Roosevelt corollary <strong>of</strong> the Monroe Doctrine<br />
had been declared totally <strong>of</strong>f limits to all powers but the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>—the Great White Fleet traveled to New Zealand, Australia,<br />
and the Philippines. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government requested a visit by<br />
the fleet, which duly arrived at Yokohama in October 1908. The ships<br />
were granted a wildly enthusiastic welcome by both <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficialdom<br />
and people alike.<br />
The effect exerted by the Great White Fleet on <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American<br />
relations is difficult to gauge. Certainly, its arrival in <strong>Japan</strong>ese waters<br />
coincided with increasing tensions between the two nations. In October<br />
1906, the authorities in San Francisco ordered that all Chinese,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese, and Korean children go to a segregated oriental public<br />
school (See CALIFORNIA). The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government duly protested<br />
the segregation <strong>of</strong> its citizens, and a war scare exploded on both sides<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Pacific. Given the rousing reception the Great White Fleet received<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>, it seems fair to conclude that it poured oil on these<br />
troubled waters. It may also have facilitated the signing <strong>of</strong> such conventions<br />
as the Taft–Katsura Agreement and the Root–Takahira<br />
Agreement. It is also necessary to recognize, however, that the U.S.<br />
Navy in 1906 had begun planning war scenarios with <strong>Japan</strong> as its hypothetical<br />
enemy, and continued to do so through 1907 and beyond.<br />
For its part, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy in 1907 nominated its American counterpart<br />
as its hypothetical enemy number one.<br />
GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE. The Greater<br />
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was a slogan devised in mid-1940 to<br />
rationalize <strong>Japan</strong>’s frankly aggressive designs toward the resource-rich
94 • GREATER EAST ASIAN CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE<br />
colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. An expeditious response to the success<br />
with which Germany’s blitzkrieg had met in Europe, which, in<br />
turn, rendered defenseless British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions<br />
in Southeast Asia, it was deemed essential to <strong>Japan</strong>’s existence as<br />
an independent nation. For this purpose, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in<br />
late July 1940 determined that if favorable circumstances arose, it<br />
would use force in Southeast Asia as a means to the construction <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.<br />
On 1 August 1940, Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka publicly<br />
announced <strong>Japan</strong>’s intention to construct the Greater East Asian Co-<br />
Prosperity Sphere, and stated that it was logical to include French<br />
Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies within it. Within weeks,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops had moved into northern Indochina. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, among the few nations still able to exercise a decisive influence<br />
on <strong>Japan</strong>’s aggressive designs, signified its opposition by slapping<br />
a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade iron, and<br />
steel scrap. This pattern was more or less repeated in July 1941,<br />
when <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops occupied the entire Indochinese peninsula<br />
and Washington responded by freezing <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets and embargoing<br />
oil.<br />
Following Pearl Harbor, despite <strong>Japan</strong>ese appeals to Asian nationalism,<br />
the fundamentals <strong>of</strong> the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity<br />
Sphere remained bluntly utilitarian. Indeed, government leaders behind<br />
closed doors made reference not to the Greater East Asian Co-<br />
Prosperity Sphere, but to the “Imperial resource sphere.” Nonetheless,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in November 1943 convened a<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> Greater East Asia, with delegates from Manchukuo,<br />
the Nanjing regime in China, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and<br />
India in attendance. On 7 November, they released a joint statement<br />
that affirmed their commitment to such principles as coexistence and<br />
co-prosperity; respect for mutual autonomy and independence; and<br />
the abolition <strong>of</strong> racial discrimination. These were fine-sounding<br />
principles, but they were clearly honored in the breach by <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Any country, by them, the relentless American counter<strong>of</strong>fensive<br />
against <strong>Japan</strong>ese positions in the Pacific rendered <strong>Japan</strong>’s self-appointed<br />
position at the apex <strong>of</strong> the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity<br />
Sphere extremely vulnerable. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD<br />
WAR II.
GREW, JOSEPH C. • 95<br />
GREW, JOSEPH C. (1880–1965). Joseph Grew was America’s ambassador<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong> throughout the decade prior to Pearl Harbor from<br />
1932 to 1944. Sensitive to <strong>Japan</strong>’s needs, he <strong>of</strong>ten found himself out<br />
<strong>of</strong> step with his colleagues in the State Department, although during<br />
the war he wielded a not-inconsiderable influence over planning for<br />
post-surrender <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
A graduate <strong>of</strong> Harvard University, he began his diplomatic career<br />
with a consular assignment in 1904. He went through the<br />
whole process from third secretary to Counselor <strong>of</strong> Embassy before<br />
achieving the rank <strong>of</strong> minister, as secretary <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> Commission to the Paris Peace Conference. For a short<br />
time, he was assigned as counselor to the Paris Embassy and then<br />
to Denmark as minister. After a tour as minister to Switzerland,<br />
Grew was sent to Lausanne to negotiate the Turkish Treaty. He became<br />
under secretary to Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Charles Evan Hughes in<br />
1924 and contributed to the reorganization <strong>of</strong> the Foreign Service.<br />
He left Washington to assume the post <strong>of</strong> ambassador to Turkey in<br />
1927. His mentor at the State Department, William R. Castle, Jr.,<br />
successfully secured Grew’s appointment in 1932 as ambassador<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Grew’s assignment was difficult. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese occupation <strong>of</strong><br />
Manchuria in 1931 had poisoned <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations, and<br />
Tokyo continued to take actions that were inimical to American interests<br />
throughout Grew’s time as ambassador. He nonetheless believed<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> could be a force for stability in the Far East. In his<br />
communications with Washington—with a few notable exceptions—<br />
he consistently counseled a moderate policy so as not to provoke the<br />
hardliners in Tokyo. In his dealings with <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials, he sought<br />
to convey the fundamentals <strong>of</strong> American policy and to gently suggest<br />
how <strong>Japan</strong> might prosper by working with—rather than against—<br />
those interests.<br />
Grew in February 1944 was appointed head <strong>of</strong> the State Department’s<br />
Office <strong>of</strong> Far Eastern Affairs; in December <strong>of</strong> that year, he<br />
was appointed under secretary <strong>of</strong> state. Throughout he propounded<br />
his basic assumption that affording <strong>Japan</strong> a liberal peace was the<br />
surest way to attain the ultimate American objective <strong>of</strong> peace and security<br />
in the Pacific. He retired from the State Department the day after<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> surrendered.
96 • GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOT<br />
GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOT (1843–1928). American yatoi (expert)<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> during the early Meiji Era, religious leader, and author<br />
<strong>of</strong> several books. After serving in a Pennsylvania regiment during<br />
the American Civil War, William Elliot Griffis entered<br />
Rutgers College in New Jersey, then affiliated with the Dutch Reformed<br />
Church. After becoming an instructor, he met and taught<br />
several <strong>Japan</strong>ese students who came to Rutgers College on the recommendation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Guido Verbeck, an American teacher and missionary<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Dutch Reformed Church in <strong>Japan</strong>. Griffis traveled to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> in 1871 and was put in charge <strong>of</strong> education in Echizen Prefecture,<br />
and later became a pr<strong>of</strong>essor at Tokyo Kaisei Gakko (later<br />
called Tokyo University). His sister, Margaret Clark Griffis, joined<br />
him in <strong>Japan</strong> and promoted women’s education. After returning to<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Griffis earned a doctorate in theology from<br />
Union College in New York and served as pastor in churches in<br />
New York and Boston. He became a prolific author, with most <strong>of</strong><br />
his writings on <strong>Japan</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>–America relations, and Holland. His<br />
best-known work, The Mikado’s Empire, originally published in<br />
1876, went through several printings and editions and became the<br />
most widely read book on <strong>Japan</strong> in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the late 19th<br />
and early 20th centuries.<br />
GUIDELINES FOR U.S.–JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION,<br />
1978. At a summit between Prime Minister Takeo Miki and President<br />
Gerald Ford in August 1975, the two men agreed to consult regarding<br />
appropriate forms <strong>of</strong> defense cooperation in order to prepare for joint<br />
engagement in case <strong>of</strong> emergency. For this purpose, in August 1976,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> established the Subcommittee for Defense<br />
Cooperation (SDC) under the auspices <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security<br />
Consultative Committee (SCC). Finally, in November 1978, the SDC<br />
formulated the Guidelines for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation. “The<br />
aim <strong>of</strong> these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and<br />
credible U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> cooperation under normal circumstances, in case<br />
<strong>of</strong> an armed attack against <strong>Japan</strong>, and in situations in areas surrounding<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. The Guidelines also provided a general framework and policy<br />
direction for the roles and missions <strong>of</strong> the two countries and ways<br />
<strong>of</strong> cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and
during contingencies.” The Guidelines stipulated the basic principles in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> emergencies in <strong>Japan</strong>, but they left emergencies in the Far East<br />
other than <strong>Japan</strong> for future consideration.<br />
GUIDELINES FOR U.S.–JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION,<br />
1997. These are new guidelines <strong>of</strong> 1997 that revised Guidelines for<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation, 1978. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> agreed with the new guidelines on 23 September 1997. The<br />
guidelines stipulate U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> cooperation in emergencies in the areas<br />
surrounding <strong>Japan</strong>. Its defense areas extended to cover not only<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese territories but also the Asia–Pacific region, and its primary<br />
aim is to contribute to bringing peace and stability in the region. The<br />
new guidelines are significant because even in emergencies outside<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese territories, <strong>Japan</strong>, for the first time in its history, may cooperate<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> militarily beyond providing the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> with military bases in <strong>Japan</strong> and other facilities. In order to secure<br />
effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the new guidelines, the so-called three new<br />
guidelines-related laws were enacted on 24 May 1999: the Lawona<br />
Situation in the Areas Surrounding <strong>Japan</strong>, the amendment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Self-Defense Forces Law, and the revised Acquisition and Cross-<br />
Servicing Agreement.<br />
– H –<br />
HALL, FRANCIS • 97<br />
HALL, FRANCIS (1822–1902). An American businessman, reporter<br />
for the New York Tribune, and friend <strong>of</strong> missionaries Samuel<br />
R. Brown and Guido Verbeck, Francis Hall lived in the treaty port<br />
<strong>of</strong> Yokohama from 1859 to 1866. He helped found Walsh, Hall &<br />
Company while living in <strong>Japan</strong>. He returned to his native Elmira,<br />
New York, where he continued his business success and became a<br />
prominent philanthropist. The journal <strong>of</strong> his years in <strong>Japan</strong>, published<br />
as <strong>Japan</strong> Through American Eyes: The Journal <strong>of</strong> Francis<br />
Hall, 1859–1866 (edited by Fred Notehelfer), is a wealth <strong>of</strong> information<br />
about life during the turbulent years <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s contact with<br />
the West just before the Meiji Restoration. See also HECO,<br />
JOSEPH.
98 • HAMAGUCHI, OSACHI<br />
HAMAGUCHI, OSACHI (1870–1931). Born in 1870, Osachi Hamaguchi<br />
was a leading politician in the Taishō and early Shōwa periods.<br />
Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1895, he entered the<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Finance soon thereafter. In December 1912, he was appointed<br />
vice communications minister in the third cabinet <strong>of</strong> General<br />
Tarō Katsura, although within three months he had resigned from his<br />
post in order to join the newly formed Protect the Constitution Movement.<br />
In 1914, he was appointed vice finance minister in the cabinet <strong>of</strong><br />
Shigenobu Okuma; the following year, he was elected to the House <strong>of</strong><br />
Representatives. He was finance minister from 1924 to 1926, and<br />
home minister from 1926 to 1927. In June 1927, he became president<br />
<strong>of</strong> the newly formed political party Minseitō, and little more than two<br />
years later formed his own cabinet. Along with his foreign minister,<br />
Kijūrō Shidehara, Hamaguchi strived for a foreign policy characterized<br />
by cooperation with the great powers. This was most readily evident<br />
in his actions throughout the First London Naval Conference <strong>of</strong><br />
1930. At this conference, American, British, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates<br />
hammered out a complicated naval limitation agreement that for the<br />
most part met <strong>Japan</strong>’s pre-conference desires. Despite the heated opposition<br />
<strong>of</strong> (particularly) the Navy General Staff, Hamaguchi—who<br />
was known as “the Lion”—showed considerable political acumen in<br />
steering this agreement through to ratification.<br />
All the while he faced charges <strong>of</strong> having trampled on the “right <strong>of</strong><br />
supreme command,” with the chief <strong>of</strong> the Navy General Staff spuriously<br />
arguing that Hamaguchi had ignored his arguments. Although<br />
refusing to be drawn into this controversy, Hamaguchi was shot by a<br />
right-wing fanatic in November 1930. His cabinet resigned in April<br />
1931, and Hamaguchi died in August <strong>of</strong> that year.<br />
HARA, TAKASHI (1856–1921). Takashi Hara was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
most influential politicians <strong>of</strong> the early 20th century. Born into a<br />
samurai family in 1856, he worked as a journalist before entering the<br />
Foreign Ministry in 1882. Serving first as <strong>Japan</strong>ese consul to<br />
Tientsin, he was later posted to France. In 1889, he left the Foreign<br />
Ministry for the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and Commerce. He served as<br />
secretary to both Kaoru Inoue and Munemitsu Mutsu before being<br />
appointed vice foreign minister (under Foreign Minister Mutsu) in<br />
the second cabinet <strong>of</strong> Hirobumi Itō. He left his post after Mutsu’s
HARRIS, TOWNSEND • 99<br />
death in 1897. After a brief period in private business, Hara in 1900<br />
joined Hirobumi Itō’s new political party, the Seiyūkai. From October<br />
<strong>of</strong> that year, when Itō formed his fourth cabinet, Hara served as<br />
communications minister. By 1903, Hara had emerged as one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
principal powerbrokers within his political party. He served as home<br />
minister in Kimmochi Saionji’s numerous cabinets, and in 1913<br />
worked with Saionji and Admiral Gombei Yamamoto to forge a cabinet<br />
headed by the latter. In 1917, he was appointed a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, and in August 1918 formed<br />
his first cabinet. He was the first prime minister to head a majority<br />
party cabinet and hold a seat in the lower house.<br />
Hara paid close attention to his nation’s foreign policy. At its most<br />
basic, his foreign policy was driven by the sensed need for cooperative<br />
relations with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and non-interference in Chinese<br />
internal affairs. Both these policies were realized at the Washington<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, although Hara did not live to see the results<br />
<strong>of</strong> the conference. He was stabbed to death by a 19-year-old<br />
youth eight days after the conference opened.<br />
HARDY, ALPHAEUS (1838–1912). Wealthy businessman from<br />
Boston, member <strong>of</strong> the Congregationalist Church–sponsored American<br />
Board <strong>of</strong> Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and trustee <strong>of</strong><br />
Amherst College, Alphaeus Hardy and his wife Susan were Jo Niijima’s<br />
primary benefactors during the young <strong>Japan</strong>ese man’s educational<br />
and spiritual sojourn in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1865 to 1874.<br />
Niijima referred to himself in English as “Joseph Hardy Niishima”<br />
and regarded Alphaeus and Susan Hardy as his “American father”<br />
and “American mother.” See also DOSHISHA UNIVERSITY.<br />
HARRIS, TOWNSEND (1804–1879). Harris was the first American<br />
chargé d’ affaires, later minister (ambassador) to <strong>Japan</strong>. A businessman<br />
dealing in the China trade and active in New York politics, Harris<br />
tried unsuccessfully to join Commodore Matthew Perry’s mission<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1853–1854. However, he convinced President Franklin<br />
Pierce to appoint him as America’s first resident diplomat in <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
took up his post in 1856. With assistance from his secretary and interpreter,<br />
Henry Heusken, Harris negotiated and signed the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and Commerce with the Tokugawa
100 • HATAKEYAMA, YOSHINARI<br />
shogunate in 1858. Tragically, Naosuke Ii, the chief negotiator and<br />
representative <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa government, and Henry Heusken<br />
were later assassinated by anti-foreign samurai. According to legend<br />
and not scholarly evidence, the Tokugawa shogunate provided Harris,<br />
a lifelong bachelor, with a mistress named Okichi, who later committed<br />
suicide because <strong>of</strong> her shameful relations with the barbarian diplomat.<br />
Harris remained in <strong>Japan</strong> until 1862, then returned to New York<br />
and promoted public education for the remainder <strong>of</strong> his life. He<br />
founded the Free Academy <strong>of</strong> the City <strong>of</strong> New York, now known as<br />
City College <strong>of</strong> New York.<br />
HATAKEYAMA, YOSHINARI (1843–1876). An early <strong>Japan</strong>ese university<br />
student in England and then in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Hatakeyama<br />
served in the Meiji government until his death in 1876. In the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, Hatakeyama stayed at the Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the New Life in<br />
upstate New York with other young <strong>Japan</strong>ese from Satsuma domain<br />
before attending Rutgers College for three years.<br />
HAWAII or HAWAI’I. Independent Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii from<br />
1810–1893; Provisional Government <strong>of</strong> Hawaii, then Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
Hawaii to 1898; Territory <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1898 to 1959;<br />
State <strong>of</strong> Hawaii from 1959. A volcanic archipelago with eight major<br />
islands, native Hawaiians lived without significant contact from the<br />
outside until 1778 when English Captain James Cook “discovered”<br />
the islands. In the early 19th century traders, sailors, and missionaries<br />
began coming to the islands and by the mid-19th century sugar<br />
cane plantations were established by Americans, British, and other<br />
Westerners. The production <strong>of</strong> sugar cane on the islands, and geographic<br />
proximity to the growing West Coast <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
to Asia made the islands <strong>of</strong> particularly strategic importance to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Americans gradually established the most significant<br />
Western presence on the islands and, by the 1890s, the islands came<br />
under American control through the actions <strong>of</strong> private Americans and<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Marines.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese shipwrecked sailors, such as Manjiro Nakahama and<br />
Joseph Heco, spent time on the islands in the 1850s, and one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
first significant diplomatic disputes between the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American<br />
governments was over the fate <strong>of</strong> 150 <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers, known
HAWAII OR HAWAI’I • 101<br />
as the gannenmono, who arrived in Hawaii in 1868 in a deal<br />
arranged by American businessman Eugene Van Reed and Hawaii’s<br />
plantation owners. In 1871, American Ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong> Charles<br />
De Long was temporarily appointed as Hawaii’s diplomatic representative<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> and signed the <strong>Japan</strong>–Hawaii Friendship Treaty on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii. Upset over the increasing influence<br />
<strong>of</strong> Americans in Hawaii, King Kalakaua asked Emperor Meiji<br />
in 1881 to be the leader <strong>of</strong> a league <strong>of</strong> Asia nations, including Hawaii.<br />
Emperor Meiji firmly rejected the idea; yet his grandson, Emperor<br />
Hirohito, considered the possibility <strong>of</strong> including Hawaii in the<br />
“Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” several decades later.<br />
Significant numbers <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants began arriving in<br />
Hawaii in the mid-1880s because <strong>of</strong> economic hardship in rural areas<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, including Okinawa, and would continue until <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and its territories was stopped in 1924<br />
by the Oriental Exclusion Act. <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants in Hawaii<br />
worked on sugar cane and pineapple plantations on several islands,<br />
while some began businesses in Honolulu.<br />
On 7 December 1941, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Imperial Navy planes attacked the<br />
U.S. Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor and several other military facilities<br />
on Hawaii in the opening phase <strong>of</strong> the Pacific War between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. With the U.S. Pacific Fleet crippled,<br />
more than 2,400 dead, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans numbering more than<br />
one-third <strong>of</strong> the total population <strong>of</strong> the islands, there was substantial<br />
fear among the civilian community that <strong>Japan</strong>ese military forces<br />
would invade Hawaii. This did not happen, and General Delos Emmons<br />
took charge as American military commander <strong>of</strong> Hawaii and<br />
maintained control <strong>of</strong> both the civilian and military populations. He<br />
also resisted pressure from authorities in Washington, D.C., to put<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans into internment camps, and only 1,000 <strong>of</strong> more<br />
than 100,000 thousand <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans on Hawaii were interned.<br />
This was unlike the fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans in the western <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, where 120,000 were forced to spend years in internment<br />
camps as so-called enemy aliens. More than 2,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
from Hawaii served in the U.S. Army’s 442nd Regimental Combat<br />
Team unit during World War II.<br />
After World War II, politicians, business leaders, and many Americans<br />
living on the islands lobbied for statehood and Hawaii became
102 • HAY, JOHN<br />
the 50th state <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1959. When George Ariyoshi<br />
was elected Governor <strong>of</strong> Hawaii in 1974, he became not only the first<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese American governor but also the first Asian American governor<br />
in <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> history. Other well-known <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
from Hawaii are Senator Daniel Inouye and U.S. Army General Eric<br />
Shinseki.<br />
Since the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, Hawaii has developed a substantial<br />
tourist industry. Americans from the mainland, <strong>Japan</strong>ese, and people<br />
all over the world come to Hawaii to enjoy its warm climate, beaches,<br />
scenic mountains, and active volcanoes. The U.S. Pacific Command<br />
and other American military facilities are based in Hawaii, while the<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Hawaii and its affiliated East–West Center have become<br />
internationally renowned education and research facilities. In<br />
recent years, many native Hawaiians have joined a movement promoting<br />
Hawaiian sovereignty, arguing that the American takeover <strong>of</strong><br />
the islands in the 1890s was illegal. The biggest success <strong>of</strong> this movement<br />
was in 1993 when both Houses <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Congress passed and<br />
President Bill Clinton signed a resolution apologizing for the actions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the American government in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy<br />
in the 1890s. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there are more<br />
than 1.2 million people living in Hawaii, the majority <strong>of</strong> whom are <strong>of</strong><br />
Asian descent. See also IMMIGRATION; INTERNMENT.<br />
HAY, JOHN (1838–1905). Born in 1838, John Hay first rose to notice<br />
as assistant private secretary to President Abraham Lincoln. He was<br />
appointed assistant secretary <strong>of</strong> state in 1879, and in 1897, he was<br />
posted as ambassador to Great Britain. An outspoken Anglophile,<br />
Hay returned to Washington in 1898, President William McKinley<br />
having named him secretary <strong>of</strong> state.<br />
Hay provided the framework for <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations<br />
throughout much <strong>of</strong> the 20th century when, in 1899 (and again in<br />
1900), he issued his famed Open Door notes. Issued to Great Britain,<br />
France, Russia, Germany, Italy, and <strong>Japan</strong>, the Open Door notes<br />
sought to ensure the future expansion <strong>of</strong> American trade in China by<br />
guarding against the disintegration <strong>of</strong> that beleaguered country.<br />
Specifically, Hay’s Open Door notes asked the imperial powers not<br />
to discriminate against the trade <strong>of</strong> other countries within their<br />
spheres <strong>of</strong> influence in China. The notes also asked the powers to refrain<br />
from interfering with Customs Service collection <strong>of</strong> tariff du-
HEPBURN, JAMES CURTIS • 103<br />
ties. As Hay himself put it, the Open Door policy asked for a fair field<br />
and no favor for all traders.<br />
HEARN, LAFCADIO (ALSO KNOWN AS YAKUMO KOIZUMI;<br />
1850–1904). An educator and author <strong>of</strong> several books and essays on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, Hearn was born in Greece, studied in England, Ireland, and<br />
France, and emigrated to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1869. He worked as a<br />
translator and journalist before moving to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1889 to become an<br />
English teacher in rural Matsue. He later taught at a college in Kumamoto,<br />
and afterward obtained a position at the University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo.<br />
Despite his partial blindness, he wrote several widely read works on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, including Glimpses <strong>of</strong> an Unfamiliar <strong>Japan</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>: An Attempt<br />
at Interpretation. He married Setsuko Koizumi, and took her<br />
family’s name upon becoming a <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizen in 1894.<br />
HECO, JOSEPH (ALSO KNOWN AS HIKOZO HAMADA;<br />
1836–1897). As a young boy, Heco was on a coastal trade ship between<br />
Edo and Kobe blown into the open Pacific Ocean by a storm<br />
and eventually rescued by an American ship returning from China to<br />
San Francisco. Assisted by American benefactors, especially the<br />
sailor Thomas Troy and the politically well-connected businessman<br />
Beverly C. Sanders, Heco remained in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> until 1859.<br />
He went to school in San Francisco and Maryland, worked at a commercial<br />
trading firm, converted to Catholicism, met Presidents<br />
Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and, on a return trip to the U.S.,<br />
met President Abraham Lincoln. He adopted the name “Joseph<br />
Heco,” and, in 1858, became the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese granted American citizenship.<br />
He returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1859, and worked as an interpreter<br />
and secretary for American charge d’ affaires Townsend Harris. He<br />
made friends with several Americans in <strong>Japan</strong>, including Francis<br />
Hall and Eugene Van Reed. Although Heco worked with the American<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>ese governments from time to time, including two<br />
years in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Finance Ministry (1872–1874), he spent most<br />
<strong>of</strong> life back in <strong>Japan</strong> as a commercial agent and business entrepreneur.<br />
See also CASTAWAY SAILORS, JAPANESE.<br />
HEPBURN, JAMES CURTIS (1815–1911). A medical doctor and<br />
American missionary, James Curtis Hepburn and his wife, Clara,<br />
lived and worked in <strong>Japan</strong> from 1859 to 1890. Dr. Hepburn provided
104 • HEUSKEN, HENRY<br />
free medical care to many <strong>Japan</strong>ese living in the Kanagawa–<br />
Yokohama area while Clara Hepburn worked as a teacher for <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
girls. Dr. Hepburn produced the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese–English dictionary<br />
in 1867, and then an English–<strong>Japan</strong>ese dictionary a few years later.<br />
He devised a coherent system <strong>of</strong> writing <strong>Japan</strong>ese words with romanized<br />
letters, known as the Hepburn Romanization System, which<br />
is still the standard system used when translating between English<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>ese. Dr. Hepburn also helped establish the first Presbyterian<br />
Church in <strong>Japan</strong>, and later he assisted fellow missionaries<br />
Samuel R. Brown and Guido Verbeck in establishing Meiji Gakuin<br />
University. See also CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN; YATOI.<br />
HEUSKEN, HENRY (1832–1861). A native <strong>of</strong> Holland who immigrated<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Henry Heusken accompanied Townsend<br />
Harris, America’s first counsel-general to <strong>Japan</strong>, as secretary and interpreter<br />
<strong>of</strong> the American legation. Heusken’s language fluency in<br />
Dutch, English, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese proved invaluable during treaty negotiations<br />
and discussions between Harris and <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials such<br />
as Naosuke Ii. Heusken also assisted the British and Prussian delegations<br />
during their negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials. In January<br />
1861, Heusken was assassinated by anti-foreign samurai from the<br />
Satsuma domain. See also ANSEI TREATIES; U.S.–JAPAN<br />
TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE.<br />
“HIGUCHI REPORT” (THE MODALITY OF THE SECURITY<br />
AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF JAPAN). Believing that arms<br />
control would be a trend in the security environment after the end <strong>of</strong><br />
the Cold War, the Morihiro Hosokawa administration established the<br />
Advisory Group on Defense Issues in February 1994 in order to acquire<br />
a basic philosophy for a new defense program outline. This<br />
group consisted <strong>of</strong> nine members, all intellectuals in the private sector,<br />
chaired by Hirotaro Higuchi <strong>of</strong> Asahi Breweries, Ltd. The group<br />
submitted to Prime Minister Tomiichiro Murayama the final report,<br />
“The Modality <strong>of</strong> the Security and Defense Capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>—The<br />
Outlook for the 21st Century.” This report suggested that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
should adopt more active security policy. “<strong>Japan</strong> should extricate itself<br />
from its security policy <strong>of</strong> the past that was, if anything, passive,<br />
and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order.” The re-
HIROHITO • 105<br />
port emphasizes “multilateral cooperation centering on the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>;” however, sensitive American defense experts were afraid that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was beginning to lose respect for the primary importance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance. Consequently, they sought to redefine the alliance<br />
that resulted in the so-called “Nye Report” in February 1995.<br />
HIROHITO (1901–1989). Hirohito ascended the throne in 1926 and remained<br />
there until 1989. For much <strong>of</strong> the first two decades <strong>of</strong> his reign,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was at war. Precisely what role Hirohito played in <strong>Japan</strong>ese politics—and<br />
what effect he exerted over <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations—<br />
in the period leading up to <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender in World War II is necessarily<br />
a matter <strong>of</strong> debate.<br />
His authority as established by the Meiji Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1890 was<br />
great: he was a “sacred and inviolable” figure who exercised the<br />
rights <strong>of</strong> sovereignty and legislative power with the consent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Diet. He had wide authority to issue ordinances. He maintained<br />
supreme command <strong>of</strong> the army and navy and held the authority to determine<br />
the organization <strong>of</strong> the armed services. He had the power to<br />
make war and peace and to conclude treaties. The emperor did not<br />
however operate in a vacuum, and relied on the conclusions reached<br />
by the responsible ministers <strong>of</strong> state as well as military <strong>of</strong>ficials.<br />
Some historians argue that Hirohito was a dynamic emperor who exercised<br />
real power and participated closely in the making <strong>of</strong> national<br />
policy. They maintain that he influenced not only the course <strong>of</strong> his nation’s<br />
diplomacy, but that he played an active role in shaping <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
war planning, strategy, and conduct. According to this line <strong>of</strong> reasoning,<br />
moreover, Hirohito, toward the end <strong>of</strong> the war, refused to break with the<br />
hardline military figures who were arguing for a decisive home-island<br />
battle, and thus bore heavy responsibility for delaying <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender.<br />
Other historians stress that Hirohito’s role amounted to little more<br />
than sanctioning policies that had already been decided upon. They<br />
argue that, for the most part, policies were drawn up by ad hoc committees<br />
<strong>of</strong> middle echelon bureaucrats (or <strong>of</strong>ficers), which were then<br />
circulated to higher levels within their respective ministries (or general<br />
staffs), then faced discussion and possible amendment at the<br />
hands <strong>of</strong> cabinet level ministers (and army and navy chiefs <strong>of</strong> staff).<br />
These historians maintain that Hirohito ratified policies only after<br />
they had been through such a process. They also argue that far from
106 • HIROTA KO – KI<br />
delaying the war’s end, it was Hirohito’s “sacred decision” that made<br />
it finally possible for a government divided between those advocating<br />
surrender and those who refused to admit defeat to surrender.<br />
HIROTA KŌKI (1878–1948). Hirota was an influential diplomat and<br />
politician throughout the Taishō and Shōwa periods, and was the only<br />
civilian tried and found guilty as a Class A war criminal at the International<br />
Military Tribunal for the Far East. As a student <strong>of</strong> Tokyo<br />
Imperial University—from which he graduated in 1905—he received<br />
instruction from career diplomat Enjirō Yamaza. He entered the Foreign<br />
Ministry in 1906, the same year as Shigeru Yoshida and Eijirō<br />
Hayashi. He served in various posts in China, Britain, and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> before he was appointed head <strong>of</strong> the Foreign Ministry’s<br />
Europe–America Bureau in 1923. Three years later, he was sent to<br />
Holland, and in 1930 he was appointed ambassador to the Soviet<br />
Union. He returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in November 1932, and, in September<br />
1933, assumed the foreign minister’s post. In a speech before the Imperial<br />
Diet in January 1934, Hirota declared that <strong>Japan</strong> alone bore responsibility<br />
for the maintenance <strong>of</strong> peace in Asia and that foreign nations<br />
must recognize that fact. Hirota repeatedly pr<strong>of</strong>essed that he<br />
sought cooperative relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and China, although his<br />
willing acquiescence in the application <strong>of</strong> military pressure against<br />
China’s northern provinces provided a revealing pointer as to his conception<br />
<strong>of</strong> Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese cooperation.<br />
Hirota assumed the prime minister’s post following the February<br />
26 Incident <strong>of</strong> 1936. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it concerned itself with foreign affairs,<br />
his cabinet placed highest priority on Soviet Russia, and in November<br />
1936, <strong>Japan</strong> and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact.<br />
This, in turn, helped facilitate <strong>Japan</strong>ese aggression in China by reducing<br />
the threat <strong>of</strong> Soviet intervention.<br />
In January 1937, Hirota’s cabinet was replaced by that <strong>of</strong> General<br />
Hayashi Senjūrō, which, in turn, was replaced by the first cabinet <strong>of</strong><br />
Fumimaro Konoe in June 1937. Hirota was appointed foreign minister.<br />
Within a month, fighting between <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Chinese forces<br />
broke out outside Peking near the Marco Polo Bridge. By August, the<br />
fighting had spread to Shanghai. Hirota did nothing to slow—much<br />
less prevent—the slide into all-out war. To the contrary, he favored its<br />
extension. He resigned as foreign minister in May 1938.
HOOVER, HERBERT • 107<br />
After an extended period on the sidelines, Hirota reemerged in<br />
June 1945. At Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō’s behest, Hirota met<br />
with Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik in an effort to lay the groundwork<br />
for Soviet good <strong>of</strong>fices in ending World War II (the Soviet<br />
Union at this time had not entered the war against <strong>Japan</strong>). It was an<br />
act <strong>of</strong> diplomatic futility.<br />
HOOVER, HERBERT (1874–1964). Herbert Hoover was president <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1929 to 1933. A graduate <strong>of</strong> Stanford University,<br />
he earned his fortune as an engineer who had a knack for scouting<br />
out mining opportunities. During World War I, he revealed his administrative<br />
prowess first as director <strong>of</strong> Belgian relief, then as Food<br />
Administrator in the administration <strong>of</strong> President Woodrow Wilson.<br />
He subsequently spearheaded postwar relief activities in Europe. He<br />
was appointed secretary <strong>of</strong> commerce in the administration <strong>of</strong> President<br />
Warren Harding, enhancing his reputation as both a humanitarian<br />
and as an administrator.<br />
Hoover secured the Republican presidential nomination in 1928.<br />
Popular with the nation at large, his candidacy was also boosted by<br />
the booming prosperity his Republican predecessors had presided<br />
over throughout the 1920s. Although his presidency will be most remembered<br />
for its inability to respond effectively to the Great Depression,<br />
his presidency also coincided with <strong>Japan</strong>’s 1931 invasion <strong>of</strong><br />
Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, he played an important role in devising<br />
the American response.<br />
In responding to <strong>Japan</strong>ese aggression in Manchuria, Hoover was<br />
largely out <strong>of</strong> step with his secretary <strong>of</strong> state, Henry L. Stimson.<br />
Whereas Stimson advocated firmness, Hoover preferred a go-s<strong>of</strong>t approach.<br />
He nonetheless agreed with Stimson that some form <strong>of</strong> response<br />
was necessary. Thus was born the Stimson notes, which were<br />
issued to <strong>Japan</strong> and China in January 1932. In these notes, the American<br />
government refused to recognize any changes in China brought<br />
about by force and in violation <strong>of</strong> the Open Door policy. The Hoover<br />
administration’s Far Eastern policy, although it largely accorded with<br />
the antiwar sentiment <strong>of</strong> the American people, does not deserve high<br />
marks. For although it thought and talked in terms <strong>of</strong> high moral principles,<br />
it refused to act in terms <strong>of</strong> power, which was the only language<br />
to which the frankly expansionist <strong>Japan</strong>ese army was responsive.
108 • HORNBECK, STANLEY<br />
HORNBECK, STANLEY (1883–1966). Stanley Hornbeck was chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> State Department’s Division <strong>of</strong> Far Eastern Affairs<br />
from 1928 to 1937 and adviser on political relations from 1936<br />
to 1944. He entered the State Department as a scholar <strong>of</strong> some<br />
renown, having published on Far Eastern politics while teaching at<br />
various Chinese colleges and later at Harvard University. He had<br />
moreover served as a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference and<br />
the Washington Conference. Once he entered the State Department,<br />
he revealed himself to be possessed <strong>of</strong> both an incisive mind and<br />
sharp tongue, regularly rebuking his subordinates for not having met<br />
his expectations.<br />
Hornbeck held various assumptions regarding the maintenance<br />
<strong>of</strong> peace in the Far East. In the first instance, he held to the conviction<br />
that China must be able to defend its political and territorial integrity.<br />
He also believed that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> must display resoluteness—and<br />
if necessary force—to warn <strong>of</strong>f predatory nations,<br />
principal among which was <strong>Japan</strong>. His position toward <strong>Japan</strong> noticeably<br />
hardened after the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War in<br />
July 1937, when he began to advocate economic sanctions in an effort<br />
to force <strong>Japan</strong> to step back from its perceived ambitions. When,<br />
in September 1940, <strong>Japan</strong> concluded an alliance relationship with<br />
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, Hornbeck was convinced that this<br />
“left no doubt that the world [was] confronted . . . not with merely<br />
regional or local wars but with an organized and ruthless movement<br />
<strong>of</strong> conquest.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed with Hornbeck,<br />
stating that, by its actions, <strong>Japan</strong> had announced itself as<br />
“openly and unashamedly one <strong>of</strong> the predatory nations and part <strong>of</strong><br />
a system which aims to wreck about everything the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
stands for.”<br />
Hornbeck’s abrasiveness in his dealings with his subordinates,<br />
combined with his unshakeable confidence in Chiang Kai-shek’s<br />
leadership <strong>of</strong> China, eventually proved his undoing. In late January<br />
1944, several junior <strong>of</strong>ficers and emerging China specialists, who<br />
were convinced that Hornbeck had “sold his soul to Chiang Kaishek,”<br />
petitioned Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Edward Stettinius for Hornbeck’s<br />
sacking. He was subsequently appointed ambassador to the Netherlands,<br />
where he remained until his retirement in 1947.
HULL, CORDELL • 109<br />
HOUSE, EDWARD H. (1836–1901). An American journalist who first<br />
went to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1871, House wrote for several publications and<br />
taught in Tokyo. House accompanied the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army during the<br />
invasion <strong>of</strong> Taiwan in 1874. In his articles, books, and letters to<br />
American friends, such as Mark Twain and former President Ulysses<br />
S. Grant, House <strong>of</strong>ten argued that <strong>Japan</strong> should be treated as an<br />
equal to the Western powers. See also YATOI.<br />
HULL, CORDELL (1871–1955). Cordell Hull served as secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
state from 1933 to 1944—approximately half again as long as any<br />
predecessor in that high <strong>of</strong>fice and nearly the double the term achieved<br />
by the most enduring <strong>of</strong> his 20th-century forerunners. Born on 2 October<br />
1871 near Byrdstown, Tennessee, Hull spent two terms in the state<br />
legislature before he entered the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives in 1906. He<br />
remained there (with one two-year interruption) until 1930, when he<br />
successfully ran for the Senate. As a Congressman, he developed a political<br />
philosophy that revolved around the concept <strong>of</strong> free trade as the<br />
key to worldwide economic growth and political stability.<br />
Through the 1930s, Hull’s political philosophy came under sustained<br />
assault as Germany, Italy, and <strong>Japan</strong> sought through military<br />
conquest to carve out autarchic spheres. Two factors combined, however,<br />
to curtail his ability to respond to this threat. First, the Great Depression<br />
meant that the administration <strong>of</strong> President Franklin D. Roosevelt<br />
had to focus the vast majority <strong>of</strong> its energies on domestic<br />
issues. Second, Roosevelt was inclined to act as his own secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
state. That said, Roosevelt did allow Hull an unusual degree <strong>of</strong> autonomy<br />
throughout the <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations <strong>of</strong> 1941.<br />
In his negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong>ese Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura,<br />
Hull repeatedly asked for <strong>Japan</strong>’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> four principles:<br />
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> all nations;<br />
non-interference in the internal affairs <strong>of</strong> other countries; equality <strong>of</strong><br />
commercial opportunity; and no disturbance <strong>of</strong> the status quo in the<br />
Pacific except by peaceful means. Adhering inflexibly to these principles,<br />
Hull reacted negatively to various <strong>Japan</strong>ese counterproposals<br />
for diplomatic rapprochement between the two nations, arguing that<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> should conclude no agreement that ran counter to<br />
its basic principles.
110 • II, NAOSUKE<br />
For all the logic inherent in Hull’s arguments, he has come under<br />
criticism for drawing a false line between diplomatic and military<br />
considerations. According to this criticism, he should have used<br />
diplomacy not to browbeat the <strong>Japan</strong>ese but rather to allow the Pentagon<br />
to focus more properly on Germany, which had long been considered<br />
the principal threat to American security.<br />
– I –<br />
II, NAOSUKE (1815–1860). Daimyō <strong>of</strong> Hikone domain, Naosuke Ii<br />
was appointed chief minister <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate in 1858. Ii<br />
negotiated and signed the Ansei Treaties with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
Britain, and France without gaining the approval <strong>of</strong> the imperial<br />
house. He also negotiated an acrimonious shogunal succession dispute.<br />
These actions and decisions created many enemies for Ii and the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate, and Ii dealt harshly with his enemies by having<br />
many imprisoned and several executed. He was assassinated by<br />
samurai from Mito and Satsuma domains in March 1860. See also<br />
HARRIS, TOWNSEND; U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF AMITY AND<br />
COMMERCE.<br />
IKEDA, HAYATO (1899–1965). The <strong>Japan</strong>ese politician Hayato Ikeda<br />
was born in Hiroshima. After graduating from the Law Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Kyoto University, he was an <strong>of</strong>ficial in the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Finance<br />
from 1925 to 1948. In 1947, he was promoted to vice minister <strong>of</strong> Finance.<br />
In 1949, he was elected to the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives. Ikeda<br />
was immediately appointed finance minister in the third Shigeru<br />
Yoshida Cabinet. In 1950, he also held the post <strong>of</strong> minister <strong>of</strong> international<br />
trade and industry. Supported by Prime Minister Shigeru<br />
Yoshida, Ikeda was an ardent advocate <strong>of</strong> the Dodge Line, the ninepoint<br />
economic stabilization plan directive. He became Secretary<br />
General <strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party in 1954. After the amalgamation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
two major conservative parties, Ikeda served as minister <strong>of</strong> finance<br />
(1956–1957) and minister <strong>of</strong> international trade and industry<br />
(1959–1960). He became prime minister in 1960. After severe turmoil<br />
because <strong>of</strong> controversy surrounding the revision <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty, Ikeda maintained a low pr<strong>of</strong>ile, advo-
IKEDA–ROBERTSON TALKS • 111<br />
cating tolerance and patience, and proposing a plan to double national<br />
income. Ikeda governed <strong>Japan</strong> for four years from 1960 to<br />
1964, during which he cemented the postwar recovery and entered<br />
into the stage <strong>of</strong> rapid economic growth.<br />
IKEDA–ROBERTSON TALKS. Hayato Ikeda, who was then chair<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party’s Policy Research Council, served as Prime Minister<br />
Shigeru Yoshida’s special envoy during approximately four<br />
weeks <strong>of</strong> talks with Walter Robertson, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assistant secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> state for the Far East, in Washington, D.C., in October 1953.<br />
The significance <strong>of</strong> these talks is that they led to the formulation <strong>of</strong><br />
basic principles that would guide <strong>Japan</strong>’s increase <strong>of</strong> its defense capabilities.<br />
For example, concerning ground forces, <strong>Japan</strong> proposed<br />
putting 180,000 troops in uniform, whereas the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> insisted<br />
on 325,000 troops. During the talks, Ikeda presented four major reasons<br />
why <strong>Japan</strong> could achieve modest but not drastic increases in its<br />
defense capabilities:<br />
1. Legal constraints: It would be impossible to amend the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
constitution, especially Article Nine, during the foreseeable<br />
future.<br />
2. Political constraints: Because <strong>of</strong> a thorough peace education<br />
program conducted by the Occupation authorities, a sentiment<br />
<strong>of</strong> “not taking up arms” had become prevalent among young<br />
people suitable for military service.<br />
3. Economic constraints: <strong>Japan</strong> at that time needed not a program<br />
<strong>of</strong> rearmament but economic growth and social security.<br />
4. Physical constraints: Even if <strong>Japan</strong> made plans to expand its<br />
Police Reserve Force (in effect, a standing army), it could not<br />
recruit enough people. As a result <strong>of</strong> the “peace education” program,<br />
very few young people exhibited an interest in voluntarily<br />
enlisting in the Police Reserve Force. If <strong>Japan</strong> were forced<br />
to proceed with a rapid expansion <strong>of</strong> the police force, that might<br />
encourage ideologically suspect people to join the Force. Moreover,<br />
the constitution clearly prohibited conscription.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> convinced the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to accept a compromise: <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would increase the size <strong>of</strong> Police Reserve Force to 180,000 within<br />
three years, starting with an increase <strong>of</strong> 30,000 in the first year alone.
112 • IMMIGRATION<br />
On 30 October, Ikeda and Robertson issued a joint communiqué that<br />
contained the following points:<br />
1. <strong>Japan</strong> would continue to increase its own defense capabilities<br />
while taking into account constitutional and economic constraints.<br />
2. Delegates from both countries would continue to hold discussions<br />
concerning military aid in Tokyo.<br />
3. An agricultural surplus provision in the amount <strong>of</strong> some $50<br />
million (a sum that was based on Article 559 <strong>of</strong> the Mutual Security<br />
Act [MSA]) and reciprocal yen funds acquired from sales<br />
<strong>of</strong> agricultural surplus would be used to subsidize <strong>Japan</strong>’s defense<br />
production and used for overseas purchases and investment<br />
to help strengthen the country’s defense-related industries.<br />
IMMIGRATION. The first <strong>Japan</strong>ese in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> arrived as<br />
castaway sailors in the 1840s and 1850s, with <strong>Japan</strong>ese students,<br />
government <strong>of</strong>ficials, and businessmen arriving by the 1860s and<br />
1870s. The first <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants were members <strong>of</strong> the Wakamatsu<br />
Colony and arrived in California in 1869. In the 1880s, the<br />
number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigrants in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> began to significantly<br />
increase and, by 1910, outnumbered Chinese immigrants on<br />
the mainland, and were by far the largest ethnic group in Hawaii.<br />
From 1910 until the 1970s, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans were the largest<br />
Asian ethnic group in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, with the largest number living<br />
in California and Hawaii. According to the 2000 U.S. Census,<br />
more than 700,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans live in the U.S.<br />
At first respected for their diligence and hard work, by the early<br />
20th century <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans increasingly became the target for<br />
racially based discrimination. The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” <strong>of</strong><br />
1907–1908; Alien Land Laws <strong>of</strong> the 1910s; the Oriental Exclusion<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> the 1924 Immigration Bill, and especially the internment <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans during World War II are the best-known examples<br />
<strong>of</strong> discriminatory laws against <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans. Despite hardship<br />
and discrimination, first generation (issei) and second generation<br />
(nisei) <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans significantly contributed to the agricultural<br />
development <strong>of</strong> western states and Hawaii, and also developed<br />
thriving business communities in many areas <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
During World War II, many <strong>Japan</strong>ese American soldiers fought
INDUSTRY FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION • 113<br />
bravely in both Europe and Asia—even though some <strong>of</strong> their relatives<br />
were imprisoned in American internment camps as possible “enemy<br />
aliens” by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government.<br />
After the animosity <strong>of</strong> World War II subsided, by the 1960s, <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Americans were hailed as a “model minority” because they were<br />
viewed as a law-abiding, industrious, and studious ethnic group contributing<br />
to the diversity <strong>of</strong> American life while maintaining elements<br />
<strong>of</strong> traditional <strong>Japan</strong>ese culture. A few prominent <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
are George Takei, actor; Ann Curry, TV news reporter; George<br />
Ariyoshi, Governor <strong>of</strong> Hawaii; Daniel Inouye, Senator from Hawaii;<br />
Robert Matsui, Congressman from California; Ellison Onizuka, astronaut;<br />
Ronald Takaki, UC Berkeley pr<strong>of</strong>essor and author; Kristi Yamaguchi,<br />
Olympic gold medal winner in figure skating; and Gen.<br />
Eric Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff. Although many <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Americans reject the designation <strong>of</strong> “model minority,” they have<br />
been remarkably successful in their personal and pr<strong>of</strong>essional lives,<br />
and have persevered in the midst <strong>of</strong> discrimination faced by themselves<br />
and their immigrant ancestors in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
As <strong>of</strong> 2003, just under 50,000 Americans were living in <strong>Japan</strong> (not<br />
including American military personnel). Many Americans living in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> are businesspersons, students, or teachers. Although some are<br />
permanent residents, especially if they have <strong>Japan</strong>ese spouses, very<br />
few are naturalized <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens because <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
immigration rules make it extremely difficult for foreigners to obtain<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese citizenship. The cost <strong>of</strong> living in <strong>Japan</strong>, plus lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
language ability also tends to keep the number <strong>of</strong> Americans living<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> at relatively low numbers. Nevertheless, since the early<br />
1980s, there has been a slow growth in the number <strong>of</strong> Americans living<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong>. See also JAPAN EXCHANGE AND TEACHING PRO-<br />
GRAM; YATOI.<br />
INDUSTRY FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION (IFSEC).<br />
With the agreement between the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments, the<br />
Industry Forum for Security Cooperation was established in January<br />
1997 as a forum <strong>of</strong> dialogue between <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. defense industries<br />
to promote effective <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. defense cooperation toward<br />
realization <strong>of</strong> peace and stability in post–Cold War Asia. The IFSEC<br />
has two primary purposes: Promotion <strong>of</strong> dialogue between <strong>Japan</strong>ese
114 • INOUE, KAORU<br />
and U.S. defense industries toward encouraging <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. defense<br />
equipment cooperation and formation <strong>of</strong> informal advisory group<br />
from the defense industries toward the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Defense Agency and<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Defense. The Defense Industry<br />
Commission <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Business Federation serves as <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
secretariat in the IFSEC while the U.S. counterpart is the National Defense<br />
Industrial Association (NDIA).<br />
INOUE, KAORU (1835–1915). Samurai from Choshu domain (Yamaguchi<br />
Prefecture) and top <strong>of</strong>ficial in the Meiji government. Kaoru<br />
Inoue, Hirobumi Ito and other Choshu samurai studied Western science<br />
in England in the early 1860s then returned to <strong>Japan</strong> and were<br />
among the Choshu and Satsuma samurai who defeated the Tokugawa<br />
shogunate and founded a new government centered on Emperor<br />
Meiji. Inoue held several ministerial posts in the Meiji government,<br />
including that <strong>of</strong> Foreign Minister from 1881 to 1887. See<br />
also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY (ICU). This is a<br />
private university located in Mitaka City, Tokyo Prefecture. <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
and American Christians had dreamed <strong>of</strong> establishing an interdenominational<br />
Christian university for half a century. Finally, on 15<br />
June 1949, their leaders formally founded the International Christian<br />
University (ICU). In 1948, the <strong>Japan</strong> International Christian University<br />
Foundation was established in New York primarily for coordinating<br />
the American participation and for leading a fund-raising<br />
drive. In <strong>Japan</strong>, Hisato Ichimada, governor <strong>of</strong> the Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, led<br />
a fund-raising campaign. In March 1953, the ICU was legally recognized<br />
as a school juridical person, and the College <strong>of</strong> Liberal Arts was<br />
opened in April as <strong>Japan</strong>’s first four-year liberal arts college. Yuasa<br />
Hachiro was the first president <strong>of</strong> the university. In April 1957, the<br />
Graduate School opened with a master’s program in Education, followed<br />
by <strong>Japan</strong>’s first master’s program in Public Administration (in<br />
1963), a doctoral program in the Division <strong>of</strong> Education (in 1964), by<br />
doctoral programs in the Division <strong>of</strong> Public Administration and the<br />
Division <strong>of</strong> Comparative Culture (in 1976), and a master’s program<br />
in the Division <strong>of</strong> Natural Sciences (in 1987). The administrative and<br />
educational system resembles an American college <strong>of</strong> liberal arts.
INTERNMENT • 115<br />
The ICU is a child <strong>of</strong> the great U.S. influence on <strong>Japan</strong> during the occupation<br />
period.<br />
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR<br />
EAST (IMTFE). The International Military Tribunal for the Far East<br />
was a tribunal created by the Allied Powers after <strong>Japan</strong>’s defeat in<br />
World War II to administer justice to <strong>Japan</strong>ese wartime leaders indicted<br />
as war criminals. In accordance with Article 10 <strong>of</strong> the Potsdam<br />
Declaration <strong>of</strong> July 1945, the Supreme Commander for the<br />
Allied Powers (SCAP) issued an ordinance on 19 January 1946 stipulating<br />
the creation <strong>of</strong> the IMTFE. The tribunal’s first court session<br />
was held on 3 May 1946. On 12 November 1948, sentences were<br />
handed down for those charged with war crimes. The tribunal consisted<br />
<strong>of</strong> one justice each from 11 countries: the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great<br />
Britain, France, China, Canada, Australia, Holland, New Zealand, the<br />
Soviet Union, India, and the Philippines. Sir William F. Webb, the<br />
justice from Australia, was appointed as the presiding judge. Somei<br />
Uzawa, a prominent attorney who later became president <strong>of</strong> Meiji<br />
University, led the defense counsel while Joseph Keenan, former<br />
U.S. assistant attorney general, served as chief prosecutor and leader<br />
<strong>of</strong> a team <strong>of</strong> international prosecutors. A total <strong>of</strong> 28 <strong>Japan</strong>ese leaders<br />
who served before or during the war were indicted by the IMTFE.<br />
Out <strong>of</strong> the 28, seven, including former Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō,<br />
were sentenced to death; 16, including Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper,<br />
were sentenced to life in prison; and two former foreign ministers,<br />
Shigenori Togo and Mamoru Shigemitsu, received prison sentences<br />
<strong>of</strong> 20 years and seven years, respectively. During trial proceedings,<br />
an extreme rightist university pr<strong>of</strong>essor was dismissed because <strong>of</strong> a<br />
mental disorder, and former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and<br />
former full Admiral Osami Nagano died from natural causes. At the<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the trial, Justice Radhabinod Pal <strong>of</strong> India dissented from the<br />
sentences handed down by the tribunal. There were calls from all<br />
over the world for <strong>Japan</strong>’s Emperor Hirohito to be prosecuted, but<br />
General Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, rejected this idea. See also<br />
PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
INTERNMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese military attack on Pearl Harbor, besides<br />
plunging the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> into war, also gave rise to, in historian
116 • IRAQ<br />
Roger Daniels’s estimation, “the worst single governmental violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> civil rights in modern times.” In the early months <strong>of</strong> 1942, 120,000<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese–Americans living on the West Coast—more than two-thirds<br />
<strong>of</strong> whom were native-born American citizens—were removed from<br />
their homes and incarcerated in concentration camps from California<br />
to Arkansas.<br />
These people were incarcerated not for crimes—real or supposed—but<br />
on the grounds <strong>of</strong> their ethnicity. War against <strong>Japan</strong>, and<br />
in particular <strong>Japan</strong>’s stunning successes in the early months <strong>of</strong> that<br />
conflict, brought into full relief deep-seated antipathies among many<br />
West Coast Americans toward their neighbors <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese ancestry.<br />
Newspapers and radio broadcasts on the West Coast loudly proclaimed<br />
the dangers posed by this supposed fifth column. To cite but<br />
one example, the San Diego Union argued that “a viper is nonetheless<br />
a viper wherever the egg is hatched.”<br />
These prejudices reached to the very top levels <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
government. Heeding the advice <strong>of</strong> General John DeWitt, commanding<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the Western Defense Command, and most <strong>of</strong> California’s<br />
elected <strong>of</strong>ficials, Secretary <strong>of</strong> War Henry L. Stimson and his deputy,<br />
John J. McCloy, argued for the internment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese living on the<br />
West Coast on the grounds that they posed a military threat to the nation.<br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 19 February 1942 responded<br />
by signing Executive Order 9066, which in effect authorized Stimson<br />
to carry out the internment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans living in California<br />
and other western states. Although Hawaii suffered an attack by <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
military forces, only 1,000 out <strong>of</strong> 150,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans<br />
living on the island territory were interned because military and business<br />
leaders did not want to lose so many needed laborers.<br />
Historians have long disparaged the purported military necessity <strong>of</strong><br />
this measure. Their views were in large part mirrored by the presidential<br />
Commission on the Wartime Internment and Relocation <strong>of</strong> Civilians<br />
(CWIRC), which, in 1982, judged that the “promulgation <strong>of</strong> Executive<br />
Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity.” Instead,<br />
“race prejudice,” “war hysteria,” and “a failure <strong>of</strong> political leadership”<br />
underlay the decision to incarcerate <strong>Japan</strong>ese Americans. See also PA-<br />
CIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
IRAQ. See SPECIAL LEGISLATION CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE<br />
IN THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ.
IWAKURA MISSION • 117<br />
IRWIN, ROBERT WALKER (1844–1925). American businessman,<br />
executive <strong>of</strong> Mitsui Trading Company, and adviser to the governments<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>, and the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii. In 1885, Irwin<br />
negotiated government-sponsored <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration to<br />
Hawaii. Irwin was one <strong>of</strong> the first American men to legally become a<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese citizen, and he married a <strong>Japan</strong>ese woman (Takechi Iki).<br />
ITO, HIROBUMI (1841–1909). Samurai from Choshu domain (Yamaguchi<br />
Prefecture) and top <strong>of</strong>ficial in the Meiji government. Hirobumi<br />
Ito traveled to England in 1863 with other Choshu samurai to<br />
study Western science and later helped lead the Choshu–Satsuma<br />
coalition that overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868. Ito then<br />
held several top positions in the Meiji government, serving as prime<br />
minister four times. He traveled with the Iwakura Mission to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe from 1871 to 1873, and traveled to Europe<br />
in the 1880s to study Western constitutions. The Meiji Constitution,<br />
promulgated in 1889 and lasting until 1946, was primarily Ito’s work.<br />
Ito was assassinated by a Korean nationalist in 1909 while serving as<br />
the resident-general <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>-controlled Korea. See also MEIJI ERA;<br />
MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
IWAKURA MISSION. From late 1871 until 1873, top-ranking members<br />
<strong>of</strong> the new Meiji government journeyed to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
Europe. Led by Prince Tomomi Iwakura, the Iwakura Mission had<br />
two purposes. One was to renegotiate the “unequal treaties” (also<br />
known as Ansei Treaties) between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, several European<br />
countries, and <strong>Japan</strong> that the previous Tokugawa government<br />
signed in the late 1850s. The other purpose was to study the science,<br />
education, military, government systems, and social systems <strong>of</strong> the<br />
West that could be utilized by the Meiji government for industrializing<br />
and modernizing <strong>Japan</strong>. Although treated well by U.S. President<br />
Ulysses S. Grant, other heads <strong>of</strong> state, and political leaders, the<br />
Iwakura Mission was unsuccessful in renegotiating the “unequal<br />
treaties.” However, much <strong>of</strong> the information about Western societies<br />
and institutions carefully studied by Meiji government <strong>of</strong>ficials and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese students who accompanied the Iwakura Mission would be<br />
adopted and adapted in the years and decades to come and significantly<br />
contributed to <strong>Japan</strong>’s industrialization and modernization. See<br />
also IWAKURA, TOMOMI (1825–1883); MEIJI ERA.
118 • IWAKURA, TOMOMI<br />
IWAKURA, TOMOMI (1825–1883). Imperial prince, supporter <strong>of</strong> the<br />
anti-Tokugawa forces, and top <strong>of</strong>ficial in the Meiji government. He<br />
led the Iwakura Mission to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe from 1871<br />
to 1873, held high positions in the Meiji government, and was a close<br />
adviser and confidant <strong>of</strong> Emperor Meiji. See also IWAKURA MIS-<br />
SION; MEIJI ERA.<br />
– J –<br />
JANES, LEROY LANSING (ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN<br />
JANES; 1838–1909). American educator and missionary. A former<br />
military <strong>of</strong>ficer, Janes arrived in <strong>Japan</strong> in 1871 to teach mathematics,<br />
science, and history at the Kumamoto prefectural school for Western<br />
studies. A fervent Christian, Janes also taught the Bible and Christianity,<br />
and converted a number <strong>of</strong> his students who called themselves<br />
the Kumamoto Band. Some <strong>of</strong> these <strong>Japan</strong>ese converts went on<br />
to became well-known <strong>Japan</strong>ese ministers, such as Ebino Danjo and<br />
Ukita Kazutani. The school was forced to close in 1876 because <strong>of</strong><br />
anti-Christian sentiment in Kumamoto, and several members <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Kumamoto Band moved to Kyoto to attend Doshisha College run by<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Christian Jo Niijima. Janes taught English in Osaka, and<br />
then returned to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He came back to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1893<br />
and taught in Kyoto before returning to California, where he died in<br />
1909. See also YATOI.<br />
JAPAN–AMERICA ECONOMIC ALLIANCE CONFERENCE.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong> Federation <strong>of</strong> Economic Organizations (Keidanren)<br />
founded the <strong>Japan</strong>–America Economic Alliance Conference in February<br />
1952. Taking advantage <strong>of</strong> special military procurement during the<br />
Korean War, the conference served to promote close economic cooperation<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It also aimed to foster<br />
use <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s rearmament program as a measure to maintain economic<br />
prosperity even after the end <strong>of</strong> special Korean War–related<br />
procurement. In cooperation with U.S. military forces, Keidanren<br />
mapped out a plan for <strong>Japan</strong>’s future self-defense force needs consisting<br />
<strong>of</strong> 300,000 troop ground forces, 300,000 tons <strong>of</strong> naval ship tonnage,<br />
and 3,000 military aircraft. Keidanren estimated that with this
JAPAN–AMERICA STUDENT CONFERENCE • 119<br />
size self-defense force, <strong>Japan</strong> would be able to defend itself for at least<br />
two months regardless <strong>of</strong> who attacked it. See also DEFENSE.<br />
JAPAN–AMERICA SOCIETY (JAS). The JAS is a non-partisan, private<br />
organization promoting education and cultural exchange, and a<br />
forum for the exchange <strong>of</strong> political and business views <strong>of</strong> its members.<br />
There are approximately 100 <strong>Japan</strong>–America Society chapters<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> and in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, based either in cities, prefectures,<br />
or states. Individual <strong>Japan</strong> America Societies first emerged in the late<br />
19th century and were organized under an umbrella national organization<br />
in 1960.<br />
The National Association <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies, Inc. (NA-<br />
JAS) is a private, non-pr<strong>of</strong>it, non-partisan organization that sponsors<br />
educational, cultural, and business programs about <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations that are open to the general public. NAJAS performs<br />
its activities through its society members in both <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> (the latter are called <strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies). In the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, NAJAS is the only national non-pr<strong>of</strong>it network dedicated<br />
to public education about <strong>Japan</strong>, consisting <strong>of</strong> about 40 independent<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>-related organizations located in 32 U.S. cities. Its members<br />
come from all walks <strong>of</strong> life, including business, political, and<br />
academic, who live in either the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> or <strong>Japan</strong>. Consequently,<br />
NAJAS can provide a variety <strong>of</strong> perspectives on U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations.<br />
In 1979, 13 <strong>Japan</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies participated in a<br />
meeting in Los Angeles to formally establish an umbrella association.<br />
The first chairman was former U.S. Ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong> U. Alexis<br />
Johnson. The association was incorporated in New York State and<br />
based in New York City until October 1999, when it moved its headquarters<br />
to its current location in Washington, D.C. In 1981, the association’s<br />
first annual conference was held in Chicago. In October<br />
1990, the name <strong>of</strong> the organization was <strong>of</strong>ficially changed to the National<br />
Association <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–America Societies. Today, NAJAS has<br />
about 15,000 individual members and over 15,000 corporate representatives.<br />
See also AMERICA–JAPAN SOCIETY, INC.<br />
JAPAN–AMERICA STUDENT CONFERENCE (JASC). The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–America Student Conference is a non-pr<strong>of</strong>it educational and<br />
university student cultural exchange program. It was created as <strong>Japan</strong>’s
120 • JAPAN–AMERICAN TRADE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT<br />
first international organization for promoting student exchanges. Based<br />
on a joint exchange program begun with Aoyama Gakuin University in<br />
Tokyo in 1934, the JASC has also become the oldest student-run exchange<br />
program operating in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In the early 1930s,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese and American university students concerned about the deterioration<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations following the 1931 Manchurian Incident<br />
founded the JASC. <strong>Japan</strong>ese students were worried that America<br />
might become hostile toward <strong>Japan</strong> and were therefore interested in<br />
founding a program that could encourage mutual trust between <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
and Americans. A principal JASC belief was that world peace<br />
flowed from the Pacific Ocean while peace in the Pacific Ocean itself<br />
depended on peaceful relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
To achieve this goal, university students had to make some contribution.<br />
JASC sought to facilitate exchanges <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American<br />
university students with different backgrounds to encourage a mutual<br />
flow <strong>of</strong> different opinions about issues affecting the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. relationship.<br />
It was thought that discussions about common problems<br />
could help young people from both countries achieve mutual understanding<br />
and foster friendship and trust. The conference continues to<br />
operate today and provides future leaders in both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> with opportunities to live together for about a month for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> deepening mutual understandings through engaging in small<br />
group discussions, field trips, and public forums.<br />
JAPAN–AMERICAN TRADE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–American Trade Arbitration Agreement was concluded between<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong> Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) and the American<br />
Arbitration Association (AAA). It took effect on 16 September<br />
1952. The agreement created a process for deciding the geographic location<br />
<strong>of</strong> arbitration proceedings (in the form <strong>of</strong> a joint arbitration commission)<br />
in the event <strong>of</strong> a commercial or legal dispute between the U.S.<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong>. Following the creation <strong>of</strong> this arbitration agreement with the<br />
U.S., <strong>Japan</strong> proceeded to conclude a series <strong>of</strong> cooperation agreements<br />
with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) institutions in various<br />
countries. As <strong>of</strong> September 2003, <strong>Japan</strong> had concluded arbitration<br />
agreements with 43 ADR institutions. Nine <strong>of</strong> these agreements created<br />
a joint arbitration commission method modeled on the commission<br />
created with the AAA and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration<br />
Commission. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.
JAPAN IS DIFFERENT ARGUMENT • 121<br />
JAPAN ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM (JAIF). The <strong>Japan</strong> Atomic<br />
Industrial Forum was created by <strong>Japan</strong>’s atomic energy industry in<br />
March 1956 to serve as a non-governmental and non-pr<strong>of</strong>it organization<br />
that would promote the peaceful utilization <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy for<br />
the benefit <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people. JAIF’s primary mission is to conduct<br />
studies <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy, facilitate an exchange <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />
about nuclear energy, promote consensus on policy issues concerning<br />
the nuclear energy industry, assist the government in the development<br />
<strong>of</strong> nuclear energy policy, and utilize the plan and promotion <strong>of</strong> its policies.<br />
JAIF encourages cooperation and communication between the<br />
nuclear energy industry and other industries, local communities, universities,<br />
the mass media and other groups involved in or related to<br />
nuclear energy activities. JAIF believes that economically viable and<br />
stable energy resources, particularly nuclear energy, are necessary for<br />
the public’s welfare and the development <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s national economy.<br />
Each spring, JAIF hosts a three-day conference in <strong>Japan</strong> to provide<br />
a forum for leaders in the global nuclear energy community to<br />
meet and exchange opinions. The conference typically attracts more<br />
than 1,000 participants from around the world. JAIF cooperates with<br />
nuclear energy-related forums and organizations in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
Great Britain, and more than 20 other, as part <strong>of</strong> its goal to promote<br />
the peaceful and safe use <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy. On a global level, JAIF is<br />
a co-founder <strong>of</strong> the International Nuclear Forum and is involved in the<br />
campaign to prevent global warming.<br />
JAPAN EXCHANGE AND TEACHING (JET) PROGRAM.<br />
Started in 1987 by the Foreign Ministry <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, the JET Program<br />
employs thousands <strong>of</strong> young American and other Western university<br />
graduates as assistant teachers and instructors in public <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
schools for one to three years.<br />
JAPAN IS DIFFERENT ARGUMENT. After the end <strong>of</strong> World War II,<br />
Americans and <strong>Japan</strong>ese had more opportunities to get to know each<br />
other. For the first decade or so after the war, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as a winner<br />
and ruler in <strong>Japan</strong> during the occupation, by and large imposed<br />
Western ways <strong>of</strong> thinking and values on <strong>Japan</strong>, firmly believing that<br />
these are universal values. Naturally, Americans emphasized the foreignness<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese culture and urged <strong>Japan</strong> to adopt Western culture<br />
as rapidly and as much as possible. The representative work <strong>of</strong> this era
122 • JAPAN–U.S. ADMINISTRATION AGREEMENT<br />
is Ruth Benedict’s, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Culture.<br />
In the 1960s, the world paid a great deal <strong>of</strong> attention to the rapid<br />
growth <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy. Even in the 1970s, <strong>Japan</strong> successfully<br />
overcame the oil shock and maintained social stability and order.<br />
The world began to suggest that unique <strong>Japan</strong>ese values and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese methods <strong>of</strong> management must be the primary causes <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country’s success and the world tried to learn from <strong>Japan</strong>. The representative<br />
work <strong>of</strong> this era is Ezra F. Vogel’s, <strong>Japan</strong> as Number One:<br />
Lessons for America.<br />
In the late 1970s, revisionists rose to surface and they insisted on<br />
critically reviewing the friendly <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. relationship. They argued<br />
that America’s real threat was not the military and ideological<br />
threat from the Soviet Union, but the economic threat from <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
They reversed the previous argument about <strong>Japan</strong>’s uniqueness: a<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> that does not adopt global standards, but maintains its own<br />
idiosyncratic economic and social structures is an “alien” country and<br />
this alien character is a real threat to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Consequently,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> should force <strong>Japan</strong> to become a “normal” country<br />
observing the global standard by implementing economic and social<br />
reforms. This opinion became popular in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the late<br />
1980s as the Soviet Union declined its power and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
suffered from twin deficits in budget and trade while <strong>Japan</strong> enjoyed<br />
economic prosperity. The representative works <strong>of</strong> this era are Karel<br />
van Wolferen’s, The Enigma <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Power: People and Politics<br />
in a Stateless Nation and Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Miracle: the Growth <strong>of</strong> Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. The momentum<br />
<strong>of</strong> revisionism, however, waned from the 1990s onward as the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese economy suffered from a long-term economic depression.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. ADMINISTRATION AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Administration Agreement was signed by <strong>Japan</strong>ese Chief Cabinet<br />
Secretary Katsuo Okazaki and <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Assistant Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
State Dean Rusk on 28 February 1952. The agreement provides the<br />
U.S. military with the legal right and authority to use certain zones and<br />
facilities within <strong>Japan</strong>. Moreover, the agreement contains rules that<br />
govern the entry <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Army into <strong>Japan</strong>ese harbors, U.S. military’s<br />
use <strong>of</strong> public utility and services, tax free <strong>of</strong> imports, procure-
JAPAN–U.S. AGREEMENT ON TRUST ISLAND TERRITORY IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN • 123<br />
ment <strong>of</strong> goods and services, nontaxable privileges, rights <strong>of</strong> criminal<br />
and civil trials, foreign exchange controls, defense measures in case<br />
any hostile actions take place within the <strong>Japan</strong>ese territory, and allocation<br />
<strong>of</strong> fees for military stationing.<br />
As for criminal trials, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> insisted on jus sanguinis.<br />
Consequently, under the agreement <strong>Japan</strong> was not allowed to exercise<br />
any jurisdiction over U.S. military <strong>of</strong>ficers and soldiers, U.S.<br />
army civilian employees, and related family members stationed or<br />
living in <strong>Japan</strong>. However, on 29 September 1953, <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> amended this agreement to allow <strong>Japan</strong> to bring criminal<br />
charges against any U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficer, soldier, or army civilian employee<br />
arrested for a crime when not undertaking <strong>of</strong>ficial duties.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN RESEARCH<br />
AND DEVELOPMENT IN ENERGY. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Agreement<br />
on Cooperation in Research and Development in Energy (now commonly<br />
called the new <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Science and Technology Agreement)<br />
was signed on 2 May 1979. Its aim is to engage in energy research and<br />
development through cooperation or joint ventures based on the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equality and mutual benefit. The agreement deals primarily<br />
with nuclear energy. In implementing plans concerning nuclear fusion,<br />
the Department <strong>of</strong> Energy (the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>) and the Ministry<br />
<strong>of</strong> Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the Ministry<br />
<strong>of</strong> Economy, Trade and Industry (<strong>Japan</strong>) assume administrative<br />
responsibility. Today, in the nuclear energy field, <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> have four major fields <strong>of</strong> cooperation: general interchange<br />
plans; joint plans (fusion reactor engineering, fusion reactor physics,<br />
etc.); joint research organization for fusion reactor theories; and joint<br />
projects. Because <strong>of</strong> this agreement, it has become possible for <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to exchange research results with their counterparts,<br />
to promote mutual advancement and provide the necessary environment<br />
for research and development by lending and borrowing<br />
expensive facilities and equipment.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. AGREEMENT ON TRUST ISLAND TERRITORY<br />
IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN (MICRONESIA ARRANGEMENT).<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Agreement on Trust Island Territory in the Pacific<br />
Ocean (Micronesia Agreement) was signed in Tokyo on 18 April
124 • JAPAN–U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL<br />
1969 by Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi and Acting Ambassador to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Charge Osborn. Based on the League <strong>of</strong> Nations’ code and the<br />
mandatory rule clause, <strong>Japan</strong> had been governing the old Southern<br />
Ocean Islands until the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, but these islands came<br />
under U.S. administrative control based on the <strong>United</strong> Nations’ Charter<br />
and the trusteeship agreement in the postwar era. Residents on the<br />
islands had been demanding compensation for damages suffered during<br />
World War II. The <strong>United</strong> Nations Trusteeship Council also asked<br />
both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to solve this problem swiftly. Because<br />
it was a fact that the islands were fierce battlegrounds between<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> during World War II and there were many<br />
casualties among native residents, as well as serious material damage<br />
and mental distress, it was desirable to find a practical solution to the<br />
problem. As a result <strong>of</strong> negotiations between the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
governments, each country agreed to make a voluntary contribution<br />
amounting to 1.8 billion yen in order to contribute to promoting the<br />
welfare <strong>of</strong> all the residents. <strong>Japan</strong> made it clear that these were not<br />
war reparations from World War II for the trust territories on the Pacific<br />
Islands. Moreover, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> approved <strong>Japan</strong>’s demand<br />
that their fishing boats should be able to call at Truk Lagoon and<br />
Palau. In addition, when <strong>Japan</strong>ese vessels were sunk within the trust<br />
territorial waters, it was approved that <strong>Japan</strong> could salvage them. See<br />
also PACIFIC WAR.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. BUSINESS COUNCIL (JUSBC). The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Business Council is a <strong>Japan</strong>ese organization that cooperates with the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council (USJBC) in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in exchanging<br />
opinions on business policy and making business-related<br />
recommendations to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments, other business<br />
organizations, corporations, and think tanks. The <strong>Japan</strong> Federation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the <strong>Japan</strong> Chamber <strong>of</strong><br />
Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shokou Kaigisho), and the <strong>Japan</strong><br />
Foreign Trade Council (Nihon Boekikai) formed the Joint Commission<br />
on Trade with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1958, which later evolved<br />
into the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Business Conference in 1961. The JUSBC comprises<br />
about 90 public and private companies doing business in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
as well as in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It is supported by the <strong>Japan</strong> Business<br />
Federation, the <strong>Japan</strong> Chamber <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Industry, the <strong>Japan</strong>
JAPAN–U.S. BUSINESSMEN’S CONFERENCE • 125<br />
Association <strong>of</strong> Corporate Executives, the Kansai Economic Federation,<br />
and the <strong>Japan</strong> Foreign Trade Council.<br />
In April 1971, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> formed the Advisory Council on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Economic Relations (ACJUSER) under the chairmanship<br />
<strong>of</strong> Najeeb E. Halaby, the chairman <strong>of</strong> Pan American World Airways.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> responded to this development by establishing the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Business Council under the joint leadership <strong>of</strong> Kogoro Uemura,<br />
chairman <strong>of</strong> the Federation <strong>of</strong> Economic Organizations; Shigeo<br />
Nagano, chairman <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Chamber <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Industry;<br />
Kazutaka Kikawada, chairman <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong> Association <strong>of</strong> Corporate<br />
Executives; and Yoshizane Iwasa, chairman <strong>of</strong> Fuji Bank. In 1985,<br />
the ACJUSER became the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Economic Council, and in<br />
1989 it took on its present name, the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council.<br />
Membership in the USJBC is open to executives from U.S. companies<br />
doing business in <strong>Japan</strong>; leading consulting, accounting, and law<br />
firms; and other major service providers.<br />
The JUSBC has five major goals:<br />
1. To make proposals on basic, long-term business policy to the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments, and to other governments<br />
around the world.<br />
2. To study current and possible future business issues involving<br />
the U.S. and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
3. To promote an exchange <strong>of</strong> business opinions between the two<br />
countries and to reach constructive agreements with the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council.<br />
4. To make timely recommendations to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S.<br />
governments with the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. business issues and common concerns.<br />
5. To promote all activities necessary to achieve the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Business Council.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. BUSINESSMEN’S CONFERENCE. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Businessmen’s Conference is a private-sector conference that brings<br />
together business-world representatives from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> to exchange opinions on economic issues <strong>of</strong> interest to both<br />
countries. The first conference was held in 1961, followed by eight<br />
more by the end <strong>of</strong> 1971. After the ninth conference in 1972, the
126 • JAPAN–U.S. CONSULAR AGREEMENT<br />
conference changed to a biannual format, once in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and a second time in <strong>Japan</strong>. The conference is sponsored by the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Business Council and the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Business Council.<br />
Each conference usually has three working groups devoted to<br />
contemporary economic issues, a plenary session, and a session dedicated<br />
to formulating joint policy recommendations. The conference<br />
forwards its joint recommendations to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments,<br />
and also to business-related organizations, corporations,<br />
and think tanks.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. CONSULAR AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Consular<br />
Agreement between Tokyo and Washington became effective<br />
in 1963. It concerns consuls, whose primary responsibility is to promote<br />
trade with the other country and to provide people <strong>of</strong> their<br />
own country with assistance and protection. This agreement provides<br />
detailed stipulations about possible problems in relation to<br />
practical matters in order to prevent such problems between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> before they take place. These stipulations are<br />
closely related to, as well as within, the limits <strong>of</strong> the contents <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that was made and<br />
adopted in 1963.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. COTTON PRODUCTS TRADE AGREEMENT. The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> began negotiating an agreement to control<br />
trade in cotton products in December 1962. After a long and acrimonious<br />
negotiation process, both countries finally concluded the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Cotton Products Trade Agreement on 27 August 1963.<br />
This agreement stipulated that for a three-year period starting in January<br />
1963, <strong>Japan</strong> would cap its annual total exports <strong>of</strong> cotton products<br />
at 287,500,000 square yards and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would cooperate<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>. Because <strong>of</strong> a limit on the quantity <strong>of</strong> corduroy<br />
products, the insertion <strong>of</strong> a consultative clause concerning regulation<br />
<strong>of</strong> other clothing fabric, intensification <strong>of</strong> stipulation on equalization<br />
<strong>of</strong> the amount <strong>of</strong> export in every quarter period, new establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
items with export ceilings, and other limitations, <strong>Japan</strong>’s actual exports<br />
<strong>of</strong> cotton products to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1963 decreased from<br />
the previous year. See also JAPAN–U.S. TEXTILE AGREEMENT;<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.
JAPAN–U.S. FLEET LOAN AGREEMENT • 127<br />
JAPAN–U.S. ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH. At a<br />
summit in June 2001, President George Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro<br />
Koizumi agreed to initiate the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Economic Partnership<br />
for Growth. Its primary purpose was to promote sustainable<br />
growth in both countries and in the world as a whole. For this grand<br />
purpose, they agreed to set up a “Subcabinet Economic Dialogue” in<br />
order to conduct strategic dialogues; a “Private Sector/Government<br />
Commission” in order to have lively dialogue with civilian business<br />
groups; a “Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative” to<br />
form a more liberal economic system; a “High-Level Officials Group”<br />
to discuss specific themes in specific sectors, such as telecommunications,<br />
information technology, energy, and medical devices/pharmaceuticals;<br />
a Financial Dialogue to deal with financial and fiscal issues;<br />
an Investment Initiative to discuss issues regarding investment and<br />
corporations; and a Trade Forum to give early warning on possible<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> trade conflicts.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. FLEET LOAN AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Fleet<br />
Loan Agreement was signed by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense Forces<br />
(JSDF) and the U.S. Army on 14 May 1954. The agreement made it<br />
possible for the U.S. Army to lend vessels from the U.S. fleet to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Marine<br />
Guard was separated from the <strong>Japan</strong> Coast Guard and became an independent<br />
agency on 26 April 1952. It later developed into the Maritime<br />
Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), established on 1 July 1954. During<br />
the Cold War era, as <strong>Japan</strong> was allied with Western nations, the<br />
MSDF had to assist the U.S. Navy by being prepared to combat submarines<br />
and naval mines in Northeast Asia. When World War II<br />
had ended, the 58 <strong>Japan</strong>ese submarines left in <strong>Japan</strong> were seized by<br />
the Allied countries. They were destroyed or sunk in the Pacific<br />
Ocean. Because Article Nine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution prohibits<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> from maintaining military forces capable <strong>of</strong> engaging in<br />
forward defense in order to solve international disputes, the construction<br />
<strong>of</strong> new submarines lagged behind the construction <strong>of</strong> destroyers<br />
and escort ships. Consequently, the cooperation <strong>of</strong> the U.S.<br />
Navy was necessary for contributing a minimum number <strong>of</strong> submarines.<br />
Based on this agreement, in August 1955, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
loaned Mingo, a fleet-type submarine, to <strong>Japan</strong> and it was renamed
128 • JAPAN–U.S. FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP<br />
“Kuroshio.” By the end <strong>of</strong> 1957, <strong>Japan</strong> had borrowed seven Multi-<br />
Purpose Support Ships.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMIC PART-<br />
NERSHIP. In 1993, the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)<br />
talks were succeeded by the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Framework for a New Economic<br />
Partnership replaced. These talks dealt with specific sectors,<br />
including government procurement, insurance, and automobile parts.<br />
Washington tried to set up numerical targets to increase U.S. exports<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>; however, Tokyo resisted these because they might lead to a<br />
controlled trade. In the end, in 1995, the two countries concluded an<br />
agreement without numerical targets.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. FRIENDSHIP COMMERCE NAVIGATION<br />
TREATY. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Friendship Commerce Navigation Treaty<br />
was concluded on 2 April 1953 in Tokyo and became effective on 30<br />
October <strong>of</strong> the same year. The representatives from the two countries<br />
during the talks that led to the treaty were <strong>Japan</strong>’s Foreign Minister<br />
Katsuo Okazaki, and U.S. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> Robert Murphy. The purpose <strong>of</strong> the treaty is to<br />
strengthen traditional peaceful and friendly relations between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, encourage a closer economic and cultural relationship<br />
between the citizens <strong>of</strong> both countries, promote a mutually<br />
beneficial trade relationship, and increase bilateral investment. The<br />
treaty, which consists <strong>of</strong> a preamble, 25 articles, and 15 protocol<br />
clauses, establishes the basis for the economic and trade relationship<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. It provides for bilateral application<br />
<strong>of</strong> unconditional most-favored-nation and national treatment<br />
status, though there are exceptions in the case <strong>of</strong> certain political and<br />
national economic considerations. The treaty also incorporates the<br />
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’s conventional<br />
tariff rates.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. INCOME TAX TREATY. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Income Tax<br />
Treaty was concluded on 6 November 2003 and took effect on 30<br />
March 2004. The purpose <strong>of</strong> the treaty was to expand trade between<br />
the two countries by eliminating or decreasing dual taxation <strong>of</strong> major<br />
tradable items. The treaty imposed no tax withholding as for royal-
JAPAN–U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY • 129<br />
ties. Because tax withholding by the local government on royalties <strong>of</strong><br />
immaterial intellectual property rights on which patent and trademarks<br />
are acquired, royalties generated, just like other pr<strong>of</strong>its, will be<br />
taxed in the resident country only based on the net pr<strong>of</strong>it. The treaty<br />
is significant for being the first treaty under which <strong>Japan</strong> agreed to<br />
eliminate tax withholding by the local government. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Income Tax Treaty also eliminated or reduced tax withholding by local<br />
governments on corporate dividends paid to overseas foreign investors.<br />
Under the treaty, the local government pay-as-you-go taxation<br />
<strong>of</strong> interest income paid to financial service companies and<br />
pension funds was also abolished. Aside from a few exceptions, such<br />
as taxation <strong>of</strong> real estate and restructured financial institutions, the<br />
treaty in principle abolished pay-as-you-go taxation.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. JET AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT.<br />
The first <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Jet Aircraft Production Agreement was concluded<br />
on 3 June 1955. It stipulated U.S. support for the production<br />
<strong>of</strong> jet aircraft in <strong>Japan</strong>. Because the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assisted <strong>Japan</strong> in<br />
kind, there is no record <strong>of</strong> exactly how much Washington provided<br />
for this purpose, but the sum reached approximately $11 billion. Because<br />
the government delayed its announcement <strong>of</strong> the conclusion <strong>of</strong><br />
the first <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Jet Aircraft Production Agreement in the Diet, it<br />
became a controversial issue in <strong>Japan</strong>. In order to rectify this situation,<br />
when <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> Stated discussed a second<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Jet Aircraft Production Agreement, the government reported<br />
to the Diet at an early stage that <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
carried out negotiations and the U.S. assistance would reach around<br />
100 million yen. The second <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Jet Aircraft Production<br />
Agreement was finally concluded on 17 April 1956. Based on this<br />
agreement, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> provided <strong>Japan</strong> with parts to produce<br />
110 F-86F jet aircraft. The agreement brought large pr<strong>of</strong>its to jet aircraft<br />
makers in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY—<br />
ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. The end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War<br />
precipitated the need for a redefinition <strong>of</strong> the security relationship between<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. Negotiations <strong>of</strong> this redefinition<br />
were largely led by Washington. They began in 1994 and continued for
130 • JAPAN–U.S. MARINE VESSEL LEASE AGREEMENT<br />
more than a year. Finally, on 17 April 1996, President Bill Clinton and<br />
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto formally announced a <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
joint declaration on security—the Alliance for the 21st Century. The<br />
Declaration confirmed that the relationship between Washington and<br />
Tokyo based on the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty should be the essential<br />
basis for maintaining economic prosperity and stability in the<br />
Asia–Pacific region. The declaration also confirmed the necessity for<br />
the presence <strong>of</strong> about 100,000 members <strong>of</strong> the American armed forces<br />
in the region. While the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty had stipulated<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. cooperation to deal with emergencies in <strong>Japan</strong> and the Far<br />
East, this Declaration contained qualitatively new contents: the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty included the maintenance <strong>of</strong><br />
peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region. To this end, Washington<br />
and Tokyo agreed to revise the Guidelines for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense<br />
Cooperation formulated in 1978. In September 1997, the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) agreed on the Guidelines<br />
for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation, stipulating cooperation between<br />
Washington and Tokyo on three stages: peacetime, emergencies in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, and emergencies in the Asia–Pacific region.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. MARINE VESSEL LEASE AGREEMENT. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Marine Vessel Lease Agreement was concluded in Tokyo<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on 12 November 1952. Foreign<br />
Minister Katsuo Okazaki represented <strong>Japan</strong> and Ambassador Extraordinary<br />
and Plenipotentiary to <strong>Japan</strong> Robert Daniel Murphy represented<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The U.S. government agreed to lease its marine<br />
vessels to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government for five years. Upon the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government’s request, and provided that both Tokyo and<br />
Washington consented, the lease duration could be extended up to<br />
five years. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would hand over marine vessels to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> at an agreed time, at an agreed place. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
would be responsible for fees, delivery, operation, and navigation.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government was also responsible for returning the<br />
leased marine vessels to the U.S. government in virtually the same<br />
condition at a given time and at a given place selected by the U.S.<br />
government. If damage to a vessel was adjudged to mean a total loss,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government should consult with the U.S. government<br />
concerning compensation.
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE • 131<br />
JAPAN–U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was signed on 26 February<br />
1968 by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments to promote their<br />
close cooperation for the peaceful utilization <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy.<br />
Both countries confirm the importance <strong>of</strong> nuclear research, development,<br />
and utilization for peaceful purposes. Respecting each government’s<br />
national strategies, <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> hope to continue<br />
and expand their cooperation in this field. Both countries agree<br />
to peaceful nuclear utilization based on transparency and credibility,<br />
taking into account both governments’ long-term nuclear plans.<br />
Tokyo and Washington reconfirm that they should carry out nuclear<br />
research, development, and utilization in line with the objectives <strong>of</strong><br />
the nonproliferation treaty. Both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> confirm<br />
that they support the goals <strong>of</strong> the International Atomic Energy<br />
Agency and they promote universal participation in the nonproliferation<br />
treaty.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. PRODUCTIVITY AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
Productivity Agreement was concluded on 6 April 1955. Under the<br />
agreement, the <strong>Japan</strong> Productivity Center (JPC) was established on<br />
14 February 1955 to serve as a pilot project for bringing together corporate<br />
managers, labor representatives, people with certain business<br />
skills, and academics to explore ways <strong>of</strong> increasing productivity in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s domestic economy. The JPC helped launch a productivityimprovement<br />
campaign across <strong>Japan</strong> that was based on three principles:<br />
maintenance and expansion <strong>of</strong> employment; cooperation and<br />
consultation between capital and labor; and fair distribution <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
fruits. U.S. involvement consisted <strong>of</strong> providing financial assistance<br />
to the JPC to help it carry out its tasks. The agreement contained<br />
broad productivity improvement goals, ranging from greater<br />
technological efficiency to a healthier labor force. As a result <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />
economic assistance and sponsorship, postwar productivity improvement<br />
campaigns, which were also known as industrial rationalization<br />
campaigns, became popular not only in <strong>Japan</strong> but also in other major<br />
capitalist countries.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (SCC).<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Consultative Committee was established in
132 • JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE<br />
August 1957 (the first SCC meeting was held on 16 August 1957).<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> the SCC is to consider matters that pertain to implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. security treaty. At the initial SCC meetings,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was represented by its foreign minister, Defense Agency<br />
director and other ministers depending on the issues discussed, while<br />
the U.S. was represented by <strong>of</strong>ficials below cabinet-level. This disparity<br />
was amended in 1990 when both countries decided to send cabinet-level<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials.<br />
An SCC meeting can be held at anytime at the request <strong>of</strong> either<br />
side. Meetings were at first generally held in Tokyo under the direction<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy.<br />
The SCC produced a series <strong>of</strong> important accomplishments. For example,<br />
on 22 December 1996, after holding a meeting, Foreign Minister<br />
Yukihiko Ikeda, Defense Agency Director Fumio Kyuma, Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> Defense William J. Perry, and U.S. Ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
Walter Mondale made a joint announcement. They reached the<br />
common conclusion that because the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. security relationship<br />
would continue to be a cornerstone <strong>of</strong> stability and prosperity in<br />
the Asia–Pacific region, forward deployment <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces would be<br />
indispensable factor to the pursuit <strong>of</strong> common goals in regional security.<br />
They confirmed the facilities and districts with which the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government provided the U.S. forces and underscored the<br />
importance <strong>of</strong> the host nation’s support. They also agreed that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> should pursue cooperation in ballistic missile<br />
defense.<br />
Moreover, in 1997, the SCC announced new guidelines on <strong>Japan</strong>–<br />
U.S. defense cooperation and, in 2000, the Committee implemented<br />
“sympathy” budget allocations (See JAPAN–U.S. STATUS-OF-<br />
FORCES AGREEMENT). The SCC holds its meetings regularly. On<br />
19 February 2005, its joint announcement stressed the importance <strong>of</strong><br />
mutual cooperation in responding to new threats <strong>of</strong> terrorism and<br />
weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction, as well as in finding peaceful solutions<br />
to various problems concerning North Korea. In recent years, Washington<br />
and Tokyo have used the SCC to go beyond immediate security<br />
treat matters to address the security environment in East Asia, cooperation<br />
on global issues, and common strategic goals with regard<br />
to such issues as energy and international terrorism.
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, 1960 • 133<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, 1952. The formal name <strong>of</strong> this<br />
treaty is the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America and <strong>Japan</strong>. The treaty was signed by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> immediately after the signing <strong>of</strong> the San<br />
Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951 and the treaty became<br />
effective along with the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. The treaty<br />
stipulates military cooperation between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong><br />
in order to maintain security in <strong>Japan</strong> and peace and stability in Asia.<br />
Tokyo proposed that Washington station its armed forces inside<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese territory in order to maintain <strong>Japan</strong>’s security. The treaty<br />
consists <strong>of</strong> a preamble and five articles. This treaty was an unequal<br />
treaty because the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> claimed the right to station its armed<br />
forces in <strong>Japan</strong>, but did not specifically assume any obligation to defend<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Moreover, U.S. armed forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong> can provide<br />
“assistance given at the express request <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Government<br />
to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or<br />
powers.” In short, U.S. forces were able to intervene in <strong>Japan</strong>ese domestic<br />
affairs. In addition, the treaty contained the so-called Far East<br />
clause: the U.S. armed forces “may be utilized to contribute to the<br />
maintenance <strong>of</strong> international peace and security in the Far East . . .<br />
against armed attack from without.” Because the geographical limitation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Far East is not specifically defined in the treaty, and dangers<br />
in other areas, such as the Middle East, may cause a security<br />
threat to the Far East, it is virtually impossible for <strong>Japan</strong> to limit the<br />
behavior <strong>of</strong> the U.S. armed forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong>. Tokyo began to<br />
discuss possible revision <strong>of</strong> this security treaty under the Ichiro Hatoyama<br />
Cabinet in the 1950s in order to amend these unequal clauses<br />
and turn the treaty into a more equal one. The Nobusuke Kishi Cabinet<br />
implemented treaty revision negotiations in earnest and a new security<br />
treaty was signed on 19 January 1960. See also DEFENSE;<br />
PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, 1960. The formal name <strong>of</strong> this<br />
treaty is the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Mutual Cooperation and Security between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. The treaty was signed between the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> on 19 January 1960 and it became effective on
134 • JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, REVISION NEGOTIATIONS<br />
23 June 1960. The treaty consists <strong>of</strong> a preamble and 10 articles. In<br />
comparison with the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. security treaty <strong>of</strong> 1952, this revised<br />
treaty is different in four major respects. First, the new treaty<br />
does not contain a clause allowing the U.S. armed forces to suppress<br />
large-scale domestic strife and civil disorder. Second, the new<br />
treaty is good for 10 years, and “after the Treaty has been in force<br />
for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party <strong>of</strong> its<br />
intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate<br />
one year after such notice has been given.” Third, the treaty<br />
contains a specific clause that both the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> defend<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and U.S. armed forces stationed inside <strong>Japan</strong>ese territory:<br />
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either<br />
Party in the territories under the administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> would be<br />
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act<br />
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional<br />
provisions and processes.” Fourth, the new treaty has a clause<br />
agreeing that both countries, as equal partners, consult closely:<br />
“The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> this Treaty, and, at the request <strong>of</strong> either Party,<br />
whenever the security <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> or international peace and security<br />
in the Far East is threatened. After the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> redefined the meaning <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
alliance, culminating in the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Joint Declaration on<br />
Security—Alliance for the 21st Century <strong>of</strong> 17 April 1996 and the<br />
Guidelines for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Defense Cooperation concluded on<br />
23 September 1997.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, REVISION NEGOTIATIONS.<br />
The so-called Vandenberg Resolution <strong>of</strong> June 1948 stipulates that<br />
when the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> assumes responsibility for the military defense<br />
<strong>of</strong> another country, it must be based on that country providing for its<br />
self-defense and mutual assistance. Consequently, in the early 1950s,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> could not enter into a mutual defense agreement<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong> because <strong>of</strong> that country’s lack <strong>of</strong> self-defense forces. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty <strong>of</strong> 1951 was one-sided in that U.S.<br />
forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong> would not assume responsibility for defending<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. This is why the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> repeatedly demanded that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> increase its self-defense forces after the treaty was signed. At
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY, REVISION NEGOTIATIONS • 135<br />
the same time that <strong>Japan</strong> began making incremental increases to the<br />
size <strong>of</strong> its self-defense forces, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama,<br />
who served in Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s government,<br />
began negotiations with Washington in October 1958 to revise the<br />
one-sided mutual defense treaty. A revised treaty was signed on 19<br />
January 1960 and became effective on 23 June. The new treaty stipulated<br />
that in the event <strong>of</strong> the external military attack against <strong>Japan</strong>, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would assume responsibility for defending <strong>Japan</strong>, while<br />
in case <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces stationed in any <strong>of</strong> the territories under <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
administration coming under attack, <strong>Japan</strong> would act in their defense.<br />
In addition, the revised treaty eliminated a clause in the initial<br />
treaty that gave the responsibility for preventing domestic warfare and<br />
civil disorder in <strong>Japan</strong> to U.S. forces.<br />
The revised treaty, which was to last 10 years, also contained these<br />
elements: an automatic renewal clause; a new clause describing economic<br />
cooperation between the two countries treaty; and a stipulation<br />
that when the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> makes an important change in the alignment<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S. forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong> or their equipment as a result<br />
<strong>of</strong> plans by <strong>Japan</strong>-based U.S. forces to initiate military operations,<br />
Washington would first hold prior consultation talks with Tokyo.<br />
The most controversial part <strong>of</strong> the revised treaty concerned Article<br />
Nine: “For the purpose <strong>of</strong> contributing to the security <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
maintenance <strong>of</strong> international peace and security in the Far East, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America is granted the use by its land, air and naval<br />
forces <strong>of</strong> facilities and areas in <strong>Japan</strong>.” Opponents <strong>of</strong> treaty revision in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> argued that even if <strong>Japan</strong> was not directly affected by a conflict<br />
in the “Far East” and that non-interference was <strong>Japan</strong>’s best policy option,<br />
Article VI created the risk <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> begin drawn into the conflict<br />
once <strong>Japan</strong>-based U.S. forces initiated military operations. Moreover,<br />
opponents expressed fears that by entering into a closer military relationship<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong> would lose its diplomatic independence.<br />
For these reasons, strong political resistance to treaty revision<br />
developed across <strong>Japan</strong>. Following much contentious debate, on 19<br />
May 1960, the Liberal Democratic Party took advantage <strong>of</strong> its majority<br />
strength in the Lower House <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s Diet to push through parliamentary<br />
ratification <strong>of</strong> a revised treaty. This precipitated huge demonstrations<br />
against the revised security treaty all across <strong>Japan</strong>. In accordance<br />
with Article 59 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution, the revised treaty
136 • JAPAN–U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT<br />
was automatically enacted on 19 June 1960 without any discussion in<br />
the Upper House, However, widespread <strong>Japan</strong>ese domestic opposition<br />
to the revisions, along with anti-Kishi and anti-U.S. demonstrations,<br />
forced U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to cancel a planned visit<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. In order to restore political calm, the Kishi government resigned<br />
en masse in July 1960. See also NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR<br />
BLOCKING REVISION OF JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY;<br />
SHIGEMITSU–DULLES MEETING.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT. In September<br />
1986, the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement was concluded between<br />
the Ministry <strong>of</strong> International Trade and Industry (MITI) and<br />
U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce for the purpose <strong>of</strong> expanding the foreign<br />
share <strong>of</strong> semiconductor sales in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese market. However,<br />
in March 1987, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> imposed punitive tariffs on <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
imports because <strong>of</strong>ficials in Washington made a determination<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> was failing to abide by the terms <strong>of</strong> the semiconductor<br />
agreement.<br />
To resolve the dispute, <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> entered into a<br />
new round <strong>of</strong> semiconductor trade negotiations. In July 1991, a second<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement was reached. Unlike the<br />
first agreement, the new agreement contained a numerical target: by<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> 1992, sales <strong>of</strong> foreign semiconductors were expected to account<br />
for 20 percent <strong>of</strong> all semiconductor sales in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese market.<br />
The duration <strong>of</strong> the second agreement was five years. In spring<br />
1993, <strong>Japan</strong> was able to verify that the foreign share <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
semiconductor market was above 20 percent. In December 1994,<br />
MITI formally announced the end <strong>of</strong> semiconductor trade friction between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the U.S., stating that <strong>Japan</strong> had achieved its promise<br />
<strong>of</strong> increasing market-entry opportunities for foreign semiconductor<br />
(namely, U.S.) makers and had created a domestic market<br />
environment conducive to permitting competition from foreign makers<br />
over the long term.<br />
When the second <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement expired in<br />
1996, the U.S. share <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese semiconductor market was 26 percent.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> insisted on extending the agreement in order to<br />
continue controlled trade with numerical market share targets, while<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> regarded this as no longer unnecessary. Based on the under-
JAPAN–U.S. STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT • 137<br />
standing that it was the age <strong>of</strong> transnational cooperation in semiconductor<br />
industry, <strong>Japan</strong> proposed to build a new high degree <strong>of</strong> international<br />
division <strong>of</strong> labor based on measures to protect environment and<br />
security, standardization, and improvement <strong>of</strong> access to third-nation<br />
markets. With support from U.S. semiconductor makers, a new framework<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> semiconductor cooperation along with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
proposal was passed on to the World Semiconductor Council that<br />
was held three times after the second <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor<br />
Agreement expired. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SPECIAL PROCUREMENT NEGOTIATIONS.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> negotiated an agreement on special procurement<br />
contracts in the 1950s after the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Korean War.<br />
The dollar value <strong>of</strong> procurement contracts spiked in 1952, and then<br />
decreased by 3 percent, 23 percent, and 5 percent in 1953, 1954, and<br />
1955, respectively, in comparison with the previous year. In 1956,<br />
this decreasing trend finally came to an end with an increase <strong>of</strong> about<br />
8 percent compared to the previous year. An increase in domestic<br />
consumption and a substantial expansion <strong>of</strong> exports contributed to<br />
this increase.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA). The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Status-<strong>of</strong>-Forces Agreement, which took effect in June<br />
1960, details the legal status <strong>of</strong> U.S. military forces stationed in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. As the agreement was ratified by <strong>Japan</strong>’s Diet and the U.S.<br />
Congress, it has the status <strong>of</strong> a formal treaty. The agreement consists<br />
<strong>of</strong> 28 clauses and various <strong>of</strong>ficial exchanges <strong>of</strong> notes and consented<br />
proceedings approved by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> that pertain to<br />
operation <strong>of</strong> the agreement.<br />
The SOFA originally stipulated that <strong>Japan</strong> would provide the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> with military bases that were to be maintained at U.S.<br />
expense. However, in 1978, <strong>Japan</strong> began to assume responsibility for<br />
costs pertaining to use <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese labor, housing and other facilities<br />
for American forces and their families, utilities, and training relocation.<br />
Because these costs have no legal basis, they are sometimes referred<br />
to as “sympathy budget” allocations by <strong>Japan</strong>’s government.<br />
The amount allocated to cover these costs tended to experience annual<br />
increases, but the deterioration in <strong>Japan</strong>’s government finances
138 • JAPAN–U.S. SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGREEMENT<br />
caused the allocation to start declining in 2001. In 2004, the “sympathy<br />
budget” was 244.1 billion yen.<br />
The SOFA also gives extraterritorial rights to U.S. forces and their<br />
family members, including exemptions from <strong>Japan</strong>ese legal requirements<br />
that concern passport and visa issuance, alien registration, and<br />
other administrative procedures normally applicable to foreigners<br />
visiting or working in <strong>Japan</strong>. For many <strong>Japan</strong>ese people, especially<br />
the residents <strong>of</strong> Okinawa, where most U.S. military facilities are currently<br />
located, the existence <strong>of</strong> extraterritorial for the U.S. military<br />
forces has resulted in complaints and protests. Some local and national<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese political leaders have demand fundamental changes<br />
in the SOFA. Among the demands are relocation <strong>of</strong> U.S. military facilities,<br />
amending the extraterritorial status and relieving certain conditions<br />
that some communities adjacent to U.S. military bases believe<br />
are excessively burdensome. See also DEFENSE.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES<br />
AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities<br />
Agreement, which was signed by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> in<br />
1955, was designed to help U.S. farmers unload surplus agricultural<br />
crops (especially wheat) and to allow <strong>Japan</strong> to overcome an unavailability<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S. dollar and yen financing to purchase desperately<br />
needed food imports. After ratification by <strong>Japan</strong>’s Diet, the agreement<br />
took effect in June 1955.<br />
In order to solve the problem <strong>of</strong> excess production and inventory<br />
<strong>of</strong> wheat in the postwar period, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> enacted the Agricultural<br />
Trade and Assistance Act in July 1954 to provide Asian countries<br />
with shipments <strong>of</strong> wheat imports financed by long-term interestbearing<br />
loans provided by the U.S. The Act allowed <strong>Japan</strong>, which at<br />
that time was still struggling with financial and food shortage problems<br />
following the war, to purchase wheat (and other food stuffs) despite<br />
its lack <strong>of</strong> U.S. dollars and sufficient yen reserves. The creation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Act led to the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Surplus Agricultural<br />
Commodities Agreement.<br />
Under the agreement, <strong>Japan</strong> purchased imports <strong>of</strong> wheat, barley,<br />
rice, cotton, tobacco in <strong>Japan</strong>ese yen equivalent to $85 million. The<br />
proceeds from the sale <strong>of</strong> these agricultural products in <strong>Japan</strong>’s domestic<br />
market were deposited into a special U.S. government fund
JAPAN–U.S. TEXTILE AGREEMENT • 139<br />
created and managed by the Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
used approximately 70 percent <strong>of</strong> this fund for economic reconstruction,<br />
such as development <strong>of</strong> a supply <strong>of</strong> electricity, while the<br />
remainder was paid to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In addition to the aid made<br />
possible by this fund, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> provided <strong>Japan</strong> with a gift <strong>of</strong><br />
free wheat, nonfat dry milk for school children, and other agricultural<br />
products valued at the time at $15 million.<br />
Because the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement was<br />
scheduled to expire in 1956, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government began negotiating<br />
its renewal with the U.S. government in July 1955. As a result,<br />
both countries formally agreed on a second surplus agreement in February<br />
1956.<br />
JAPAN–U.S. TEXTILE AGREEMENT. The <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Textile<br />
Agreement reached in January 1972 contains a promise by <strong>Japan</strong> to<br />
voluntarily self-restrict exports <strong>of</strong> 18 textile items to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. From the late 1950s, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese synthetic fiber industry began<br />
to expand to and reached the point <strong>of</strong> becoming the world’s<br />
largest exporting country <strong>of</strong> synthetic fiber by 1965. However, this<br />
rapid expansion <strong>of</strong> exports precipitated trade frictions with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. After a series <strong>of</strong> severe and emotional negotiations between<br />
the two countries, including Washington raising the possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
linking the textile issue to the issue <strong>of</strong> the reversion <strong>of</strong> Okinawa to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, a decision was finally made to work out a compromise. Under<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Textile Agreement, <strong>Japan</strong>’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> voluntary<br />
restrictions on its textile exports to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> did tremendous<br />
damage to the country’s textile industry. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
allocated 127 billion yen from the national budget to provide relief to<br />
the textile industry, but, partly because <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s voluntary restrictions,<br />
in 1972 the industry suffered from declining production. Also,<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the Agreement, <strong>Japan</strong>’s textile corporations were hurt by<br />
a big increase in price-cutting competition among themselves in the<br />
domestic market and cheap imports from developing countries. Steep<br />
price-cutting competition undermined investment by textile companies<br />
in capital investment and technical innovation, which retarded<br />
technology and eventually led to the textile industry’s overall decline.<br />
See also JAPAN–U.S. COTTON PRODUCTS TRADE AGREE-<br />
MENT; U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.
140 • JAPAN–U.S. WISE PERSONS COMMITTEE<br />
JAPAN–U.S. WISE PERSONS COMMITTEE (JUSWPC). The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Wise Persons Committee was a forum in which <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
and U.S. civilians discussed the economic relationship between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the U.S. The committee was established at the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
summit held on 30 April 1979 in order to minimize trade friction between<br />
the two countries. The JUSWPC consisted <strong>of</strong> four members<br />
from each country. After submitting its final report, the JUSWPC dissolved<br />
itself in September 1981. The final report proposed the following<br />
five points: holding a regular ministerial-level conference;<br />
encouragement <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese private corporations’ investments in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; convocation <strong>of</strong> a national productivity conference in<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; establishment <strong>of</strong> an ombudsman in <strong>Japan</strong>; and liberalization<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese agricultural market. See also U.S.–JAPAN<br />
TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
JAPAN–WEST GERMANY–U.S. LOCOMOTIVE THEORY. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–West Germany–U.S. Locomotive Theory was presented by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> at the London and Bonn Summits in 1977 and 1978, respectively,<br />
and urged that not only the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> but also <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and West Germany should provide leadership in the global world<br />
economy by cultivating their domestic markets.<br />
In the 1970s, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> suffered a current account deficit and<br />
inflation, mainly because <strong>of</strong> spending on the Vietnam War. Consequently,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> demanded that <strong>Japan</strong> and West Germany<br />
should play more important roles in the world economy. With respect to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, the U.S. believed that given the large size <strong>of</strong> its domestic market,<br />
it should assume part <strong>of</strong> the burden <strong>of</strong> maintaining a liberal international<br />
trading system and promote global trade by expanding its imports, even<br />
at the risk <strong>of</strong> damaging some <strong>Japan</strong>ese industries. <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister<br />
Takeo Fukuda took this idea seriously and publicly pledged to encourage<br />
domestic demand-led economic growth <strong>of</strong> 7 percent. As a result,<br />
in 1978 <strong>Japan</strong>’s central government spending on public works<br />
dramatically increased 34.5 percent and government-bond issuance rose<br />
38.8 percent compared with previous year levels. In addition, when serious<br />
trade friction developed between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> in<br />
1981, <strong>Japan</strong> took the initiative <strong>of</strong> voluntarily restricting its exports <strong>of</strong> automobiles<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> by capping the export level at 1.68 million<br />
vehicles. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.
JAPANESE–AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1941 • 141<br />
JAPANESE–AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1941. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese–<br />
American negotiations <strong>of</strong> 1941 opened in February 1941 and ended<br />
some 10 months later with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese attack on the American naval<br />
base at Pearl Harbor. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Cordell Hull and Ambassador<br />
Kichisaburō Nomura were the principal protagonists. From the<br />
outset, the gulf separating the two nations was wide.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government months earlier had decided that if favorable<br />
circumstances arose, it would advance militarily into the<br />
resource-rich colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
government, for its part, was convinced that the defense <strong>of</strong> Great<br />
Britain was the best defense <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In this connection,<br />
it was hardly amenable to a <strong>Japan</strong>ese advance against Britain’s Far<br />
Eastern possessions. Compounding the issue was <strong>Japan</strong>’s ongoing<br />
war in China. As early as January 1940, Washington had put <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
policymakers on notice by abrogating the two nations’ treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
commerce. Then when, in September 1940, <strong>Japan</strong> allied itself with<br />
Nazi Germany, its war in China presented itself to American policymakers<br />
not as a regional or local war but as part <strong>of</strong> “an organized and<br />
ruthless movement <strong>of</strong> conquest.”<br />
The course taken by the negotiations reflected the slim chances <strong>of</strong><br />
success. To be sure, the prospect <strong>of</strong> diplomatic rapprochement—in<br />
the form <strong>of</strong> the so-called Draft Understanding between <strong>Japan</strong> and the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>—flickered briefly in April. For reasons <strong>of</strong> his own,<br />
however, Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka refused to play ball. In<br />
the meantime, as Matsuoka raised the ire <strong>of</strong> American <strong>of</strong>ficialdom,<br />
Germany launched its assault on the Soviet Union. Matsuoka counseled<br />
an immediate attack on the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern<br />
provinces, although the army and navy chiefs <strong>of</strong> staff carried the debate<br />
with their insistence on an attack to the south. <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops<br />
occupied the Indochinese peninsula in its entirety in late July 1941.<br />
From Washington, Ambassador Nomura had repeatedly warned<br />
his government that an advance into Southeast Asia would torpedo<br />
his negotiations with American <strong>of</strong>ficialdom. He also sought to bring<br />
America’s state <strong>of</strong> war-preparedness to his government’s attention.<br />
Nobody listened until Washington responded to the occupation <strong>of</strong> Indochina<br />
first by freezing <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets and then by slapping a total<br />
embargo on oil. In August Foreign Minister Teijirō Toyoda (who replaced<br />
Matsuoka in mid-July) and Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe
142 • JAPANESE CONSTITUTION<br />
proposed a summit meeting between Konoe and <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although there is some room for conjecture<br />
concerning whether Konoe planned to make far-reaching concessions<br />
at the proposed summit meeting, the fact remains that<br />
neither he nor Toyoda were willing to <strong>of</strong>fer anything substantial prior<br />
to the conference. The proposal thus appeared as an attempt to<br />
change the negotiators but not the terms <strong>of</strong> negotiation, and met with<br />
a negative response from Washington.<br />
In the meantime, <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers had agreed that if no<br />
diplomatic breakthrough was reached by mid-October, <strong>Japan</strong> would<br />
launch war against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Konoe in mid-October resigned<br />
and halted the slide toward war, although the successor cabinet <strong>of</strong><br />
General Hideki Tōjō was unable to set terms for negotiation that<br />
held out the prospect <strong>of</strong> diplomatic success.<br />
In a final attempt to break the deadlock, Ambassador Nomura on<br />
his own initiative conceived <strong>of</strong> a modus vivendi, whereby the two<br />
governments would agree on the least contentious issues, leaving<br />
(particularly) the solution <strong>of</strong> the China problem until a later date. For<br />
a short time, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government toyed with the idea as it<br />
had long prioritized the defeat <strong>of</strong> Germany over and above that <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. In the end, however, it dropped the idea because it feared that<br />
such an agreement might undermine Chinese morale and lead to that<br />
nation’s surrender. Thus, on 26 November, Secretary Hull presented<br />
Ambassador Nomura with an uncompromising note, which effectively<br />
shut the door on the possibility <strong>of</strong> a diplomatic rapprochement.<br />
Within days, <strong>Japan</strong> attacked Pearl Harbor. See also WORLD WAR II.<br />
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution succeeded<br />
the Meiji Constitution. On 3 November 1946, a new <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution<br />
was promulgated and it became effective on 3 May 1947. It<br />
consists <strong>of</strong> a preamble and 103 articles grouped into 11 chapters.<br />
These are:<br />
Chapter I. The Emperor (Articles 1–8)<br />
Chapter II. Renunciation <strong>of</strong> War (Article 9)<br />
Chapter III. Rights and Duties <strong>of</strong> the People (Articles 10–40)<br />
Chapter IV. The Diet (Articles 41–64)<br />
Chapter V. The Cabinet (Articles 65–75)<br />
Chapter VI. Judiciary (Articles 76–82)
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION • 143<br />
Chapter VII. Finance (Articles 83–91)<br />
Chapter VIII. Local Self-Government (Articles 92–95)<br />
Chapter IX. Amendments (Article 96)<br />
Chapter X. Supreme Law (Articles 97–99)<br />
Chapter XI. Supplementary Provisions (Articles 100–103)<br />
The constitution is founded primarily on popular sovereignty, respect<br />
for basic human rights, and pacifism. Additionally, the constitution<br />
stipulates that the emperor is a symbol <strong>of</strong> the state, renunciation<br />
<strong>of</strong> war, the separation <strong>of</strong> the three branches <strong>of</strong> government, the<br />
Diet as the highest organ <strong>of</strong> the state power, security <strong>of</strong> local autonomy,<br />
freedom <strong>of</strong> thought, universal suffrage, social rights, and more.<br />
On 4 October 1945, Fumimaro Konoe, a prominent politician<br />
who had been prime minister three times, visited General Douglas<br />
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers<br />
(SCAP), and explained that the so-called feudal forces in <strong>Japan</strong> centered<br />
around the emperor and the Zaibatsu had resisted <strong>Japan</strong>’s waging<br />
war against the Allied Powers, and if SCAP eliminated the emperor<br />
and the Zaibatsu, the country would immediately become<br />
communist. On hearing this plea, MacArthur informally suggested<br />
that Konoe engage in revising the Constitution <strong>of</strong> the Empire <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Konoe and his associates began to draft a new constitution.<br />
However, on 1 November 1945, because Konoe was accused <strong>of</strong> being<br />
responsible for waging the war, SCAP announced that it had<br />
nothing to do with the Konoe’s idea <strong>of</strong> a new constitution. Nonetheless,<br />
Konoe continued his study and on 12 November 1945, he announced<br />
his ideas. On 24 November, Soichi Sasaki, one <strong>of</strong> Konoe’s<br />
associates, also publicized his own ideas for constitution. Rejecting<br />
these ideas, SCAP forcefully interposed their own views.<br />
Meanwhile, General MacArthur directed Kiju- ro- Shidehara to revise<br />
the Constitution <strong>of</strong> the Empire <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. The Shidehara cabinet<br />
established the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee<br />
headed by Minister <strong>of</strong> State Joji Matsumoto. On 1 February 1946, the<br />
Mainichi Newspaper got a scoop <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> many drafts that the committee<br />
rejected in the process <strong>of</strong> its examination. On 3 February, General<br />
MacArthur ordered the Government Section (GS) <strong>of</strong> the General<br />
Headquarters (GHQ) <strong>of</strong> SCAP to draft a new <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution.<br />
In just nine days, the GS drew up a draft constitution and submitted<br />
it to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government on 13 February 1946. Based on this
144 • “JAPANESE SPIRIT, WESTERN LEARNING”<br />
draft constitution, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government made some revisions.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution is the supreme law in <strong>Japan</strong> and it has<br />
never been amended.<br />
Article Nine is a groundbreaking clause renouncing war as a sovereign<br />
right. The articles states: “(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international<br />
peace based on justice and order, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people forever<br />
renounce war as a sovereign right <strong>of</strong> the nation and the threat or use<br />
<strong>of</strong> force as means <strong>of</strong> settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish<br />
the aim <strong>of</strong> the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air<br />
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The<br />
right <strong>of</strong> belligerency <strong>of</strong> the state will not be recognized.” Article Nine<br />
deepened the <strong>Japan</strong>ese pacifist sentiment; however, in the post–Cold<br />
War era, Article Nine has been a major stumbling bloc for <strong>Japan</strong> to<br />
play a more proactive military role in the international community.<br />
This is one <strong>of</strong> the major reasons why there are so many people who<br />
would like to amend the constitution. The Special Committee on the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution was established in September 2005 to examine<br />
measures concerning the institutionalized system for referendums for<br />
amending the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution and to carry out an extensive as<br />
well as comprehensive investigation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Constitution.<br />
See also ARTICLE NINE; MEIJI CONSTITUTION.<br />
“JAPANESE SPIRIT, WESTERN LEARNING.” An exhortation that<br />
became prominent in the midst <strong>of</strong> the modernization drive in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
during the Meiji Era. While maintaining and emphasizing traditional<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese values, <strong>Japan</strong>ese were encouraged to learn methods <strong>of</strong> Western<br />
education, science, and technology to strengthen the nation. See<br />
also EASTERN ETHICS, WESTERN SCIENCE; IWAKURA MIS-<br />
SION; MEIJI ERA; SAKUMA, SHOZAN.<br />
JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA. The first <strong>Japan</strong>ese to attend<br />
American schools were Manjiro Nakahama and Joseph Heco (also<br />
known as Hikozo Hamada) in the late 1840s and 1850s. In the 1860s<br />
and 1870s, more <strong>Japan</strong>ese came to America and studied at colleges,<br />
such as Rutgers College in New Jersey, Amherst College in Massachusetts,<br />
Hope College in Michigan, and Pacific University in Oregon.<br />
The Iwakura Mission brought more than 50 <strong>Japan</strong>ese students to attend<br />
American schools and colleges, including the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese female
JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE • 145<br />
students. By the end <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, several hundred <strong>Japan</strong>ese had<br />
studied at American high schools and colleges, including West Point<br />
and the U.S. Naval Academy. The number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese students in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> gradually increased throughout the 20th century, except<br />
during World War II when <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens and even many American<br />
citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese ancestry were forced to stop their studies by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government, despite the objections <strong>of</strong> many college presidents.<br />
By the early 1990s, the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese students in America<br />
exceeded 40,000. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese K–12 students are the children <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese businessmen at American-based factories, such as Honda, Nissan,<br />
Sony, etc., while <strong>Japan</strong>ese college students decide to attend an<br />
American college for both educational and social reasons. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
graduate and post-graduate students attend American colleges to<br />
study business or one <strong>of</strong> the sciences. <strong>Japan</strong>ese students can be found at<br />
almost any sizeable university or college in America, with the largest<br />
number on the West Coast and in the Northeastern <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. See<br />
also IMMIGRATION; MAKINO, NOBUAKI; MATSUDAIRA,<br />
TADAATSU; MORI, ARINORI; MURRAY, DAVID; NAGAI,<br />
SHIGEKO; NIIJIMA, JO; NITOBE, INAZO; TSUDA, UMEKO;<br />
UCHIMURA, KANZO; YAMAKAWA, SUTEMATSU.<br />
JAPAN’S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON<br />
TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> established a<br />
liberal, multilateral world economic structure in the postwar era centered<br />
on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International<br />
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction<br />
and Development (IBRD). <strong>Japan</strong> joined the IMF and the<br />
IBRD in August 1952 without much difficulty. However, it was very<br />
difficult to join GATT.<br />
Because the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy depended on foreign trade, Tokyo<br />
had a strong interest in GATT even during the occupation. In July<br />
1952, 10 months after signing the peace treaty, Tokyo applied to join<br />
GATT; however, Great Britain objected to <strong>Japan</strong>’s membership, insisting<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> should carry out formal multilateral tariff negotiations.<br />
Consequently, <strong>Japan</strong>’s accession to GATT was pending. In<br />
1953, <strong>Japan</strong> became a pro tempore member <strong>of</strong> GATT and acquired<br />
the right to participate in GATT conferences. In October 1954, GATT<br />
made a resolution to start tariff negotiations with <strong>Japan</strong>. Finally, in
146 • JAPAN’S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES<br />
September 1955, <strong>Japan</strong> joined GATT as a full member. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> strongly endorsed <strong>Japan</strong>’s accession to GATT because <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
economic independence based on multilateral liberal trade would be<br />
beneficial for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to fight the Cold War. In contrast,<br />
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain strongly opposed <strong>Japan</strong>’s accession<br />
because <strong>of</strong> their bad experience regarding <strong>Japan</strong>’s export<br />
thrust with its low-price textile goods to the world market in the<br />
1930s. In the end, <strong>Japan</strong> had to accept the imposition <strong>of</strong> GATT Article<br />
35, Non-application <strong>of</strong> the Agreement Between Particular Contracting<br />
Parties, stipulating that “A contracting party may withhold<br />
application <strong>of</strong> its schedule <strong>of</strong> tariff concessions, or the entire agreement,<br />
from another contracting party with which it has not entered<br />
into tariff negotiations.” In short, <strong>Japan</strong> was excluded from the nondiscriminatory<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> GATT. By the mid-1960s, the four major<br />
European countries mentioned previously repealed their application<br />
<strong>of</strong> GATT Article 35 in return for <strong>Japan</strong>’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> voluntary export<br />
restraint, and still, in the 1960s, about 40 countries, including underdeveloped<br />
ones (such as Chad in Africa) applied Article 35 to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Tokyo had to deal with the discriminatory status resulting<br />
from GATT Article 35 until the World Trade Organization (WTO)<br />
came into being 1995 as the successor to GATT. See also GENERAL<br />
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT).<br />
JAPAN’S THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES. These are the<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> not producing, not possessing, and not allowing the entry<br />
<strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons into <strong>Japan</strong>. On 11 December 1967, at a meeting<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Lower House Budget Committee, Prime Minister Eisaku<br />
Sato clearly stated these three non-nuclear principles for the first<br />
time. He reconfirmed them in an administrative policy speech made<br />
at the Diet in January 1968. In November 1971, a Lower House plenary<br />
session adopted a resolution <strong>of</strong> the three principles. It is habitually<br />
suspected that U.S. naval vessels and combat aircraft are<br />
equipped with nuclear weapons, but Tokyo argues that as long as<br />
Washington <strong>of</strong>fers no prior consultation, they do not carry nuclear<br />
weapons. On 30 May 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda<br />
stated that because <strong>of</strong> changes in the international situation, <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
non-nuclear principles might be altered. This statement sparked controversy;<br />
overwhelming <strong>Japan</strong>ese sentiment is still opposed to possessing<br />
nuclear weapons. See also NUCLEAR ENERGY.
JOHN DOE ASSOCIATES • 147<br />
JOHN DOE ASSOCIATES. The so-called John Doe Associates,<br />
whose membership included an American priest, a <strong>Japan</strong>ese army<br />
colonel, and a <strong>Japan</strong>ese banker, worked behind the <strong>of</strong>ficial diplomatic<br />
scenes <strong>of</strong> the 1941 <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations with the intention<br />
<strong>of</strong> maneuvering the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> into a peaceful<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> their differences. As the <strong>Japan</strong>ese attack on Pearl Harbor<br />
attests, their endeavors ended in failure. In fact, a noted authority<br />
on this private effort for peace regards the John Doe Associates as<br />
a distracting and disruptive element that made <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American<br />
rapprochement harder—not easier—to obtain.<br />
Their activities began in late 1940, when Fr. James Drought met<br />
with various <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials. As he informed President Franklin<br />
D. Roosevelt in January 1941, he emerged convinced that <strong>Japan</strong> was<br />
prepared to leave the Tripartite Alliance, and that it was ready to conclude<br />
the China Incident on terms acceptable to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Roosevelt was too prudent to take Drought’s evaluations at face<br />
value. After all, they flew in the face <strong>of</strong> other indicators <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
policy, including—most importantly—the bellicosity <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka. Roosevelt chose instead to await the arrival<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s newly appointed ambassador, Kichisaburō Nomura.<br />
Through no fault <strong>of</strong> his own, Nomura arrived in Washington in<br />
February without any concrete proposals for bettering<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations. Soon thereafter, however, Tadao<br />
Ikawa, a banker who was a friend <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe,<br />
arrived in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He was followed closely by Colonel<br />
Hideo Iwakuro, who was dispatched in response to Ambassador Nomura’s<br />
specific request for the army’s understanding and assistance.<br />
Drought, Ikawa, and Iwakuro—the so-called John Doe Associates—<br />
proceeded over the ensuing months to draft various proposals for<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese–American understanding. They maintained quite close relations<br />
with Ambassador Nomura. At the same time, Ikawa intermittently<br />
contacted Konoe, and Iwakuro remained in close contact with<br />
the War Ministry. On the American side, their principal contact came<br />
in the form <strong>of</strong> Postmaster General Frank Walker.<br />
The so-called Draft Understanding between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, which Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Cordell Hull in April 1941 informed<br />
Nomura would be acceptable as the basis for negotiations,<br />
was the product <strong>of</strong> the John Doe Associates’ endeavors. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government, however, refused to play ball. Foreign Minister
148 • JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF FSX<br />
Matsuoka in May rewrote the Draft Understanding so as to significantly<br />
change its character. The changes were in no way acceptable<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, which, in June, submitted its own proposal. The<br />
terms contained in this proposal were considerably stronger than<br />
those <strong>of</strong> the original April document, and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government—wrongly—seized<br />
on this as evidence <strong>of</strong> the stiffening <strong>of</strong><br />
Washington’s position. The American proposal, moreover, coincided<br />
with the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Soviet–German war. Tokyo responded to<br />
this development by advancing its troops into southern Indochina,<br />
which, in turn, prompted Washington to freeze <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and to place an embargo on oil. These actions virtually<br />
guaranteed that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations <strong>of</strong> 1941—<br />
and <strong>of</strong> course the efforts <strong>of</strong> the John Doe Associates—ended in war.<br />
See also WORLD WAR II.<br />
JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF FSX. The Fighter Support X (FSX) is<br />
an F2 support fighter plane for <strong>Japan</strong>’s Air Self-Defense Force<br />
(ASDF) that was co-developed with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Initially, the<br />
ASDF and <strong>Japan</strong>ese engineers in both the public and private sectors<br />
insisted on domestic production <strong>of</strong> the plane, but the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
which strongly desired to sell its own fighters to <strong>Japan</strong> and feared that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> might become a serious competitor to the U.S. aerospace aircraft<br />
industry, raised strong objections.<br />
In October 1987, <strong>Japan</strong> compromised by agreeing to <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
joint development <strong>of</strong> a fighter plane based on the U.S.-made F16.<br />
This was the first time the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> had ever decided<br />
on joint development <strong>of</strong> a fighter. In return for abandoning its hope<br />
<strong>of</strong> domestic development, <strong>Japan</strong> was permitted to acquire most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
technology used in the F-16 joint development; however, owing to<br />
opposition from the Congress, <strong>Japan</strong> was forced to develop its own<br />
flight-control computer s<strong>of</strong>tware.<br />
The direction <strong>of</strong> technology flow was not one way. The codevelopment<br />
agreement obligated <strong>Japan</strong> to provide the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>’s own cutting-edge technologies used in, for example,<br />
radar, shipbuilding, digital flight control, ducted rocket engines, ceramic<br />
engines for military vehicles, shallow water acoustic sound<br />
systems, and ballistic missile defense. Because <strong>of</strong> limitations imposed<br />
by <strong>Japan</strong>’s arms export regulations, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was not<br />
allowed to export U.S.-made arms that incorporated any technologies
JOINT REPORT ON THE U.S.–JAPAN COMMON AGENDA • 149<br />
originally provided by <strong>Japan</strong>. In addition, if new missile-defense<br />
technologies jointly developed by <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> are to<br />
be deployed in an operational national missile defense system, this<br />
raises questions <strong>of</strong> whether such deployment might conflict with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s ban on exercising the right <strong>of</strong> collective defense. The FSX is<br />
to be used for interception, as well as for anti-ship and anti-surface<br />
<strong>of</strong>fense.<br />
While the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> agreed that the maximum development<br />
expense for the FSX would be 165 billion yen, to be paid entirely<br />
by <strong>Japan</strong>, in the end the actual development cost was about twice<br />
that amount (327.4 billion yen). Core contractors for the FSX were<br />
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (<strong>Japan</strong>) and Lockheed Martin (U.S.).<br />
JOINT REPORT ON THE U.S.–JAPAN COMMON AGENDA FOR<br />
COOPERATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (U.S.–JAPAN<br />
COMMON AGENDA). The Joint Report on the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Common<br />
Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective (U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Common<br />
Agenda) was submitted to U.S. President Bill Clinton and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa by U.S. Under Secretary for Global<br />
Affairs Frank E. Loy and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Deputy Foreign Minister Yoshiji<br />
Nogami in July 1993. Leaders from <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
launched the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Common Agenda as a public-private framework<br />
for bilateral cooperation that seeks to apply the considerable resources<br />
and technical expertise <strong>of</strong> the world’s two largest economies to<br />
four major global issues: health and human development, challenges to<br />
international security, the environment, and advancements in science<br />
and technology. In each issue area, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> have<br />
broadened and deepened their cooperative ties, and have jointly created<br />
more than 80 scientific projects and projects involving cooperative development<br />
assistance.<br />
The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Common Agenda has led to a significant increase<br />
in the number <strong>of</strong> new links between government, the private sector,<br />
academia, and civil society organizations/non-governmental organizations<br />
(CSOs/NGOs). U.S. Common Agenda participants, including<br />
such institutions as the Common Agenda Roundtable (CART) and the<br />
CSO Network in <strong>Japan</strong>, and the Common Agenda Public Private<br />
Partnership (P-3) have provided grassroots level input and advice on<br />
Common Agenda activities. As a public–private partnership, the organizers<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Common Agenda hope that their efforts can create an
150 • JOINT STATEMENT ON THE JAPAN–UNITED STATES<br />
important foundation for future cooperation in regard to global problems<br />
that public sector institutions alone cannot tackle.<br />
JOINT STATEMENT ON THE JAPAN–UNITED STATES<br />
FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP. The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. summit held in July 1993 agreed to establish a framework<br />
for building a new <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. economic relationship. The two countries<br />
decided that the core <strong>of</strong> the new relationship would be an agenda<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. cooperation that would be based on a common global<br />
perspective and on joint consultations on matters pertaining to economics,<br />
industrial sectors, and economic structure. Among the purposes underlying<br />
the creation <strong>of</strong> the framework was achieving a more balanced<br />
and mutually beneficial <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. economic relationship, promotion<br />
<strong>of</strong> global economic growth, greater market liberalization, and—the next<br />
was considered extremely important by the two countries—an expansion<br />
<strong>of</strong> global free trade. Joint consultations on these matters were to<br />
consist <strong>of</strong> biannual summits.<br />
Under the new partnership, the two countries committed to achieving<br />
certain goals. <strong>Japan</strong> pledged to achieve a meaningful reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
its current-account surplus over the medium term; significantly increase<br />
its imports <strong>of</strong> goods and services from all countries, not just<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; encourage strong and pervasive domestic-demandled<br />
economic growth; and aggressively increase access by competing<br />
foreign goods and services to the domestic market over the medium<br />
term. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> agreed to such medium-term goals as a sizeable<br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> its fiscal debt, greater domestic savings, and work<br />
to strengthen its international business competitiveness.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the explicitly stated aims <strong>of</strong> the new partnership was to implement<br />
policies that would result in a substantial reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s trade surplus with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The partnership also decided<br />
to apply a global perspective to a variety <strong>of</strong> important issues,<br />
such as the environment, technology, human resource development,<br />
global population growth, and HIV/AIDS. See also U.S.–JAPAN<br />
TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
JOINT U.S.–JAPAN COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC<br />
AFFAIRS. The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Joint Committee on Trade and Economic<br />
Problems was established in June 1961 during Prime Minister Hayato
Ikeda’s visit to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It came about through an exchange <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial notes between Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka and Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Dean Rusk. Its primary purpose was to make <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. economic<br />
relations more intimate by setting up direct economic-related<br />
ministerial talks between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. <strong>Japan</strong>ese representatives<br />
consisted <strong>of</strong> major economic-related ministers, such as the<br />
ministers <strong>of</strong> the Foreign, Finance, and International Trade and Industry<br />
Ministries headed by the foreign minister, while the U.S. representatives<br />
also consisted <strong>of</strong> major economic-related secretaries, such as the secretaries<br />
<strong>of</strong> state, the Treasury, and Commerce, headed by the secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
state. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese foreign minister and the U.S. secretary <strong>of</strong> state became<br />
chairperson <strong>of</strong> the committee alternately. The committee is not a<br />
formal place to negotiate concrete issues or make agreements, but provides<br />
a forum where both sides exchange opinions freely in order to<br />
strengthen friendship ties and to contribute to developing closer cooperative<br />
ties in the economic relationship between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. The primary agenda <strong>of</strong> the committee is the promotion <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
cooperation between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>, especially an<br />
exchange <strong>of</strong> information and opinions concerning trade issues and economic<br />
assistance programs. The first committee was held in November<br />
1961 and the committee was held 13 times during the period up to 1973.<br />
See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
– K –<br />
KAISEIJO • 151<br />
KAGOSHIMA BOMBARDMENT. In August 1863, a British squadron<br />
<strong>of</strong> seven ships bombarded Kagoshima, the capital city <strong>of</strong> Satsuma domain,<br />
in retaliation for the murder the previous year <strong>of</strong> a British merchant<br />
by Satsuma samurai in the Namamugi Incident. After the bombardment<br />
<strong>of</strong> Kagoshima, the Tokugawa bakufu agreed to pay an<br />
indemnity to the British government.<br />
KAISEIJO. Originally called “the Institute for the Study <strong>of</strong> Barbarian<br />
Books,” the name <strong>of</strong> this government-funded college in Edo was<br />
changed in 1863 to “Kaiseijo,” meaning Institute for Development. It<br />
was the Tokugawa shogunate’s primary center for higher education<br />
in Western languages, sciences, and military studies. Later known as
152 • KANAGAWA TREATY<br />
Kaisei Gakko, it formed part <strong>of</strong> the original University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo<br />
founded in 1877.<br />
KANAGAWA TREATY (1854). Formally known as the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Friendship, this treaty was negotiated and signed by U.S.<br />
Commodore Matthew Perry and Tokugawa shogunate <strong>of</strong>ficials in<br />
March 1854. The three major agreements in the treaty are: better<br />
treatment for shipwrecked sailors; allowing purchase <strong>of</strong> coal, wood,<br />
fresh water, and other provisions by American ships at the ports <strong>of</strong><br />
Shimoda and Hakodate; and allowing an American diplomat at Shimoda.<br />
This was the first formal treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and a Western<br />
government. See also ANSEI TREATIES; HARRIS, TOWNSEND.<br />
KANEKO, KENTARO (1853–1942). Early <strong>Japan</strong>ese overseas student<br />
who studied at Harvard University from 1872 to 1878, where he became<br />
friends with fellow student Theodore Roosevelt. Kaneko was<br />
a close associate <strong>of</strong> Hirobumi Ito, and held a number <strong>of</strong> positions in<br />
the Meiji government, including serving as <strong>Japan</strong>’s Ambassador to<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> during the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong> War, which occurred during<br />
President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. See also JAPA-<br />
NESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA.<br />
KATAYAMA, SEN (1860–1933). Influential labor leader, socialist, and<br />
Christian, Katayama studied in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1884 to 1894,<br />
mostly at Yale University, before returning to <strong>Japan</strong> and founding the<br />
first labor newspaper (published in both <strong>Japan</strong>ese and English). He<br />
helped establish the original <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist Party in 1906. In 1914, he<br />
returned to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and settled in California. By the time <strong>of</strong><br />
the Russian Revolution in 1917, Katayama had become a communist<br />
and moved to Moscow in 1922, where he died 11 years later. See also<br />
JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA.<br />
KATŌ, KANJI (1870–1939). Admiral Kanji Katō was a hawkish figure—and<br />
an important one at that—in the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy<br />
throughout the Taishō and Shōwa periods. Impulsive and hot-headed,<br />
he was widely popular with younger <strong>of</strong>ficers within the service. Unfortunately,<br />
Katō prioritized cultivating and maintaining that popularity<br />
over and above cold calculations <strong>of</strong> national interest.
KATO – , TOMOSABURO – • 153<br />
In 1891, Katō graduated from the Naval Academy, and was chief<br />
gunner on the enormous battleship Mikasa during the RUSSO–<br />
JAPANESE WAR <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905. His pedigree was impeccable: after<br />
serving as Admiral Gombei Yamamoto’s aide-de-camp in 1906, he<br />
was posted in 1909 as naval attaché to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese embassy in London.<br />
He attended the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, and<br />
emerged as a vociferous opponent <strong>of</strong> plenipotentiary (and navy minister)<br />
Admiral Tomosaburō Katō’s decision to accept the American<br />
proposal for the reduction <strong>of</strong> capital ship strength according to the ratio<br />
<strong>of</strong> 5:5:3 for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Having been promoted to admiral in 1927, Katō in 1929 was appointed<br />
chief <strong>of</strong> the Navy General Staff. In this position, he violently<br />
opposed the naval limitations agreements hammered out at the 1930<br />
First London Naval Conference. He charged the government with<br />
having ignored his opinions, which he argued constituted an infringement<br />
on the rights <strong>of</strong> the supreme command. This, in turn,<br />
sparked a shrill political controversy—with debate centering on the<br />
government’s prerogatives vis-à-vis those <strong>of</strong> the supreme command—in<br />
the midst <strong>of</strong> which Katō (in June 1930) resigned his post.<br />
In subsequent years, he worked behind the scenes to empower those<br />
within the navy who opposed the system <strong>of</strong> naval limitation.<br />
KATŌ, RYOZO (1941). Ryozo Katō has been ambassador extraordinaire<br />
and plenipotentiary to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> since 2001. In 1965, he<br />
graduated from Faculty <strong>of</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> Tokyo University and entered the<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. After holding a series <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
posts, he was promoted to deputy minister for Foreign Affairs in 1999.<br />
In the 21st century, a number <strong>of</strong> delicate issues exist between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. In particular, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> has been implementing<br />
global military realignment. Because <strong>of</strong> this, Washington<br />
has agreed to reduce 8,000 marines currently stationed in Okinawa.<br />
Ambassador Katō plays an important role in these negotiations.<br />
KATŌ, TOMOSABURŌ (1861–1923). Admiral Tomosaburo Katō<br />
was a towering figure in the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy through the<br />
1910s and early 1920s. A judicious judge <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s war-making capabilities,<br />
he exercised his authority to drag the navy into the era <strong>of</strong><br />
naval limitation.
154 • KATSU, KAISHU<br />
In 1880, he graduated from the Naval Academy. He was chief gunner<br />
on the cruiser Yoshino during the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong><br />
1894–1895, and during the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905 was<br />
appointed fleet chief <strong>of</strong> staff, a position in which he was directly responsible<br />
to commander <strong>of</strong> the Combined Fleet Admiral Heihachirō<br />
Tōgō. He subsequently served as vice minister <strong>of</strong> the navy,<br />
commander-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the Kure Naval District, and commander <strong>of</strong><br />
the First Fleet, before being appointed navy minister in August 1915,<br />
in the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Shigenobu Okuma. As navy minister, Katō<br />
emerged as the architect <strong>of</strong> the so-called eight-eight fleet plan—<br />
which entailed a fleet with a nucleus <strong>of</strong> eight battleships and eight<br />
cruisers. In the immediate postwar era, however, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
began trumpeting its policy <strong>of</strong> constructing a navy “second to none,”<br />
and it was obvious to Katō that <strong>Japan</strong> simply could not keep pace.<br />
In such a frame <strong>of</strong> mind, Katō led <strong>Japan</strong>’s delegation to the Washington<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. Violent opposition from within<br />
naval ranks notwithstanding, he accepted Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Charles<br />
Evan Hughes’s proposal for the reduction <strong>of</strong> capital ship strength according<br />
to the ratio <strong>of</strong> 5:5:3 for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. In so doing, he conceded that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy was not an instrument<br />
for war against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It was instead an instrument<br />
for deterring the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from interfering in <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
sensed prerogatives.<br />
Katō assumed the prime minister’s post soon after his return from<br />
the Washington Conference. He also remained as navy minister. He<br />
established a foreign policy <strong>of</strong> cooperation with the great powers. To<br />
this end, he effectuated the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops from<br />
Siberia and China’s Liaotung peninsula (both issues had been a sore<br />
point in post–World War I <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations). He also implemented<br />
the Washington treaties, although he died in August 1923<br />
while still in <strong>of</strong>fice.<br />
KATSU, KAISHU (1823–1899). Born in Edo, Katsu was a student and<br />
then instructor in Western languages and military science, and served<br />
as a top naval <strong>of</strong>ficer in both the Tokugawa shogunate and Meiji<br />
governments. In 1860, he commanded the Kanrin Maru, one <strong>of</strong> two<br />
ships taking <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Shogun’s Embassy to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. After returning from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Katsu estab-
KISHI, NOBUSUKE • 155<br />
lished a naval school in Kobe and served as the Tokugawa government’s<br />
chief naval engineer. In March 1868, he avoided a potentially<br />
devastating war in Edo between Tokugawa warriors and imperial<br />
forces led by Satsuma and Choshu by negotiating a peaceful surrender<br />
<strong>of</strong> the city. From 1873 to 1875, he served as deputy minister<br />
and then minister <strong>of</strong> the navy in the Meiji government, and continued<br />
to hold government posts until his death. See also BOSHIN WAR;<br />
MEIJI RESTORATION; SAKUMA, SHOZAN.<br />
KIDDER, MARY EDDY (1834–1910). American missionary and educator.<br />
Arriving in <strong>Japan</strong> during the late 1860s as a teacher and missionary<br />
for the Dutch Reformed Church <strong>of</strong> America, Mary Eddy Kidder<br />
founded a school for <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls, and then established Ferris<br />
Women’s College in Yokohama in 1870. Now known as Ferris University,<br />
this was the first college for women established in <strong>Japan</strong>. See<br />
also YATOI.<br />
KIDO, KOIN (ALSO KNOWN AS KIDO, TAKAYOSHI; 1833–<br />
1877). A samurai from Choshu domain, Kido studied with Shoin<br />
Yoshida and became a leader in the imperial restoration and anti-<br />
Tokugawa shogunate movements. Kido helped negotiate an alliance<br />
between Choshu and Satsuma domains in 1866, and the<br />
Satsuma–Choshu-led forces overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in<br />
early 1868. He served in a number <strong>of</strong> Meiji government positions<br />
until his death, including as an ambassador with the Iwakura Mission<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.<br />
KISHI, NOBUSUKE (1896–1987). The politician Nosubuke Kishi was<br />
born in Yamaguchi prefecture. After graduating from the Law Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Tokyo Imperial University, he became a bureaucrat in the<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Agriculture and Commerce. In 1935, he was made chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Engineering Works Department. In 1936, he became deputy director<br />
<strong>of</strong> Manchukuo Business Department and he promoted the fiveyear<br />
plan for Manchu industrial development. Kishi returned to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
in 1939 and was promoted to vice minister <strong>of</strong> commerce and industry.<br />
Along with the vice minister <strong>of</strong> health and welfare, Kishi announced<br />
a plan to bring 85,000 Korean workers to <strong>Japan</strong> as forced laborers in
156 • KOIZUMI, JUNICHIRO<br />
May 1939. In October 1941, he was appointed minister <strong>of</strong> commerce<br />
and industry in the Hideki To - jo - Cabinet.<br />
After World War II, Kishi was arrested on A-class war-crime<br />
charges; however, he was exempted from prosecution and released<br />
from prison in December 1948. As soon as the purge was lifted after<br />
the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective, Kishi returned to<br />
politics. In 1953, he won the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives election as a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party. In November 1954, he played a major<br />
role in establishing the <strong>Japan</strong> Democratic Party and became its secretary<br />
general. Kishi was one <strong>of</strong> the chief promoters <strong>of</strong> amalgamation<br />
<strong>of</strong> two major conservative parties, the <strong>Japan</strong> Democratic Party and<br />
the Liberal Party. As a result, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)<br />
was established in November 1955 and Kishi was appointed its secretary<br />
general. In December 1956, Tanzan Ishibashi defeated Kishi in<br />
the LDP presidential election, and Kishi became foreign minister.<br />
However, when the prime minister resigned his post because <strong>of</strong> illness,<br />
Kishi became prime minister in February 1957. Kishi began negotiations<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in order to amend the one-sided<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty. On 18 May 1960, Kishi decided to<br />
unilaterally ratify a new <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty in the Lower<br />
House. After violent reactions, in June 1960, the Kishi Cabinet dissolved<br />
itself in order to defuse the crisis among the people.<br />
KOIZUMI, JUNICHIRO (1942– ). Junichiro Koizumi was born in<br />
Kanagawa Prefecture. Koizumi was first elected to the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives<br />
in 1972 as a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member.<br />
He became prime minister in April 2001. When the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> suffered<br />
from a series <strong>of</strong> terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Prime<br />
Minister Koizumi denounced the terrorism and on 29 November<br />
2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted.<br />
Koizumi seemed to be pro–<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; however, on 17 September<br />
2002, Koizumi visited North Korea as the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese prime minister<br />
in history to do so. He held a summit with Chairman Kim Jongil<br />
and signed the <strong>Japan</strong>–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. Prime Minister<br />
Koizumi did this without close consultation with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, and Washington regarded this surprise summit as an indication<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s moving away from the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance. The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> imposed strong pressure on the Koizumi administration
KOMURA, JU – TARO – • 157<br />
to move back to the alliance. The Koizumi administration had to accommodate<br />
an insistent U.S. request to strengthen the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
military alliance by making appropriate legal arrangements. On 6<br />
June 2003, three laws on war contingencies were enacted. On 26 July<br />
2003, Special legislation Calling for Assistance in the Rebuilding<br />
<strong>of</strong> Iraq was enacted. In January 2004, Tokyo dispatched the main<br />
unit <strong>of</strong> the Air Self-Defense Force to Samawa, Iraq, known as the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group. On 14 June 2004,<br />
seven laws on war contingencies were enacted. In the end, Prime<br />
Minister Koizumi reinforced the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance and expanded<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s military role in the international community.<br />
KOMURA, JŪTARŌ (1855–1911). A product <strong>of</strong> Harvard Law<br />
School, Jūtarō Komura was a distinguished diplomat in the late Meiji<br />
period. At ease in American circles, Komura has been given high<br />
marks for his diplomacy as foreign minister.<br />
Having joined the Foreign Ministry in 1884, Komura gained wide<br />
experience in China and Korea before being appointed vice foreign<br />
minister in 1896. In this post, he served beneath foreign ministers<br />
Kimmochi Saionji, Shigenobu Ōkuma, and Tokujirō Nishi. In September<br />
1998, he was appointed ambassador to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. It<br />
was a difficult assignment. He sought, without success, to guarantee<br />
the rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese nationals in Hawaii and California. He was<br />
similarly unsuccessful in his attempts to protect <strong>Japan</strong>ese trading<br />
rights in Hawaii. In his communications with <strong>of</strong>ficials in Tokyo, Komura<br />
advised a conciliatory stance toward America’s annexation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Philippines, sought to explain Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Hay’s<br />
enunciation <strong>of</strong> the Open Door, and spoke <strong>of</strong> the necessity <strong>of</strong> restricting<br />
immigration to the American West Coast.<br />
After an 18-month stint as ambassador to Russia, Komura in September<br />
1901 was appointed foreign minister in the first cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime<br />
Minister Tarō Katsura. Along with the genrō, General Aritomo Yamagata,<br />
and Prime Minister Katsura, Komura in 1902 led a divided government<br />
to conclude the Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese alliance. Russia subsequently<br />
revealed its imperialist ambitions not only in Manchuria but also in Korea.<br />
Komura was prepared to concede Russia’s superior position in<br />
Manchuria, but he would not assent to the continued stationing <strong>of</strong> Russian<br />
troops there (Russian troops had remained in Manchuria since the
158 • KONOE, FUMIMARO<br />
Boxer Uprising). He was assertive <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s preeminent rights in Korea,<br />
and would brook no Russian influence on the peninsula. Negotiations<br />
with Russia broke down in December 1903, and Tokyo made the<br />
decision for war in January 1904. Within a month, Komura defined<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s war aims as the extension and solidification <strong>of</strong> its influence over<br />
Korea and the extension <strong>of</strong> its interests in Manchuria. Komura represented<br />
his nation at the negotiations ending the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War,<br />
and in August 1905 signed the Portsmouth Treaty.<br />
He resigned as foreign minister in January 1906, but returned to the<br />
post in August 1908 in the second cabinet <strong>of</strong> Tarō Katsura. His foreign<br />
policy was predicated on securing <strong>Japan</strong>’s paramount interests in Korea<br />
and Manchuria, and gaining the great powers’ recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
position in the Far East. In light <strong>of</strong> the latter objective, he viewed the<br />
Root–Takahira Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1908 as a success. This success was<br />
tempered however by President William Howard Taft’s subsequent<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> dollar diplomacy, which squared <strong>of</strong>f against <strong>Japan</strong>’s interests<br />
in southern Manchuria. To counter this unwelcome development,<br />
Komura turned to Russia. The two nations reached an agreement on<br />
their respective spheres <strong>of</strong> Manchurian influence in 1910. Komura<br />
nonetheless remained convinced <strong>of</strong> the necessity <strong>of</strong> close economic ties<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and presided over efforts toward the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation <strong>of</strong> 1911.<br />
KONOE, FUMIMARO (1891–1945). Scion <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s most<br />
aristocratic families, Fumimaro Konoe was an influential politician<br />
in the World War II period. However, whether he used his influence<br />
judiciously is open to serious doubt. Educated at Kyoto Imperial University,<br />
he accompanied the genro - Kimmochi Saionji to the Paris<br />
Peace Conference <strong>of</strong> 1919. At this time, he shot to prominence—and<br />
raised Saionji’s ire—with publication <strong>of</strong> an essay that attacked the<br />
“Anglo–American peace” as hypocritical and unfair.<br />
While still a student he had been given a seat in the Diet’s House <strong>of</strong><br />
Peers and became president <strong>of</strong> that body in 1933. He cultivated acquaintances<br />
with men <strong>of</strong> many stripes, although by far the most extensive<br />
were his contacts with right-wing reformers, traditional conservatives,<br />
and Asianists. He was also popular with army <strong>of</strong>ficers,<br />
particularly after he came out in ardent support <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s actions in<br />
Manchuria in 1931. In 1936, Konoe gathered around himself a group
KONOE–ROOSEVELT SUMMIT MEETING • 159<br />
<strong>of</strong> leading bureaucrats and intellectuals—including Hozumi Ozaki,<br />
who in 1941 was executed for his involvement in the Sorge spy ring—<br />
in the so-called Shōwa Research Association.<br />
Konoe assumed the prime minister’s post in June 1937. A month<br />
later, <strong>Japan</strong> was at war with China. His leadership at this crucial moment<br />
was wanting. Utterly incapable <strong>of</strong> capitalizing on the desires <strong>of</strong><br />
both nations for a speedy local settlement, Konoe instead allowed reinforcements<br />
to be sent and then looked on as the fighting intensified and<br />
developed into a major war. With no exit strategy in sight, in the following<br />
January, Konoe proclaimed that his government would deal with<br />
Chiang Kai-shek only on the battlefield and at the surrender table.<br />
Having in November 1938 announced a “new order” in Asia, Konoe<br />
in January 1939 resigned as prime minister. He returned to <strong>of</strong>fice the<br />
following July, launching a series <strong>of</strong> foreign policies with disastrous<br />
consequences. His foreign policy rested on an alliance relationship with<br />
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which, far from bringing an end to the<br />
war in China, threatened to embroil <strong>Japan</strong> in a much wider war against<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain. Not until late August 1941 did Konoe<br />
recognize how close he had brought <strong>Japan</strong> to war with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. His effort at warding <strong>of</strong>f such a disaster, which amounted to a<br />
proposal for a personal summit between President Franklin D. Roosevelt<br />
and himself, was a classic too-little, too-late response.<br />
Late in the war, Konoe feared an impending Communist revolution<br />
and thus advised the emperor to seek a conditional peace with the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. He saw such a peace in the terms <strong>of</strong> the Potsdam<br />
Proclamation. After the war, he attempted to rewrite the Meiji Constitution.<br />
The American authorities not only rejected his efforts, but<br />
arrested him as a war criminal. Embittered, Konoe committed suicide<br />
in December 1945.<br />
KONOE–ROOSEVELT SUMMIT MEETING (1941). Foreign Minister<br />
Teijirō Toyoda in early August 1941 instructed <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador<br />
to Washington, Kichisaburō Nomura, to sound out American policymakers<br />
on the possibility <strong>of</strong> a summit meeting between Prime Minister<br />
Fumimaro Konoe and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Talks to this<br />
end continued for some two months, although <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers’<br />
inability to define the terms to which Konoe would agree at the summit<br />
meeting ensured that the proposal never got <strong>of</strong>f the ground.
160 • KUMAMOTO BAND<br />
The proposal came against an inauspicious backdrop. <strong>Japan</strong> remained<br />
embroiled in its war with China. By means <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–<br />
Germany–Italy Tripartite Pact, it had allied itself to Washington’s<br />
quasi-enemy. It had moreover undertaken an advance into the colonial<br />
regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. For its part, Washington had adopted<br />
increasingly stringent countermeasures, culminating in its freezing <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese assets and embargoing oil in late July–early August 1941.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese army and navy policymakers began eyeing the oil-rich<br />
Dutch East Indies to make up for this loss, all the while threatening<br />
that a forceful occupation <strong>of</strong> the colony meant war with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>.<br />
Konoe and Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda hoped by means <strong>of</strong> the<br />
summit meeting to halt the slide toward war. In short, they wanted to<br />
have both the embargo on oil lifted and <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> unfrozen. It stood to reason, however, that if the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
were to do so, it would first require <strong>Japan</strong> to undo the action that had<br />
prompted these economic sanctions in the first place. In other words,<br />
Washington required a firm guarantee that <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops would<br />
withdraw from the Indochinese peninsula. Although there is room for<br />
speculation as to whether Konoe would have <strong>of</strong>fered Indochinese<br />
withdrawal had the summit meeting taken place—where he would<br />
have been free <strong>of</strong> the overbearing arguments <strong>of</strong> the army and navy—<br />
the fact remains that neither he nor Toyoda were able to meet this basic<br />
requirement prior to the proposed conference. In light <strong>of</strong> this failure,<br />
it is hardly surprising that the U.S. government reacted for the<br />
most part negatively to this proposal.<br />
KUMAMOTO BAND. See LEROY LANSING JANES.<br />
KUME, KUNITAKE (1838–1931). A samurai from Saga province,<br />
Kume became a writer and scholar <strong>of</strong> the Meiji and Taisho eras. Appointed<br />
as the <strong>of</strong>ficial secretary <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura Mission, Kume<br />
wrote and published the <strong>of</strong>ficial, five-volume report <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura<br />
Mission in 1878. He spent most <strong>of</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> his career as a history<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essor and writer at Kyoto University and Waseda University.<br />
KURIYAMA, TAKAKAZU (1931– ). Takakazu Kuriyama joined the<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs in 1954. He was promoted to director <strong>of</strong> the
Treaties Bureau in 1981 and to director-general <strong>of</strong> the North American<br />
Affairs Bureau in 1984. He then served as ambassador to Malaysia in<br />
1985 and became deputy minister <strong>of</strong> foreign affairs in 1989. Finally, he<br />
became ambassador to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1992. Although <strong>Japan</strong> contributed<br />
$13 billion to the U.S.-led coalition forces during the Gulf<br />
War, many American people, as well as U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials, criticized <strong>Japan</strong><br />
for not dispatching <strong>Japan</strong>’s Self-Defense Forces to the War. Ambassador<br />
Kuriyama made every effort to diffuse their anger and sought to<br />
solidify the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance by every means he could find.<br />
KUSAKABE, TARO (1845–1870). One <strong>of</strong> the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese students<br />
in America, Kusakabe studied at Rutgers College in New<br />
Brunswick, New Jersey. He was the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese to be elected to the<br />
Phi Beta Kappa honor society, and graduated from Rutgers in 1870.<br />
Sadly, his graduation was posthumous as he died from tuberculosis<br />
three weeks before the graduation ceremony.<br />
KYOTO. Imperial capital city <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> from 794 to 1868. During the<br />
1850s and 1860s, Kyoto became a mecca for anti-Tokugawa samurai<br />
who claimed the emperor should be “restored” to his rightful place as<br />
sovereign leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. After the Meiji Restoration <strong>of</strong> 1868,<br />
Tokyo (formerly known as Edo) became the political capital city <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Kyoto is in many ways a modern city, but it had a nearly 1,100year<br />
reign as <strong>Japan</strong>’s imperial capital, and is full <strong>of</strong> major Buddhist<br />
temples, Shinto Shrines, and other traditional institutions that attract<br />
tourists from all over <strong>Japan</strong> and the world. At the end <strong>of</strong> World War<br />
II, Kyoto had been considered as a target for an atomic bomb but this<br />
was passed over at the insistence <strong>of</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> War Henry Stimson.<br />
– L –<br />
LANMAN, CHARLES • 161<br />
LANMAN, CHARLES (1819–1895). A prolific writer on many subjects<br />
during the second half <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, Charles Lanman also served<br />
as secretary to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese legation in Washington, D.C., for many<br />
years during the 1870s and 1880s. One <strong>of</strong> his works on <strong>Japan</strong> was The<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese in America, published in 1872, and he assisted Arinori<br />
Mori, <strong>Japan</strong>’s first resident diplomat in Washington in researching and
162 • LANSING–ISHII AGREEMENT<br />
writing Life and Resources in America. In 1883, Lanman published<br />
Leading Men <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, With a <strong>Historical</strong> Summary <strong>of</strong> the Empire. For<br />
several years, Lanman and his wife, Adeline, were also the host family<br />
for Umeko Tsuda, who first arrived to live and study in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> with the Iwakura Mission in 1871.<br />
LANSING–ISHII AGREEMENT (1917). The name given to the exchange<br />
<strong>of</strong> formal notes between envoy Kikujirô Ishii and U.S. Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Robert Lansing in November 1917. Against the backdrop<br />
<strong>of</strong> deep differences over the two nations’ policies toward China,<br />
the Lansing–Ishii agreement represented a bargain whereby the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> recognized <strong>Japan</strong>’s dominant role in China in exchange<br />
for promises <strong>of</strong> moderation.<br />
From the outset, Lansing asked Ishii to reaffirm the Open Door<br />
and to disavow closed spheres <strong>of</strong> influence in China. Aware that his<br />
government had cemented its hold over Manchuria through a series<br />
<strong>of</strong> secret pacts with the European nations, Ishii refused. He argued instead<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong>’s rights in China resembled U.S. rights under the<br />
Monroe Doctrine: they “exist regardless <strong>of</strong> the recognition <strong>of</strong> other<br />
nations.” <strong>Japan</strong> wanted recognition as well <strong>of</strong> its “paramount interests”<br />
in Manchuria.<br />
For his part, Lansing was unwilling to recognize <strong>Japan</strong>’s “paramount<br />
interests” in Manchuria. The implications—the entire China<br />
market could in time become a <strong>Japan</strong>ese-controlled area if “paramount<br />
interests” were admitted—were too great. Instead, Lansing<br />
handed Ishii a letter on 2 November that declared that “territorial<br />
propinquity creates special relations” between countries. In return,<br />
Ishii declared his government’s continued adherence to the policy <strong>of</strong><br />
respecting the independence and territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> China and the<br />
preservation there <strong>of</strong> the Open Door for commerce and industry.<br />
The agreement nonetheless failed to define the meaning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Open Door or the nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s “special interests.” <strong>Japan</strong> interpreted<br />
it to signify recognition <strong>of</strong> its preeminent position politically,<br />
as well as economically in China, but the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> maintained<br />
that it merely had recognized that <strong>Japan</strong> had special geographical relations<br />
to its huge neighbor.<br />
LAW ON A SITUATION IN THE AREAS SURROUNDING<br />
JAPAN. Based on the stipulation <strong>of</strong> the Guidelines for U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong>
LEND LEASE • 163<br />
Defense Cooperation, 1997, this law governs U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> defense<br />
cooperation in a situation surrounding <strong>Japan</strong>. This law and the amendment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Self-Defense Forces Law were enacted and the revised<br />
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement was approved on 24<br />
May 1999. The Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding <strong>Japan</strong><br />
was promulgated on 28 May and became effective on 25 August <strong>of</strong> the<br />
same year. This law basically stipulates that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
will assist military campaigns conducted by the U.S. armed forces in<br />
areas surrounding <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
This law clearly states, “situations in areas surrounding <strong>Japan</strong> will<br />
have an important influence on <strong>Japan</strong>’s peace and security.” However,<br />
“the concept, situations in areas surrounding <strong>Japan</strong>, is not geographic<br />
but situational.” The law is unclear what “situations in areas surrounding<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>” really mean. According to the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Joint Declaration<br />
on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century <strong>of</strong> April 1996,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty is the base for maintaining peace and<br />
security in the Asia–Pacific area. Considering in this context, the areas<br />
surrounding <strong>Japan</strong> means the Asia–Pacific region. This law allows<br />
the Self-Defense Forces to carry out not only defending <strong>Japan</strong> but also<br />
preserving peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region.<br />
LEGENDRE, CHARLES (1830–1899). A native <strong>of</strong> France, LeGendre<br />
became a naturalized American citizen and was later wounded fighting<br />
as a Union Army <strong>of</strong>ficer during the American Civil War. He was<br />
appointed American consul at Amoy, China, in 1866 and served in<br />
that position until 1872. He was then hired by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
as a military adviser and received the Order <strong>of</strong> the Rising Sun<br />
commendation from Emperor Meiji for his assistance with the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese expedition to Formosa in 1874. LeGendre remained in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> working as an adviser to government leader Shigenobu<br />
Okuma until 1890. He left <strong>Japan</strong> to become an adviser to the Korean<br />
government, and died in Seoul in 1899. See also MEIJI ERA; YATOI.<br />
LEND LEASE. Lend Lease was the means by which the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
made available vast quantities <strong>of</strong> aid to those nations fighting the<br />
Axis in World War II. The Lend Lease program eventually conveyed<br />
goods and services valued at over $50 billion to America’s<br />
wartime friends and allies, including Great Britain, the Soviet Union,<br />
and China.
164 • LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Franklin D. Roosevelt in December 1940<br />
received a letter from Prime Minister Winston Churchill explaining<br />
that Britain required vast amounts <strong>of</strong> aid if it were to carry on the<br />
fight against Germany. Roosevelt responded by telling his constituents<br />
on 17 December that America should lease Britain those materials<br />
necessary to win its struggle for survival against Germany. As<br />
he explained, “they would be more useful to the defense <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> if they were used in Great Britain than if they were kept<br />
in storage here.” Then, in one <strong>of</strong> his famed “fireside chats,” Roosevelt<br />
on 29 December denounced the “unholy alliance” <strong>of</strong> Germany,<br />
Italy, and <strong>Japan</strong>, on the grounds that it sought to “dominate and enslave<br />
the entire human race.” Maintaining that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was<br />
the “arsenal <strong>of</strong> democracy,” he called on the American people to<br />
“support the nations defending themselves against the Axis.” Then,<br />
on 10 January 1941, the Roosevelt administration <strong>of</strong>ficially made the<br />
proposal that resulted in the Lend Lease Act <strong>of</strong> 11 March 1941.<br />
Much as Roosevelt had anticipated, it sparked intensive debate. Domestic<br />
critics <strong>of</strong> Lend Lease charged that it paved the way to American<br />
involvement in war—and added that Roosevelt sought nothing<br />
less than dictatorial powers—while proponents countered that it <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
the best protection so long as the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> remained a nonbelligerent.<br />
Opponents forced the administration to make several<br />
changes to the proposal, although in its final form the Lend Lease Act<br />
empowered the president to make available to “any country whose defense<br />
the president deems vital to the defense <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>”<br />
any “defense article,” any service, or any “defense information.”<br />
The Roosevelt administration decided in early July 1941 to establish<br />
in China a military advisory corps, whose principal duty was<br />
overseeing the implementation <strong>of</strong> the lend-lease program. The message<br />
to Tokyo was clear: the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was acting as China’s de<br />
facto ally in that nation’s war against <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE (1930). The London Naval Conference<br />
convened from 21 January to 22 April 1930, with delegates<br />
from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, <strong>Japan</strong>, France, and Italy in attendance.<br />
The conference’s principal aim was to reach an agreement<br />
limiting auxiliary naval vessels, an aim that had informed the failed<br />
Geneva Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1927.
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE • 165<br />
Several factors combined to ensure the London Naval Conference’s<br />
successful conclusion, although the most important <strong>of</strong> these<br />
was Anglo–American conciliation. Some months before the conference<br />
opened, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald met with<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Herbert Hoover in the White House, where<br />
the two men reached mutual understanding on the issue <strong>of</strong> naval limitation.<br />
In this way, the recrimination that had characterized Anglo–American<br />
relations since the Geneva Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1927<br />
was dispelled, and the Anglo–American dispute that had broken up<br />
the Geneva Conference was resolved before the London Conference<br />
was convened.<br />
The most protracted negotiations that took place at the London<br />
Naval Conference were those between U.S. Senator David Reed and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to Great Britain Matsudaira Tsuneo (parallel<br />
talks were also held between Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry L. Stimson<br />
and former Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō). The <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates’<br />
negotiating position was informed by the so-called Three Basic<br />
Principles, which the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in November 1929<br />
had adopted as basic policy. The principles regarded as necessary a<br />
70 percent ratio for <strong>Japan</strong> (vis-à-vis the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great<br />
Britain) in auxiliary vessel strength; called for a 70 percent ratio visà-vis<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in heavy cruisers; and maintained that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
should be able to possess submarines totaling 78,000 tons. They<br />
achieved in large part these objectives, and, on 14 March, sent a complicated<br />
plan to Tokyo that gave <strong>Japan</strong> a cruiser strength approximately<br />
70 percent <strong>of</strong> that <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain, and<br />
allowed <strong>Japan</strong> to maintain its 78,000 tons in submarines.<br />
In Tokyo, the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi was receptive<br />
to this plan. The core policymaking group within the Navy<br />
Ministry—Vice Navy Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin, chief <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Naval Affairs Bureau Hori Teikichi, and chief Navy Ministry adjutant<br />
Koga Mineichi—were also willing to accept the plan. Prime Minister<br />
Hamaguchi, on 1 April, cabled his government’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> the plan<br />
to the conferees, and, on 22 April, the London Naval Treaty was<br />
signed.<br />
For both the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy and government, the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the<br />
conference was messy and complicated. The Navy command, led by<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Admiral Kanji Katō and his vice-chief, Vice Admiral
166 • LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE<br />
Nobumasa Suetsugu, registered their unalterable opposition to the<br />
treaty. They received inestimable support from Admiral Heihachirō<br />
Tōgō, who remained a national hero for his exploits in the Russo–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905. Over the ensuing months, a bitter<br />
quarrel broke out in which the Navy General Staff repeatedly accused<br />
the government <strong>of</strong> having infringed the right <strong>of</strong> the supreme command<br />
(constitutionally, the cabinet had no power over the command<br />
and operations <strong>of</strong> the armed forces, these being the concern <strong>of</strong> the<br />
chiefs <strong>of</strong> staff in their role as adviser to the emperor).<br />
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE (1935–1936). The London Naval<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1935–1936 represented the final naval arms limitation<br />
conference <strong>of</strong> the pre–World War II period. Held because the naval<br />
limitation treaties signed at the Washington Conference and London<br />
Naval Conference would both terminate at the end <strong>of</strong> 1936, the conference’s<br />
outcome was assured even before it convened: the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government in 1934 demanded naval parity with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and Great Britain.<br />
Several factors underlay the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy’s determination to end<br />
the era <strong>of</strong> naval limitation. First was <strong>Japan</strong>’s international isolation,<br />
brought about by the army’s invasion <strong>of</strong> Manchuria in 1931. The second—and<br />
perhaps more important—factor was the makeup <strong>of</strong> the upper<br />
echelons <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy in the mid-1930s. In the aftermath<br />
<strong>of</strong> the London Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1930, navy hawks saw to it that<br />
those <strong>of</strong>ficers who had supported the naval limitations agreements<br />
were either retired or placed on the reserve list. In the estimation <strong>of</strong><br />
one authority, there remained in 1934–1935 few voices <strong>of</strong> caution<br />
and restraint in the navy’s upper echelons.<br />
Whatever the case, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation withdrew from the conference<br />
on 16 January 1936, after the American and British delegations<br />
refused to concede parity. The earlier naval limitations agreements subsequently<br />
came to an end in December 1936. Thereafter there was no<br />
limit on the number <strong>of</strong> naval vessels to be built by any nation. Although<br />
between 1935 and 1940, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government undertook no<br />
significant new naval construction programs, in June–July 1940, Congress<br />
provided funds for an enormous 1,325,000 tons <strong>of</strong> naval construction.<br />
The construction program envisioned a two-ocean navy with<br />
seven new battleships, six battle cruisers, 19 carriers, more than 60
cruisers, 150 destroyers, and 140 submarines. As one observer has<br />
noted, any advantage <strong>Japan</strong> had gained by ending the era <strong>of</strong> naval limitation<br />
was undermined—and would eventually be swept away—by<br />
American construction.<br />
LUCKY DRAGON INCIDENT (DAIGO FUKURYUMARU INCI-<br />
DENT). The Lucky Dragon (Daigo Fukuryumaru) Incident occurred<br />
on 1 March 1954. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> exploded the largest hydrogen<br />
bomb as part <strong>of</strong> a test conducted on Bikini Island in the Marshall Islands.<br />
The crew <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese tuna fishing boat that was fishing in<br />
waters near the test site, the Daigo Fukuryumaru, suffered adverse<br />
health effects as a result <strong>of</strong> explosion to radiation fallout from the<br />
bomb. Before the test explosive was conducted, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had<br />
failed to give prior warning to <strong>Japan</strong>’s Coast Guard and Fisheries<br />
Agency. On 14 March, the Daigo Fukuryumaru returned to <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
all 23 crewmembers were found to be in need <strong>of</strong> medical attention.<br />
They were admitted to hospitals in Tokyo, but on 23 September 1954,<br />
the oldest member <strong>of</strong> the boat’s crew died. The remaining 22<br />
crewmembers were eventually discharged, but they continued to experience<br />
health problems. By 2003, 12 more crewmembers had died.<br />
It was later discovered that vast sections <strong>of</strong> the Pacific Ocean had<br />
been contaminated by substantial amounts <strong>of</strong> radiation spread by the<br />
1 March and additional test explosions, resulting in serious damage<br />
to the fishing industries <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and other Pacific island countries.<br />
Because not only the Daigo Fukuryumaru but also approximately<br />
900 tuna fishing boats fished in areas near the Marshall Islands, close<br />
to 20,000 people ended up suffering from radiation poisoning. The<br />
Daigo Fukuryumaru incident led to the birth <strong>of</strong> the anti-nuclear peace<br />
movement in <strong>Japan</strong> and in other countries, which coalesced into a<br />
worldwide ban-the-bomb movement.<br />
– M –<br />
MACARTHUR, GENERAL DOUGLAS • 167<br />
MACARTHUR, GENERAL DOUGLAS (1880–1964). Douglas<br />
MacArthur was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, on 26 January 1880.<br />
In 1903, he graduated top in his class from West Point Military Academy.<br />
MacArthur commanded the 42nd Division on the Western Front
168 • MACARTHUR, GENERAL DOUGLAS<br />
in World War I. He was promoted to the rank <strong>of</strong> brigadier in August<br />
1918. Two months later in November, MacArthur was chosen as the<br />
youngest U.S. divisional commander in France. When he returned to<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> after the war ended, he was again promoted, to the<br />
rank <strong>of</strong> brigadier general and he became the youngest superintendent<br />
<strong>of</strong> West Point in history. In 1922, the Army sent MacArthur to the<br />
Philippines to command the Military District <strong>of</strong> Manila. Another promotion<br />
in 1923 resulted in MacArthur becoming the U.S. Army’s<br />
youngest general.<br />
In 1930, Douglas MacArthur was selected as the youngest chief <strong>of</strong><br />
staff <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Army in history. In June 1932, he suppressed protests<br />
by war veterans (known as the Bonus Army) in Washington, D.C., believing<br />
that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was on the verge <strong>of</strong> a communist upheaval.<br />
In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent MacArthur to<br />
the Philippines, where he had planned to remain after retiring in 1937.<br />
When it became clear that war with <strong>Japan</strong> was imminent, Roosevelt<br />
recalled MacArthur to active duty in June 1941 as a major general.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops invaded the Philippines after the Pacific War broke<br />
out in December 1941. MacArthur and U.S. troops under his command<br />
were forced to retreat to the Bataan peninsula, but MacArthur managed<br />
to escape in February 1942 and then travel to Australia to take up new<br />
duties.<br />
In December 1944, MacArthur was named general <strong>of</strong> the Army. In<br />
March 1945, U.S. forces captured Manila. With <strong>Japan</strong>’s defeat in August<br />
1945, he was appointed as Supreme Commander for the Allied<br />
Powers (SCAP) and head <strong>of</strong> the Allied occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. On 30 August<br />
1945, MacArthur arrived at Atsugi Airport in <strong>Japan</strong>. Through his<br />
position as SCAP and leader <strong>of</strong> the occupation, he was responsible for<br />
the demilitarization and democratization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> for the next five years<br />
and eight months. During this period, he adopted a somewhat imperious<br />
attitude and suggested—or imposed—far-reaching reforms, such as<br />
changes in the educational system, support <strong>of</strong> the moderate political parties,<br />
taming <strong>of</strong> the trade unions, and dissolution <strong>of</strong> the zaibatsu.<br />
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, MacArthur was appointed<br />
commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> Nations forces. On 15 September 1950,<br />
he landed U.S. and South Korean marines at Inchon, 200 miles behind<br />
North Korean lines, and began a counterattack. By 24 October 1950,<br />
MacArthur had marched all the way up to the Yalu River, the border
MACARTHUR LINE • 169<br />
between Korea and China. But that prompted an intervention by Chinese<br />
troops, who pushed U.S.-led <strong>United</strong> Nations’ forces back to the<br />
southern half <strong>of</strong> the Korean peninsula. Objecting to a cautious war<br />
policy decided on by the administration <strong>of</strong> President Harry S. Truman,<br />
MacArthur demanded the freedom to wage all-out war against China,<br />
even including the use <strong>of</strong> atomic weaponry. A defiant MacArthur was<br />
removed from his command by Truman in April 1951.<br />
Shortly thereafter, MacArthur returned to America. He addressed the<br />
U.S. Congress on 19 April 1951, ending his speech with the famous<br />
line: “Old soldiers never die; they just fade away. And like the old soldier<br />
<strong>of</strong> that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away,<br />
an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see<br />
that duty.” Following a long career <strong>of</strong> military service, MacArthur entered<br />
the private sector to become chairman <strong>of</strong> the board <strong>of</strong> the Remington<br />
Rand Corporation. But, he did not quite fade away; he made political<br />
comments and was even wanted as a presidential candidate. He<br />
died at Water Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., on 5 April 1964.<br />
MACARTHUR LINE. The MacArthur Line, designated by Supreme<br />
Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN)<br />
1033 in November 1945, was a boarded area <strong>of</strong> the sea inside <strong>of</strong><br />
which <strong>Japan</strong>ese fishing vessels were permitted to fish. SCAP established<br />
this line to prevent <strong>Japan</strong>ese fishing vessels from overfishing<br />
as well as to protect South Korean fishing. In September 1951, the<br />
MacArthur Line was abolished with the signing <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco<br />
Peace Treaty. In its place was substituted the newly created Syngman<br />
Rhee Line, created under a marine sovereignty declaration issued<br />
by South Korean President Syngman Rhee in 1952. Through<br />
this unilateral declaration by Rhee, South Korea claimed sovereign<br />
rights over all natural resources and fisheries that existed within the<br />
waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula.<br />
The MacArthur and Syngman Rhee Lines are closely related to the<br />
Tokdo–Takeshima island dispute between South Korea and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
SCAPIN 1033 indicated that, with respect to related areas or any<br />
other area, it was not the Allied Powers’ definitive policy concerning<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese jurisdiction, international border, or fishing rights. Consequently,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government insisted that Takeshima Island was<br />
part <strong>of</strong> Shimane Prefecture in western <strong>Japan</strong>. On the other hand, the
170 • MACDONALD, RANALD<br />
South Korean government insisted that Tokdo Island (the Korean<br />
name for Takeshima Island) was under South Korean jurisdiction in<br />
accordance with the Syngman Rhee Line. <strong>Japan</strong> has refused to recognize<br />
the Syngman Rhee line, which <strong>Japan</strong> believes was abolished<br />
under the <strong>Japan</strong>–South Korea Fishery Agreement concluded in 1965.<br />
Nevertheless, the Tokdo–Takeshima island dispute continues to be an<br />
unresolved matter between <strong>Japan</strong> and South Korea.<br />
MACDONALD, RANALD (1824–1894). Born in Oregon territory<br />
then claimed by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, and Mexico, MacDonald<br />
was the son <strong>of</strong> a Hudson’s Bay Company executive and a Chinook<br />
Indian woman. He became fascinated with <strong>Japan</strong> and convinced a<br />
whaling ship to land him near Hokkaido in 1848. Captured by native<br />
Ainu and turned over to <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate, Mac-<br />
Donald was sent to Nagasaki to wait for a Western ship. Technically,<br />
MacDonald was under arrest for breaking <strong>Japan</strong>’s sakoku (“national<br />
isolation”) policies, but was allowed to teach English to samurai interpreters<br />
in Nagasaki. One <strong>of</strong> the interpreters taught by MacDonald<br />
in Nagasaki was Einosuke Moriyama, who would later be an interpreter<br />
for many negotiations between the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American<br />
governments until the 1870s. MacDonald spent 10 months in Nagasaki<br />
and was then returned to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> with some shipwrecked<br />
sailors. He spent the rest <strong>of</strong> his life as a wandering adventurer<br />
in Europe, Australia, Canada, and the Northwest <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
His autobiography, Ranald MacDonald: The Narrative <strong>of</strong> His Life,<br />
contains useful and interesting information about <strong>Japan</strong> and Nagasaki<br />
before the arrival <strong>of</strong> U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry. See also<br />
CASTAWAY SAILORS, JAPANESE.<br />
MAEKAWA REPORTS. The Maekawa Report, produced by the economic<br />
structural adjustment study group for international cooperation,<br />
was submitted to Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone on 7 April<br />
1986. This study group consisted <strong>of</strong> 17 members and was chaired by<br />
Haruo Maekawa, former Governor <strong>of</strong> the Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. On 23 April<br />
1987, the special committee <strong>of</strong> economic structural adjustment in the<br />
Economic Council, Maekawa published another report (the so-called<br />
New Maekawa Report) that contained provisions for putting the first<br />
Maekawa Report into effect. Together, the two reports argued that
<strong>Japan</strong> should seek to turn its export-oriented economy into a domestic<br />
demand-led economy, relying less on achieving economic parity<br />
with the other industrially developed countries through foreign exchange<br />
rate adjustment. These reports stated that reorientation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
economy would require demand-side improvements in the quality <strong>of</strong><br />
daily life in <strong>Japan</strong>, a transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s industrial structure<br />
and an expansion <strong>of</strong> imports. Achieving an industrial structural transformation,<br />
the reports stressed, should be based on utilizing marketincentive<br />
mechanisms. Taken together, the two Maekawa Reports<br />
contained six major recommendations:<br />
1. Expansion <strong>of</strong> domestic demand for housing, improvements in<br />
the quality <strong>of</strong> social capital, more effective land usage, the introduction<br />
<strong>of</strong> capital investment for promoting industrial structural<br />
adjustments, and increased consumption (such as by taking<br />
advantage <strong>of</strong> the appreciating yen, promoting paid holidays,<br />
and distributing the benefits <strong>of</strong> improved labor productivity in<br />
the form <strong>of</strong> higher wages and shorter working hours).<br />
2. Shorter working hours. <strong>Japan</strong> should adjust the number <strong>of</strong> working<br />
hours to its economic capabilities. Annual working hours<br />
should be reduced to 1,800 hours by the year 2000. A two-day<br />
weekend for public servants and financial institutions was recommended.<br />
3. <strong>Japan</strong> should implement an industrial structure harmonious<br />
with international norms. For this purpose, <strong>Japan</strong> needed to<br />
make changes in five areas: undertake planned industrial structural<br />
adjustment; permit foreign direct investment; improve its<br />
corporate competitiveness both at home and abroad; expansion<br />
<strong>of</strong> imports; and creation <strong>of</strong> new agricultural policies suited to<br />
international trade.<br />
4. <strong>Japan</strong> should focus on improving domestic employment conditions<br />
through the following: stress on the importance <strong>of</strong> employment;<br />
changes <strong>of</strong> employment structure and obtaining an<br />
appropriate demand-supply balance; comprehensive employment<br />
measures; redistribution <strong>of</strong> employment opportunities;<br />
emphasizing the importance <strong>of</strong> regional economies; and contributing<br />
to the international community.<br />
See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
MAEKAWA REPORTS • 171
172 • MAGIC<br />
MAGIC. MAGIC was the name given to the code-breaking device that<br />
allowed American <strong>of</strong>ficials after 25 September 1940 to read <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
diplomatic traffic. The intercepted and decoded messages—which by<br />
late 1941 numbered between 50 and 75 messages a day—were immediately<br />
made available to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his<br />
secretaries <strong>of</strong> state, war, and the navy, and a select group <strong>of</strong> other <strong>of</strong>ficials.<br />
The question inevitably arises: Did the Roosevelt administration<br />
use these decoded messages judiciously? From the vantage point <strong>of</strong><br />
hindsight, it might be answered in the negative. To cite but one example,<br />
MAGIC in early July 1941 alerted the Roosevelt administration<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>’s decision to occupy southern Indochina. After various<br />
warnings and a proposal for the neutralization <strong>of</strong> Indochina were ignored<br />
by Tokyo, a presidential order froze <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on 25 July. This may have had the unfortunate effect <strong>of</strong><br />
convincing the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army and navy leadership—who had not<br />
foreseen such a sharp reprisal—that they now had nothing to lose. On<br />
28 July, 40,000 <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops marched “peacefully” into southern<br />
Indochina. In short, there was no compelling reason to freeze <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
assets before the occupation <strong>of</strong> southern Indochina had taken<br />
place. In this way, MAGIC may have had the unfortunate effect <strong>of</strong><br />
nullifying the admittedly slim chances <strong>of</strong> a diplomatic breakthrough<br />
on the issue <strong>of</strong> Indochina.<br />
In light <strong>of</strong> revisionist charges to the effect that Roosevelt maneuvered<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese into firing the first shot—and, in particular, the<br />
charge that he was aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese plans to attack Pearl Harbor—<br />
it is necessary to recall that Magic did not enable Washington to read<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese army or navy plans. As one authority has noted, though<br />
Washington by late November 1941 had come to expect war with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, that expectation did not imply knowledge <strong>of</strong> an attack on Pearl<br />
Harbor. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
MAHAN, ALFRED THAYER (1840–1914). After service as an <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
in the U.S. Navy, Mahan became a lecturer on naval affairs and<br />
president <strong>of</strong> Newport War College. His book, The Influence <strong>of</strong><br />
Seapower Upon History, first published in 1890, was an influential<br />
work around the world, including in <strong>Japan</strong>, which was then building<br />
its modern navy. See also AKIYAMA, SANEYUKI.
MANCHURIAN INCIDENT • 173<br />
MAKINO, NOBUAKI (1861–1949). Son <strong>of</strong> Toshimichi Okubo, a<br />
major leader in the early Meiji government, Makino was also the father-in-law<br />
<strong>of</strong> Shigeru Yoshida, who served as prime minister and<br />
foreign minister during most <strong>of</strong> the American Occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Makino studied in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1871 to 1874, and thereafter<br />
held a number <strong>of</strong> foreign affairs–related posts in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government. Seen as too pro-British and pro-American by right-wing<br />
militarists, Makino was forced out <strong>of</strong> the government in 1935 and<br />
nearly killed the following year in the 26 February 1936 Incident.<br />
See also JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA.<br />
MANCHURIAN INCIDENT (1931). In its most limited sense, the<br />
Manchurian Incident refers to the events <strong>of</strong> September 1931, when<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese army forces conquered China’s northeastern provinces and<br />
later detached them from China proper to create the nominally independent<br />
state <strong>of</strong> Manchukuo. Its meaning and portent was, however,<br />
much broader in scope than these basic details attest. It was sparked<br />
by an explosion on 18 September on the South Manchurian Railway,<br />
just south <strong>of</strong> the southern Manchurian city <strong>of</strong> Mukden. Although the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese claimed that Chinese troops dynamited a section <strong>of</strong> the<br />
South Manchurian Railway track, the truth <strong>of</strong> the matter was that the<br />
explosion was part <strong>of</strong> a plot for the invasion <strong>of</strong> Manchuria that was engineered<br />
by a group <strong>of</strong> middle-echelon Kwantung Army <strong>of</strong>ficers, including<br />
Lieutenant-Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, Colonel Seijirō Itagaki,<br />
and Colonel Kenji Doihara. Thus marked the high point <strong>of</strong> the concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> gekokujō—domination <strong>of</strong> superiors by inferiors—which continued<br />
to haunt both the army and navy through the 1930s and early 1940s.<br />
The Manchurian Incident’s second point <strong>of</strong> significance derives<br />
from the fact that the army in the field consistently ignored and outmaneuvered<br />
the cabinet in Tokyo. The army’s initial response to the<br />
explosion was undertaken on its own initiative: it surrounded the Chinese<br />
barracks at Mukden, captured the garrison and military stores,<br />
and seized various points near the railway line in question. Once the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese cabinet learned <strong>of</strong> these developments, it sought to limit international<br />
fallout by keeping the fighting localized. Army authorities<br />
on the ground, however, ignored this decision and instead widened<br />
the sphere <strong>of</strong> operations. The Manchurian Incident thus provided ample<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> the locus <strong>of</strong> power within the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government.
174 • MANIFEST DESTINY<br />
A third point <strong>of</strong> significance derives from the ineffectiveness <strong>of</strong> the<br />
international reaction to the Manchurian Incident. Recognizing its inability<br />
to take the fight to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese, the Chinese government at<br />
Nanjing appealed to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and to the League <strong>of</strong> Nations.<br />
Working on the mistaken assumption that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese cabinet—<br />
most notably Foreign Minister Kijūrō Shidehara—might rein in the<br />
nation’s unruly soldiers, both the League and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> at first<br />
treaded s<strong>of</strong>tly. By the closing days <strong>of</strong> 1931, however, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
army had occupied most <strong>of</strong> Manchuria in defiance <strong>of</strong> world opinion.<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Henry L. Stimson responded on 7 January by issuing<br />
his “non-recognition doctrine,” which refused to recognize any<br />
changes in China brought about by force and in violation <strong>of</strong> the Open<br />
Door policy. Stimson’s non-recognition doctrine, however, was not<br />
backed by the threat <strong>of</strong> force and as such it left no impression on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in Manchuria. The nominally independent state <strong>of</strong><br />
Manchukuo was created later that year.<br />
MANIFEST DESTINY. The political, economic, cultural, and even<br />
moral ideology <strong>of</strong> Americans during the 19th century that they had<br />
the right to expand across North America at the expense <strong>of</strong> the indigenous<br />
inhabitants, chiefly Mexicans and Native Americans. From<br />
1803 to 1853, the nation increased its territory by 300 percent<br />
through conquests, purchases, and diplomacy. The high point <strong>of</strong><br />
Manifest Destiny came in the 1840s, when the controversy over<br />
Texas and the resulting Mexican–American War led to the U.S. acquisition<br />
<strong>of</strong> vast southwest and Pacific territories. Commodore<br />
Matthew Perry’s mission to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1853–1854 for trade and diplomatic<br />
relations can be viewed as an extension <strong>of</strong> the ideology <strong>of</strong><br />
Manifest Destiny. In the second half <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, the U.S.<br />
continued to expand by acquiring the territories <strong>of</strong> Alaska, Hawaii,<br />
and the Philippines. See also CALIFORNIA.<br />
MANJIRO (ALSO KNOWN AS MANJIRO NAKAHAMA, JOHN<br />
MANJIRO, AND JOHN MUNG; 1827–1898). Manjiro is the most<br />
well-known and romanticized <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailor. Shipwrecked<br />
in 1841, Manjiro and four other young fisherman were rescued by<br />
Captain William Whitfield, then commanding a whaling vessel in the<br />
Pacific. Manjiro and the other <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaways were taken to
MANSFIELD, MIKE • 175<br />
Hawaii, and Manjiro chose to accompany Whitfield to his hometown<br />
<strong>of</strong> Fairhaven, Massachusetts. Manjiro spent four years in Massachusetts,<br />
where he attended public school, studied English and mathematics,<br />
and became pr<strong>of</strong>icient at navigation and sailing. He and two<br />
<strong>of</strong> his fellow castaways returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1851, 10 years after they<br />
were believed lost at sea. Manjiro was elevated to honorary status <strong>of</strong><br />
samurai and allowed to take a family name, Nakahama, from the<br />
name <strong>of</strong> his village on Shikoku Island. He worked occasionally for<br />
the Tokugawa government as an interpreter, and accompanied the<br />
Shogun’s Embassy to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1860. In 1870, the Meiji<br />
government included Manjiro on a mission to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
Europe. Unlike another well-known <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway, Joseph<br />
Heco, Manjiro never wrote a memoir <strong>of</strong> his overseas experiences. After<br />
his death in 1898, several works <strong>of</strong> fact and fiction were published<br />
on Manjiro emphasizing his gaman (strength, courage) and his role<br />
as a bridge between <strong>Japan</strong> and America. See also CASTAWAY<br />
SAILORS, JAPANESE; SAKOKU.<br />
MANSFIELD, MIKE (1903–2001). Long-serving Democrat congressman<br />
and senator from the state <strong>of</strong> Montana, Mike Mansfield<br />
was also a pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> political science and history. After Lyndon B.<br />
Johnson was elected as vice president on the ticket with John F.<br />
Kennedy in 1960, Mansfield became the Senate majority leader from<br />
1961 to 1977. Mansfield criticized fellow Democrat President Lyndon<br />
Johnson’s policies during the Vietnam War. After he decided not<br />
to run for reelection to the Senate in 1976, newly elected President<br />
Jimmy Carter asked Mansfield to serve as <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Ambassador<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. After President Carter was defeated in 1980, the politically<br />
conservative Republican President-elect Ronald Reagan surprisingly<br />
asked the politically liberal Democrat Mike Mansfield to remain at<br />
his post as ambassador. Mansfield continued to serve throughout<br />
Ronald Reagan’s two terms. As ambassador, Mike Mansfield dealt<br />
with many <strong>of</strong> the trade friction issues between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. He also became famous for stating in several speeches that,<br />
“the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. relationship is the most important relationship in the<br />
world, bar none.” Just before leaving <strong>of</strong>fice in January 1989, President<br />
Reagan awarded Mike Mansfield the Presidential Medal <strong>of</strong><br />
Freedom in a ceremony at the White House.
176 • MARIA LUZ INCIDENT<br />
MARIA LUZ INCIDENT. In 1872, the Peruvian ship Maria Luz anchored<br />
in Yokohama Bay to avoid a storm. The ship was carrying<br />
over 200 Chinese laborers bound for Peru. A <strong>Japan</strong>ese court determined<br />
that the Chinese were mistreated and should be allowed to return<br />
to China. This resulted in a diplomatic incident between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and Peru eventually settled through negotiations mediated by Russia<br />
and the American minister to <strong>Japan</strong>, Charles De Long. The Maria<br />
Luz Incident also publicized the <strong>of</strong>ten poor treatment <strong>of</strong> Asian immigrant<br />
laborers.<br />
MARINE POLICE. The Marine Police was an institution designed to<br />
take all necessary measures at sea in emergencies. Its role was to protect<br />
human life and property and to maintain peace and security at sea.<br />
The Marine Police was established on 26 April 1952, and attached to<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong> Coast Guard, an external agency <strong>of</strong> the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Transport.<br />
On 1 August 1952, the Marine Police became the “Guard Police”<br />
and was placed under the authority <strong>of</strong> the Peace Preservation Agency,<br />
an external organ <strong>of</strong> the General Administrative Agency <strong>of</strong> the Cabinet.<br />
On 1 July 1954, the Guard Police became the Maritime Self-Defense<br />
Forces because <strong>of</strong> the enforcement <strong>of</strong> the Defense Agency Act and the<br />
Self-Defense Forces Law. See also DEFENSE.<br />
MATSUDAIRA, TADAATSU (1852?–1888). Tadaatsu Matsudaira<br />
and his brother Tadanari attended Rutgers College in New Jersey in<br />
the early 1870s. Tadaatsu transferred to Harvard and graduated in<br />
1877, while Tadanari finished his studies at Rutgers in 1879 and returned<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>. Tadaatsu remained in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and worked<br />
as an engineer for the Manhattan Elevated Railway in New York, for<br />
the Union Pacific Railway in the West, and then became the city engineer<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bradford, Pennsylvania, in 1884. After marrying, having<br />
two children, and contracting tuberculosis, he and his family moved<br />
to Denver, Colorado, where he briefly worked for the Colorado state<br />
government before dying in 1888. See also JAPANESE STUDENTS<br />
IN AMERICA.<br />
MATSUMURA, JUNZO (1842–1919). Junzo Matsumura was part <strong>of</strong><br />
group <strong>of</strong> young <strong>Japan</strong>ese samurai from Satsuma domain who studied<br />
in England from 1865–1867, and later lived at the Brotherhood
MATSUOKA, YO – SUKE • 177<br />
<strong>of</strong> the New Life in upstate New York for one year. He was allowed<br />
to enter the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1869 and graduated<br />
from its regular course in 1873. During his lengthy career as a <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
naval <strong>of</strong>ficer, ultimately reaching the rank <strong>of</strong> vice-admiral, Matsumura<br />
played a key role in expanding the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy.<br />
MATSUOKA, YŌSUKE (1880–1946). As foreign minister from July<br />
1940 until July 1941, Yōsuke Matsuoka exerted a pr<strong>of</strong>ound effect<br />
over <strong>Japan</strong>’s road to war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Garrulous and abrasive,<br />
Matsuoka was regarded by Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Cordell Hull as<br />
being “as crooked as a basket <strong>of</strong> fish hooks.” Several <strong>of</strong> his contemporaries—both<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese and American—went so far as to question<br />
the foreign minister’s mental health.<br />
Born into an impoverished merchant family in March 1880, Matsuoka<br />
in 1893 entered the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as an itinerant. He remained<br />
on the West Coast <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> until 1902, by which time he<br />
had graduated second in his class from the University <strong>of</strong> Oregon<br />
School <strong>of</strong> Law. After his return to <strong>Japan</strong>, he entered the Foreign Ministry<br />
and served in posts in China, Russia, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Following<br />
World War I, he served as a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s delegation to<br />
the Paris Peace Conference, and soon after left the Foreign Ministry.<br />
He was subsequently appointed to the board <strong>of</strong> the South<br />
Manchurian Railway Company, a quasi-governmental body that<br />
spearheaded <strong>Japan</strong>’s aggressive policies toward northern China. In<br />
February 1930, Matsuoka was elected to the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives<br />
only to resign his seat in December 1933. In the meantime, he<br />
negotiated an end to the Shanghai Incident and led <strong>Japan</strong> out <strong>of</strong> the<br />
League <strong>of</strong> Nations to protest that body’s criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s 1931 invasion<br />
<strong>of</strong> Manchuria.<br />
Appointed foreign minister in July 1940, Matsuoka worked with<br />
the army and navy leaders and Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe to<br />
set a foreign policy agenda that included an alliance with Germany<br />
and Italy, and an opportunistic policy <strong>of</strong> expansion into the colonial<br />
regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. He also sought an adjustment <strong>of</strong> diplomatic<br />
relations with the Soviet Union and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, believing<br />
that a German alliance would empower <strong>Japan</strong> to the extent that<br />
rapprochement with Moscow and Washington would come largely on<br />
Tokyo’s terms.
178 • MCKINLEY, WILLIAM<br />
Matsuoka’s diplomacy failed because it rested on several false assumptions.<br />
First and most important, the alliance relationship with<br />
Germany did not empower <strong>Japan</strong> vis-à-vis the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Even as<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and Germany announced their alliance relationship to the world,<br />
Washington retaliated to <strong>Japan</strong>’s simultaneous occupation <strong>of</strong> northern<br />
Indochina by slapping a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, highgrade<br />
iron, and steel scrap. Throughout Matsuoka’s time as foreign<br />
minister, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> continued to insist that rapprochement was<br />
only possible if and when the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government dissociated itself<br />
from Adolf Hitler and his brand <strong>of</strong> militaristic aggression.<br />
The possibility <strong>of</strong> rapprochement with the Soviet Union proved<br />
Matsuoka’s second false assumption. Although there is some historical<br />
debate concerning whether or not he sought to incorporate the<br />
Soviet Union into the Tripartite Alliance, there is no mistaking<br />
that Matsuoka was caught <strong>of</strong>f guard when, in June 1941, German<br />
forces invaded the Soviet Union. Showing scant regard for the nonaggression<br />
pact he had personally negotiated in April 1941 with Soviet<br />
leader Josef Stalin, Matsuoka in late June–early July 1941 urged<br />
an immediate attack against the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern<br />
provinces. This put him in direct opposition to the army and navy<br />
leadership, who responded to the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Soviet–German war<br />
with a renewed enthusiasm for an advance into Southeast Asia, and<br />
he soon found himself dismissed as foreign minister.<br />
MCKINLEY, WILLIAM (1843–1901). President <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
from 1897 until his assassination in 1901. During McKinley’s presidency,<br />
the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and<br />
Hawaii came under formal <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> control. The situation in<br />
Hawaii, the Boxer Rebellion in China, and Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John<br />
Hay’s Open Door Policy caused political tensions between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. See also ROOSEVELT, THEODORE;<br />
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR.<br />
MEIJI CONSTITUTION. Promulgated in 1889, it was an important<br />
symbol <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s national progress. Based to a large extent on the<br />
Prussian monarchical constitution, the Meiji Constitution placed the<br />
emperor as head <strong>of</strong> state; instituted a two-house parliament (Diet)<br />
with a cabinet <strong>of</strong> ministers led by a prime minister; allowed for in-
MEIJI ERA • 179<br />
creasing suffrage for adult males; and provided limited rights to all<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese. The Army and Navy, however, were subjected only to the<br />
authority <strong>of</strong> the emperor, not to the parliament or the cabinet. This<br />
would eventually lead to military domination <strong>of</strong> government affairs<br />
by the 1930s. The Meiji Constitution was replaced in 1947 by a new<br />
constitution primarily drafted by American Occupation authorities.<br />
See also ITO, HIROBUMI; JAPANESE CONSTITUTION; MEIJI<br />
EMPEROR; MEIJI ERA.<br />
MEIJI EMPEROR (1852–1912; REIGNED 1867–1912). Son <strong>of</strong> Emperor<br />
Komei, 15-year-old Mutsuhito ascended the throne upon his father’s<br />
death in February 1867. The following year, Satsuma- and<br />
Choshu-led forces overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate, claiming to<br />
have “restored” the emperor to his role <strong>of</strong> supreme leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
To mark this event, the era name changed to “Meiji,” meaning enlightened<br />
rule, and the emperor became known as the Meiji Emperor<br />
as well. Led primarily by government <strong>of</strong>ficials from the victorious<br />
Satsuma and Choshu domains, the long reign <strong>of</strong> Emperor Meiji became<br />
known for industrialization; modernization; wars with China,<br />
Korea, and Russia; and the beginnings <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese imperialism. Emperor<br />
Meiji did not personally rule <strong>Japan</strong>, but, by the mid-1870s, he<br />
increasingly held substantial discussions with top <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials and made decisions based on their advice. Among his<br />
lengthiest discussions with foreigners were his meetings with<br />
Ulysses S. Grant when the former American president and Civil<br />
War general visited <strong>Japan</strong> in 1879. Emperor Meiji’s son, Yoshihito,<br />
succeeded him as Emperor Taisho, and his grandson was Emperor<br />
Hirohito. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
MEIJI ERA (1868–1912). Denoted by the reign <strong>of</strong> the Meiji Emperor,<br />
this era is primarily known for industrialization, modernization, the<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> Westernization, and the beginnings <strong>of</strong> imperialism. Significant<br />
events include the Iwakura Mission to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
and Europe from 1871 to 1873; the beginnings <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration<br />
to Hawaii and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; the promulgation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Meiji Constitution in 1889; the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1894–<br />
1895; the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905; and the formal annexation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Korea in 1910. The Meiji Era was preceded by the
180 • MEIJI RESTORATION<br />
Tokugawa Era <strong>of</strong> 1600–1868, and followed by the Taisho Era <strong>of</strong><br />
1912–1926. See also MEIJI CONSTITUTION; MEIJI EMPEROR;<br />
MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
MEIJI RESTORATION. After several years <strong>of</strong> political and economic<br />
discontent, armies led by samurai from the domains <strong>of</strong> Satsuma and<br />
Choshu overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in early 1868 and<br />
forced the last Tokugawa shogun, Yoshinobu, to cede his powers to<br />
Emperor Meiji. Begun in 1600 with Ieyasu Tokugawa, two and a<br />
half centuries <strong>of</strong> Tokugawa rule in <strong>Japan</strong> came to an end with what<br />
was called the “restoration” <strong>of</strong> imperial rule. See also AIZU DO-<br />
MAIN; ANSEI TREATIES; MEIJI ERA; SAIGO, TAKAMORI.<br />
MEIROKUSHA. The “Meiji Six Society,” so named because it was<br />
founded in 1874—the sixth year <strong>of</strong> the Meiji Era—was founded by<br />
progressives Arinori Mori and Yukichi Fukuzawa to promote “civilization<br />
and enlightenment” in <strong>Japan</strong>. Meirokusha held regular<br />
meetings and published a journal that advocated such Western liberal<br />
ideas as political democracy, public education, women’s rights, and<br />
religious tolerance. Although short-lived as a formal society,<br />
Meirokusha had a lasting influence among <strong>Japan</strong>ese progressives in<br />
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See also NISHIMURA,<br />
SHIGEKI; PEOPLE’S RIGHTS MOVMENT.<br />
MISSILE DEFENSE (BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE). Missile<br />
Defense (MD) can be divided into a number <strong>of</strong> different categories:<br />
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) for defense <strong>of</strong> U.S. allies outside the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and National Missile Defense (NMD) for defense <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
After the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union, one <strong>of</strong> the major problems<br />
was proliferation <strong>of</strong> theater ballistic missiles. The Gulf War in January<br />
1991 was a watershed for MD. In this war, Iraq launched about<br />
40 missiles at Israel and 51 missiles at Saudi Arabia. This war rapidly<br />
emphasized the need for TMD to defend American military forces<br />
and U.S. allies close to the battlefield.<br />
In August 1999, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> agreed to promote<br />
joint technological research on MD. <strong>Japan</strong> is currently equipped with<br />
patriot missiles (PAC-2), but it has already decided to upgrade these
MONDALE, WALTER FREDERICK • 181<br />
to PAC-3 in order to counter Taepodong missiles from North Korea.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government developed future warning and control system<br />
radar (FPS-XX) and the Advanced Infrared Ballistic Missile Observation<br />
Sensor System (AIRBOSS) to search for ballistic missiles.<br />
Tokyo has also already decided to adopt standard missiles (SM-3),<br />
interceptor missiles operated by Aegis guided missile destroyers. The<br />
missile defense system will be deployed from 2007 in <strong>Japan</strong>. There<br />
are several concerns. First, the commander in the field has a wide<br />
range <strong>of</strong> discretionary powers to launch the missiles so that civilian<br />
control may not function properly. Second, because the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution<br />
prohibits collective security, MD could become a controversial<br />
political problem. Third, MD will require a great deal <strong>of</strong> money<br />
but at the present technology levels, chances are that these missiles<br />
may not intercept ballistic missiles. Consequently, some experts<br />
question the validity and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> MD.<br />
MITSUYA KENKYU. Mitsuya Kenkyu (Mitsuya Military Planning)<br />
was a contingency simulation scheme conducted in 1963 by top <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Joint Staff Committee. Assuming the outbreak <strong>of</strong> a second<br />
Korean war, this military planning focused on how the <strong>Japan</strong><br />
Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong> could<br />
conduct a joint response, how to implement national mobilization,<br />
and what kind <strong>of</strong> legal preparations would be necessary. This was the<br />
first contingency planning made in the postwar era.<br />
Haruo Okada, a Lower House member from the <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist<br />
Party, revealed the existence <strong>of</strong> this secret military planning at a<br />
meeting <strong>of</strong> the Lower House Budget Committee on 10 February<br />
1965. The Defense Agency submitted the necessary documents to explain<br />
the Mitsuya Military Planning to the Mitsuya Kenkyu subcommittee<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Lower House Budget Committee and the Upper House<br />
Budget Committee on 10 March 1965. Revelations about this planning<br />
provoked a strongly negative reaction among a pacifist public.<br />
After this incident, “contingency planning” became taboo in <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
See also DEFENSE.<br />
MONDALE, WALTER FREDERICK (5 JANUARY 1928– ). Walter<br />
Mondale was born in Ceylon, Minnesota. He is a lawyer by pr<strong>of</strong>ession,<br />
but served two terms as U.S. Senator from Minnesota. Then,
182 • MORI, ARINORI<br />
he served as vice president from 20 January 1977 to 20 January 1981.<br />
He ran for president against the incumbent Ronald Reagan, but was<br />
defeated.<br />
President Bill Clinton appointed Mondale as Ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
a post he held from 13 August 1993 to 15 December 1996. His incumbency<br />
was a crucial time for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> to redefine<br />
their alliance. On 12 August 1994, the Advisory Group on Defense<br />
Issues under Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued the<br />
Modality <strong>of</strong> the Security and Defense Capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>: The Outlook<br />
for the 21st Century that seemed to emphasize <strong>Japan</strong>’s wish for<br />
more independent military behavior and to regard regional multilateral<br />
security organization as more important than the bilateral alliance<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. On 27 February 1995, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (Nye<br />
Report) was announced in order to strengthen the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> bilateral<br />
alliance. On 4 September 1995, three American servicemen abducted<br />
and raped an Okinawan schoolgirl. The crime renewed tensions<br />
over the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. On 12 April 1996,<br />
Washington and Tokyo agreed on the return <strong>of</strong> the Futenma Base in<br />
Okinawa to <strong>Japan</strong>. On 17 April 1996, the two countries announced<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the<br />
21st Century. On 2 December 1996, the Security Consultative Committee<br />
approved the Special Action Committee’s recommendations<br />
on the Okinawa Final Report. These series <strong>of</strong> agreements between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> solidified the alliance. Ambassador Mondale<br />
also helped conclude numerous trade agreements and expanded educational<br />
exchanges between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
MORI, ARINORI (1847–1889). From Satsuma domain, Mori was<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the earliest <strong>Japan</strong>ese overseas students, an <strong>of</strong>ficial and<br />
diplomat <strong>of</strong> the Meiji government, and a philosopher. After studying<br />
in England with a few other young samurai from Satsuma,<br />
Mori traveled to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and lived at the Brotherhood<br />
<strong>of</strong> the New Life Christian commune in upstate New York from<br />
1867 to 1868. Soon after returning to <strong>Japan</strong>, Mori was appointed<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s first resident diplomat to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1870 when<br />
he was only 24 years old, and served until late 1873. During his<br />
posting as <strong>Japan</strong>’s chargé d’affaires in Washington, Mori helped
MURAYAMA, TOMIICHI • 183<br />
arranged the Iwakura Mission, looked after <strong>Japan</strong>ese students at<br />
American colleges, and wrote Life and Resources in America with<br />
the help <strong>of</strong> Charles Lanman. He later served as <strong>Japan</strong>’s minister<br />
to China and England, and then as minister <strong>of</strong> education from<br />
1886 to 1889. He co-founded the Meirokusha, or “Meiji Six Society,”<br />
that promoted liberalism and progressivism in the 1870s.<br />
Although Mori clearly became more conservative and nationalist<br />
by the 1880s, he was assassinated on 11 February 1889—the same<br />
day the Meiji Constitution was promulgated—by an ultra-nationalist<br />
who believed Mori did not show proper respect to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s native Shinto religion. See also CIVILIZATION AND<br />
ENLIGHTENMENT; FUKUZAWA, YUKICHI; MEIJI ERA.<br />
MORRISON INCIDENT. In 1837, the unarmed, private American<br />
ship Morrison attempted to return three <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailors<br />
turned over to Americans in Macao by the British, but was driven<br />
away when local <strong>of</strong>ficials fired on the vessel with small coastal guns.<br />
Although the captain <strong>of</strong> the American ship sent two notes in Chinese<br />
indicating his desire to return <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaways, <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
acted strictly in accord with centuries-old sakoku policies <strong>of</strong> not allowing<br />
Western ships to approach—except Dutch ships—and foreigners<br />
or <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaways were prohibited from coming ashore.<br />
These policies were strengthened by the Expulsion Edict <strong>of</strong> 1825,<br />
which directed <strong>of</strong>ficials to fire on Western ships. The Morrison returned<br />
to Macao and left the <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaways to fend for themselves.<br />
The Morrison Incident motivated some samurai-scholars to<br />
question the Tokugawa shogunate’s policies concerning relations<br />
with the West. Two scholars who publicly criticized these policies<br />
were arrested, jailed, and allegedly committed suicide.<br />
MORSE, EDWARD (1838–1925). An American biologist hired as a<br />
yatoi, or “foreign expert” by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in 1877.<br />
Morse conducted archaeological research and taught at Tokyo University<br />
until 1883. He also collected ceramics, many <strong>of</strong> which are at<br />
the Boston Museum <strong>of</strong> Fine Arts.<br />
MURAYAMA, TOMIICHI (1924– ). Tomiichi Murayama was born<br />
in Oita Prefecture. He was first elected to the House <strong>of</strong> Representa-
184 • MURRAY, DAVID<br />
tives in 1972 as a <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist Party (JSP) member and became the<br />
party chairman in 1993. Murayama served as prime minister, the second<br />
prime minister from the JSP after Tetsu Katayama in 1947, from<br />
30 June 1994 to 11 January 1996.<br />
In July 1994, as prime minister, Murayama drastically changed the<br />
JSP’s philosophy on security policies: the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense<br />
Forces (SDF) were legal and <strong>Japan</strong> would maintain the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Security Treaty. This drastic change was a turning point for the JSP.<br />
The party lost its identity and raison d’etre and it has been rapidly declining<br />
in power and influence since then. Murayama hardly demonstrated<br />
his ideas as a left-wing politician. On 15 August 1995, at the<br />
50th commemoration <strong>of</strong> the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, Prime Minister<br />
Murayama made a statement, “On the occasion <strong>of</strong> the 50th anniversary<br />
<strong>of</strong> the war’s end,” in which toward Asian countries, he said, “[I]<br />
express here once again my feelings <strong>of</strong> deep remorse and state my<br />
heartfelt apology.” This has become <strong>Japan</strong>’s starting point <strong>of</strong> its Asian<br />
diplomacy since then.<br />
MURRAY, DAVID (1830–1905). Murray was a pr<strong>of</strong>essor at Rutgers<br />
College in New Brunswick, New Jersey, in the 1860s when <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
students began arriving on campus. Taking a strong interest in these<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese students, he was hired by Arinori Mori, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
chargé d’affaires in Washington, to go to <strong>Japan</strong> and work as a special<br />
adviser to the new Education Ministry in Tokyo. Murray worked for<br />
the Education Ministry until 1879, when he returned to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. See also JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA; YATOI.<br />
MUTSU, MUNEMITSU (1844–1897). Politician and diplomat who<br />
served in several foreign affairs–related posts in the Meiji government,<br />
including as <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from<br />
1888–1890. As <strong>Japan</strong>’s foreign minister from 1892 to 1896, Mutsu<br />
was instrumental in revising the Ansei Treaties (“unequal treaties”)<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong>, the U.S., and other Western countries. See also<br />
TREATY REVISION.<br />
MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS (MSAs). The Mutual Security<br />
Agreements were signed on 8 March 1954 by Foreign Minister<br />
Katsuo Okazaki and U.S. Ambassador John M. Allison. Because <strong>of</strong>
the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Korean War and the U.S. policy <strong>of</strong> containment<br />
against the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China and the Soviet Union, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> embarked on an effort to remilitarize <strong>Japan</strong>. On 8 September<br />
1951, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> concluded the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Security Treaty, which permitted U.S. forces to be stationed on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese soil.<br />
The MSAs comprised four agreements: the Mutual Defense Assistance<br />
Agreement, the Surplus Agricultural Products Purchase Agreement,<br />
the Economic Measures Agreement, and the Investment Guarantee<br />
Agreement. The primary purpose <strong>of</strong> the MSAs was for the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to give assistance to <strong>Japan</strong> in order to strengthen <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
military power based on the Mutual Security Act enacted in the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on 8 October 1951. The Shigeru Yoshida Cabinet was<br />
interested in this program and <strong>of</strong>ficial MSA negotiations began in<br />
July 1953. Discussions continued at the Ikeda–Robertson Talks in<br />
October 1953, and the MSAs were finalized in March 1954 and<br />
promulgated on 1 May 1954. Prior to the Agreements, <strong>Japan</strong> only had<br />
ground forces, but the agreements prompted <strong>Japan</strong> to enact two important<br />
defense-related laws: the Defense Agency Act and the Self-<br />
Defense Forces Law. Because <strong>of</strong> these laws, <strong>Japan</strong> upgraded its Security<br />
Agency into the Defense Agency and turned the Police Reserve<br />
Force and Police Guard into the <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces consisting<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in July 1954.<br />
– N –<br />
NAGASAWA, KANAYE • 185<br />
NAGAI, SHIGEKO (ALSO KNOWN AS BARONESS URIU; 1861–<br />
1928). One <strong>of</strong> five <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls chosen to accompany the Iwakura<br />
Mission to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe in 1871. She later studied<br />
music at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York, from 1878 to<br />
1881. Nagai and Sutematsu Yamakawa, who also attended Vassar<br />
College, were the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese women to study at an American college.<br />
See also BACON, ALICE MABEL; JAPANESE STUDENTS<br />
IN AMERICA; TSUDA, UMEKO.<br />
NAGASAWA, KANAYE (1852–1932). A young samurai from Satsuma<br />
domain sent to England to study the West in 1865, Nagasawa
186 • NAKASONE, YASUHIRO<br />
traveled to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1867 with six other <strong>Japan</strong>ese to live<br />
at the Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the New Life Christian commune in Brocton,<br />
New York, led by the charismatic spiritualist Thomas Lake Harris.<br />
Unlike the other <strong>Japan</strong>ese who initially joined the Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the<br />
New Life, Nagasawa remained a member for the rest <strong>of</strong> his life. In<br />
1875, he moved with Harris and a handful <strong>of</strong> British and American<br />
members to Santa Rosa, California, and helped establish Fountaingrove<br />
Winery. After Harris returned to New York in the early 1890s,<br />
Nagasawa became the owner <strong>of</strong> Fountaingrove and developed it into<br />
a well-known winery, now known as Paradise Ridge Winery. See also<br />
IMMIGRATION.<br />
NAKASONE, YASUHIRO (1918– ). Yasuhiro Nakasone was born in<br />
Gunma Prefecture. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University,<br />
he served in the Home Ministry. After World War II, he became a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives in 1947. He was a vehement<br />
advocate <strong>of</strong> constitutional amendment. He served as prime minister<br />
for five years from 27 November 1982 to 6 November 1987. In the<br />
1980s, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> strongly pressured <strong>Japan</strong> to increases its defense<br />
budget and this precipitated conflicts between these two countries.<br />
Nakasone, however, succeeded in building a close personal relationship<br />
with President Ronald Reagan (the “Ron–Yasu”<br />
relationship) and recovered a relationship <strong>of</strong> mutual trust between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> by strengthening the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> security<br />
system. In January 1983, the Nakasone administration approved the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese military technology to Washington as an exception<br />
to the three principles <strong>of</strong> arms export—three specific areas to<br />
which <strong>Japan</strong> was prohibited from exporting arms—communist countries;<br />
countries under embargoes mandated by the <strong>United</strong> Nations;<br />
and countries currently, or likely to be in the near future, involved in<br />
military conflicts. Nakasone broke the barrier <strong>of</strong> one percent <strong>of</strong> GNP<br />
for the limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s defense expenditure that had been decided at<br />
the Cabinet meeting in 1976. Nakasone also made a bold statement<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> was an unsinkable aircraft carrier.<br />
NAMAMUGI INCIDENT. On 14 September 1862, samurai escorting<br />
the former daimyō <strong>of</strong> Satsuma domain attacked a group <strong>of</strong> British<br />
travelers for allegedly not bowing while the daimyō’s entourage passed.
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL • 187<br />
One British traveler was killed and two were injured. The Tokugawa<br />
shogunate apologized and paid an indemnity to the British government,<br />
but Satsuma domain refused, leading to the Kagoshima Bombardment<br />
one year later. Occurring one and a half years after the murder in<br />
Edo <strong>of</strong> American legation secretary Henry Huesken, the Namamugi Incident<br />
demonstrated that the “revere the emperor, expel the barbarian”<br />
movement was still strong. See also MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR BLOCKING REVISION OF THE<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SECURITY TREATY. The National Council for<br />
Blocking Revision <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty was established<br />
on 28 March 1959 by the <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist Party, the <strong>Japan</strong> Communist<br />
Party, the General Council <strong>of</strong> Trade Unions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, and<br />
more than 100 organizations shortly after <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
began holding high-level discussions on revising the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security<br />
Treaty. The Council, which became the main umbrella group<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese civic organizations opposed to treaty revision, conducted<br />
a nationwide petition drive and hosted mass demonstrations in<br />
opposition to the pro-revision position <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister<br />
Nobusuke Kishi. The principal argument <strong>of</strong> the Council was that<br />
treaty revision would bind <strong>Japan</strong> more strongly to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
thereby restricting <strong>Japan</strong>’s independence and obligating it to participate<br />
in military conflicts that were outside the control <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
citizens or their government. The Council voiced three policies:<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s security would be best maintained by not joining a military<br />
bloc; the <strong>Japan</strong>ese would best be served by being militarily selfdependent;<br />
and <strong>Japan</strong> should pursue a neutral-country diplomacy.<br />
The Council believed these goals could be realized without violating<br />
the tenets <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s postwar “peace constitution.”<br />
Nevertheless, despite widespread popular resistance, the Liberal<br />
Democratic Party was able to accomplish ratification <strong>of</strong> revisions to the<br />
treaty in the Lower House <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Diet. In the end, however,<br />
the powerful protest campaign waged by the Council triggered the resignation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Kishi’s cabinet. See also ARTICLE NINE.<br />
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL (NDC). In addition to the two<br />
military defense institutions <strong>Japan</strong> already had, the Defense Agency<br />
and the <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces, the National Defense Council
188 • NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE<br />
was an organization established in July 1956. It was a cabinet body<br />
that examined important issues with respect to national defense. An<br />
enforcement order <strong>of</strong> the Law on the Establishment <strong>of</strong> the Security<br />
Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> abolished the NDC in July 1986. It was different<br />
from the Defense Agency or <strong>Japan</strong> Self-Defense Forces in that the<br />
latter two bodies are military defense organizations.<br />
The NDC was responsible for the following: First, it examined<br />
items that the prime minister was required to take on advice: the basic<br />
policy for national defense; the National Defense Program Outline;<br />
a regulatory plan outline for industries related to the National<br />
Defense Program; the advisability <strong>of</strong> defensive mobilization; and<br />
other important national defense-related issues that the prime minister<br />
considered necessary. Second, when necessary, the NDC <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
its recommendations to the prime minister concerning important national<br />
defense-related issues in accordance with Article 62 <strong>of</strong> the Defense<br />
Agency Act.<br />
The NDC consisted <strong>of</strong> the prime minister as chairperson, vice<br />
prime minister, foreign minister, finance minister, Defense Agency<br />
director, and the chief <strong>of</strong> the Economic Planning Agency. When necessary,<br />
the prime minister could invite state ministers, chiefs <strong>of</strong> staff,<br />
and others concerned to the council and listen to their opinions. In<br />
1972, in order to strengthen civilian control, the cabinet council decided<br />
to add the minister <strong>of</strong> international trade and industry, the<br />
director-general <strong>of</strong> the Science and Technology Agency, the chief<br />
cabinet secretary, and the director <strong>of</strong> the National Public Safety Commission.<br />
NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE. On 25 June 1950, the Korean War<br />
broke out. In order to maintain domestic order and security, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government established the National Police Reserve (NPR) on<br />
10 August, based on a directive given by General Douglas<br />
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).<br />
The NPR took the form <strong>of</strong> a police institution, but in substance it was<br />
a lightly armed military organization. As for chain <strong>of</strong> command, the<br />
NPR was independent from the police and it was directly under the<br />
General Administrative Agency <strong>of</strong> the cabinet directed by the prime<br />
minister. The Peace Preservation Agency was established on 1 August<br />
1952 and the headquarters <strong>of</strong> the NPR became an internal bureau <strong>of</strong>
NIIJIMA, JO • 189<br />
the Peace Reservation Agency. However, except for the headquarters,<br />
the organization continued under the name <strong>of</strong> “National Police Force”<br />
until it was abolished on 15 October and the Police Reserve Force formally<br />
came into being.<br />
NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY INITIATIVE. In June 1993, President<br />
Bill Clinton announced his New Pacific Community initiative,<br />
placing U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relations at the center and promoting economic<br />
cooperation through the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />
(APEC), democracy and human rights across the region. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> had until then not made a serious commitment to the APEC,<br />
but President Clinton changed this stance and began to seriously engage<br />
with the rapidly growing East Asian economy. Following strong<br />
U.S. pressure on the APEC, the organization held a summit conference<br />
in Seattle in 1993. Making use <strong>of</strong> this initiative, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> sought to change the economic structure <strong>of</strong> each East Asian nation<br />
through “liberalization <strong>of</strong> trade, investment, and exchange rate”<br />
in order to establish firm grounds for shaping Asia in a fashion favorable<br />
to the U.S. multinational corporations. Objecting to holding<br />
this conference, Malaysia was absent from the APEC summit meeting.<br />
In the end, Clinton’s initiative was unsuccessful, but U.S. tactics<br />
toward Asia became clearer.<br />
NIIJIMA, JO (ALSO KNOWN AS JOSEPH HARDY NEESHIMA;<br />
1843–1890). From a middle-level ranking samurai family <strong>of</strong> Annaka<br />
domain (Gunma Prefecture), Niijima became interested in Western science<br />
and Christianity after seeing Western ships in Edo Bay and reading<br />
translations <strong>of</strong> Western books. Among the first Western books he<br />
read were Robinson Crusoe, <strong>Historical</strong> Geography <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
and the New Testament <strong>of</strong> the Christian Bible. Desiring to learn more<br />
about Western science and Christianity, he secretly left <strong>Japan</strong> in 1864 by<br />
stowing away on a foreign ship, and arrived in Boston several months<br />
later. The wealthy Alphaeus Hardy and his family were impressed with<br />
young Niijima’s determination and became his benefactors for the several<br />
years he remained in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Niijima went to Amherst<br />
College in Massachusetts, where he studied Latin, Greek, geography,<br />
and botany, though Christianity was his primary interest. Graduating<br />
from Amherst College in 1870, Niijima and Taro Kusakabe, who
190 • NISHIMURA, SHIGEKI<br />
simultaneously graduated from Rutgers College, were the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
graduates <strong>of</strong> American universities. Niijima then attended Andover<br />
Theological Seminary in Massachusetts, worked as an interpreter for<br />
the Iwakura Mission, and became an ordained minister in the Congregational<br />
Church before returning to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1874. The following year,<br />
Niijima established Doshisha University in Kyoto. Doshisha, a Christian<br />
college, struggled to survive in its early years. But by the time <strong>of</strong><br />
Niijima’s death in 1890, the college had become a significant institution<br />
<strong>of</strong> higher learning—as it is to the present day. In addition to establishing<br />
Doshisha College, Niijima worked tirelessly as minister and missionary<br />
and is the most well-known <strong>Japan</strong>ese Christian <strong>of</strong> the 19th<br />
century. See also JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA; JANES,<br />
LEROY LANSING; UCHIMURA, KANZO.<br />
NISHIMURA, SHIGEKI (1828–1902). Educator and philosopher.<br />
Shigeki Nishimura studied Confucianism and Western learning under<br />
Shozan Sakuma whose philosophy <strong>of</strong> “Eastern ethics, Western<br />
science” shaped many policies <strong>of</strong> the Meiji Era. Nishimura was<br />
founding member <strong>of</strong> Meirokusha, the literary and philosophy society<br />
that promoted Western culture among the <strong>Japan</strong>ese elite. Nishimura<br />
worked for the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Education from 1873 to 1886, <strong>of</strong>ten presented<br />
lectures to Emperor Meiji, and was tutor to the crown prince<br />
(later Emperor Taisho) for several years.<br />
NITOBE, INAZO (1862–1933). Philosopher, educator, government<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial, and Christian. Inazo Nitobe graduated from Sapporo Agricultural<br />
College founded by Christian educator William Smith<br />
Clark, and subsequently studied in Germany and at John Hopkins<br />
University in Maryland. He met and married Mary Patterson Elkington<br />
while at John Hopkins University, and became a Quaker. After returning<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>, Nitobe held several government and educational positions,<br />
including president <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> Women’s University, and later<br />
became a member <strong>of</strong> the House <strong>of</strong> Peers. Concerned especially with<br />
international affairs, Nitobe served as a top <strong>of</strong>ficial in the League <strong>of</strong><br />
Nations Secretariat from 1920 to 1926. Widely known in <strong>Japan</strong> as an<br />
educator, government <strong>of</strong>ficial, and Christian liberal, Nitobe is best<br />
known in the West as the author <strong>of</strong> Bushido—The Soul <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. See<br />
also CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN.
NOMURA–GREW CONVERSATIONS • 191<br />
NIXON SHOCK. The Nixon shock is the fact that on 15 August 1971,<br />
President Richard Nixon announced cessation <strong>of</strong> conversion <strong>of</strong> dollars<br />
to gold. This was a major change in the framework <strong>of</strong> international<br />
finance.<br />
Since the late 1960s, because <strong>of</strong> skyrocketing war expenses for the<br />
Vietnam War and <strong>of</strong> the implementation <strong>of</strong> the “Great Society,” the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> suffered from economic overheating: a fiscal deficit,<br />
acceleration <strong>of</strong> inflation, and an expansion <strong>of</strong> the trade deficit. President<br />
Nixon needed more and more fiscal expenditure in order to continue<br />
the Vietnam War and maintain domestic employment. In order<br />
to overcome these difficulties, he abandoned the fixed exchange rate<br />
regime and shifted to a floating exchange rate regime.<br />
In order to adjust exchange rate, in December 1971, a financial<br />
ministerial meeting was held at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington,<br />
D.C. The exchange rate from yen to dollars was highly appreciated<br />
from 360 yen to 308 yen to the dollar, an appreciation <strong>of</strong><br />
16.88 percent. Combined with the Oil Shock in 1973, that is, the Organization<br />
<strong>of</strong> Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) unilaterally<br />
raising crude oil prices and the shock this policy gave to the international<br />
economy, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy experienced “the worst economic<br />
depression in postwar history” and recorded negative growth<br />
for the first time since the war.<br />
NOMURA–GREW CONVERSATIONS. The administration <strong>of</strong> President<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1939 announced its intention to<br />
abrogate the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation. A<br />
blunt response to <strong>Japan</strong>’s widening <strong>of</strong> its sphere <strong>of</strong> military activities<br />
in the China Incident, it meant that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would be in a<br />
position from January 1940 to impose trade sanctions on <strong>Japan</strong>. Aware<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s dependence on trade with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign<br />
Minister Kichisaburō Nomura in November–December 1939<br />
entered conversations with American Ambassador Joseph Grew with<br />
an eye to laying the foundations for a new treaty <strong>of</strong> commerce.<br />
Having assumed the foreign minister’s post at the behest <strong>of</strong> Prime<br />
Minister Nobuyuki Abe in September 1939—at virtually the same<br />
time that World War II began in Europe—Nomura warned his cabinet<br />
colleagues <strong>of</strong> the necessity <strong>of</strong> conciliating the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. To<br />
this end, he sought their commitment to a policy <strong>of</strong> respecting China’s
192 • NOMURA, KICHISABURO –<br />
territorial integrity, and allowing equality <strong>of</strong> commercial opportunity<br />
in that nation. In other words, he argued for an explicit <strong>Japan</strong>ese commitment<br />
to the American principle <strong>of</strong> the Open Door. Backed by cabinet<br />
unanimity on this score, Nomura entered conversations with<br />
Grew in early November. By December, Nomura proposed that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would compensate the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for damages it had inflicted on<br />
American interests in China. He also promised to honor and respect<br />
American interests in China, and, as a show <strong>of</strong> good faith, he <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
to partially open the Yangtze River to foreign ships. In return, he<br />
sought a new treaty <strong>of</strong> commerce from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Through<br />
Grew, Washington responded coolly to Nomura’s overtures. This, in<br />
turn, convinced those in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government who opposed Nomura’s<br />
diplomatic stance <strong>of</strong> the futility <strong>of</strong> seeking a rapprochement<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and the Abe cabinet collapsed in January 1940.<br />
Within days, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> formally abrogated the two nations’<br />
treaty <strong>of</strong> commerce. See also PACIFIC WAR.<br />
NOMURA, KICHISABURŌ (1877–1964). Kichisaburō Nomura was<br />
an admiral <strong>of</strong> the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy who sought throughout his<br />
career to establish cordial relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. The third son <strong>of</strong> a former samurai family in Wakayama prefecture,<br />
he graduated second in his class from the Naval Academy at<br />
Etajima in 1899. His first extended contact with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
came in World War I, when he served as naval attaché to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Embassy in Washington from 1914 to 1918. He returned to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as Admiral Tomosaburō Katō’s chief aide de camp at<br />
the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. In the face <strong>of</strong> violent opposition<br />
from within naval ranks, Nomura <strong>of</strong>fered Katô his unequivocal<br />
support for the latter accepting Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Charles Evan<br />
Hughes’s proposal for the reduction <strong>of</strong> capital ship strength according<br />
to the ratio <strong>of</strong> 10:10:6 for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Over the ensuing years, Nomura emerged as a leading figure<br />
among those who supported the naval limitation treaties. After retiring<br />
from active service in 1937, he served as foreign minister (September<br />
1939–January 1940) in the short-lived cabinet <strong>of</strong> General<br />
Nobuyuki Abe, and reemerged in the postwar era as the “father” <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces.<br />
Nomura inevitably will be remembered best as <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> at the time <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor. Although historians
NUCLEAR ENERGY • 193<br />
traditionally have not looked favorably upon his efforts to avert war<br />
between the two nations throughout the <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1941, more recently a revisionist literature has emerged that<br />
portrays Nomura as a positive activist for peace. In any case, Nomura<br />
was handicapped throughout his ambassadorial posting by, first,<br />
Tokyo’s increasingly obstreperous determination to go it alone in the<br />
Far East, and second, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>’ ever-increasing resolve to resist<br />
that development. See also PACIFIC WAR.<br />
NUCLEAR ENERGY. On 28 April 1952, the San Francisco Peace<br />
Treaty came into effect. In the following month, the Liberal Party led<br />
by Shigeru Yoshida unveiled a plan to establish the Science and Technology<br />
Agency to carry out research and development into high-tech<br />
weapons and nuclear energy. In March 1954, the Diet approved<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s first nuclear budget (250 million yen), opening the door for<br />
nuclear development in <strong>Japan</strong>. The Lucky Dragon (Daigo Fukuryumaru)<br />
Incident had already occurred on 1 March 1954, but the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese people were not aware <strong>of</strong> it before the nuclear budget was<br />
passed. Nevertheless, because <strong>of</strong> this incident, <strong>Japan</strong> took more cautious<br />
nuclear energy policies. In December 1955, the Atomic Energy<br />
Basic Law was enacted, including the three principles <strong>of</strong> peaceful<br />
utilization <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy. Based on this law, the Science and<br />
Technology Agency was established in April 1956.<br />
On 7 May, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi stated in the Upper<br />
House that within the right <strong>of</strong> self-defense, it would be possible to<br />
have nuclear weapons. On 2 March 1959, in the Upper House Budget<br />
Committee, he also indicated that, in his judgment, it is constitutional<br />
to have small nuclear weapons for defense. In 1960, the<br />
Nobusuke Kishi Cabinet established an <strong>of</strong>ficial policy that possessing<br />
nuclear weapons is constitutional.<br />
On 11 December 1967, the Lower House Budget Committee,<br />
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato presented the three non-nuclear principles<br />
<strong>of</strong> not producing, not possessing, and not allowing the entry <strong>of</strong><br />
nuclear weapons into the country. In his administrative policy speech<br />
in January 1968, Prime Minister Sato confirmed these three nonnuclear<br />
principles.<br />
In order to make <strong>Japan</strong> less dependent on energy imports, the government<br />
promoted research and development <strong>of</strong> nuclear energy. However,<br />
in December 1995, Monju, <strong>Japan</strong>’s only fast breeder reactor,
194 • “NYE REPORT”<br />
suffered a serious accident and had to be shut down. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
has tried to provide nuclear energy and safety simultaneously<br />
in the face <strong>of</strong> strong anti-nuclear movements and sentiments among the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese people. See also ATOMIC ENERGY BASIC LAW; ATOMIC<br />
INDUSTRIAL FORUM; BILATERAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGREE-<br />
MENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES; JAPAN<br />
ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM; JAPAN–U.S. AGREEMENT ON<br />
COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN EN-<br />
ERGY; JAPAN–U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT;<br />
LUCKY DRAGON INCIDENT.<br />
“NYE REPORT” (UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY<br />
FOR THE EAST ASIA–PACIFIC REGION). This was a report<br />
prepared by the Office <strong>of</strong> International Security Affairs <strong>of</strong> the Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Defense in February 1995. After the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War, the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance seemed to be in limbo. The “Higuchi Report”<br />
prepared by an advisory group directly under the prime minister and<br />
submitted in August 1994 seemed to confirm that <strong>Japan</strong> was beginning<br />
to lose respect for the primary importance <strong>of</strong> the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance.<br />
This situation urged the Defense Department to redefine or reconfirm<br />
the importance <strong>of</strong> the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance. The “Nye Report”<br />
is a product <strong>of</strong> this redefinition. According to the report, “Security is<br />
like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it. The<br />
American security presence has helped provide this ‘oxygen’ for East<br />
Asian development.” This is the justification for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> “to<br />
maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level<br />
<strong>of</strong> about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future.” Washington tried<br />
to stop <strong>Japan</strong>’s tendency to move away from the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> alliance<br />
by affirming the critical importance <strong>of</strong> their bilateral relationship.<br />
“There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we<br />
have with <strong>Japan</strong> . . . . Our security alliance with <strong>Japan</strong> is the linchpin<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> security policy in Asia.”<br />
– O –<br />
OGASAWARA ISLANDS (ALSO KNOWN AS BONIN ISLANDS).<br />
Four groups <strong>of</strong> islands in the Pacific Ocean 600 miles south <strong>of</strong> Tokyo.
OKAKURA, TENSHIN • 195<br />
These islands include Chijijima, Hahajima, and Iwojima. Shipwrecked<br />
sailors from <strong>Japan</strong>, such as Manjiro Nakahama, have landed on the<br />
Ogasawara Islands since the 1600s, but the first permanent residents<br />
were Americans and Europeans who settled on Chijijima in 1830.<br />
Commodore Matthew Perry and his ships briefly stopped at Chijijima<br />
before sailing to Edo in July 1853. The islands came under formal control<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in 1876, and were an area <strong>of</strong> heavy<br />
fighting between <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American military forces during World<br />
War II, especially the Battle <strong>of</strong> Iwojima. After World War II, the Ogasawara<br />
Islands were administratively controlled by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
military until returned to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in 1968. See also<br />
PACIFIC WAR.<br />
OIL SHOCK. The oil shock (or oil crisis) was a worldwide economic<br />
depression because <strong>of</strong> shortages <strong>of</strong> oil and a rapid rise in the oil price<br />
in 1973–1974. Because <strong>Japan</strong> depended heavily on imported oil especially<br />
from the Middle East, it suffered from a severe economic crisis.<br />
The oil crisis was a turning point in postwar <strong>Japan</strong>ese rapid high<br />
economic growth. When the fourth Middle East war broke out in October<br />
1973, the Organization <strong>of</strong> Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries<br />
(OAPEC) and the Organization <strong>of</strong> Pacific Economic Cooperation<br />
(OPEC) resorted to reducing crude oil production, to restricting exports<br />
<strong>of</strong> oil to pro-Israeli nations, including the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, and to<br />
quadruple oil prices. Following pro-Israeli U.S. policy, Tokyo had<br />
been very close to Jerusalem. The oil shock demonstrated the decline<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S. hegemony and pushed <strong>Japan</strong> to adopt more flexible foreign<br />
policies and to majorly revise its Middle East policy in particular. In<br />
November 1973, the Kakuei Tanaka administration decided to recognize<br />
the rights <strong>of</strong> the Palestinian people and it promised to review its<br />
policies toward Israel. Moreover, OPEC’s continuous increase <strong>of</strong> the<br />
crude oil price and disruption <strong>of</strong> crude oil exports because <strong>of</strong> the Iranian<br />
Revolution in 1979 precipitated the second oil shock (oil crisis).<br />
OKAKURA, TENSHIN (ALSO KNOWN AS KAKUZO OKAKURA;<br />
1862–1913). Influenced by American pr<strong>of</strong>essor Ernest Fenellosa at<br />
Tokyo University, Okakura studied and promoted <strong>Japan</strong>ese art and<br />
culture. Okakura established two art academies, promoted <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
art and culture to the West through writings, such as The Book <strong>of</strong> Tea,
196 • OKAWARA, YOSHIO<br />
and worked for several years as the curator <strong>of</strong> Oriental Art at the<br />
Boston Museum <strong>of</strong> Art.<br />
OKAWARA, YOSHIO (1919– ). In 1942, Yoshio Okawara graduated<br />
from Faculty <strong>of</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> Tokyo University and entered the Ministry <strong>of</strong><br />
Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. After holding a series <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial posts, he<br />
served as ambassador to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1980 to 1985. He was<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the few ambassadors to the U.S. who had not previously<br />
served as deputy minister for foreign affairs. In the 1980s, <strong>Japan</strong><br />
faced serious trade conflicts with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Ambassador<br />
Okawara carried out skillful negotiations with his counterpart in the<br />
U.S. and actively dealt with U.S. congressmen in order to establish a<br />
better U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> relationship.<br />
OKINAWA. The largest island in the Ryuku Island archipelago. Okinawa<br />
and the rest <strong>of</strong> the Ryukyu Islands were a nominally independent<br />
kingdom, partly controlled by Satsuma domain since the early<br />
1600s, and were formally annexed as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese territory in<br />
1879 and named Okinawa Prefecture. Commodore Matthew Perry<br />
stopped at Okinawa during his 1854 voyage to <strong>Japan</strong>, and former<br />
American President Ulysses S. Grant mediated a dispute over Okinawa<br />
between <strong>Japan</strong> and China in 1879 and decided in <strong>Japan</strong>’s favor.<br />
Okinawan culture and people have been influenced throughout history<br />
by China, Korea, the South Pacific, <strong>Japan</strong>, and since 1945 by the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military.<br />
From early April to late June 1945, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
military forces fought the devastating Battle <strong>of</strong> Okinawa. The<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> military was formally in charge <strong>of</strong> Okinawa from the<br />
fall <strong>of</strong> 1945 until 1972, and still maintains substantial bases and numbers<br />
<strong>of</strong> personnel on the islands. See also PACIFIC WAR.<br />
OKINAWA, RESTITUTION OF. U.S. forces began to land on mainland<br />
Okinawa in April 1945. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> fought<br />
horrific battles, but in the end, the organized resistance by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
forces ended in late June. As soon as the U.S. forces occupied<br />
Okinawa, America declared the enforcement <strong>of</strong> military governance.<br />
On 15 December 1950, the U.S. forces abolished U.S. military<br />
government and established the U.S. Civil Administration <strong>of</strong> the
OKUMA, SHIGENOBU • 197<br />
Ryukyu Islands in order to acquire residents’ cooperation for enduring<br />
governance.<br />
The San Francisco Peace Treaty formally terminated the occupation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> by the Allied Powers; however, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was<br />
allowed to use U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The region being declared<br />
to be outside the application <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty,<br />
1952. Washington approved Tokyo’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa,<br />
but Okinawa had different legal status from that <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. Consequently,<br />
people both in Okinawa and on mainland <strong>Japan</strong> promoted<br />
movements for the restitution <strong>of</strong> Okinawa back to <strong>Japan</strong>. Civilians in<br />
both Departments <strong>of</strong> State and Defense agreed that in order for the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to maintain military bases in Okinawa, it was necessary<br />
to return the administrative rights over Okinawa back to <strong>Japan</strong>. Finally,<br />
at the summit in November 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato<br />
and President Richard M. Nixon agreed the restitution <strong>of</strong> Okinawa to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese administration. On 17 June 1971, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> signed the Okinawa Restitution Agreement. According to the<br />
agreement, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> continued to retain its military bases in<br />
Okinawa, but those bases were to be nuclear-free. The U.S. military<br />
still controlled about 19 percent <strong>of</strong> Okinawa. On 15 May 1972, Okinawa<br />
was formally returned to <strong>Japan</strong>ese sovereignty.<br />
OKUBO, TOSHIMICHI (1830–1878). A samurai from Satsuma domain,<br />
Okubo helped lead Satsuma and Choshu forces against the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate. Okubo was a major <strong>of</strong>ficial in the early Meiji<br />
government, and took part in the Iwakura Mission to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and Europe from 1871 to 1873. He was assassinated in 1878<br />
by former samurai from Satsuma after he helped put down a rebellion<br />
against the Meiji government in his native domain. See also MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.<br />
OKUMA, SHIGENOBU (1838–1922). From Saga domain near Nagasaki,<br />
Okuma studied Dutch and Western learning, and then participated<br />
in the anti-Tokugawa shogunate movement in the 1860s. A<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the Iwakura Mission to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Europe,<br />
Okuma later served in a number <strong>of</strong> government positions until his<br />
death, including as foreign minister and prime minister. Okuma also<br />
founded Waseda University in 1888, which remains one <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>’s
198 • OPEN DOOR<br />
most respected private universities. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.<br />
OPEN DOOR. The Open Door informed American policies vis-à-vis<br />
China and <strong>Japan</strong> throughout much <strong>of</strong> the first half <strong>of</strong> the 20th century.<br />
As originally envisaged, the Open Door rested on two main principles:<br />
China’s territorial integrity should be preserved; and all nationals<br />
should receive equality <strong>of</strong> treatment in their economic pursuits in<br />
China. For many years, the Open Door remained little more than a<br />
principle, with no indication that Washington was prepared to use<br />
force in its defense.<br />
The concept <strong>of</strong> the Open Door grew out <strong>of</strong> 19th-century imperial<br />
rivalries that threatened to carve China into colonies and exclusive<br />
spheres <strong>of</strong> interest. It was formalized by Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John<br />
Hay’s Open Door notes <strong>of</strong> 1899 and 1900, and resurfaced intermittently<br />
over the ensuing years, usually in response to <strong>Japan</strong>ese efforts<br />
to shut the door on American business interests in northeastern<br />
China. Then, at the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong> signed a treaty in which they explicitly<br />
undertook to respect China’s sovereignty as well as the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> “equal opportunity for the commerce and industry <strong>of</strong> all nations<br />
throughout the territory <strong>of</strong> China.” In other words, the Open<br />
Door had become a treaty commitment.<br />
Through the 1930s, the Open Door continued to provide American<br />
policymakers with a point <strong>of</strong> reference in their efforts to devise a response<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>ese aggressions in China. Then, in April 1941, Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Cordell Hull informed ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura<br />
that diplomatic rapprochement between their two nations would<br />
have to conform to several principles, included among which were respect<br />
for all nations’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, and support<br />
<strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong> commercial opportunity. In other words,<br />
the principle <strong>of</strong> the Open Door had shifted away from its exclusive<br />
emphasis on China, and instead had become the benchmark <strong>of</strong> American<br />
policies toward all nations. Washington did not shift from this<br />
commitment to the Open Door throughout 1941, and <strong>Japan</strong> was<br />
equally stubborn in its refusal to acquiesce in the principle.<br />
In this sense, the Pacific War was fought over two conflicting visions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the future <strong>of</strong> East Asia. On the one hand, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>
ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT • 199<br />
fought for a single world order in which goods and trade would flow<br />
freely between nations. Such was necessary, in the minds <strong>of</strong> American<br />
policymakers, in order to ensure against a revisit <strong>of</strong> the economic<br />
disasters <strong>of</strong> the late 1920s and early 1930s. On the other hand, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government was fighting for the creation <strong>of</strong> an autarchic<br />
economic sphere that covered the greater part <strong>of</strong> East Asia.<br />
Neither side got what it wanted. When, in August 1945, <strong>Japan</strong> surrendered<br />
unconditionally to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and its allies, its dreams<br />
<strong>of</strong> economic autarchy lay in ruins. The American vision <strong>of</strong> the Open<br />
Door fared little better. Not only did the Soviet Union show scant regard<br />
for its wartime ally’s policy prescriptions, but China—the very nation<br />
upon which the Open Door policy had been founded—plunged headlong<br />
into a civil war that, by late 1949, saw it shift into the Soviet orbit.<br />
OPIUM WAR (1839–1841). The war fought between Britain and<br />
China over the issue <strong>of</strong> trade in opium. The Chinese imperial authorities<br />
tried to halt British trade in opium in China, but Britain argued<br />
this was a restriction <strong>of</strong> trade. British gunboats and troops defeated<br />
the outdated Chinese military forces, and the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Nanjing<br />
(1842) was negotiated in Britain’s favor. A second opium war, sometimes<br />
called the Arrow War, was fought in 1857–1858. As a result <strong>of</strong><br />
the Opium War between Britain and China, foresighted observers in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, such as Shozan Sakuma, began pushing the Tokugawa<br />
shogunate to utilize Western science and technology to build up its<br />
military forces, or <strong>Japan</strong> would wind up losing a war and losing its<br />
independence to the West. See also EASTERN ETHICS, WESTERN<br />
SCIENCE.<br />
ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT. The Orderly Marketing<br />
Agreement was concluded between the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments<br />
in May 1977 for the purpose <strong>of</strong> regulating trade between the two<br />
countries. In the 1970s, a <strong>Japan</strong>ese export thrust precipitated trade friction<br />
in various parts <strong>of</strong> the world. This, in turn, caused an appreciation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the yen. In particular, there occurred severe friction in the automobile<br />
and electronics industries because <strong>of</strong> the competitiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
exports. This friction led to a series <strong>of</strong> negotiations between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> and finally the Orderly Marketing Agreement<br />
was concluded. This agreement strictly stipulated the market share that
200 • ORIENTAL EXCLUSION ACT<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese exporting corporations could acquire in the U.S. market.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> accepted the use <strong>of</strong> U.S. corporations for building urban infrastructure,<br />
sewage systems, and highways in <strong>Japan</strong>. See also<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
ORIENTAL EXCLUSION ACT (1924). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress<br />
in May 1924 debated a prohibitive immigration law aimed squarely<br />
at <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens. Passed in July 1924, it was dubbed the Oriental<br />
Exclusion Act, and remained a sore point in <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. relations up<br />
until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The law provided for immigration<br />
based on national quotas: the number <strong>of</strong> immigrants to be admitted<br />
annually was limited to 2 percent <strong>of</strong> the foreign-born individuals <strong>of</strong><br />
each nationality living in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1890. On the grounds<br />
that Asian nationals were ineligible for citizenship, the law entirely<br />
prohibited Asian immigration. Because Congress had previously prohibited<br />
all non–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Asian immigration, the new law left little<br />
doubt as to which nationality was being targeted. Unsurprisingly, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government protested the new law, with <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador<br />
to Washington Hanihara Masanao expressing his fear that the exclusion<br />
act could have “grave consequences” for <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American<br />
relations.<br />
What then were the consequences <strong>of</strong> the law for <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American<br />
relations? Certainly it was out <strong>of</strong> step with the cooperative and friendly<br />
spirit established at the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. Recognizing<br />
this, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Charles Evan Hughes worried about<br />
“what the reaping will be after the sowing <strong>of</strong> this seed.” His fears were<br />
well founded. Foreign Minister Kijūrō Shidehara, who predicated his<br />
diplomacy on the spirit <strong>of</strong> the Washington Conference, found himself<br />
later in the decade under sustained attack for his “weak-kneed diplomacy.”<br />
Although the Oriental Exclusion Act was not the sole reason for<br />
these attacks, it did have a decisive effect in turning <strong>Japan</strong>ese public<br />
opinion against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. This augured poorly for those <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
diplomats and statesmen who sought to overcome—or ignore—<br />
the animosity engendered by the racism <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Congress.<br />
As one perceptive commentator has noted, the law left a permanent<br />
scar on <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations. See also IMMIGRATION; IN-<br />
TERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS DURING WORLD<br />
WAR II.
– P –<br />
PACIFIC WAR. See WORLD WAR II.<br />
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE • 201<br />
PANAY INCIDENT (1937). On 12 December 1937, <strong>Japan</strong>ese warplanes<br />
attacked the American gunboat Panay and three Standard Oil<br />
Company tankers on the Yangtze River and strafed survivors in the<br />
water. For obvious reasons, the Panay Incident had the potential to<br />
exacerbate existing <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American tensions. Yet the most notable<br />
feature <strong>of</strong> the Panay Incident was the conciliatory approach that<br />
both Washington and Tokyo adopted in its aftermath.<br />
Some months earlier, in July 1937, <strong>Japan</strong> had plunged into a<br />
frankly aggressive war in China. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt<br />
responded in October by publicly indicating his belief that “international<br />
gangsters” should be segregated in much the same way as<br />
society quarantines the carriers <strong>of</strong> dangerous and communicable diseases.<br />
Certainly, the Panay Incident—which neatly coincided with<br />
the much-publicized Rape <strong>of</strong> Nanjing—would have seemed to confirm<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s place amongst the “international gangsters.” Nonetheless,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government refused to take any action that<br />
might accord with Roosevelt’s statement. Washington summarily refused<br />
a British proposal—HMS Ladybird was attacked the same day<br />
as the Panay—to impose economic sanctions, instead contenting itself<br />
with stern demands for an apology and reparations.<br />
Doubtlessly, the actions <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in the aftermath<br />
<strong>of</strong> the incident played a role in convincing Washington against<br />
more forceful countermeasures. A <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy warship almost immediately<br />
sailed from Nanjing to help in the rescue <strong>of</strong> survivors from<br />
the American vessels. In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota told<br />
Ambassador Joseph Grew <strong>of</strong> his dismay and regret at the incident.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to Washington, Hiroshi Saitō, admitted to the<br />
American public that <strong>Japan</strong> was entirely in the wrong and <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
apologies.<br />
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. In the aftermath <strong>of</strong> World War I, the<br />
victorious allies held the Paris Peace Conference from January to<br />
June 1919 to decide the terms <strong>of</strong> peace to be accorded Germany. This
202 • PEACE IN VIETNAM! CITIZENS’ COALITION<br />
gave rise to several thorny issues in the Far East, most <strong>of</strong> which centered<br />
on the former German rights and concessions in the Chinese<br />
province <strong>of</strong> Shantung.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was included along with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain,<br />
France, and Italy as one <strong>of</strong> the five great powers <strong>of</strong> the conference.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation, led by Prince Saionji Kimmochi, saw its<br />
most important task as retaining all German rights and concessions in<br />
Shantung (in 1914, <strong>Japan</strong> seized the German leasehold). The Chinese<br />
delegation sought the province’s restoration to China. It found a sympathetic<br />
supporter in President Woodrow Wilson, who led the American<br />
delegation to the conference. <strong>Japan</strong>, however, was bargaining<br />
from a position <strong>of</strong> strength. During the war, it had reached secret<br />
agreements with Britain, France, and Russia, which supported its territorial<br />
claims. The Chinese, too, had committed themselves to supporting<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s territorial claims. In the event that these claims were<br />
not met, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates threatened to walk out <strong>of</strong> the conference<br />
and to boycott the League <strong>of</strong> Nations, whose establishment Wilson<br />
believed to be the most important task <strong>of</strong> the conference.<br />
Wilson backed down and consented to a clause in the Versailles<br />
peace treaty, which transferred the former German holdings to <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
For its part, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation <strong>of</strong>fered reassurances that political<br />
control <strong>of</strong> Shantung would be returned to China in due course (irreconcilable,<br />
China refused to sign the treaty). The treaty also handed<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> the Pacific islands formerly held by Germany, the Marianas,<br />
Carolines, and Marshalls, under a League <strong>of</strong> Nations mandate.<br />
Nonetheless, <strong>Japan</strong> walked away from the conference with a bad<br />
taste in its mouth: its fellow great powers had refused to insert a<br />
racial equality clause in the League <strong>of</strong> Nations charter. Across the Pacific,<br />
Wilson met with implacable congressional opposition to his<br />
peacemaking efforts. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> never joined the League <strong>of</strong><br />
Nations and signed a separate peace with Germany in 1921. See also<br />
DULLES, JOHN FOSTER.<br />
PEACE IN VIETNAM! CITIZENS’ COALITION. The Peace in Vietnam!<br />
Citizens’ Coalition was a civic movement in <strong>Japan</strong> that started in<br />
1965 to protest U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. The founding<br />
leaders <strong>of</strong> the movement were Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Michitoshi Takabatake <strong>of</strong> Surugadai<br />
University, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Shunsuke Tsurumi <strong>of</strong> Doshisha Univer-
PEACE KEEPING OPERATION (PKO) COOPERATION LAW • 203<br />
sity and Makoto Oda, a popular left-wing novelist. When U.S. bombing<br />
<strong>of</strong> North Vietnam began in February 1965, these three individuals decided<br />
in April 1965 to organize Peace to Vietnam!, a coalition <strong>of</strong> citizen<br />
cultural groups, with Makoto Oda serving as lead representative.<br />
On 16 October 1966, the coalition changed its name to the Peace<br />
to Vietnam! Citizens’ Coalition and began efforts to organize a larger<br />
movement throughout all <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. This coalition developed a variety<br />
<strong>of</strong> unique citizen protest actions, such as sponsoring monthly<br />
demonstrations, hosting 24-hour teach-ins (in August 1965), publishing<br />
an anti–Vietnam war advertisement in the New York Times (16<br />
November 1965), holding a <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. citizens’ conference to examine<br />
American involvement in Vietnam (August 1966), providing<br />
assistance to U.S. soldiers who did not wish to serve in Vietnam (beginning<br />
in November 1968), establishing anti-war organizations that<br />
operated underground on U.S. military bases in <strong>Japan</strong>, and publishing<br />
Weekly AMPO (from November 1969 through June 1970).<br />
The coalition defined itself as “not an organization but as a movement,”<br />
insisting on the importance <strong>of</strong> “coalition through action.” The<br />
coalition gradually increased its organizational ties with leftist <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
university and high school students. Working together, a largescale<br />
anti-war demonstration <strong>of</strong> 70,000 people was organized in June<br />
1969, which startled the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government and helped to energize<br />
progressive political forces throughout <strong>Japan</strong>. The signing <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Treaty <strong>of</strong> Paris in 1973 between the U.S. and Vietnam led to the complete<br />
evacuation <strong>of</strong> U.S. military forces from Vietnam. On 26 January<br />
1974, the Peace to Vietnam! Citizens’ Coalition was dissolved.<br />
PEACE KEEPING OPERATION (PKO) COOPERATION LAW.<br />
The formal name <strong>of</strong> this law is “A Law Concerning Cooperation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>United</strong> Nations’ Peace Keeping Operation and Other Activities.” It<br />
was enacted in June 1992, stipulating that <strong>Japan</strong>ese Self-Defense<br />
Forces may participate in UN-led peacekeeping operations as long as<br />
the PKO five principles <strong>of</strong> participation are met: a cease-fire agreement<br />
between the warring parties, agreement to the presence <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese forces by the country to which they will be dispatched, adherence<br />
to neutrality in any operations undertaken, discontinuance <strong>of</strong><br />
activities and retreat <strong>of</strong> work force and military units, and necessary<br />
minimum use <strong>of</strong> small arms to protect the lives <strong>of</strong> the workforce.
204 • PEARL HARBOR<br />
This law was amended in June 1998. The old law allowed each<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the Self-Defense Forces to make a judgment concerning<br />
the use <strong>of</strong> firearms, but the amended law stipulates that each member<br />
can use firearms on the orders <strong>of</strong> a superior <strong>of</strong>ficer. The law was<br />
amended again in December 2001, going hand-in-hand with the enactment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the special anti-terrorism legislation (October 2001) to<br />
support the U.S. military attack against Afghanistan in response to a<br />
series <strong>of</strong> terrorist attacks against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on 11 September<br />
2001. The amended law allowed the Self-Defense Forces to participate<br />
in the Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) operations and eased the<br />
standard <strong>of</strong> use <strong>of</strong> firearms by the members <strong>of</strong> Self-Defense Forces.<br />
Despite such major amendments, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government did not<br />
abandon the observation <strong>of</strong> the five conditions that were placed on<br />
SDF involvement in peacekeeping activities. Consequently, it is practically<br />
impossible for the Self-Defense Forces to directly participate<br />
in the PKF operations.<br />
PEARL HARBOR. On 7 December 1941, some 400 <strong>Japan</strong>ese carrierbased<br />
torpedo bombers launched an attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet<br />
at Pearl Harbor. They sank five <strong>of</strong> the fleet’s six best battleships,<br />
damaged numerous lesser vessels, and destroyed more than threequarters<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fleet’s 230 planes. Nearly 2,330 American military<br />
personnel were killed. American naval power in the Pacific was crippled.<br />
Seen from a purely tactical viewpoint, the attack on Pearl Harbor<br />
was a resounding success.<br />
The attack on Pearl Harbor was accompanied by attacks on Western<br />
positions throughout the Far East. Within days <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor,<br />
two British battleships—the Prince <strong>of</strong> Wales and the Repulse—had<br />
been sunk. Within weeks, Hong Kong had fallen to <strong>Japan</strong>ese invaders.<br />
Soon thereafter, Malaya and then Singapore were in <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
hands. Resistance to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese in the Dutch East Indies, Burma,<br />
and Ceylon collapsed in early 1942. The Philippines fell to <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
troops within six months <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor.<br />
The state <strong>of</strong> panic that gripped the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the immediate<br />
aftermath <strong>of</strong> Pearl Harbor was soon replaced by a grim determination<br />
to roll back the marauding <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces. This determination was<br />
fed in large part by the perception that <strong>Japan</strong> had not only violated international<br />
law but also basic tenets <strong>of</strong> decency in launching the at-
PERRY, COMMODORE MATTHEW C. • 205<br />
tack without first issuing a declaration <strong>of</strong> war. <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt went before Congress the day after Pearl<br />
Harbor, branding it an act that would “live in infamy.” Implicit in<br />
Roosevelt’s statement was the supposition that <strong>Japan</strong> had long<br />
planned a “sneak attack”—even as America was negotiating in good<br />
faith. In this way, acting on the war cry “Remember Pearl Harbor!,”<br />
the American people united behind their nation’s war effort. See also<br />
PACIFIC WAR.<br />
PERRY, COMMODORE MATTHEW C. (1794–1858). American<br />
Navy <strong>of</strong>ficer and brother <strong>of</strong> Admiral Oliver Perry. Nearing the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> his career, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Perry was asked by<br />
President Millard Fillmore to command a squadron ships sent to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> for the purpose <strong>of</strong> establishing trade and diplomatic relations<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. Perry and his four ships arrived<br />
in Uraga Bay near Edo on 8 July 1853. The four ships were<br />
larger than any ships in <strong>Japan</strong>—two were steam-fired frigates<br />
belching black, coal smoke—and became known as “the black<br />
ships” for their dark, ominous appearance. Perry presented a letter<br />
from President Fillmore to <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials asking for good treatment<br />
<strong>of</strong> shipwrecked sailors; permission to buy wood, water, and<br />
other supplies for American ships; and a trade treaty between the<br />
two countries. Perry departed to allow <strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials time to<br />
discuss the matter, and returned in February 1854 with nine ships<br />
to negotiate the first formal treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and a Western<br />
country.<br />
Despite the “gunboat diplomacy” element to the negotiations,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese <strong>of</strong>ficials refused to grant a general trade agreement to Perry.<br />
Nevertheless, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Friendship, usually<br />
known as the Kanagawa Treaty, established diplomatic relations between<br />
the two countries, and other countries soon followed Perry into<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and negotiated similar treaties. Perry’s mission began American<br />
formal relations with <strong>Japan</strong>, allowed other Western countries to<br />
establish relations with <strong>Japan</strong>, and played a significant role in breaking<br />
open pent-up grievances by many <strong>Japan</strong>ese against the Tokugawa<br />
shogunate, leading to its demise by 1868. See also ANSEI<br />
TREATIES; BIDDLE, JAMES; HARRIS, TOWNSEND; MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION; SAKOKU.
206 • PLAZA ACCORD<br />
PLAZA ACCORD. This was an agreement on foreign exchange rates<br />
concluded by the Group <strong>of</strong> Five (G5: the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain,<br />
France, West Germany, and <strong>Japan</strong>) at the Plaza Hotel in New York on<br />
22 September 1985. The accord stipulated the reduction <strong>of</strong> the dollar’s<br />
value by 10 to 20 percent through cooperation by G5 central<br />
bank intervention. By the end <strong>of</strong> October 1985, the dollar exchange<br />
rate had declined rapidly and the accord was achieved. The Plaza Accord<br />
was a watershed in the transition from floating rates to managed<br />
rates in which major countries intervene in the exchange market on<br />
appropriate occasions. The accord also stipulated that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> would have to reduce its fiscal deficit and both <strong>Japan</strong> and West<br />
Germany should expand their domestic demand.<br />
The dollar value continued to decline and major advanced countries<br />
did not desire any further decline. Finally, in February 1987, the<br />
Group <strong>of</strong> Seven (G7: G5 + Canada and Italy) reached the Louvre Accord.<br />
The G7 agreed to stabilize exchange rates at around contemporary<br />
levels while <strong>Japan</strong> and West Germany pledged to implement<br />
economic stimulation policies.<br />
PORTSMOUTH TREATY (AUGUST 1905). The Portsmouth Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> August 1905 brought a formal end to the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War.<br />
Sponsored by <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Theodore Roosevelt, the<br />
treaty transferred to <strong>Japan</strong> the Russian lease <strong>of</strong> the Liaotung Peninsula<br />
and the South Manchurian Railroad rights. The southern half <strong>of</strong><br />
the island <strong>of</strong> Sakhalin became <strong>Japan</strong>ese territory. Russia was also<br />
forced to recognize <strong>Japan</strong>’s paramount interest in the Korean peninsula.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, however, received no indemnities.<br />
The terms <strong>of</strong> the Portsmouth Treaty quite neatly reflected the<br />
course which the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War had taken. In February<br />
1904, <strong>Japan</strong> launched a surprise attack against the Russian Far<br />
Eastern fleet, which lay at anchor outside the defenses <strong>of</strong> Port<br />
Arthur. Over the ensuing 18 months, Russia’s Far Eastern fleet was<br />
destroyed, and its Baltic fleet was annihilated in the battle <strong>of</strong><br />
Tsushima. Port Arthur surrendered to <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in January<br />
1905, and the main Russian army was utterly defeated by March<br />
1905. These victories left their impression on President Roosevelt,<br />
who wrote to a British friend in June 1905: “What wonderful people<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese are!”
POTSDAM DECLARATION • 207<br />
If Roosevelt’s sympathy toward <strong>Japan</strong> was partly sentimental, it was<br />
also based on his reading <strong>of</strong> the balance <strong>of</strong> power in the Far East. Although<br />
aware that <strong>Japan</strong> might rise to challenge American interests in<br />
the region, Roosevelt firmly believed that Russia posed the more immediate<br />
threat. He was also aware that although <strong>Japan</strong> was everywhere,<br />
victorious it had strained its financial resources to the limit. Nor did he<br />
wish to see Russia driven out <strong>of</strong> Far Eastern balance-<strong>of</strong>-power calculations<br />
altogether—it might, he reasoned, have a “moderative effect” on<br />
future <strong>Japan</strong>ese actions. This intuition, coupled with the intransigence <strong>of</strong><br />
the Russian negotiators who maintained that their nation’s superior resource<br />
base meant that it could continue the war, led Roosevelt to broker<br />
a peace that included no indemnity payments for <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
POTSDAM DECLARATION (1945). Issued on 26 July 1945 over the<br />
signatures <strong>of</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Harry S. Truman, British Prime<br />
Minister Clement Attlee, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the<br />
Potsdam Declaration called for the unconditional surrender <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s armed forces, for the complete elimination <strong>of</strong> militarism and<br />
militarists, the removal <strong>of</strong> obstacles to democratic tendencies, and the<br />
punishment <strong>of</strong> war criminals. It promised that the <strong>Japan</strong>ese would not<br />
be “enslaved” as a race or “destroyed” as a nation, although it made<br />
clear that, following <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender, Allied forces would occupy<br />
the nation until there should have been established “in accordance<br />
with the freely expressed will <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people a peacefully inclined<br />
and responsible government.”<br />
Prepared in advance by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government, the Potsdam<br />
Declaration underwent a complicated drafting process. Acting Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Joseph Grew, in May 1945, approached President Truman<br />
and suggested that <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender might be facilitated if the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese were assured that surrender would not endanger the institution<br />
<strong>of</strong> the emperor. He was, in effect, arguing for modification <strong>of</strong> the<br />
unconditional surrender policy to which Truman’s predecessor,<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt, had earlier committed the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. If<br />
his primary objective in doing so was to secure <strong>Japan</strong>’s prompt surrender,<br />
that objective dovetailed neatly with the sensed need to secure<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s acquiescence in the postwar international order as defined by<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, as well as a grim foreboding <strong>of</strong> the need to contain<br />
the postwar influence <strong>of</strong> Soviet Russia.
208 • PRIOR CONSULTATION<br />
Grew received support from Secretary <strong>of</strong> War Henry Stimson,<br />
who revealed himself “inclined to agree with giving the <strong>Japan</strong>ese a<br />
modification <strong>of</strong> the unconditional surrender formula.” Truman vacillated,<br />
although by early July a committee made up <strong>of</strong> representatives<br />
from the State, War, and Navy Departments had drafted a declaration<br />
that included direct reference to the continued postwar existence <strong>of</strong> a<br />
“constitutional monarchy.” Grew submitted this draft to the new secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> state, James F. Byrnes, although mindful <strong>of</strong> Byrnes’s disinclination<br />
to modify the unconditional surrender policy, Grew<br />
lamented that the text would probably be “ditched on the way over.”<br />
In one aspect he was correct: the Potsdam Declaration made no mention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese monarchy. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government subsequently<br />
indicated its intention to “ignore” the Potsdam Declaration,<br />
and Washington responded by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima<br />
and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union simultaneously entered the war<br />
against <strong>Japan</strong>. Tokyo then accepted the Potsdam Declaration in its entirety<br />
although, immediately after its surrender, it indicated that it<br />
saw no contradiction between the terms <strong>of</strong> surrender and retention <strong>of</strong><br />
the monarchy. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
PRIOR CONSULTATION. Under a special arrangement stipulated in<br />
an exchange <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial notes at the time the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Security<br />
Treaty was amended in 1960, Washington assumed the following obligation:<br />
Before the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> makes an important change in the<br />
military alignment or equipment <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong>, or<br />
before it conducts military operations that require use <strong>of</strong> its military<br />
bases located in <strong>Japan</strong>, the U.S. government should engage in prior<br />
consultations with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government. The primary reason for<br />
the prior consultation is to secure <strong>Japan</strong>’s right to have a voice in the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> U.S. military bases located in <strong>Japan</strong>. President Dwight D.<br />
Eisenhower assured <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi that<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had no intention <strong>of</strong> conducting any kind <strong>of</strong> military<br />
operation that would go against the wishes <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
expressed in any prior consultation.<br />
However, no prior consultation precedent has ever been established,<br />
partly because the <strong>of</strong>ficial note exchange left the following<br />
important loophole: The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would have to carry out prior<br />
consultation with <strong>Japan</strong> only when U.S. forces found it necessary to<br />
conduct sorties directly from U.S. bases in <strong>Japan</strong>. U.S. forces sta-
PRIORITY PRODUCTION SYSTEM • 209<br />
tioned in <strong>Japan</strong> did participate in the Gulf Wars <strong>of</strong> 1990 and 2003, but<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> did not engage in prior consultation with <strong>Japan</strong> on<br />
the grounds that its forces did not conduct combat operations against<br />
Iraq directly from U.S. bases in <strong>Japan</strong> but “received the order while<br />
they were moving.”<br />
In the event that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> might wish to store nuclear<br />
weapons in <strong>Japan</strong>, the exchange <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial notes also contained a<br />
promise by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> that it would hold prior consultation talks<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>. However, when <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign Minister Masayoshi<br />
Ohira met with U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer in April 1963,<br />
Ohira stated that when U.S. naval ships carrying nuclear weapons<br />
called at or passed through a <strong>Japan</strong>ese harbor, <strong>Japan</strong> would not consider<br />
these actions to be violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s three non-nuclear<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> not producing, not possessing and not allowing the entry<br />
<strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons into <strong>Japan</strong>, nor a violation <strong>of</strong> the promises contained<br />
in the 1960 exchange <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial notes. See also DEFENSE.<br />
PRIORITY PRODUCTION SYSTEM. The Priority Production System<br />
was the <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic policy for increasing production. It<br />
was devised and implemented from the end <strong>of</strong> 1946 to 1948 in order<br />
to revive production after the destruction caused by World War II.<br />
It was proposed by Hiromi Arisawa, chairman <strong>of</strong> the Coal Committee<br />
and established by the first Shigeru Yoshida Cabinet.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> allocated all the heavy oil it was allowed to import by the<br />
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to the steel industry<br />
to increase production. Then, the government allocated steel to<br />
coal production and vice versa in a reciprocal manner. In other words,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> placed top priority on increasing production <strong>of</strong> steel and coal first.<br />
Only then, did the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government allow coal to be used for major<br />
economic sectors other than steel. This resulted in increasing production<br />
as a whole. The coal production at the end <strong>of</strong> 1946 fell to 21<br />
million tons (less than 40% <strong>of</strong> wartime production.) This was barely adequate<br />
to cover railroad and occupation operations. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
aimed to increase coal production to 30 million tons by fiscal<br />
year 1947. Both the Yoshida and Katayama Cabinets implemented this<br />
economic program and <strong>Japan</strong> managed to attain this initial goal.<br />
The Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) that was established in<br />
January 1947 supported this economic program financially. The RFB<br />
lent money primarily to critically important industries including coal,
210 • PRUYN, ROBERT H.<br />
steel, electric power, and marine transportation. The Ashida Cabinet<br />
continued to espouse the Priority Production System, and this played<br />
an important role in getting <strong>Japan</strong>’s economic recovery <strong>of</strong>f the<br />
ground. However, the RFB depended for its funds on floating RFB<br />
bonds underwritten by the Bank <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> and this precipitated accelerated<br />
inflation. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government also provided a large<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> price-support subsidy so that coal was transferred to the<br />
steel industry at a price lower than cost and steel was transferred to<br />
the coal industry at a price lower than cost. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
issued a financial emergency order, but it could not stem the inflation.<br />
Both the Katayama and Ashida Cabinets tried, but neither succeeded<br />
to contain the high wages that partly caused inflation. <strong>Japan</strong> had to<br />
wait for the Dodge Line to contain inflation.<br />
PRUYN, ROBERT H. (1815–1882). Appointed American minister to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> by President Abraham Lincoln in 1861, Robert Pruyn served<br />
until 1867. In addition to dealing with several tumultuous events in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> during the final years <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate, he helped<br />
guide several young <strong>Japan</strong>ese men to colleges in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
especially to Rutgers College in New Jersey, his alma mater. See<br />
also JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA.<br />
– R –<br />
RAPE OF NANJING. After capturing Nanjing, the Chinese Nationalist<br />
capital, in early December 1937 during the Second Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
War, <strong>Japan</strong>ese soldiers went on a rampage <strong>of</strong> slaughter and rape. Surrendering<br />
Chinese troops were summarily executed. Yet, the vast majority<br />
<strong>of</strong> victims were civilians—old men, women, and children. The<br />
number <strong>of</strong> Chinese killed by <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops in the area <strong>of</strong> Nanjing<br />
from December 1937 to February 1938 is still a matter <strong>of</strong> considerable<br />
controversy, but most scholars put the total number at approximately<br />
200,000—one <strong>of</strong> the worst atrocities <strong>of</strong> the 20th century. In addition<br />
to the Panay Incident, which occurred on 12 December 1937 at the<br />
nearby Yangtze River, the Rape <strong>of</strong> Nanjing inflamed anti-<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
sentiment in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. See also PACIFIC WAR; WORLD<br />
WAR II.
REISCHAUER, EDWIN O. • 211<br />
RED PURGE. The Red Purge was an unjustified removal or discharge<br />
<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Communist Party (JCP) and suspected<br />
sympathizers from their workplace by the government or by corporations.<br />
On 6 and 7 June 1950, all 24 members <strong>of</strong> the JCP’s central<br />
committee (including seven members <strong>of</strong> the House <strong>of</strong> Councilors)<br />
and 17 members <strong>of</strong> the editorial board <strong>of</strong> the Akahata, the JCP’s <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
newspaper, were removed from their posts. After the outbreak<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Korean War on 25 June 1950, General Douglas MacArthur<br />
escalated the Red Purge, prohibiting JCP members and suspected<br />
sympathizers from working for such major industries as newspapers,<br />
broadcasting, electricity, coal, transportation, and iron. In September,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government expanded the scope <strong>of</strong> the Red Purge to<br />
government institutions and public enterprises. In 1950 alone, 1,177<br />
people were purged from government institutions and 10,972 people<br />
from private corporations.<br />
The JCP could not implement effective resistance against the Red<br />
Purge because <strong>of</strong> its internal disunity and confusion. As a result, the<br />
JCP lost its influence and leadership in the postwar labor movement.<br />
Labor unions expressed their intentions <strong>of</strong> disagreeing with the Red<br />
Purge, but they could not organize an effective systematic anti-Red<br />
Purge movement. As a result, labor unions in <strong>Japan</strong> also suffered<br />
great damage and lost much <strong>of</strong> the influence gained in the early stage<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Occupation.<br />
REISCHAUER, EDWIN O. (1910–1990). Born in <strong>Japan</strong> to missionary<br />
parents, Edwin Reischauer was one <strong>of</strong> America’s first scholars <strong>of</strong> East<br />
Asia. After growing up in Tokyo, he attended Oberlin College and<br />
Harvard University in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. During World War II, he<br />
served as an <strong>of</strong>ficer in the U.S Army translating and deciphering<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese codes. He became well known as an Asia expert at Harvard<br />
University in the 1950s, and was selected by newly elected President<br />
John F. Kennedy to be the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ambassador to <strong>Japan</strong>. As an<br />
academic with no political or previous diplomatic experience, and because<br />
<strong>of</strong> his public criticism <strong>of</strong> State Department policies regarding<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, Reischauer’s appointment was both unusual and resisted by<br />
many in Washington. Nevertheless, he was able to mediate between<br />
the two countries he knew so well during the five years he served as<br />
ambassador before returning to Harvard. Reischauer’s wife, Haru
212 • REISCHAUER STABBING INCIDENT<br />
Matsukata Reischauer (his first wife, Adrienne, died in 1955) was a<br />
major asset during Reischauer’s years as ambassador. After returning<br />
to academia, Reischauer wrote several works on <strong>Japan</strong>, and <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
relations with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> that became textbooks for a generation<br />
<strong>of</strong> scholars. See also REISCHAUER STABBING INCIDENT.<br />
REISCHAUER STABBING INCIDENT. In March 1964, U.S. Ambassador<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong> Edwin O. Reischauer was stabbed in front <strong>of</strong> the<br />
U.S. Embassy by a 19-year-old <strong>Japan</strong>ese man suffering from a mental<br />
disorder called integration dysfunction syndrome. State Minister<br />
Masayoshi Ohira visited Ambassador Reischauer on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government. Ryuji Takeuchi, <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, also expressed formal regrets to the U.S. government.<br />
Ambassador Reischauer survived with the help <strong>of</strong> a massive blood<br />
transfusion made possible using blood purchased from blood banks<br />
operated by lightly regulated blood providers known as “blood sellers.”<br />
When it was later discovered that following the blood transfusion<br />
Ambassador Reischauer had incurred inflammation <strong>of</strong> the liver,<br />
the competence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s health system was called into serious<br />
question. As a result, <strong>Japan</strong>’s national system for blood provisioning<br />
using private blood banks was abolished and replaced with a blooddonation<br />
system operated by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Red Cross.<br />
The stabbing incident also made clear that <strong>Japan</strong>’s medical care <strong>of</strong><br />
mentally disturbed people was a major social problem. As a result,<br />
the Mental Health Act was partly modified in 1965 to require local<br />
healthcare centers to become the frontline in providing mental healthcare.<br />
The centers would arrange for mental health consultants to visit<br />
homes to conduct health consultations with people suffering mental<br />
disturbances. Also, mental health centers were established <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
prefecture. The national government assumed financial responsibility<br />
for half <strong>of</strong> the healthcare expenditures for the mentally disturbed living<br />
at home. When a patient suffering a mental disorder leaves a hospital<br />
without permission from hospital managers, that unauthorized<br />
absence has to be reported to the police. For mentally disturbed individuals<br />
who pose a serious danger to themselves or others, the government<br />
has established provisions for compulsory legal hospital admissions.<br />
New government rules were also created related to<br />
discharging and confidentiality obligations.
REPARATIONS • 213<br />
REPARATIONS. These are monies, property, and products that the loser<br />
pays to the winner to compensate for damage as a result <strong>of</strong> a war. A<br />
U.S. reparation mission led by Edwin W. Pauley came to <strong>Japan</strong> in November<br />
1945, and submitted an interim report in December 1945 and<br />
a final report in November 1946. Overestimating <strong>Japan</strong>’s ability to pay<br />
reparations, these reports were severe on the <strong>Japan</strong>ese. <strong>Japan</strong>ese production<br />
levels were limited to those <strong>of</strong> 1931, and 1,000 factories were<br />
ordered to be set aside for reparations. In early 1947, the Supreme<br />
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) began to take machine<br />
facilities to China, Holland, the Philippines, and Great Britain.<br />
As the Cold War progressed, in April 1947, SCAP sent an interim<br />
directive to remove only 30 percent <strong>of</strong> the factories that the interim<br />
reparations designated and passed 15 percent <strong>of</strong> them to China and 5<br />
percent each to the Philippines, Holland, and Great Britain. Finally,<br />
in May 1949, Washington made a unilateral announcement to cease<br />
the removal <strong>of</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> the war reparations that the interim directive<br />
had designated.<br />
In September 1951 at the San Francisco Peace Conference, the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> wished to exclude any statement on reparations, but because<br />
<strong>of</strong> opposition by Asian countries, Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the peace treaty<br />
stipulates the reparations principle simply: “It is recognized that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering<br />
caused by it during the war.” Article 14 left <strong>Japan</strong> and Asian<br />
countries to make their own negotiations: “<strong>Japan</strong> will promptly enter<br />
into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories<br />
were occupied by <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces and damaged by <strong>Japan</strong>, with<br />
a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost <strong>of</strong> repairing<br />
the damage done.” <strong>Japan</strong> concluded a peace treaty and a reparations<br />
agreement with Burma in November 1955 and promised to<br />
pay $200 million for reparations “by making available the services <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese people in production, salvaging and other work for the<br />
Allied Powers in question.”(Article 14) <strong>Japan</strong> concluded a reparations<br />
treaty with the Philippines in May 1956 and promised to pay<br />
$550 million for reparations in accordance with Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the San<br />
Francisco peace treaty. <strong>Japan</strong> concluded reparations agreement with<br />
Indonesia in January 1958 and promised to pay $223.8 million for<br />
reparations. <strong>Japan</strong> concluded reparations agreement with South Vietnam<br />
in May 1959 and promised to pay $39 million for reparations.
214 • REPARATIONS TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES<br />
REPARATIONS TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PHILIP-<br />
PINES. The Reparations Treaty between <strong>Japan</strong> and the Philippines was<br />
concluded in Manila, the Philippines on 9 May 1956. <strong>Japan</strong> agreed to<br />
pay $55,000 for reparations. This treaty was concluded with substantial<br />
U.S. mediation, as part <strong>of</strong> that country’s anti-Communist policy.<br />
Through this treaty, <strong>Japan</strong> and the Philippines achieved diplomatic normalization.<br />
After paying the reparations, <strong>Japan</strong> began <strong>of</strong>ficial development<br />
assistance to the Philippines.<br />
REVERE THE EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BARBARIAN (SONNŌ<br />
JŌI, IN JAPANESE). An <strong>of</strong>ten-used slogan to unite the disparate<br />
groups <strong>of</strong> anti-Tokugawa and anti-foreign samurai in the 1850s and<br />
1860s. Ironically, many <strong>of</strong> those who fought under this slogan became<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials in the Meiji government after 1868 and actively promoted<br />
foreign relations and Westernization. See also ANSEI<br />
TREATIES; II, NAOSUKE; MEIJI RESTORATION; NAMAMUGI<br />
INCIDENT; TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE.<br />
REVERSE COURSE. The reverse course was a movement attempting<br />
to draw a halt to the democratic momentum generated in <strong>Japan</strong> after<br />
World War II and attempting to return to the militaristic <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
prewar era. The movement arose in the context <strong>of</strong> an intensifying<br />
Cold War atmosphere and it became especially prominent after the<br />
San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective.<br />
After 1948, U.S. occupation policy toward <strong>Japan</strong> changed from<br />
emphasizing democratization and demilitarization to focusing on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese economic recovery, as well as on militarization as a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Western bloc. In August 1950, soon after the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />
the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government to establish the National Police Reserve. This precipitated<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese remilitarization. After the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco<br />
Peace Treaty in September 1951 to gain independence, although<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> primarily depended on a U.S. military umbrella for its<br />
security, it nevertheless pursued gradual remilitarization despite the<br />
fact that Article Nine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese constitution renounced war<br />
and prohibited <strong>Japan</strong> from possessing any military power.<br />
In education, on 14 November 1951, Teiyu Amano, minister <strong>of</strong><br />
education in the third Shigeru Yoshida Cabinet, advocated the
ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO • 215<br />
teaching <strong>of</strong> “morals” as a school subject and he promoted “An Outline<br />
for National Moral Practice,” a postwar version <strong>of</strong> the Imperial<br />
Rescript on Education. The Yomiuri Newspaper defined these proposals<br />
as the “reverse course” and published a series <strong>of</strong> articles from<br />
2 November to 2 December 1951, which made this term popular. See<br />
also DEFENSE.<br />
RICH NATION, STRONG ARMY (FUKOKU KYOHEI, in <strong>Japan</strong>ese).<br />
A slogan and policy adopted by the early Meiji government<br />
meant to strengthen the economy and military forces for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> maintaining <strong>Japan</strong>’s independence.<br />
ROBERTS, EDMUND (1784–1836). Edmund Roberts was the first<br />
American sent by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government to attempt treaty negotiations<br />
with <strong>Japan</strong>. Sent on two missions to Asia, in 1832 and<br />
1835, Roberts successfully negotiated treaties with Muscat (Oman)<br />
and Siam (Thailand). However, he died <strong>of</strong> cholera in Macao in 1836<br />
and never reached <strong>Japan</strong>. Ten years later, Commodore James Biddle<br />
made the next attempt to establish formal relations between the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. See also PERRY, MATTHEW C.<br />
ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (1882–1945). As president <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from 1933 until 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt looms<br />
large in the 20th-century history <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations.<br />
Born into a patrician family in New York, he was educated at Groton,<br />
Harvard, and Columbia Law School. He served as assistant secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> the navy in the administration <strong>of</strong> President Woodrow Wilson, in<br />
which capacity he established a “close and personal” friendship (his<br />
words) with the naval attaché to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese embassy in Washington,<br />
Kichisaburo - Nomura. He was the Democratic nominee for vice<br />
president in 1920. The following year, he was struck by polio<br />
myelitis, which crippled him for the remainder <strong>of</strong> his life. He was<br />
elected governor <strong>of</strong> New York in 1928; four years later, he defeated<br />
incumbent Herbert Hoover in the presidential election. His inaugural<br />
address, in which he addressed himself directly to the torpor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Great Depression, has been quoted so many times as to appear almost<br />
redundant: “Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have<br />
to fear is fear itself.”
216 • ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO<br />
Summarizing Roosevelt’s presidency (he won reelection an unprecedented<br />
three times, serving until his death in April 1945) is<br />
fraught with difficulties. He left little in the way <strong>of</strong> written records,<br />
and he was (in)famously flexible and deceptive. His first term saw<br />
little in the way <strong>of</strong> foreign policy initiatives. It was characterized instead<br />
by the belief that foreign policy must play a secondary role until<br />
the domestic economic crisis was eased. As a result, many historians<br />
(most notably Robert Divine) have portrayed Roosevelt as an<br />
isolationist who painfully metamorphosed into an interventionist<br />
sometime after the Munich crisis <strong>of</strong> 1938.<br />
Other historians have depicted Roosevelt as a fairly consistent internationalist<br />
(in his thought, if not always in his actions). After all,<br />
he reversed the policies <strong>of</strong> his predecessors when, in 1933, he established<br />
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union—purportedly for<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> fostering strategic cooperation against <strong>Japan</strong>. Following<br />
the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War in 1937, he delivered his<br />
so-called Quarantine Address, which amounted to an unsuccessful effort<br />
to prepare the American people for a greater role on the world<br />
stage.<br />
Whether Roosevelt’s sympathies lay with the isolationists or the<br />
internationalists, there is no mistaking that his administration adopted<br />
an increasingly proactive stance following conclusion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
German–<strong>Japan</strong>ese–Italian Tripartite Pact <strong>of</strong> September 1940. (This<br />
has itself given rise to historical controversy, with Charles Beard and<br />
the violently anti-British Charles Tansill blaming an ostensibly conspiratorial<br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt for American intervention<br />
in the war.) Denouncing the Tripartite Pact as an “unholy alliance”<br />
that sought “to dominate and enslave the entire human race,” Roosevelt<br />
called on the American people to “support the nations defending<br />
themselves against the Axis.” Having, however, assigned priority<br />
to the defeat <strong>of</strong> Germany, and furthermore not in possession <strong>of</strong> a twoocean<br />
navy, the Roosevelt administration until at least late November<br />
1941 trod a delicate diplomatic line toward the <strong>Japan</strong>ese. Whereas,<br />
on the one hand, there was an unmistakable display <strong>of</strong> firmness toward<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese hegemonic pretensions, on the other, there was a determined<br />
effort not to shut the door on the possibility <strong>of</strong> conciliation<br />
should the <strong>Japan</strong>ese dissociate themselves from Adolf Hitler and his<br />
brand <strong>of</strong> militaristic aggression.
ROOSEVELT, THEODORE • 217<br />
Following Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt grappled tirelessly with both<br />
the military and the longer-range political problems that defined that<br />
conflict. Nonetheless, his ideas concerning post-surrender <strong>Japan</strong>—<br />
even in the dark days <strong>of</strong> early 1942 when <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces overran the<br />
western Pacific, neither Roosevelt nor his advisers seriously contemplated<br />
the possibility <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese victory in the Pacific—remain an<br />
unknown quantity. Certainly, he was an advocate <strong>of</strong> a “hard peace”<br />
for Germany, and there is every reason to believe that he envisioned<br />
nothing less for <strong>Japan</strong>. See also UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER;<br />
YALTA CONFERENCE.<br />
ROOSEVELT, THEODORE (1858–1919). President <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> from 1901 to 1909, Theodore Roosevelt was convinced that<br />
the Pacific Ocean represented the future for American policy and<br />
power. Despite his usually racist perspective, he held the <strong>Japan</strong>ese in<br />
high esteem. Born into a wealthy New York family in 1858, Roosevelt<br />
graduated from Harvard University in 1880. He subsequently<br />
entered Columbia Law School, although he dropped out in 1881 to<br />
pursue a political career. President William McKinley appointed<br />
him assistant secretary <strong>of</strong> the navy in 1897. In this position, Roosevelt<br />
worked with McKinley to have the U.S. Asiatic Squadron attack<br />
the Spanish colony <strong>of</strong> the Philippines. An avid reader <strong>of</strong> the<br />
naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan—who, among other things,<br />
urged both the construction <strong>of</strong> a massive American fleet and the acquisition<br />
<strong>of</strong> naval bases in the Caribbean and Pacific—Roosevelt<br />
pushed vociferously for the annexation <strong>of</strong> the Philippines.<br />
Included as McKinley’s running mate in the 1900 election, Roosevelt<br />
rose to the presidency in September 1901 following his boss’s<br />
assassination. He was elected president in his own right in 1904. In<br />
the realm <strong>of</strong> foreign affairs, Roosevelt sought a position <strong>of</strong> leadership<br />
for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in world affairs. Sea power held the key to his<br />
aspirations. At the same time, Roosevelt recognized the limits to his<br />
nation’s power and thus was not averse to diplomacy. Nowhere was<br />
this more visible than in his dealings with <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
Roosevelt viewed <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations through the prism <strong>of</strong><br />
the Far Eastern balance <strong>of</strong> power. Great Britain, Germany, <strong>Japan</strong>, Russia,<br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> all had interests in the region, most <strong>of</strong> which<br />
centered on China. Roosevelt was nonplussed by Russian designs in
218 • ROOT, ELIHU<br />
China, and, for this reason, supported <strong>Japan</strong> throughout the<br />
Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905. At the same time, he did not desire<br />
the complete eradication <strong>of</strong> Russian power in the Far East precisely<br />
because he realized that nation’s ability to hold <strong>Japan</strong>ese ambitions in<br />
check.<br />
Roosevelt recognized the potential for <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American friction<br />
in the post–Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War era. He sought to preempt this possibility<br />
by arranging for an agreement—the so-called Taft–Katsura<br />
Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1905—in which Tokyo acknowledged American control<br />
over the Philippines in exchange for Washington’s recognition <strong>of</strong><br />
Tokyo’s right to rule the Korean peninsula. In the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War, he confronted <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American friction<br />
over both the immigration issue and China. He poured oil over these<br />
troubled waters with the Gentlemen’s Agreement and the<br />
Root–Takahira Agreement. He also recognized that the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> was not in a position to defend the Philippines in the event that<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese launched an attack on the colony, and ordered the U.S.<br />
Pacific base to be moved from Manila to Hawaii. See also<br />
PORTSMOUTH TREATY.<br />
ROOT, ELIHU (1845–1937). A native <strong>of</strong> New York, Elihu Root served<br />
as both secretary <strong>of</strong> war (1899–1904) and secretary <strong>of</strong> state<br />
(1905–1909). He was a firm believer in the notion that <strong>Japan</strong> was a<br />
force for order in the Far East, and was never convinced—as he put<br />
it at the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922—that China was a<br />
full-fledged member <strong>of</strong> the family <strong>of</strong> nations.<br />
After a successful career in corporate law, Root in 1899 was appointed<br />
secretary <strong>of</strong> war by President William McKinley. He remained<br />
in the post under McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt,<br />
until 1905. His principal efforts as secretary <strong>of</strong> war were aimed at the<br />
institutional modernization <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Army, and he also<br />
maintained responsibility for the administrations in Cuba and the<br />
Philippines. Root replaced John Hay as secretary <strong>of</strong> state in July<br />
1905, in which position he worked closely with President Roosevelt<br />
to steer the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> toward a cooperative <strong>Japan</strong> policy. The Gentlemen’s<br />
Agreement <strong>of</strong> February 1908 and the Root–Takahira<br />
Agreement <strong>of</strong> November 1908 represented his principal diplomatic<br />
achievements vis-à-vis <strong>Japan</strong>.
ROOT–TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT • 219<br />
Root left the State Department in 1909, and was subsequently<br />
elected senator <strong>of</strong> New York state. A powerful Republican voice on<br />
foreign affairs, he worked with fellow Republican Senator Henry<br />
Cabot Lodge to draft reservations as conditions for Senate ratification<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Versaille Peace Treaty (See PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE).<br />
Wilson refused to bend, and so did the Senate. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
signed a separate peace with Germany in 1921.<br />
As an elder statesman, Root played an important role in the Washington<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. He drafted a statement <strong>of</strong> principles<br />
designed to tie Britain and <strong>Japan</strong> to a broad interpretation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Open Door, or respect for the principles <strong>of</strong> China’s territorial integrity<br />
and the equality <strong>of</strong> commercial opportunity in that country.<br />
Root refused to countenance, however, that American principles visà-vis<br />
China should poison the nation’s relations with <strong>Japan</strong>, intimating<br />
to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegation that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would not insist<br />
on any change in <strong>Japan</strong>’s status in Manchuria.<br />
ROOT–TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT (30 NOVEMBER 1908). On 30<br />
November 1908, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Elihu Root and ambassador<br />
Takahira Kogorō signed an agreement designed to dispel <strong>Japan</strong>ese–<br />
American frictions that had intensified in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War. One source <strong>of</strong> friction—Californian discrimination<br />
against resident <strong>Japan</strong>ese citizens—had been removed earlier in<br />
1908 by means <strong>of</strong> the Gentlemen’s Agreement. An equally important<br />
source <strong>of</strong> friction, however, remained: Tokyo’s actions threatened to<br />
shut the Open Door in Manchuria. It was precisely this issue that the<br />
Root–Takahira Agreement sought to address.<br />
By the agreement, the two nations agreed to respect each other’s<br />
possessions and to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. They also<br />
affirmed the “independence and integrity <strong>of</strong> China and the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equal opportunity for the commerce and industry <strong>of</strong> all nations in<br />
that Empire.” At the same time, the agreement confirmed American<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s possessions in Korea and Manchuria. This<br />
last provision—particularly as it pertained to Manchuria—seemed<br />
to depart from the two nations’ declared commitment to the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong> opportunity throughout China. Yet it is necessary<br />
to recognize—as did Root and President Theodore Roosevelt—<br />
that Washington was in no position to force the open door upon the
220 • RUSSO–JAPANESE WAR<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese in Manchuria. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as the Root–Takahira Agreement<br />
was concluded against the backdrop <strong>of</strong> the fait accompli <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
expansion into Manchuria, it represented an attempt to maintain<br />
the status quo in both the Pacific and in China.<br />
RUSSO–JAPANESE WAR (1904–1905). The Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War<br />
opened on 8 February 1904 when <strong>Japan</strong> launched a surprise attack<br />
against Russian naval forces at Port Arthur. Over the ensuing months,<br />
Russian forces were driven from Port Arthur and, in March 2005, from<br />
the Manchurian city <strong>of</strong> Mukden. Fighting effectively ended when, in<br />
May 1905, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy annihilated Russia’s Baltic Fleet in the<br />
Straits <strong>of</strong> Tsushima.<br />
The war was directly attributable to the two nations’ competing<br />
ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The Russians had signaled their<br />
intentions in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the Boxer Uprising <strong>of</strong> 1900 when they<br />
refused to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. They also sought<br />
to expand their influence on the Korean peninsula. For their part,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese governing circles were convinced that a foreign-dominated<br />
Korea would prove to be a dagger pointed at the heart <strong>of</strong> their nation.<br />
From July 1903, the two nations sought to negotiate their differences<br />
but these negotiations ended in naught.<br />
The Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War carried with it obvious implications for<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese–American relations. After all, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President<br />
Theodore Roosevelt sponsored the Portsmouth Treaty (which<br />
formally ended the hostilities). Washington’s policy toward the region<br />
had hitherto rested on the twin assumptions <strong>of</strong>, first, the defense<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Philippines, and second, the promotion <strong>of</strong> trade in<br />
China (Open Door). Because Russia had positioned itself contrary<br />
to the Open Door, Washington welcomed <strong>Japan</strong>’s victories in the<br />
Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War. At the same time, however, <strong>Japan</strong>’s victories<br />
raised new questions. What was the extent <strong>of</strong> its own imperialist<br />
ambitions? Was it committed to the Open Door? Might it attack the<br />
Philippines? Could the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> defend the Philippines against<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese attack? President Roosevelt grappled with all these issues<br />
both during and after the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War, and his response can<br />
be seen in such diplomatic agreements as the Taft–Katsura Agreement,<br />
the Gentlemen’s Agreement, and the Root–Takahira<br />
Agreement.
RUTGERS COLLEGE. Originally established in New Brunswick,<br />
New Jersey, in 1766 as an affiliate <strong>of</strong> the Dutch Reformed Church, Rutgers<br />
became a state college <strong>of</strong> New Jersey. From the mid-1860s to<br />
1880, approximately 40 <strong>Japan</strong>ese students studied at Rutgers College<br />
or its affiliated high school—more than any other American university<br />
at the time. These early <strong>Japan</strong>ese overseas students were initially encouraged<br />
by Rutgers alumni in <strong>Japan</strong>, such as Guido Verbeck,<br />
William Elliot Griffis, and Robert Pruyn. While more <strong>Japan</strong>ese students<br />
attended colleges in New York and Boston by the end <strong>of</strong> the 19th<br />
century, and then colleges on the West Coast by the 20th century, Rutgers<br />
College and its long legacy with <strong>Japan</strong> continues to draw <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
students and visitors. The William Elliot Griffis Collection <strong>of</strong> Rutgers<br />
Library’s Special Collections and University Archives is a major<br />
collection <strong>of</strong> 19th-century materials on <strong>Japan</strong>ese students in America<br />
and Westerners in <strong>Japan</strong> during the Meiji Era. See also KUSAKABE,<br />
TARO; MATSUDAIRA, TADAATSU; MURRAY, DAVID.<br />
RYUKYU ISLANDS. See OKINAWA.<br />
– S –<br />
SAKAMOTO, RYOMA • 221<br />
SAIGO, TAKAMORI (1827–1877). Samurai from Satsuma domain<br />
who led the pro-imperial military forces during the decisive battles<br />
near Kyoto and in Edo against the Tokugawa forces in early 1868.<br />
Saigo became the top general in the new Meiji government, but quit<br />
in 1873 after most <strong>of</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> the Meiji leaders opposed his plan to<br />
invade Korea. In 1877, Saigo and some <strong>of</strong> his followers rebelled<br />
against the government in what is called the Satsuma Rebellion. The<br />
new conscript army <strong>of</strong> the Meiji government defeated Saigo, and he<br />
committed suicide. By the 1890s, however, Saigo was posthumously<br />
rehabilitated as an example <strong>of</strong> a principled <strong>Japan</strong>ese warrior and a<br />
large statue <strong>of</strong> him (and his dog) was erected at the entrance to Ueno<br />
Park in central Tokyo. See also BOSHIN WAR; MEIJI RESTORA-<br />
TION; OKUBO, TOSHIMICHI.<br />
SAKAMOTO, RYOMA (1835–1867). Samurai from Tosa domain,<br />
Sakamoto became a major figure in the anti-Tokugawa and pro
222 • SAKOKU<br />
imperial movement. He worked with Katsu Kaishu in studying<br />
shipping and naval training, and later played a key role in negotiating<br />
an alliance between Satsuma and Choshu domains. His assassination<br />
by Tokugawa bakufu supporters in late 1867 motivated<br />
opposition to the Tokugawa government.<br />
SAKOKU. Meaning “national isolation,” the maritime and overseas<br />
travel restrictions ordered by the Tokugawa shogunate in the 1630s<br />
became known as the sakoku policy. Although never absolute, sakoku<br />
restricted relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and Western countries for two centuries.<br />
According to sakoku policies, <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway sailors<br />
were not allowed to re-enter the country; the only Westerners allowed<br />
to live in <strong>Japan</strong> were Dutch traders who had to live on the small island<br />
<strong>of</strong> Dejima; and <strong>Japan</strong>ese were forbidden from converting to<br />
Christianity. See also EXPULSION EDICT.<br />
SAKUMA, SHOZAN (1811–1864). Samurai scholar from Matsushiro<br />
domain (Nagano), Sakuma was a Confucian scholar who also conducted<br />
experiments and studied Western scientific methods. He took<br />
part in making defense arrangements during Commodore Matthew<br />
Perry’s 1853 visit to <strong>Japan</strong>. He promoted the dualistic concept <strong>of</strong><br />
“Eastern ethics, Western science”—a blending <strong>of</strong> Neo-Confucian ethical<br />
principles with knowledge <strong>of</strong> Western science, languages, and economics.<br />
Among his students and colleagues were Katsu Kaishu<br />
(Sakuma’s brother-in-law), Shoin Yoshida, Ryoma Sakamoto, and<br />
Shigeki Nishimura. While acting as a mediator between the imperial<br />
court and the Tokugawa shogunate in 1864, Sakuma was assassinated<br />
by anti-foreign samurai in Kyoto. See also MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
SAMURAI. See CLASS SYSTEM IN JAPAN.<br />
SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY. After World War II, the San<br />
Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by <strong>Japan</strong> and 48 other countries on<br />
8 September 1951. It became effective on 28 April 1952. Fifty-two<br />
countries (including <strong>Japan</strong>) participated in the conference, but the Soviet<br />
Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia did not sign the treaty. India<br />
and Burma were so dissatisfied with the treaty that they did not attend<br />
the conference. China was a major player in the war with <strong>Japan</strong>, but
SATO, EISAKU • 223<br />
neither the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China nor the Republic <strong>of</strong> China (Taiwan)<br />
was invited to the conference. After the San Francisco Treaty,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> made a separate peace treaty and other agreements with those<br />
who did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It concluded a peace<br />
treaty with Republic <strong>of</strong> China on 28 April 1952, India on 9 June 1952,<br />
and Burma on 5 November 1954. The <strong>Japan</strong>–Soviet Union Joint<br />
Declaration was signed on 19 October 1956. <strong>Japan</strong> made agreements<br />
on the resumption <strong>of</strong> diplomatic ties with Poland on 8 February 1957,<br />
Czechoslovakia on 13 February 1957, Indonesia on 20 January 1958,<br />
South Korea on 22 June 1965, and finally made the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Joint Statement on 29 September 1972.<br />
The San Francisco Peace Treaty consists <strong>of</strong> seven chapters with 27<br />
articles, one protocol, and two declarations. Article One stipulates<br />
that the state <strong>of</strong> war between <strong>Japan</strong> and each <strong>of</strong> the Allied Powers is<br />
terminated when the Treaty comes into effect. Article Two stipulates<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> recognizes the independence <strong>of</strong> Korea, renounces all<br />
rights, titles, and claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the<br />
Kurile Islands. Article Three stipulates that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would<br />
place Nansei Shoto south <strong>of</strong> 29 degrees north latitude, Nanpo Shoto<br />
south <strong>of</strong> S<strong>of</strong>u Gan, and Parece Vela and Marcus Island under the<br />
<strong>United</strong> Nations’ trusteeship system with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as the only<br />
administering authority. Article Six indicates that although the Allied<br />
Powers’ occupation forces are to be withdrawn, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
would be able to station its forces under its bilateral agreement with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Immediately after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> concluded the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Security<br />
Treaty so that the U.S. forces would be able to continue to be stationed<br />
in <strong>Japan</strong> after the formal termination <strong>of</strong> the Allied Powers’ occupation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
SATO, EISAKU (1901–1975). Eisaku Sato was born in Yamaguchi<br />
Prefecture. Nobusuke Kishi was Sato’s elder brother. He became<br />
vice-minister <strong>of</strong> transportation in 1947. He served as prime minister<br />
for seven years and eight months, from 9 November 1964 to 7 July<br />
1972, the longest serving prime minister in the post–World War II<br />
period in <strong>Japan</strong>. He was primarily responsible for achieving the restitution<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Ogasawara Islands and Okinawa from the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> back to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1968 and 1972, respectively. Afraid <strong>of</strong> the rise
224 • SATSUMA DOMAIN<br />
<strong>of</strong> the anti-U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Security Treaty movement every 10 years<br />
when the Treaty came for renewal, the Sato administration decided to<br />
maintain the Treaty with automatic extension for one year every year<br />
without renewal or abolishment <strong>of</strong> the Treaty. On 11 December 1967,<br />
at a meeting <strong>of</strong> the Lower House Budget Committee, Sato clearly<br />
stated for the first time the <strong>Japan</strong>ese non-nuclear principles <strong>of</strong> not<br />
producing, not possessing, and not allowing the entry <strong>of</strong> nuclear<br />
weapons into the country. With the three non-nuclear principles, Sato<br />
decided to operate the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Security Treaty. With his policies<br />
including the three non-nuclear principles, he received the Nobel<br />
Peace Prize in 1974.<br />
SATSUMA DOMAIN (KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE). With its<br />
capital city at Kagoshima, Satsuma was a large, samurai-dominated<br />
domain led by the Shimazu clan. Satsuma adopted Western learning,<br />
manufacturing, and sciences—even before Commodore Matthew<br />
Perry arrived in <strong>Japan</strong> in 1853. In 1864, Satsuma began sending a<br />
few <strong>of</strong> its young samurai to England to study Western subjects. In addition<br />
to Satsuma’s long-standing trade relations with the Ryukyu Islands<br />
and China, American and British merchants began trading with<br />
the domain in the late 1850s independently <strong>of</strong> the control <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate. After the Kagoshima Bombardment in<br />
1863, Satsuma domain became even more determined to learn Western<br />
sciences—especially weaponry. A leader in the “revere the emperor,<br />
expel the barbarian” movement, many Satsuma leaders were<br />
more dedicated to overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate than expelling<br />
Westerners.<br />
After distancing themselves from Aizu domain—their nominal<br />
ally and Tokugawa supporter—Satsuma formed an alliance with<br />
Choshu domain in 1866 and together led the forces that overthrew<br />
the Tokugawa shogunate and restored the emperor to control over<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> in 1868. Satsuma’s forces, calling themselves the “imperial<br />
army,” then fought against Aizu domain and their allies in the Boshin<br />
War, forcing Aizu’s surrender in November 1868. As with Choshu<br />
domain, many Satsuma samurai became leaders in the Meiji government.<br />
In 1877, Saigo Takamori, a Satsuma samurai and former minister<br />
<strong>of</strong> the army in the Meiji government, led a failed uprising<br />
against the Meiji government known as the Satsuma Rebellion. In
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ • 225<br />
1871, Satsuma domain was formally incorporated into the new prefectural<br />
system as Kagoshima Prefecture. In addition to its historical<br />
and political legacy, Satsuma/Kagoshima is well known for its ceramics<br />
and unique spoken dialect. See also MEIJI RESTORATION;<br />
OKUBO, TOSHIMICHI.<br />
SCHNELL, JOHN HENRY. See WAKAMATSU COLONY.<br />
SCIOTO. Under command <strong>of</strong> Captain William Reagan through an<br />
arrangement by American businessman Eugene Van Reed, the ship<br />
Scioto sailed from Yokohama on 17 May 1868 with 150 <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers<br />
aboard. On 19 June 1868, it arrived in Honolulu with a group<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers known as Gannenmono. This was the first<br />
group <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers in Hawaii, many <strong>of</strong> whom would remain<br />
on the islands for the rest <strong>of</strong> their lives, becoming the ancestors <strong>of</strong><br />
Hawaii’s substantial <strong>Japan</strong>ese ethnic population. See also IMMI-<br />
GRATION.<br />
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES LAW. The Self-Defense Forces Law,<br />
which became effective on 9 June 1954, stipulates the assignments <strong>of</strong><br />
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the organization and alignment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
SDF’s military units, the permissible behaviors and authorities <strong>of</strong> the<br />
SDF, the status and classes <strong>of</strong> SDF members, and other things related<br />
to the SDF. Article seven clearly claims that the prime minister has<br />
supreme command and the regulatory authority to ensure the civilian<br />
control <strong>of</strong> the SDF. See also DEFENSE.<br />
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ. This Sino–U.S. joint communiqué<br />
was announced on 28 February 1972 when President Richard Nixon<br />
visited the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China (PRC). At the beginning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1970s, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy became increasingly expansionist.<br />
President Nixon, who had been elected in 1969, reviewed<br />
U.S. policy toward the PRC and attempted to establish formal diplomatic<br />
relations. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser,<br />
made two secret trips to the PRC in July and October 1971. He conferred<br />
with Premier Zhou Enlai, then in charge <strong>of</strong> Chinese foreign<br />
policy under Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong, and prepared<br />
an amicable agreement between the two countries. On 15 July 1971,
226 • SHANGHAI INCIDENT<br />
President Nixon made a public announcement on television that<br />
Kissinger had gone to the PRC to talk with Premier Zhou Enlai, and<br />
Nixon accepted an invitation to visit the PRC. He actually visited<br />
from 21 to 28 February 1972. This was known as the “Nixon Shock.”<br />
It was especially surprising for <strong>Japan</strong>, a country that had had historically<br />
close contact with China, but had failed to establish a formal<br />
diplomatic relationship due to the strong U.S. pressure against this.<br />
This announcement was “shocking” in the sense that Washington had<br />
not consulted with Tokyo in advance—even though <strong>Japan</strong> had been a<br />
faithful ally <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
In the Shanghai Communiqué, the treatment <strong>of</strong> Taiwan was a crucial<br />
issue. The U.S. government clearly declared: “The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side <strong>of</strong> the Taiwan Strait<br />
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part <strong>of</strong> China.<br />
The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Government does not challenge that position.” The<br />
Shanghai Communiqué marked the beginning <strong>of</strong> normalized relations<br />
between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and the PRC.<br />
SHANGHAI INCIDENT (1932). Twice in the 1930s, large-scale<br />
fighting broke out between Chinese and <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in the port<br />
city <strong>of</strong> Shanghai. The first Shanghai Incident began in early 1932 and<br />
the second Shanghai Incident in late 1937. Because the second<br />
Shanghai Incident formed part <strong>of</strong> the wider China Incident (or<br />
Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War) that began in July 1937, this account concerns<br />
itself with the first incident alone.<br />
As China’s northeastern provinces fell under <strong>Japan</strong>ese control in<br />
the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the Manchurian Incident <strong>of</strong> September 1931, anti-<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese demonstrations spread throughout China. <strong>Japan</strong>ese concessions<br />
in the port city <strong>of</strong> Shanghai came under attack, and, in January<br />
1932, <strong>Japan</strong>ese nationals resident in Shanghai were attacked. One<br />
died as a result. It emerged in the postwar era that these attacks were<br />
plotted and effectuated by <strong>Japan</strong>ese army major Ryūkichi Tanaka in<br />
an attempt to shift world attention away from Manchuria.<br />
A <strong>Japan</strong>ese naval brigade and China’s 19th Route Army clashed on<br />
29 January 1932. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces were hopelessly outnumbered<br />
and it was obvious that reinforcements were necessary. At the same<br />
time, <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers were aware that an intensification <strong>of</strong> the<br />
incident directly threatened the livelihood and interests <strong>of</strong> the 14,000
SHIDEHARA, KIJU – RO – • 227<br />
British, American, French, and Italian residents in Shanghai. For this<br />
reason, the Navy General Staff worked on the premise that army<br />
forces were neither desirable nor necessary to conclude the incident.<br />
The Third Fleet was subsequently organized under the command <strong>of</strong><br />
Vice Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura, who was respected within<br />
American naval circles.<br />
For reasons <strong>of</strong> his own, Navy Minister Mineo Ōsumi ignored his<br />
service’s determination to resolve the incident without the army’s intervention<br />
and asked War Minister General Araki Sadao to dispatch<br />
troops. Subsequently, the forces under Nomura and army general<br />
Yoshinori Shirakawa’s command launched a crippling attack against<br />
their Chinese counterparts without at the same time threatening<br />
American, British, French, or Italian lives. Hostilities came to an end<br />
on 3 March. An armistice agreement was signed on 5 May by <strong>Japan</strong>ese,<br />
Chinese, British, American, French, and Italian representatives.<br />
SHIBUSAWA, EIICHI (1841–1931). Sometimes known as the “father<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese business,” Shibusawa supported the Tokugawa shogunate<br />
during its final years but was soon hired by the new Meiji<br />
government because <strong>of</strong> his knowledge <strong>of</strong> business and finance. Although<br />
he continued to work closely with the Meiji government, he<br />
left government service in 1873 to devote himself to private business.<br />
He helped establish well over 100 businesses during his career and<br />
was especially noted for adopting Western manufacturing and finance<br />
techniques. Shibusawa also strongly supported education and<br />
international knowledge. See also MEIJI ERA; ZAIBATSU.<br />
SHIDEHARA, KIJU - RO - (1872–1951). An immensely influential<br />
diplomat through the 1920s and early 1930s, Kijūrō Shidehara was<br />
known for his conciliatory policies toward the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
China. He also reemerged briefly during <strong>Japan</strong>’s postwar occupation<br />
as prime minister.<br />
After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, Shidehara in<br />
1896 entered the Foreign Ministry. In his early career, he served in<br />
China, London, and Antwerp. Between 1904 and 1914, he served in a<br />
variety <strong>of</strong> Foreign Ministry posts in Tokyo, during which time he was<br />
trained in the finer aspects <strong>of</strong> diplomacy by Foreign Ministry adviser<br />
Henry W. Denison. After a brief stint in the Netherlands, Shidehara
228 • SHIGEMITSU–DULLES MEETING<br />
returned to Tokyo to assume the post <strong>of</strong> vice foreign minister. He remained<br />
in that post through the cabinets <strong>of</strong> Shigenobu Ōkuma,<br />
Masatake Terauchi, and Takashi Hara. Ambassador to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> from 1919 to 1922, he served as a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s delegation<br />
to the Washington Conference <strong>of</strong> 1921–1922. A perceptive observer<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, he alerted Tokyo throughout the Washington<br />
Conference <strong>of</strong> America’s determination to bring an end to the<br />
diplomacy <strong>of</strong> imperialism.<br />
As foreign minister from 1924 to 1927 and again from 1929 to<br />
1931, Shidehara showed himself to be a consummate realist, always<br />
seeking to integrate his foreign policy objectives with the available<br />
means. Historians are generally agreed that the main characteristics<br />
<strong>of</strong> Shidehara’s foreign policy were non-intervention in the internal affairs<br />
<strong>of</strong> China international (or great power) cooperation and economic<br />
rationalism.<br />
The arrival <strong>of</strong> the Great Depression spelled the end for Shidehara’s<br />
diplomacy. Powerful voices—most notably from within the army—<br />
charged that his policy <strong>of</strong> peaceful, economic expansion into China<br />
had failed. They advocated the adoption <strong>of</strong> more proactive measures,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> what these measures signified for the future <strong>of</strong> great<br />
power cooperation. His support for the naval limitation proposals put<br />
forth at the London Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1930, furthermore, caused<br />
powerful elements within the Navy to turn against him. The final nail<br />
in the c<strong>of</strong>fin <strong>of</strong> his diplomacy came with the Manchurian Incident<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1931. Washington initially had faith in Shidehara’s ability to localize<br />
the fighting and bring a prompt end to the affair, but it soon became<br />
obvious to all concerned that he was powerless in the face <strong>of</strong><br />
the Kwantung Army’s intransigence.<br />
SHIGEMITSU–DULLES MEETING. In 1955, <strong>Japan</strong>ese Deputy<br />
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and U.S.<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Foster Dulles held a three-day meeting from<br />
31 August to 2 September to discuss contemporary political events<br />
pertaining to East Asia and other regions <strong>of</strong> the world. Regarding<br />
East Asia, the two <strong>of</strong>ficials shared the same opinion: destabilizing<br />
factors remaining from World War II meant that the free world, or<br />
mainly Western countries, would have to continue to closely cooperate<br />
to maintain peace in the region. Shigemitsu indicated that <strong>Japan</strong>
SHIMONOSEKI BOMBARDMENT • 229<br />
was determined to take part in cooperating with the free world, led by<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, a decision that became the core <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s foreign<br />
policy for helping to preserve international peace. Shigemitsu and<br />
Dulles agreed that it would be necessary for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> to foster closer cooperation and consultation with each other on<br />
a range <strong>of</strong> issues that were <strong>of</strong> common interest to the governments <strong>of</strong><br />
both countries.<br />
In regard to <strong>Japan</strong>’s national security, Shigemitsu and Dulles addressed<br />
certain basic issues. One issue was an argument by<br />
Shigemitsu that while <strong>Japan</strong> had managed to acquire substantial defensive<br />
capabilities since the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, any increase in<br />
its capabilities would have to be done incrementally because <strong>of</strong> domestic<br />
political and budget constraints. Shigemitsu outlined to<br />
Dulles plans by <strong>Japan</strong>ese defense authorities for increasing <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
defensive military posture. The two <strong>of</strong>ficials agreed to examine<br />
these plans together, and they also jointly voiced the opinion that<br />
the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> security treaty existing at that time should be replaced<br />
by a treaty with enhanced bilateral features. Shigemitsu and<br />
Dulles also agreed in principle on two other points: the U.S. and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese governments should explore a gradual withdrawal <strong>of</strong><br />
American ground forces from <strong>Japan</strong> as the latter increased its defense<br />
capabilities; and the desirability <strong>of</strong> a gradual decrease in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s financial assistance to U.S. forces stationed in <strong>Japan</strong> over<br />
the next several years.<br />
SHIMONOSEKI BOMBARDMENT (1864). Choshu domain leaders<br />
upset at the Tokugawa shogunate for not expelling foreigners,<br />
began attacking Western trade ships passing through the Shimonoseki<br />
Straits between Honshu and Kyushu Islands. In 1864, a force <strong>of</strong><br />
naval ships from <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, France, Britain, and Holland attacked<br />
forts along the area, landed troops, and destroyed Choshu weapons.<br />
Choshu domain and the Tokugawa government signed a treaty, which<br />
included a substantial indemnity and trade concessions, with the<br />
Western powers. As with the Kagoshima bombardment in Satsuma<br />
one year earlier, Choshu domain turned its attention away from attacking<br />
foreigners and toward overthrowing the Tokugawa bakufu in<br />
the wake <strong>of</strong> the Shimonoseki bombardment. See also MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION.
230 • SHINTO<br />
SHINTO. Literally meaning “the way <strong>of</strong> the gods,” Shinto is recognized<br />
as <strong>Japan</strong>’s native religion, although it has similarities to ancient<br />
practices in Korea. It is a shamanistic, animistic religion <strong>of</strong> purity<br />
based upon worship <strong>of</strong> kami (gods or spirits) who inhabit nature.<br />
There are four main categories <strong>of</strong> Shinto: imperial Shinto, shrine<br />
Shinto, state Shinto, and folk Shinto. In <strong>Japan</strong>, Shinto <strong>of</strong>ten overlaps<br />
with Buddhism, and many <strong>Japan</strong>ese consider themselves adherents<br />
<strong>of</strong> both. Shinto was regarded as enflaming <strong>Japan</strong>ese nationalism and<br />
exercising militarism and was thus repressed by the American authorities<br />
just after World War II.<br />
SHOGUN. Shogun is the shortened version <strong>of</strong> the title, seii tai shogun, literally<br />
meaning “barbarian-expelling general.” Shogun was the title used<br />
by the commander <strong>of</strong> a military government <strong>of</strong> samurai, known as<br />
shogunate or bakufu. The shogun and his government were formally appointed<br />
by the emperor and nominally under the emperor’s command;<br />
but in reality it was the shogun and the bakufu government in command<br />
<strong>of</strong> the country until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The first shogun was<br />
Yoritomo Minamoto (reigned 1192–1199), who established the Kamakura<br />
bakufu; the last shogun was Yoshinobu Tokugawa. See also<br />
CLASS SYSTEM IN JAPAN; TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE.<br />
SHOGUN’S EMBASSY <strong>of</strong> 1860. The Tokugawa shogunate sent more<br />
than 70 <strong>of</strong>ficials and servants on an embassy to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in<br />
1860 for the <strong>of</strong>ficial purpose <strong>of</strong> ratifying the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Amity and Commerce negotiated by the American minister<br />
Townsend Harris and shogunate regent Naosuke Ii. In addition to<br />
meeting with President James Buchanan and other American <strong>of</strong>ficials,<br />
the embassy visited San Francisco; Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia;<br />
and New York. This was the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese government overseas<br />
mission to a Western country. See also A BROADWAY PAGEANT.<br />
SIBERIAN INTERVENTION. From July 1918, <strong>Japan</strong>ese, American,<br />
British, and French troops advanced into Siberia. Hopelessly divided<br />
as to the purpose <strong>of</strong> the intervention, the allies—with the exception<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, whose troops remained until October 1922—withdrew their<br />
troops in early 1920.<br />
In the immediate aftermath <strong>of</strong> Russia’s Bolshevik revolution <strong>of</strong> November<br />
1917, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army saw an opportunity to extend <strong>Japan</strong>’s
SINO–JAPANESE WAR • 231<br />
influence into Manchuria and Russia’s Far Eastern provinces. In short,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army emphasized that the Bolshevik revolution afforded<br />
an opportunity to eliminate the Russian threat to <strong>Japan</strong>’s national security.<br />
The army moreover evinced a willingness to dispatch troops,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> the attitude <strong>of</strong> other nations. Although Foreign Minister<br />
Ichirō Motono supported the army’s stand, most policymakers in<br />
Tokyo emphasized the necessity <strong>of</strong> first gaining allied understanding.<br />
Debate in Tokyo heightened after receipt <strong>of</strong> a British–French<br />
proposal for an allied intervention into Siberia. The army and Foreign<br />
Minister Motono remained proactive in their emphases on a<br />
move into Siberia, although various members <strong>of</strong> the powerful Advisory<br />
Council on Foreign Relations—including Takashi Hara<br />
and Nobuaki Makino—as well as Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake<br />
urged caution. Their major point <strong>of</strong> focus was the perceived<br />
need for American cooperation. Washington in March made clear<br />
its stance when it stated that intervention might arouse “hot resentment”<br />
in Russia. American attitudes turned, however, after<br />
Bolshevik forces clashed with some 60,000 Czech troops who had<br />
been fighting the Germans. So far as Tokyo was concerned, the issue<br />
was decided when, in July 1918, Washington proposed a joint<br />
intervention.<br />
The allied troops’ ostensible purpose was to guard military<br />
supplies—which it was feared might fall into German hands—and<br />
to assist in the escape <strong>of</strong> the above-mentioned Czech troops. American<br />
troops, in reality, kept a close eye on their <strong>Japan</strong>ese counterparts,<br />
whose numbers quickly swelled from 7,000 to 80,000. For<br />
their part, <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops were motivated by the perceived need to<br />
halt the Far Eastern territorial gains <strong>of</strong> the Bolshevik regime. A significant<br />
step to this end was taken when, in May 1919, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government granted de facto recognition to the Aleksandr<br />
Kolchak regime in western Siberia. Even after that regime collapsed,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops continued fighting against the Sovietsponsored<br />
Far Eastern Republic. In a conciliatory gesture to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Tokyo withdrew its troops in 1922.<br />
SINO–JAPANESE WAR (1894–1895). Once the internal Tonghak Rebellion<br />
in Korea grew too large for the Korean government to contain,<br />
both China and <strong>Japan</strong> sent in military forces to protect their nationals<br />
and their economic interests. Chinese and <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops soon began
232 • SINO–JAPANESE WAR<br />
fighting against each other and declared war on each other. Fighting<br />
took place primarily in Korea and in the Manchurian province <strong>of</strong><br />
China. <strong>Japan</strong>’s modernized forces defeated China’s ill-equipped<br />
forces. With the Shimonoseki Treaty, China was forced to pay a large<br />
indemnity, cede Taiwan to <strong>Japan</strong>, and allow several other <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
economic and military concessions. With the Triple Intervention <strong>of</strong><br />
Russia, Germany, and France, <strong>Japan</strong> was forced to give up one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
major gains from the Shimonoseki Treaty, the Liaotung Peninsula. See<br />
also ITO, HIROBUMI; MEIJI ERA; RUSSO–JAPANESE WAR.<br />
SINO–JAPANESE WAR (1937–1945). The China Incident (Sino–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese War) raged for eight years, from 1937 until 1945. It started<br />
with a small skirmish on the Marco Polo Bridge (just west <strong>of</strong> Peking)<br />
on 7 July 1937. In the immediate aftermath <strong>of</strong> this skirmish, the cabinet<br />
<strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe was confronted with a choice: it<br />
could seek to force an armistice agreement by militarily chastising the<br />
Chinese, or it could adopt a conciliatory policy toward the Chinese and<br />
in so doing smooth <strong>Japan</strong>’s relations with the great powers. Konoe’s<br />
cabinet chose the former course, in the apparent belief that Chinese<br />
leader Chiang Kai-shek would back down if confronted by a preponderance<br />
<strong>of</strong> force. This was the first in a litany <strong>of</strong> disastrous policy options<br />
that characterized <strong>Japan</strong>ese efforts to end the China Incident.<br />
By the end <strong>of</strong> 1938 most major cities in China had fallen into<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese hands. Even so, Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to surrender confronted<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> with a quandary <strong>of</strong> mammoth proportions. There was<br />
no conceivable end to the war, and <strong>Japan</strong>’s national strength was<br />
draining away in the quagmire. All the while, <strong>Japan</strong>’s reliance on the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for precious resources—particularly oil—was increasing.<br />
Washington <strong>of</strong>fered a timely reminder <strong>of</strong> this fact when, in July<br />
1939, it announced its intention to abrogate the U.S.–JAPAN<br />
TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.<br />
In the hope <strong>of</strong> bringing an end to the China Incident, in March 1940,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> helped establish a collaborationist regime in Nanjing. Headed by<br />
Wang Ching-wei, a prominent government <strong>of</strong>ficial who had parted<br />
company with Chiang Kai-shek and had chosen instead the path <strong>of</strong> cooperation<br />
with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese, the establishment <strong>of</strong> the Nanjing regime<br />
did little to extricate <strong>Japan</strong> from China. Fighting continued, as did<br />
guerilla attacks within those regions under <strong>Japan</strong>ese control. <strong>Japan</strong>’s re-
SOUTHWARD ADVANCE • 233<br />
action to its inability to bring an end to the China Incident was curious:<br />
it widened its sphere <strong>of</strong> military activities. <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in September<br />
1940 moved into northern Indochina, and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> responded<br />
by slapping a virtual embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade<br />
iron, and steel scrap. The fighting in China continued unabated; in July<br />
1941, <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces occupied the remainder <strong>of</strong> Indochina. For its part,<br />
Washington froze <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and established<br />
an embargo on oil.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese Government was by no means united, although significant<br />
voices—particularly within the army and navy—at this juncture<br />
began positing the inevitability <strong>of</strong> conflict with the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>. <strong>Japan</strong> attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. This step<br />
ensured that <strong>Japan</strong> would never emerge victorious over China, for the<br />
enormous fighting capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s new enemy guaranteed that its<br />
attentions—and resources—were concentrated not on the continent,<br />
but in the Pacific. After <strong>Japan</strong> accepted the terms <strong>of</strong> the Potsdam<br />
Declaration, it formally surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek on 9 September<br />
1945. See also SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ.<br />
SOUTHWARD ADVANCE. The term southward advance refers to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s advance into the resource-rich colonial regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast<br />
Asia. Long considered the prerogative <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese navy, for many<br />
years, it was conceived <strong>of</strong> as a peaceful, economically driven undertaking.<br />
All this changed as German armies in the summer <strong>of</strong> 1940<br />
overran the region’s colonial masters in Western Europe.<br />
The navy’s hawkish middle echelons began trumpeting the opportunity<br />
that German victories had given <strong>Japan</strong> to replace the European<br />
colonial powers in Southeast Asia. Of particular interest was the oil <strong>of</strong><br />
the Dutch East Indies, which carried with it the tantalizing prospect <strong>of</strong><br />
reducing the navy’s dependence on the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. For reasons <strong>of</strong> its<br />
own, by mid-1940, the army had shelved its traditional emphasis on operations<br />
against northern China and the Soviet Union, and turned its attentions<br />
to a southward advance. Upon his assumption <strong>of</strong> the foreign<br />
minister’s post in July 1940, Yōsuke Matsuoka revealed his receptivity<br />
to this enthusiasm for a southward advance, stating that <strong>Japan</strong> should<br />
take “positive measures” to incorporate British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese<br />
colonies into <strong>Japan</strong>’s empire. By September 1940, <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
troops had marched into northern Indochina. If <strong>Japan</strong>ese policymakers
234 • SOVIET–JAPANESE NEUTRALITY TREATY<br />
required any reminders that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> provided the principal<br />
stumbling block to the southward advance, they got it when Washington<br />
responded to the advance into northern Indochina by slapping a virtual<br />
embargo on aviation gasoline, high-grade iron, and steel scrap.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> undertook no further advance to the south in the first half <strong>of</strong><br />
1941. In March the army and navy agreed that <strong>Japan</strong> should only<br />
progress peacefully, unless the <strong>Japan</strong>ese empire’s self-existence and<br />
self-defense were at stake. When Adolf Hitler launched his assault<br />
against the Soviet Union in late June, however, attentions in Tokyo<br />
again turned to the southward advance. The navy was particularly vociferous.<br />
By late July, <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops had occupied all <strong>of</strong> Indochina.<br />
Washington again responded, this time by freezing <strong>Japan</strong>ese assets in<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, embargoing oil, and cutting <strong>of</strong>f negotiations with<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s ambassador, Kichisaburō Nomura. This placed the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
navy in a desperate situation. Without oil, its battleships could not<br />
move. It subsequently turned its attentions to securing the oil <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Dutch East Indies, even at risk <strong>of</strong> war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. For its<br />
part, the army began pressing for a decision <strong>of</strong> war against the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and Britain. The navy was trapped in its own circuitous reasoning:<br />
in order to prepare for war against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, it needed<br />
to secure the oil <strong>of</strong> the Dutch East Indies, which, in turn, made war<br />
against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> inevitable. See also PEARL HARBOR.<br />
SOVIET–JAPANESE NEUTRALITY TREATY (1941). The Soviet–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Neutrality Treaty was part <strong>of</strong> Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka’s<br />
grand design for strengthening <strong>Japan</strong>’s hand at the negotiating<br />
table with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Upon his assumption <strong>of</strong> the foreign minister’s<br />
post, Matsuoka negotiated the terms <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>–Germany–<br />
Italy Tripartite Pact in September 1940. At that time, he explained to<br />
his colleagues in Tokyo that the only course open to <strong>Japan</strong> in its dealings<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was to maintain a “firm stand.” In short, he<br />
sought to draw the Soviet Union into an expanded alliance network<br />
that was aimed ultimately at cowing the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> into its isolationist<br />
shell. This, in turn, he argued, would free <strong>Japan</strong> in its efforts<br />
to establish its hegemony over the greater part <strong>of</strong> East Asia. It was<br />
with such a diplomatic vision that Matsuoka departed for Europe in<br />
March 1941.<br />
After a brief stopover in Moscow, during which he bored Joseph<br />
Stalin with his lectures on <strong>Japan</strong>ese–Soviet compatibility, Matsuoka
SPANISH–AMERICAN WAR, 1898 • 235<br />
proceeded to Berlin. For someone who prided himself on his sharp<br />
diplomatic mind, this segment <strong>of</strong> the trip should have revealed to<br />
Matsuoka the bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> the Tripartite Pact. Adolf Hitler, who<br />
was immersed in plans for an assault on the very nation that Matsuoka<br />
planned to bring into the Axis, refused to be drawn into Matsuoka’s<br />
idea <strong>of</strong> an expanded pact. Matsuoka, for his part, having been<br />
forbidden by the Imperial Army to make any binding commitments<br />
about <strong>Japan</strong>ese contributions to the German subjugation <strong>of</strong> Great<br />
Britain, could not give Hitler the much-sought guarantee that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would invade Singapore. Then, in spite <strong>of</strong> the Germans’ implicit<br />
warnings <strong>of</strong> pending war with the Soviet Union, Matsuoka proceeded<br />
to Moscow and, on 13 April, signed a neutrality treaty with Stalin.<br />
Rather than creating an overwhelming anti–Anglo–American front,<br />
Matsuoka deepened the fissures that had appeared in <strong>Japan</strong>’s alliance<br />
with Germany, while in no way lessening Washington’s resolve to<br />
oppose the Axis alliance.<br />
Following Pearl Harbor, the two nations maintained an uneasy<br />
neutrality until April 1945, when the Soviet Union announced that it<br />
would not renew its neutrality treaty with <strong>Japan</strong>. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
chose to ignore the writing on the wall and sought the Soviet<br />
Union’s aid in securing a favorable peace settlement from the Allies.<br />
Why the Soviet Union should turn its back on its alliance relationship<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great Britain to instead back the side that<br />
was obviously losing the war is a question that Tokyo never seriously<br />
contemplated. The truth hit home when the Soviet Union in August<br />
1945 mauled <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces in Manchuria, at the same time that the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was launching the world’s first atomic bomb attacks<br />
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<br />
SPANISH–AMERICAN WAR, 1898. War fought by <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
military forces against Spanish military forces in Cuba and the<br />
Philippines. The outcome <strong>of</strong> the war marked the end <strong>of</strong> the Spanish<br />
overseas empire and the emergence <strong>of</strong> an American overseas empire.<br />
Spain was forced to give Cuba its freedom, while ceding the Philippines,<br />
Guam, and Puerto Rico to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Because <strong>of</strong> the geographic<br />
proximity <strong>of</strong> the Philippines to <strong>Japan</strong>, and with the nearsimultaneous<br />
American annexation <strong>of</strong> the Hawaiian Islands, political<br />
tensions arose between the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong>. See also<br />
HAWAII; MCKINLEY, WILLIAM, ROOSEVELT, THEODORE.
236 • SPECIAL LEGISLATION CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ<br />
SPECIAL LEGISLATION CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE IN<br />
THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ. This legislation was enacted as a<br />
temporary statute with a four-year life span on 26 July 2003 in order<br />
to dispatch Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq to assist in<br />
rebuilding the country. It was promulgated and became effective on<br />
1 August 2003. The legislation consists <strong>of</strong> 21 articles and a supplement<br />
to the law.<br />
The dispatch <strong>of</strong> the SDF is based on UN Security Council resolution<br />
concerning assistance for rebuilding Iraq. The SDF has two primary<br />
responsibilities: humanitarian assistance for reconstruction activities,<br />
such as providing medical services and supplies, and<br />
providing logistic support for multinational armed forces stationed in<br />
the region. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government planned to dispatch government<br />
survey missions to Iraq immediately, and the Ground Self-Defense<br />
Force in October 2003; however, because <strong>of</strong> the danger, Tokyo<br />
had to postpone this.<br />
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dispatched government survey<br />
missions and the SDF’s special survey missions to Iraq in September<br />
and November 2003, respectively. On 9 December 2003, the<br />
Koizumi administration passed the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi<br />
Reconstruction Special Measures Law as a basic plan stipulating the<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> dispatch and the contents and scale <strong>of</strong> activities. Based on<br />
this legislation, the Defense Agency drew up an implementation outline<br />
<strong>of</strong> the framework for SDF deployment that was approved by<br />
Prime Minister Koizumi on 18 December 2003. Tokyo dispatched an<br />
advance group <strong>of</strong> the Air Self-Defense Force in December 2003 and<br />
the main unit <strong>of</strong> the Air Self-Defense Force in January 2004 to<br />
Samawa. They were known as the <strong>Japan</strong>ese Iraq Reconstruction and<br />
Support Group. The term <strong>of</strong> dispatch was for one year from 15 December<br />
2003 to 14 December 2004. The Koizumi administration extended<br />
the term for one year on 9 December 2004. In December<br />
2005, the Koizumi administration extended the special legislation<br />
calling for assistance in the rebuilding <strong>of</strong> Iraq for another year. As<br />
Britain seriously considered withdrawing its armed forces from Iraq,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> announced in January 2006 that it was considering similar action.<br />
On 22 March 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi claimed that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would decide when to withdraw the SDF from Iraq when it saw fit.<br />
See also DEFENSE.
STIMSON, HENRY • 237<br />
STIMSON, HENRY (1867–1960). An old follower <strong>of</strong> Theodore Roosevelt,<br />
Henry Stimson conceived <strong>of</strong> international relations as governed<br />
by strict standards <strong>of</strong> moral principles and moral respect. From<br />
1911 to 1913, Stimson served as Secretary <strong>of</strong> War in the administration<br />
<strong>of</strong> President William Howard Taft, in which capacity he reorganized<br />
and modernized the War Department. After the outbreak <strong>of</strong><br />
World War I, he joined the army and served in France as an artillery<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer. He was appointed governor <strong>of</strong> the Philippines in 1927, only<br />
to leave the islands after two years to take up a position as President<br />
Herbert Hoover’s secretary <strong>of</strong> state. Hoover—who did not know<br />
Stimson well and approached him only after three other men had<br />
turned down the post—may well have regretted the decision, for the<br />
two men differed sharply over Far Eastern policy.<br />
But this split was not immediately obvious. Stimson headed the<br />
American delegation to the London Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1930. He<br />
emerged impressed with the courage <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government for<br />
having pushed ahead with naval limitation in spite <strong>of</strong> the opposition<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Navy General Staff. He told the Senate Foreign Relations<br />
Committee: “I take my hat <strong>of</strong>f to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government in this<br />
treaty.”<br />
Soon after the Manchurian Incident <strong>of</strong> September 1931, when<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese cabinet revealed itself more or less powerless to rein in<br />
its army, however, Stimson’s attitude toward Tokyo hardened. Viewing<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese aggression as a threat to international peace, Stimson<br />
emerged as a foremost advocate <strong>of</strong> a policy <strong>of</strong> firmness toward the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese. This, in turn, put him at odds with President Hoover, who<br />
was determined to limit the nation’s foreign commitments. Hoover,<br />
nonetheless, agreed with Stimson that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> should condemn<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s actions. Thus was born the Stimson Non-Recognition<br />
Doctrine. In identical notes to <strong>Japan</strong> and China on 7 January 1932,<br />
the American government refused to recognize any changes in China<br />
brought about by force and in violation <strong>of</strong> the Open Door policy.<br />
This remained a benchmark <strong>of</strong> American policy right through until<br />
Pearl Harbor.<br />
After Franklin D. Roosevelt won the presidential election <strong>of</strong><br />
1933, Stimson practiced law. He remained in the public eye, however,<br />
with his public calls for a hardline policy toward <strong>Japan</strong>. Roosevelt<br />
then appointed him Secretary <strong>of</strong> War in July 1940. In this
238 • STONEWALL, CSS<br />
position, he continued until Pearl Harbor to advocate a hardline<br />
policy toward <strong>Japan</strong>’s hegemonic aspirations. Toward the end <strong>of</strong><br />
the war, he promoted the use <strong>of</strong> the atomic bomb. He also believed<br />
that Washington should assure Tokyo that surrender would not endanger<br />
the institution <strong>of</strong> the emperor. He resigned his post as Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> War in September 1945, soon after <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender.<br />
STONEWALL, CSS. Built by a French shipbuilding company and sold<br />
to the Confederate <strong>States</strong> <strong>of</strong> America in 1864, the ironclad ram CSS<br />
Stonewall arrived in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> too late to help the Confederacy<br />
turn the tide in the American Civil War. The ship was sold by<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government to the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867,<br />
but delivered to the new Meiji government after the fall <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa<br />
government in early 1868. Under the name Kotetsu (literally<br />
“ironclad”), the ship took part in the Battle <strong>of</strong> Hakodate in 1869, the<br />
last significant battle between the new Meiji imperial forces and supporters<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fallen Tokugawa government. Renamed Azuma, the<br />
former CSS Stonewall served in the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy until<br />
1888. See also BOSHIN WAR.<br />
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (SII). During the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> summit meeting at the Arche Summit in July 1989 attended<br />
by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime<br />
Minister Sosuke Uno, the two leaders formally decided to establish<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative. The first Structural<br />
Impediments talks were held in Tokyo in September 1989, while later<br />
talks alternated between the two countries’ capitals until the initiative<br />
process ended in June 1990. Starting in the mid-1980s, new frictions<br />
in the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. economic and trade relationship began to surface.<br />
The problem areas were individual commodities, such as automobiles<br />
and semiconductors, and a structural trade imbalance arising<br />
from certain institutional and business practices. In July 1990, the final<br />
report <strong>of</strong> the Structural Impediments talks was issued.<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this was to supplement economic policy cooperation<br />
efforts for correcting foreign trade imbalances and to distinguish<br />
and solve structural impediments that had become barriers to adjusting<br />
trade and the balance <strong>of</strong> international payments between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.
SUPER 301 PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE • 239<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> cited seven structural impediments in the American economy,<br />
including savings, investment patterns, corporate investment<br />
activities and productive power, and corporate behaviors. <strong>Japan</strong> not<br />
only pointed out the necessity <strong>of</strong> increasing individual savings rates<br />
and efforts to reduce fiscal deficit, but also suggested ideas for American<br />
corporations to recover their competitiveness. On the other hand,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> indicated six structural impediments in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
economy including savings and investment patterns, the product<br />
distribution system, and exclusive trade practices.<br />
It is important to note that because both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
recognized that contributing to solving foreign trade imbalance problems<br />
and developing smooth economic relations between <strong>Japan</strong> and<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would be essential conditions for the world economy<br />
to achieve balanced growth, these countries decided to carry out the<br />
SII. In particular, it was epoch-making that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, which<br />
had <strong>of</strong>ten unilaterally passed the responsibility for trade friction to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, actually recognized that there were many structural impediments<br />
within the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> itself and it demonstrated its willingness<br />
to tackle the problems. The SII was not a negotiation, but an exchange<br />
<strong>of</strong> ideas to deal with structural impediments by friendly nations in various<br />
fields. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
SUPER 301 PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND<br />
COMPETITIVE ACT OF 1988. The Super 301 provisions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act <strong>of</strong> 1988 were enacted into<br />
law by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1988. The law was created to help identify<br />
countries, categories <strong>of</strong> foreign businesses, and import items that<br />
were associated with unfair trading practices based on annual U.S.<br />
government surveys. If an unfair trading practice was discovered, the<br />
Super 301 law provided a grace period during which the U.S. government<br />
was to negotiate an end to the practice with the <strong>of</strong>fending<br />
country. If an agreement could not be reached, the law allowed Washington<br />
to impose trade sanctions.<br />
The Super 301 law was only valid for a short period. It expired in<br />
1997, after being extended twice. However, through presidential order<br />
by President Bill Clinton on 1 April 1999, the Super 301 provisions<br />
were revived owing to new appearances <strong>of</strong> trade friction following<br />
the increase <strong>of</strong> the U.S. trade deficit and exteriorization <strong>of</strong>
240 • SUZUKI, KANTARO<br />
downward trend in the U.S. economy. The Super 301 law passed by<br />
the U.S. Congress stipulated that after the U.S. Trade Representative<br />
(USTR) wrote a report about trade barriers, it would have to enter<br />
into investigation <strong>of</strong> a specific country to break these barriers. However,<br />
the Super 301 revived under the presidential directive allowed<br />
only very limited time before picking the specific country. Moreover,<br />
because the revived Super 301 established a 90-day period for intensive<br />
negotiations, it was easier for the U.S. government to put pressure<br />
on the other country to liberalize its market. Other countries<br />
were highly critical <strong>of</strong> the revived Super 301, viewing it as a U.S.<br />
unilateral measure <strong>of</strong> trade sanctions that might be in violation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
World Trade Organization agreement. The earlier Super 301 was effective<br />
in opening up the <strong>Japan</strong>ese market to imports <strong>of</strong> U.S. super<br />
computers and telecommunications equipment. The revived Super<br />
301 further opened <strong>Japan</strong>’s market to imports <strong>of</strong> U.S. automobiles,<br />
automobile parts, insurance, and rice. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE<br />
CONFLICTS.<br />
SUZUKI, KANTARO (1867–1948). Kantaro Suzuki, full admiral, was<br />
prime minister <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> from 7 April 1945 to 17 August 1945. Suzuki<br />
was born in Sakai, Osaka. He graduated from the naval academy and<br />
served in the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese and Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Wars. In 1923,<br />
he was promoted to full admiral. Suzuki intensified preparations to<br />
fight against the Allied forces on the mainland <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> after the<br />
bloody battle in Okinawa. At the same time, he made every effort to<br />
end the war by negotiating with the Soviet Union with the ultimate<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> maintaining <strong>Japan</strong>’s national polity. When the Allied powers<br />
announced the Potsdam Declaration, he was reported to say, “ignore<br />
it entirely” or “reject” the declaration. However, Suzuki meant<br />
to say, “I will not make any special comment.” The dropping <strong>of</strong> the<br />
atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war compelled <strong>Japan</strong> to accept<br />
the Potsdam Declaration. In December 1945, Suzuki once again<br />
became president <strong>of</strong> the Council.<br />
– T –<br />
TAFT–KATSURA AGREEMENT (1905). The Taft–Katsura Agreement<br />
was a secret agreement negotiated in July 1905 by U.S. Secre-
TO – GO – , SHIGENORI • 241<br />
tary <strong>of</strong> War William Howard Taft and <strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Minister Tarō<br />
Katsura. By the terms <strong>of</strong> the agreement, <strong>Japan</strong> acknowledged American<br />
sovereignty in the Philippines. For its part, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
promised its approval if <strong>Japan</strong> should find it necessary to assume<br />
control <strong>of</strong> the international relations <strong>of</strong> Korea.<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> President Theodore Roosevelt approved the agreement<br />
on 2 August 1905. As an executive agreement, it avoided potentially<br />
raucous ratification debates in the U.S. Senate. Concluded<br />
before <strong>Japan</strong>ese and Russian delegates met to negotiate the terms <strong>of</strong><br />
the Portsmouth Treaty (which brought a formal end to the<br />
Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War), the Taft–Katsura Agreement should be seen<br />
within the larger context <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American effort to prevent a<br />
clash between their growing empires. The agreement formed the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Root–Takahira Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1908, which reaffirmed<br />
American and <strong>Japan</strong>ese commitments to respect each other’s possessions<br />
in Asia.<br />
TERASHIMA, MUNENORI (1832–1893). From Satsuma domain,<br />
Terashima studied Western languages and medicine, and was one <strong>of</strong><br />
several Satsuma samurai sent to study in England in 1865. After returning<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>, Terashima became the minister <strong>of</strong> foreign affairs in<br />
the new Meiji government and thereafter served in several foreign affairs-related<br />
posts. See also MEIJI ERA.<br />
TŌGŌ, SHIGENORI (1882–1950). Shigenori Tōgō was a career<br />
diplomat who held the post <strong>of</strong> foreign minister at the time <strong>of</strong> both<br />
Pearl Harbor and <strong>Japan</strong>’s surrender. A graduate <strong>of</strong> Tokyo Imperial<br />
University, he entered the Foreign Ministry in 1912. His first post<br />
was to Mukden, the center <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese activities in Manchuria. During<br />
the war, he was posted to Switzerland, before serving as a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In the early<br />
post–World War I era, Tōgō was posted to Berlin. He returned to<br />
Tokyo in 1921, and after working for recognition <strong>of</strong> the Soviet government,<br />
he was posted to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1925. After a brief<br />
subsequent stint in Germany, Tōgō again returned to Tokyo in 1933.<br />
He worked closely with Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, and in 1937,<br />
was posted as ambassador to Germany. Soon thereafter, he was transferred<br />
to Moscow, at which post it fell upon him to negotiate an end<br />
to the Battle <strong>of</strong> Nomonhan.
242 • TO – JO – , HIDEKI<br />
Recalled from the Soviet Union by Foreign Minister Yōsuke<br />
Matsuoka in August 1940, Tōgō in October 1941 was appointed<br />
foreign minister in the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō. His<br />
primary task upon assumption <strong>of</strong> the foreign minister’s post was unraveling<br />
the deadlocked <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American negotiations, to<br />
which end he contributed little, sending the so-called Plans A and B<br />
to ambassadors Kichisaburō Nomura and Kurusu Saburō in November<br />
1941.<br />
After <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941,<br />
Tōgō directed his subordinates in the Foreign Ministry to direct all<br />
their energies toward an early negotiated peace. A negotiated peace,<br />
however, rested on the assumption that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was willing<br />
to negotiate, which it patently was not. Tōgō resigned his post later<br />
in 1942 to protest the creation <strong>of</strong> the Greater East Asian Ministry.<br />
Again appointed foreign minister in April 1945 in the cabinet <strong>of</strong><br />
Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki, Tōgō masterminded an approach to<br />
the Soviet Union in an effort to secure a favorable peace settlement<br />
from the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The Soviets remained noncommittal, and on<br />
26 July the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and China issued the Potsdam<br />
Declaration. Tōgō only came into his own after the American<br />
atomic bomb attack against Hiroshima on 6 August, when he moved<br />
decisively to bring an end to the war.<br />
TŌJŌ, HIDEKI (1884–1948). <strong>Japan</strong>’s prime minister at the time <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s attack against Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Hideki Tōjō<br />
was an incisive, quick-tempered army general who in the postwar era<br />
was executed as a Class-A war criminal. The son <strong>of</strong> a lieutenantgeneral,<br />
Tōjō graduated from the army’s War College in 1915. He<br />
spent several years in Switzerland and Germany from the late 1910s<br />
to the early 1920s, and subsequently held various important posts in<br />
Manchuria (including chief <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s forces stationed there).<br />
He returned to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1938 to serve as vice war minister, and in July<br />
1940 was appointed war minister in the second cabinet <strong>of</strong> Prime Minister<br />
Fumimaro Konoe. In October 1941, Tōjō precipitated the collapse<br />
<strong>of</strong> Konoe’s third cabinet by arguing against the possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
conciliation with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as he refused to consent<br />
to the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops from China, Tōjō was consistent<br />
in his arguments.
TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE • 243<br />
Whatever the case, Tōjō was appointed Konoe’s successor as<br />
prime minister. Directed by the emperor to seek diplomatic rapprochement<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Tōjō led his cabinet in early November<br />
to the decision whereby it would carry on negotiations with<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> while at the same time preparing for war. It should<br />
be noted, however, that the terms for diplomatic rapprochement that<br />
Tōjō’s cabinet agreed upon <strong>of</strong>fered next to no hope <strong>of</strong> a diplomatic<br />
breakthrough with Washington.<br />
The Tōjō cabinet entered war against the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great<br />
Britain, and the Dutch in the belief that Germany would emerge victorious<br />
over the British. <strong>Japan</strong> would facilitate this by knocking<br />
Britain out <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia. In the meantime, it would force the collapse<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chiang Kai-shek’s regime and simultaneously build an East<br />
Asian sphere impregnable to American counterattack. In this way, the<br />
Tōjō cabinet hoped to bring an isolated and dispirited <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
to the negotiating table. This scenario never eventuated, and, by July<br />
1944, <strong>Japan</strong> had suffered enough setbacks in the war to force Tōjō’s<br />
surrender. Arrested soon after the war’s end as a war criminal, he accepted<br />
responsibility for his government’s actions during the war and<br />
was hanged in December 1948. See also INTERNATIONAL MILI-<br />
TARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST; WOLRD WAR II.<br />
TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE. The Tokugawa “military government”<br />
(bakufu), headed by a shogun from one <strong>of</strong> three Tokugawa family<br />
branches, was established in 1600 and lasted until 1868. Although formally<br />
appointed by the emperor, the Tokugawa shogunate was the<br />
dominant government in <strong>Japan</strong>, primarily because its samurai armies<br />
could be called upon to meet any challenge and put down any rebellion.<br />
Any challenge to shogunate authority usually meant death for the<br />
challenger. Individual daimyō (lord) who followed shogunate rules<br />
and were not suspected <strong>of</strong> disloyalty were allowed to rule their<br />
provinces with relative autonomy. In the 1850s, however, strong individual<br />
daimyō with significant numbers <strong>of</strong> samurai, and the imperial<br />
house challenged Tokugawa rule, leading to the overthrow <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate and transfer <strong>of</strong> power from the last shogun to the<br />
emperor in 1868. See also AIZU DOMAIN; CHOSHU DOMAIN;<br />
CLASS SYSTEM IN JAPAN; DUTCH LEARNING (RANGAKU,<br />
IN JAPANESE); EDO; SATSUMA DOMAIN.
244 • TOKUGAWA, YOSHINOBU<br />
TOKUGAWA, YOSHINOBU (ALSO KNOWN AS KEIKI HITOT-<br />
SUBASHI, 1837–1913). The 15th and last shogun <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>, he<br />
reigned for only two years, 1866–1867, but played a major role in the<br />
Tokugawa shogunate government for several years before he ascended<br />
to the position <strong>of</strong> shogun. He formally gave up his powers to<br />
the imperial house in late 1867, but his supporters fought against the<br />
anti-Tokugawa forces led by Satsuma and Choshu domains for another<br />
year. He was declared an enemy <strong>of</strong> the state in 1868, and then<br />
pardoned the following year. Although admired by many <strong>Japan</strong>ese,<br />
he played no role in political affairs after 1868. See also BOSHIN<br />
WAR; MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
TOKYO FIREBOMBING (9–10 MARCH 1945). The largest and most<br />
deadly firebombing raid launched by American military forces during<br />
World War II killed more than 100,000 people in Tokyo. During the<br />
final months <strong>of</strong> the war, American B-29 bombers struck Tokyo, Yokohama,<br />
Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Sendai, and several other cities with either<br />
firebombs (incendiary bombs) or conventional bombs. See also<br />
ATOMIC BOMBINGS; PACIFIC WAR; WORLD WAR II.<br />
TOSHIBA MACHINE INCIDENT. On 27 May 1987, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
police arrested two senior executives from Toshiba Machine Co. The<br />
two had been in charge <strong>of</strong> designing and exporting strategically sensitive<br />
products to the Soviet Union: Toshiba Machine Co.’s four nineaxis<br />
and four five-axis milling machines in 1982–1984 and 1984, respectively,<br />
in violation <strong>of</strong> the Coordinating Committee on<br />
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> complained<br />
that the machines were used to make improved propellers for<br />
Soviet submarines that made them quieter and harder to detect. However,<br />
information disclosed after the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union revealed<br />
that this was a false accusation. The Soviet Union had just improved<br />
its nuclear-powered submarines to absorb noises. This<br />
incident developed into a major diplomatic row, resulting in a U.S.<br />
ban <strong>of</strong> Toshiba, the parent company <strong>of</strong> Toshiba Machine Co., exports<br />
to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. This harsh sanction was partly a consequence <strong>of</strong><br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> trade conflicts that had arisen in the 1970s. U.S. criticism<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong> escalated. In order to deal with this crisis, Tokyo promised<br />
to strengthen domestic laws concerning the COCOM regula-
TRILATERAL COMMISSION • 245<br />
tions. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese government revised the Foreign Exchange and<br />
Foreign Trade Control Law in September 1987.<br />
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA (TREATY<br />
OF TAIPEI). The Treaty <strong>of</strong> Peace between <strong>Japan</strong> and Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
China (ROC) was designed to terminate the war status between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and ROC. It was signed in Taipei on 28 April 1952, and became effective<br />
on 5 August <strong>of</strong> the same year. Major clauses <strong>of</strong> this treaty include<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s abandonment <strong>of</strong> territorial rights over Taiwan, assurance<br />
<strong>of</strong> making efforts to conclude trade and fishing agreements, and<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> a peaceful and friendly relationship between the two<br />
countries. When sex slaves for <strong>Japan</strong>ese soldiers demanded compensation,<br />
the Tokyo District Court handed down a judgment that because<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Peace between <strong>Japan</strong> and ROC, Taiwan had relinquished<br />
its right to request reparation. This treaty was approved by<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, which used ROC as part <strong>of</strong> its efforts to contain the<br />
People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China during the Cold War. See also YOSHIDA<br />
LETTER.<br />
TREATY REVISION. From its reluctant acceptance <strong>of</strong> the Ansei<br />
Treaties <strong>of</strong> 1858, which <strong>Japan</strong> regarded as “the unequal treaties,” a<br />
primary diplomatic goal <strong>of</strong> the Tokugawa shogunate and then the<br />
Meiji government was to revise these treaties on a more equitable basis.<br />
The Iwakura Mission and other diplomatic missions sent by the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese government failed to substantially revise the Ansei Treaties<br />
with Western countries until the 1890s. See also MEIJI ERA; MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION; MUTSU, MUNEMITSU.<br />
TRILATERAL COMMISSION. The Trilateral Commission is a private,<br />
non-pr<strong>of</strong>it policy consultative group advocated by David Rockefeller,<br />
chief executive <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the Chase Manhattan Bank, established<br />
in 1973 by prominent leaders in the private sectors in <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
North America, and Europe. The commission carried out joint research<br />
and discussions about domestic and international problems common to<br />
advanced countries such as macroeconomic policy, international trade,<br />
financial problems, politics and security issues, energy and science and<br />
technology issues. Members also made efforts to deepen their common<br />
understanding and make policy recommendations to governments and
246 • TRIPARTITE PACT<br />
leaders in the private sector. Contributions from foundations and member<br />
corporations form the financial basis <strong>of</strong> the commission.<br />
Each region has its own commission, and the general assembly is<br />
jointly operated by these three commissions. The general assembly is<br />
held in each region in turn once a year. During the three-day session,<br />
there are seminars on the political and economic conditions in the<br />
three regions, reports and discussion <strong>of</strong> joint policy research by task<br />
forces, panel discussions on current affairs, public lectures by opinion<br />
leaders outside the three regions, and exchanges <strong>of</strong> opinions with<br />
government <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the host country. The contents are compiled<br />
in a report and research papers are published as part <strong>of</strong> the “Triangle<br />
Papers” series. Because <strong>of</strong> changes in the international situation and<br />
the development <strong>of</strong> globalization, central European countries began<br />
to join the Europe sector after the mid-1990s, Mexico joined North<br />
America in 2000, and the <strong>Japan</strong> group was expanded to the Pacific<br />
Asian group and Asian countries other than <strong>Japan</strong> joined this region<br />
after 2000.<br />
The headquarters <strong>of</strong> the Pacific Asian group are located in the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> Center for International Exchange, and Yotaro Kobayashi,<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Board, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., serves as its chairman.<br />
The European group, including members from Austria, Belgium, the<br />
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,<br />
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic<br />
<strong>of</strong> Cyprus, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the <strong>United</strong><br />
Kingdom, has a ceiling <strong>of</strong> 150 members. The ceiling for the North<br />
American group is 110, including 15 Canadian members, 10 Mexican<br />
members, and 85 U.S. members.<br />
In 2000, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese group <strong>of</strong> 85 members was expanded to become<br />
a Pacific Asian group <strong>of</strong> 117 members, and includes 75 members from<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>, 11 members from Korea, 7 from Australia and New Zealand, and<br />
15 from the original five Association <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asian Nations<br />
(ASEAN) members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,<br />
and Thailand). The new Pacific Asian group also includes participants<br />
from the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.<br />
TRIPARTITE PACT. The Tripartite Pact signed by Germany, <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
and Italy on 27 September 1940 was by any standard one <strong>of</strong> the greatest<br />
failures in <strong>Japan</strong>ese diplomacy. Long desired by the Imperial
TRIPARTITE PACT • 247<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Army—and long opposed by the Imperial <strong>Japan</strong>ese Navy—<br />
the pact in the end result was the brainchild <strong>of</strong> Foreign Minister Yôsuke<br />
Matsuoka. Upon his assumption <strong>of</strong> the foreign ministership in<br />
July 1940, Matsuoka found in the services a congenial audience<br />
when he spoke with confidence <strong>of</strong> Germany’s ultimate victory in Europe.<br />
Matsuoka argued that tying <strong>Japan</strong>’s fortunes to Germany made<br />
sense because that nation’s war had rendered the European colonial<br />
regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia ripe for <strong>Japan</strong>’s picking. Furthermore, the<br />
prospect <strong>of</strong> incorporating the Soviet Union into the Tripartite Pact—<br />
the Soviets were after all signatory to a non-aggression pact with<br />
Germany—held out the possibility <strong>of</strong> freeing the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army from<br />
its long-standing preoccupation with the threat <strong>of</strong> the Red Army. This<br />
could only serve to heighten enthusiasm for <strong>Japan</strong>’s advance into<br />
resource-rich Southeast Asia.<br />
According to Matsuoka’s diplomatic vision, there was but one remaining<br />
obstacle to <strong>Japan</strong>’s pursuit <strong>of</strong> empire: the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Through the Tripartite Pact, Matsuoka aimed to overcome that obstacle<br />
by adhering to his self-pr<strong>of</strong>essed “firm stand” toward that nation.<br />
Witness Article Three <strong>of</strong> the Pact, which committed the signatories to<br />
“assist one another with all political, economic, and military means<br />
when one <strong>of</strong> the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present<br />
not involved in the European War or the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese conflict.”<br />
This was, as President <strong>of</strong> the Privy Council Hara Yoshimichi noted, “a<br />
treaty <strong>of</strong> alliance with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as its target.” By presenting the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> with the threat <strong>of</strong> war against an overwhelming antidemocratic<br />
front—which, once the Soviet Union had been brought into<br />
the fold, would stretch across the Eurasian continent—Matsuoka<br />
hoped to cow the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> back into its isolationist shell. With the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> out <strong>of</strong> the way, <strong>Japan</strong> would be free to undertake its<br />
southward advance.<br />
The Tripartite Pact was a failure for many reasons. Far from breaking<br />
Washington’s resolve, it steeled it. In threatening the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> with the use <strong>of</strong> force, it did not account for the fact that the<br />
force <strong>Japan</strong> could muster was merely a fraction <strong>of</strong> that which the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> possessed and <strong>Japan</strong>’s alliance partners were in no way<br />
able to make up for that shortfall. It pushed <strong>Japan</strong>—now allied militarily<br />
to America’s proxy enemy in Europe—perilously close to an<br />
unwinnable war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Finally, Matsuoka’s dream <strong>of</strong>
248 • TRIPLE INTERVENTION<br />
drawing the Soviet Union into the fold was never anything more than<br />
a dream. See also SOVIET–JAPANESE NEUTRALITY TREATY.<br />
TRIPLE INTERVENTION. Soon after <strong>Japan</strong> and China signed the<br />
Shimonoseki Treaty ending the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War <strong>of</strong> 1894–1895,<br />
Russia, France, and Germany demanded that <strong>Japan</strong> restore the Liaotung<br />
Peninsula to Chinese sovereignty. Russia, which wanted the<br />
Liaotung Peninsula for its own railway and imperial interests, led the<br />
Triple Intervention challenge. Appealing in vain for American and<br />
British support, <strong>Japan</strong> reluctantly handed the Liaotung Peninsula<br />
back to China, which soon turned over its administration to Russia.<br />
The humiliating Triple Intervention <strong>of</strong> 1895 was a major reason<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> fought—and won—the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong> War <strong>of</strong> 1904–1905.<br />
TSUDA, UMEKO (1865–1929). Daughter <strong>of</strong> progressive scholar Sen<br />
Tsuda, Umeko Tsuda was one <strong>of</strong> five <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls chosen to accompany<br />
the Iwakura Mission in 1871 and live in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
She lived with the family <strong>of</strong> Charles and Adeline Lanman, and attended<br />
school in the Washington, D.C., area until returning to <strong>Japan</strong><br />
in 1882. In 1889, she entered Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania,<br />
majored in biology, and graduated in 1892. Tsuda was the third<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese woman to attend an American college, and the second to<br />
graduate. After teaching at the elite Peeress’s School in Tokyo for<br />
several years, Tsuda established her own college in Tokyo in 1900,<br />
the Girls English School. Despite the name, the Girls English School<br />
adopted a “whole education” program for <strong>Japan</strong>ese women and later<br />
changed its name to Tsuda College. Because <strong>of</strong> significant interest <strong>of</strong><br />
young <strong>Japan</strong>ese women in obtaining higher education, the college<br />
grew to include undergraduate and graduate programs in the many <strong>of</strong><br />
the arts and sciences, and celebrated its centennial anniversary in<br />
2000. Tsuda College is the best-known women’s college in <strong>Japan</strong>,<br />
and Umeko Tsuda was the foremost promoter <strong>of</strong> women’s education<br />
in the late 19th and early 20th century. See also JAPANESE STU-<br />
DENTS IN AMERICA.<br />
TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915. <strong>Japan</strong>ese Foreign Minister<br />
Takaaki Katō in January 1915 handed the so-called Twenty-One Demands<br />
to Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai. A brash attempt to bring
China under <strong>Japan</strong>ese control, the Twenty-One Demands incurred<br />
not only the wrath <strong>of</strong> Chinese nationalism, but also the displeasure <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. By the demands, <strong>Japan</strong> would acquire all German<br />
rights in the Shantung peninsula; receive vast concessions in South<br />
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; control a rich iron and coal company<br />
in central China; and obtain essential control <strong>of</strong> Fukien province. The<br />
final set <strong>of</strong> demands, which were only added after it was realized that<br />
negotiations were in the <strong>of</strong>fing, included a provision for the employment<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese political, financial, and military advisers by the<br />
Chinese government. This is last set <strong>of</strong> demands, in particular, would<br />
have resulted in substantial infringements on Chinese sovereignty.<br />
By May 1915, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government dropped the last <strong>of</strong> these demands,<br />
and the Yuan government signed a series <strong>of</strong> treaties incorporating<br />
the remaining demands.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the last surviving genrō, Aritomo Yamagata, was opposed<br />
to this policy, questioning whether it would promote Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
relations and fearing that it might incur the wrath <strong>of</strong> the great naval<br />
powers. He was right on both counts. Virulent anti-<strong>Japan</strong>ese sentiment<br />
was aroused in China, and this was harmful to <strong>Japan</strong>ese trade<br />
with that country. Moreover, the reaction <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>—<br />
which, unlike Britain, was not wholly engaged in defeating the Germans<br />
in Europe and thus was in a position to do something about<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s frankly expansionist maneuvering in China—confirmed Yamagata’s<br />
fears <strong>of</strong> a great naval power response. Lodging a strong<br />
protest, Secretary <strong>of</strong> State William Jennings Bryan warned the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would not recognize any actions that<br />
“violated Chinese sovereignty.” Although this protest was not backed<br />
by the threat <strong>of</strong> force, it was enough to force Katō to drop the most<br />
extreme <strong>of</strong> his original demands. In the longer term, the Twenty-One<br />
Demands left many Americans with a fundamental distrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
objectives in China.<br />
– U –<br />
UCHIMURA, KANZO • 249<br />
UCHIMURA, KANZO (1861–1930). He studied at the Sapporo Agricultural<br />
College (now known as Hokkaido University) and became a<br />
Christian, along with Inazo Nitobe. From 1884 to 1888, Uchimura
250 • UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER<br />
lived and studied in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Upon his return to <strong>Japan</strong>, he<br />
took up teaching, but his refusal to acknowledge the “Imperial Rescript<br />
on Education” and bow before portraits <strong>of</strong> the Emperor Meiji<br />
led to his removal from teaching positions. Uchimura also founded a<br />
new Christian movement called Mukyōkai, literally “without<br />
church,” and began publishing Christian magazines. He took up writing<br />
autobiographical and religious works, some in <strong>Japan</strong>ese and some<br />
in English, for the remainder <strong>of</strong> his life. See also CHRISTIANITY;<br />
NIIJIMA, JO.<br />
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. Unconditional surrender was the<br />
overarching military objective <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in its war against<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Enunciated by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the<br />
Casablanca Conference <strong>of</strong> January 1943, it also went a long way toward<br />
setting the parameters <strong>of</strong> the postwar peace. To borrow the<br />
words <strong>of</strong> a State Department <strong>of</strong>ficial, the pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s “unconditional<br />
surrender” suggested that America’s goal was not only to defeat<br />
that nation militarily, but also “to render it incapable <strong>of</strong> renewed<br />
aggression and at the same time to eliminate the various factors,<br />
whether economic, social, or political, upon which this aggressive<br />
spirit has thrived.” Debate within the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> government revolved<br />
around the means that would best facilitate such an end.<br />
Protagonists in the debate regarding the unconditional surrender<br />
policy as it applied to <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong>fered two widely divergent visions. On<br />
the one hand, there arose a concept <strong>of</strong> a harsh peace. It stressed the<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> extremely restrictive measures so as to preclude the possibility<br />
that <strong>Japan</strong> might again threaten the peace. On the other, there<br />
were those who advocated a s<strong>of</strong>t peace for <strong>Japan</strong>. Animated by the<br />
basic belief that vindictive postwar punishment would most likely result<br />
in renewed <strong>Japan</strong>ese militaristic adventures, this vision looked<br />
instead to those <strong>Japan</strong>ese who had pursued cooperative relations with<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the pre–Pearl Harbor era to again lead <strong>Japan</strong> in<br />
the aftermath <strong>of</strong> World War II.<br />
Over the course <strong>of</strong> the war, the advocates <strong>of</strong> a s<strong>of</strong>t peace gained the<br />
ascendancy in this debate. They suffered various setbacks, however,<br />
as evidenced most significantly by their failure to have included in<br />
the Potsdam Declaration an assurance <strong>of</strong> the continuation <strong>of</strong> the institution<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese emperor. The debate over a s<strong>of</strong>t or harsh
U.S.–JAPAN CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL INTERCHANGE • 251<br />
peace toward <strong>Japan</strong>—or the debate over the fundamental meaning <strong>of</strong><br />
unconditional surrender—remained unresolved even as <strong>Japan</strong>’s postwar<br />
occupation got underway. See also SUPREME COMMANDER<br />
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS (SCAP).<br />
Unequal Treaties. See ANSEI TREATIES.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL AND EDUCA-<br />
TIONAL INTERCHANGE (CULCON). The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Conference<br />
on Cultural and Educational Interchange was established in<br />
1961 by an agreement made at a summit meeting between <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and U.S. President John F. Kennedy.<br />
The Conference’s primary purposes are: to discuss various problems<br />
concerning cultural and educational exchange programs between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> by assembling <strong>Japan</strong>ese and American<br />
persons <strong>of</strong> learning; to provide recommendations to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and<br />
U.S. governments; to increase exchange programs in cultural and educational<br />
fields and to improve mutual understanding. The first<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. joint conference was held in Tokyo in January 1962.<br />
Since then, a joint conference has been held every two years in Tokyo<br />
and Washington, D.C., in turn.<br />
In 1968, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. governments exchanged <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
notes to establish a joint committee that regularly examines<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. cultural and educational problems and that indicates the<br />
implications <strong>of</strong> CULCON’s proposals and recommendations. At the<br />
15th committee held in 1991, it adopted a resolution entitled “Towards<br />
a Stronger CULCON” in order to further revitalize CULCON’s activities.<br />
The committee agreed to establish an ad hoc task force to deal<br />
with specific problems and a permanent secretariat at the <strong>Japan</strong> Foundation.<br />
The <strong>Japan</strong>ese secretariat is funded by the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Affairs and the <strong>Japan</strong> Foundation. As for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Friendship Commission serves as permanent secretariat.<br />
The U.S. secretariat is funded by the Department <strong>of</strong> Education.<br />
In order to prepare the joint meetings and to follow up their proposals<br />
consistently, two panels, one for each country, consisting <strong>of</strong> 12<br />
members, representatives <strong>of</strong> government, the business world, academic<br />
circles, and many other walks <strong>of</strong> life has been established in<br />
both <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Moreover, in order to implement
252 • U.S.–JAPAN FRAMEWORK TALKS ON BILATERAL TRADE<br />
CULCON’s recommendations and proposals, a joint <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S.<br />
working group has been established whenever needed.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN FRAMEWORK TALKS ON BILATERAL TRADE.<br />
These bilateral trade talks are extension <strong>of</strong> the Structural Impediments<br />
Initiative (SII). In April 1993, President Bill Clinton and<br />
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa decided to establish them at the<br />
summit. These talks have three major pillars: sectoral negotiations,<br />
macro economy issues, and global issues. During the negotiations,<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> consistently argued that <strong>Japan</strong> imported less American<br />
manufacturing goods because <strong>Japan</strong> was different and its market<br />
was very closed. Consequently, it demanded <strong>Japan</strong>’s expansion <strong>of</strong><br />
imports by setting numerical targets. <strong>Japan</strong> opposed this idea because<br />
it might lead to controlled trade and would destroy the liberal trade<br />
system. After heated negotiations, by June 1995, Washington and<br />
Tokyo made agreements on three priority sectors: insurance, government<br />
procurement, and automobile/automobile parts.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and <strong>Japan</strong> experienced<br />
trade friction primary because <strong>of</strong> increased exports from<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. After World War II, under tutelage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong> made great efforts toward economic recovery.<br />
The U.S. market was the lifeblood for <strong>Japan</strong>’s postwar recovery.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s exports <strong>of</strong> textiles, silverware, and other miscellaneous good<br />
rapidly increased. In this period, textiles were <strong>Japan</strong>’s largest-volume<br />
export item, and a flood <strong>of</strong> cheap <strong>Japan</strong>ese cotton goods did great<br />
damage to the American textile industry, precipitating a <strong>Japan</strong>ese voluntary<br />
export restraint in January 1956. The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had a favorable<br />
trade balance with <strong>Japan</strong> until 1964, but since then, it has<br />
generally run a trade deficit. In the late 1960s, <strong>Japan</strong>’s exports <strong>of</strong> cotton,<br />
wool, and synthetic fiber products to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> rose to the<br />
surface as the first instance <strong>of</strong> trade friction. In January 1972, the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Textile Agreement was concluded based on the Multi<br />
Fiber Agreement (textile trade).<br />
Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, <strong>Japan</strong>’s exports <strong>of</strong> steel,<br />
color TVs, machine tools, and automobiles became major targets for<br />
trade friction with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. In 1969, a three-year agreement<br />
was signed to set up a voluntary export restraint on <strong>Japan</strong>, and this
U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS • 253<br />
was extended through 1974. In September 1977, a dumping suit was<br />
filed against <strong>Japan</strong>ese steel producers. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese producers were<br />
ready to carry out voluntary export restraint; however, Washington<br />
introduced a price-trigger mechanism in 1978: when steel prices fell<br />
below the standard prices, dumping investigations were automatically<br />
initiated.<br />
In 1968 and between 1970 and 1977, a series <strong>of</strong> dumping suits<br />
were filed against <strong>Japan</strong>ese color television manufacturers. In May<br />
1977, Tokyo concluded an orderly marketing agreement with Washington<br />
to pledge a three-year period <strong>of</strong> voluntary export restraint on<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese manufacturers.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> occupied 9.3 percent <strong>of</strong> U.S. automobile market share in<br />
1976, but this had jumped drastically to 21.3 percent by 1980. Both<br />
the private sector and U.S. Congress demanded import relief or a<br />
market-share agreement with <strong>Japan</strong>. In May 1981, Tokyo concluded<br />
with Washington a three-year voluntary export restraint on automobiles<br />
and renewed this later. The restrictions were set at 2.3 million<br />
vehicles per year in April 1985. Many <strong>Japan</strong>ese automakers moved<br />
their manufacturing base to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, which resulted in reducing<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s exports <strong>of</strong> automobiles. In 1994, Tokyo eliminated its<br />
voluntary export restraint on automobiles.<br />
In the late 1970s, Washington focused not only on <strong>Japan</strong>’s exports<br />
but also on the closed nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s domestic market that prevented<br />
the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> from increasing its exports to <strong>Japan</strong>. In January<br />
1978, due to strong U.S. demand, <strong>Japan</strong> expanded its import<br />
quotas for beef, grapefruit, and fruit juice.<br />
In January 1985, Tokyo and Washington started Market-Oriented<br />
Sector Selective talks (MOSS). The first round covered four sectors:<br />
telecommunications, electronics, pharmaceuticals and medical<br />
equipment, and forestry products. Transportation equipment was<br />
added to the MOSS agenda in the second round in 1986.<br />
In September 1986, the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Semiconductor Agreement<br />
was concluded in order to prevent <strong>Japan</strong>ese dumping in the U.S. market<br />
and to increase the share <strong>of</strong> foreign semiconductors in the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
market. Dissatisfied with the lack <strong>of</strong> visible results, in March<br />
1987, Washington resorted to sanctions against <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
In April 1988, the Super 301 provisions <strong>of</strong> the Omnibus Trade and<br />
Competitiveness Act <strong>of</strong> 1988 were enacted by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. The
254 • U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS<br />
Super 301 authorized the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> to impose sanctions when negotiations<br />
fail. With the Super 301 in hand, Washington focused on<br />
three sectors to open their markets: supercomputers, satellites, and<br />
wood products; however, Tokyo did not agree to further negotiations.<br />
The U.S. trade deficit with <strong>Japan</strong> increased rapidly from 1981 to<br />
1987, when it peaked at $52.1 billion. Consequently, not only specific<br />
trade items but also <strong>Japan</strong>ese business practices and administration<br />
became serious issues. Trade friction gradually turned into economic<br />
friction between Tokyo and Washington. Between September<br />
1989 and June 1990, the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative<br />
(SII) was held to discuss the domestic structural problems <strong>of</strong><br />
both countries in order to resolve the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. trade imbalance.<br />
Because the Super 301 did not cover structural impediments in the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese market, these were discussed separately at the SII.<br />
The U.S. trade deficit began declining in 1988, but it rose again in the<br />
1991 to 1994 period. In July 1993, succeeding the SII, the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong><br />
Framework Talks for a New Economic Partnership on bilateral<br />
trade were started to discuss not only each trade item but also a wide<br />
range <strong>of</strong> subjects, such as macroeconomic problems, development <strong>of</strong><br />
human resources, and environment issues. In the sectoral consultation,<br />
Tokyo and Washington decided to focus on three sectors: government<br />
procurement, insurance, and automobile parts. Washington strongly demanded<br />
the setting up numerical targets, while Tokyo consistently opposed<br />
this because it would ruin the free-trade principle. Finally, in October<br />
1994, a consensus was reached in principle on government<br />
procurement and insurance. In June 1995, the two countries concluded<br />
another agreement on automobile parts without numerical targets.<br />
U.S. trade deficit with <strong>Japan</strong> dropped in the mid-1990s, which eased<br />
trade friction between the two countries. In the late 1990s, the American<br />
economy continued in prosperity while <strong>Japan</strong> suffered from a long-term<br />
economic slump. Moreover, the World Trade Organization (WTO) tended<br />
to deal with trade-related conflicts, but there was no significant trade friction<br />
between Tokyo and Washington. In June 2001, President George<br />
Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed to start the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Economic Partnership for Growth, which aims to promote<br />
sustainable growth in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>, and the world<br />
through their close dialogue and cooperation. See also FOREIGN EX-<br />
CHANGE ALLOCATION SYSTEM; FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPE-
U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION • 255<br />
CIAL QUOTA SYSTEM; JAPAN–AMERICAN TRADE ARBITRA-<br />
TION AGREEMENT; JAPAN–U.S. COTTON PRODUCTS TRADE<br />
AGREEMENT; JAPAN–U.S. FRIENDSHIP COMMERCE NAVIGA-<br />
TION TREATY; JAPAN–U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT;<br />
JAPAN–U.S. SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGREE-<br />
MENT; JAPAN–U.S. TEXTILE AGREEMENT; JOINT STATEMENT<br />
ON THE JAPAN–UNITED STATES FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW<br />
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP; JOINT U.S.–JAPAN COMMITTEE ON<br />
TRADE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS; MAEKAWA REPORTS; MOR-<br />
RISON INCIDENT; ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT;<br />
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (SII); SUPER 301 PRO-<br />
VISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVE ACT OF<br />
1988; U.S.–JAPAN YEN DOLLAR COMMITTEE; VOLUNTARY EX-<br />
PORT RESTRAINT.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE. Sometimes<br />
called the “Harris Treaty,” this treaty negotiated by Townsend<br />
Harris and Naosuke Ii was the first <strong>of</strong> the Ansei Treaties between<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> and Western countries in 1858. Trading rights, opening <strong>of</strong><br />
ports to trade and Western residents, and extraterritoriality provisions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the U.S–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Amity and Commerce and the other<br />
Ansei Treaties caused significant tensions between the Tokugawa<br />
shogunate in Edo, represented by Naosuke Ii, and the imperial<br />
house in Kyoto, which refused to ratify the treaties. See also MEIJI<br />
RESTORATION; REVERE THE EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BAR-<br />
BARIAN.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.<br />
Ever since Commodore Matthew Perry in the 1850s negotiated the<br />
Ansei Treaties with <strong>Japan</strong>—treaties whose inequality was replicated<br />
by the agreements <strong>Japan</strong> subsequently reached with all the major<br />
powers—Tokyo had sought to revise those “unequal treaties.” In<br />
particular, it sought the right to control its own tariffs and ports. By<br />
February 1911, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese got what they wanted through the<br />
U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong> Commerce and Navigation, and, in return, reiterated<br />
an earlier promise—as encapsulated in the Gentlemen’s<br />
Agreement <strong>of</strong> 1908 to restrict <strong>Japan</strong>ese immigration to the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>.
256 • U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP<br />
Conclusion <strong>of</strong> this treaty confirmed an idea that was already current<br />
among policymakers in Tokyo: <strong>Japan</strong> was a member <strong>of</strong> a coterie<br />
<strong>of</strong> great powers. The treaty also confirmed that <strong>Japan</strong> was recognized<br />
as such by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>. Following the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War, 1937–1945 in July 1937, however, <strong>Japan</strong> appeared<br />
less interested in being included as a member <strong>of</strong> any great<br />
power coterie than it was in establishing its political domination over<br />
China. It furthermore attacked American interests in China, as dramatically<br />
evidenced by the Panay Incident. Debate in Washington<br />
soon turned to the idea <strong>of</strong> economic pressure.<br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on 26 July 1939 that<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was being given the mandatory six months’ notice <strong>of</strong> the abrogation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the treaty. This meant that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would be in a<br />
position in January 1940 to impose trade sanctions on <strong>Japan</strong>. Because<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s economic well-being depended on close commercial relations<br />
with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, such a step clarified American opposition<br />
to <strong>Japan</strong>’s policy <strong>of</strong> aggression. At the same time, however, the<br />
door to the two nations’ trade had not been shut. The application—or<br />
non-application—<strong>of</strong> sanctions would depend on subsequent <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
actions. Foreign Minister Kichisaburō Nomura worked to ensure<br />
respect for foreign rights and interests in China and for the hallowed<br />
American principle <strong>of</strong> the Open Door. He was undermined, however,<br />
by <strong>Japan</strong>ese troops on the ground in China, as well as by his<br />
subordinates in the Foreign Ministry, and the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Commerce and Navigation was abrogated in late January 1940.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. See KANAGAWA<br />
TREATY.<br />
U.S.–JAPAN YEN DOLLAR COMMITTEE. The U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Yen<br />
Dollar Committee was established with a U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> joint announcement<br />
made in November 1983. Its purpose is to serve as forum<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>ese and U.S. financial authorities to discuss financial<br />
matters. The committee discussed many financial topics, including<br />
issues relating to the Yen–Dollar exchange rate, the liberalization <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese financial and capital markets, the internationalization <strong>of</strong> the<br />
yen, and others. In May 1984, the committee announced a report including<br />
the following points, which were actually carried out: Liber-
alization <strong>of</strong> interest rates for large deposits; abolition <strong>of</strong> restrictions<br />
<strong>of</strong> an exchanging foreign currencies into yen; creation <strong>of</strong> a yen-based<br />
bankers acceptance market; and acceptance <strong>of</strong> foreign banks’ unilateral<br />
entrance into the fiduciary business.<br />
In 1989, along with the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Structural Impediments Initiative,<br />
a <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. financial market working group was established<br />
that discussed issues on financial liberalization both in the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> and in <strong>Japan</strong>, as well as their common concern about world financial<br />
markets. Moreover, under the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Framework Talks<br />
on bilateral trade begun in 1993, the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Financial Service<br />
Consultation was established as a sub-basket (group <strong>of</strong> services) in<br />
the financial service field that examined deregulation in this field. In<br />
1995, when the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Financial Service agreement was<br />
reached, as its follow-up meeting, the U.S.–<strong>Japan</strong> Yen Dollar Committee<br />
continued to be held to discuss the development <strong>of</strong> financial<br />
markets both in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and in <strong>Japan</strong>. See also U.S.–JAPAN<br />
TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
– V –<br />
VERBECK, GUIDO • 257<br />
VAN REED, EUGENE (1835–1873). American businessman, adventurer,<br />
and part-time diplomat, Van Reed lived in Yokohama and<br />
Tokyo from 1859 to 1872. He met Joseph Heco, the castaway <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
sailor in San Francisco in 1858 and decided to follow him to<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. To the consternation <strong>of</strong> American diplomatic <strong>of</strong>ficials, Van<br />
Reed soon developed a close business relationship with Satsuma domain.<br />
Van Reed was involved in other business ventures, including<br />
arranging the first group <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese laborers, known as Gannenmono<br />
to be sent to the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii in 1868. The arrangement<br />
among Van Reed, the Hawaiian government, and <strong>Japan</strong>ese labor recruiters<br />
caused political difficulties between <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
and Hawaii that were eventually resolved by a treaty between <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hawaii negotiated by Charles De Long, the<br />
American minister to <strong>Japan</strong>.<br />
VERBECK, GUIDO (1830–1898). Born in Holland, Verbeck became<br />
an American citizen and missionary for the Dutch Reformed Church.
258 • VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT<br />
He arrived in Nagasaki in 1859 as one <strong>of</strong> the first missionaries in <strong>Japan</strong><br />
and taught English and Dutch. He helped arrange for several young<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese men to attend Rutgers College in New Jersey. He was hired<br />
by the Meiji government in 1869 as a yatoi and worked for the government<br />
for several years. See also GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOT.<br />
VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT. When exports <strong>of</strong> specific<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese items suddenly increased or their market share rapidly expanded,<br />
trade friction between <strong>Japan</strong> and other countries was a consequence<br />
<strong>of</strong> this. Voluntary export restraint was <strong>Japan</strong>’s response to<br />
avoid such trade friction with various countries.<br />
For example, in May 1981, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese automobile industry imposed<br />
voluntary restraint on its exports to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for three<br />
years, on the assumption that U.S. automobile manufacturers would<br />
make great efforts to revitalize themselves. Because <strong>of</strong> this restraint,<br />
automobile exports to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> did not surpass 1,690,000 cars<br />
in the fiscal years <strong>of</strong> 1981 and 1982. In the fiscal year <strong>of</strong> 1981, the total<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> automobile exports declined by 6.8 percent over the previous<br />
year. This voluntary export restraint tentatively resolved trade<br />
friction concerning automobiles between <strong>Japan</strong> and the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
This example indicates that <strong>Japan</strong>’s voluntary export restraint measures<br />
prevent its trade counterparts from taking import-restriction measures.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> carried out major voluntary export restraints in the steel industry<br />
between 1972 and 1974, in the automobile industry between 1981 and<br />
1984, and in the machine tool industry between 1987 and 1993. <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
voluntary export restraint is not a fundamental solution to <strong>Japan</strong>’s trade<br />
friction with other countries, but an extraordinary and temporary measure<br />
that, in the long run, maintains and develops further liberal freetrade<br />
principles. See also U.S.–JAPAN TRADE CONFLICTS.<br />
– W –<br />
WAKAMATSU COLONY (ALSO KNOWN AS AIZU COLONY,<br />
AIZU–WAKAMATSU COLONY). After Aizu was defeated supporting<br />
the Tokugawa shogunate against the Satsuma and Choshuled<br />
forces in late 1868, approximately 30 <strong>Japan</strong>ese from the region<br />
traveled to Coloma, California, to establish a tea and silk farm. Most
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE • 259<br />
were samurai class, and were political and economic refugees. Led<br />
by John Henry Schnell, a German merchant and adviser to Aizu<br />
daimyō Katamori Matsudaira, the “Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Farm”<br />
in California seemed to prosper at first, but then water problems developed<br />
and the project collapsed by 1871. Three <strong>Japan</strong>ese remained<br />
in northern California for the rest <strong>of</strong> their lives; it is unknown what<br />
happened to the others or to Schnell. Although <strong>Japan</strong>ese castaway<br />
sailors, diplomats, and students had already arrived in America, the<br />
Wakamatsu colonists can be considered the first group <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
immigrants in America. See also BOSHIN WAR; IMMIGRATION;<br />
MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE (1921–1922). The Washington<br />
Conference was convened from November 1921 to February 1922.<br />
Its purposes were tw<strong>of</strong>old. First, it sought to resolve a number <strong>of</strong> controversies<br />
in the Pacific and Far East. Second, it was aimed at halting<br />
a costly and dangerous competition in armaments between the<br />
world’s three leading naval powers. In a word, the Washington Conference<br />
represented an attempt to redefine international relations in<br />
the post–World War I Far East.<br />
The Washington Conference was convened against the backdrop<br />
<strong>of</strong> growing <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American discord. In the first instance, the two<br />
powers were at odds over their perceived interests in China. At issue<br />
was <strong>Japan</strong>’s ambivalence toward the American principle <strong>of</strong> the Open<br />
Door. The two powers were also unable to agree on the disposition<br />
<strong>of</strong> former German possessions in the Pacific. It had been agreed at the<br />
Paris Peace Conference that these possessions—the Marshall, Caroline,<br />
and Mariana Islands—would be mandated to <strong>Japan</strong>, but the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> had not ratified the peace treaty and therefore argued<br />
that it had not assented to <strong>Japan</strong>’s mandate. The Siberian Intervention<br />
provided another source <strong>of</strong> friction, particularly as <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
troops alone remained in the Soviet Union’s far eastern provinces.<br />
These controversies sparked a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American naval armaments<br />
race that also involved Great Britain, which had no intention <strong>of</strong> overseeing<br />
the demise <strong>of</strong> its traditional mastery <strong>of</strong> the seas. At the same<br />
time, Washington was leery <strong>of</strong> the Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance for the<br />
simple fact that its existence might see Britain siding with <strong>Japan</strong> if<br />
the latter went to war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.
260 • WILSON, WOODROW<br />
The tone <strong>of</strong> the Washington Conference was set from the outset,<br />
when American plenipotentiary Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Charles Evan<br />
Hughes proposed the reduction <strong>of</strong> capital ship strength according to the<br />
ratio <strong>of</strong> 5:5:3 for the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Great Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong>. In the face<br />
<strong>of</strong> violent opposition from within naval ranks, <strong>Japan</strong>ese plenipotentiary<br />
(and navy minister) Tomosaburō Katō accepted the proposal. Thus,<br />
was born the Five-Power Treaty (which included not only the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, Britain, and <strong>Japan</strong>, but also Italy and France) on naval limitation.<br />
Publicly connected to the Five-Power Treaty was the Four-Power<br />
Treaty (which incorporated the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, <strong>Japan</strong>, and<br />
France), a non-aggression pact that replaced the Anglo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance.<br />
It had little in the way <strong>of</strong> concrete commitments.<br />
Having disposed <strong>of</strong> the naval armaments race and the Anglo–<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Alliance, the conferees were then free to concentrate on the<br />
political problems centering on China and the Pacific. To this end, the<br />
Washington Conference produced the Nine-Power Pact, whose signatories<br />
included the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, Britain, <strong>Japan</strong>, France, Italy, China,<br />
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal. By the terms <strong>of</strong> the pact, the<br />
signatories agreed to respect China’s sovereignty, as well as the principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> “equal opportunity for the commerce and industry <strong>of</strong> all nations<br />
throughout the territory <strong>of</strong> China.” In other words, the signatories accepted<br />
in treaty form the traditional American policy <strong>of</strong> the Open Door.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese delegates also entered delicate discussions with their<br />
Chinese counterparts over the future <strong>of</strong> the Shantung peninsula. A<br />
Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese agreement was reached, which provided for the<br />
restoration <strong>of</strong> Chinese sovereignty in Shantung, the withdrawal <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops, and the purchase by China from <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> the principal<br />
railroad in the province. For its part, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> gave its<br />
consent to the exercise by <strong>Japan</strong> <strong>of</strong> its mandate over former German<br />
possessions in the Pacific, in return for a <strong>Japan</strong>ese promise to allow<br />
American access to the island <strong>of</strong> Yap for the purpose <strong>of</strong> cable and radio<br />
communications. Finally, <strong>Japan</strong>ese delegate Kijūrō Shidehara<br />
assured his fellow conferees that <strong>Japan</strong> would withdraw its troops<br />
from Soviet territory.<br />
WILSON, WOODROW. Inaugurated as president <strong>of</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
in 1913, Woodrow Wilson championed a moralistic world order free<br />
from the imperialistic rivalries that led inexorably to World War I.
WILSON, WOODROW • 261<br />
Born in 1856 in Staunton, Virginia, Wilson earned a law degree at<br />
Princeton and practiced briefly in Atlanta before earning a doctorate<br />
from Johns Hopkins University in 1886 (his dissertation on Congressional<br />
Government has been viewed as a landmark study in political<br />
history). He taught at Princeton before becoming the university’s<br />
president, when the phrase “Princeton in the nation’s service” was<br />
frequently on his lips. Elected as Democratic governor <strong>of</strong> New Jersey<br />
in 1910, he won the presidential election in 1912.<br />
Wilson’s foreign policy goals as president were colored by his belief<br />
that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> ought to use its power to serve the interests<br />
<strong>of</strong> people everywhere. An advocate <strong>of</strong> democratic values, he eventually<br />
sent American forces into World War I to make the world “safe<br />
for democracy.” In the Far East, however, Wilson’s foreign policy<br />
seemed driven less by democratic ideals than it was by the perceived<br />
necessity <strong>of</strong> the preservation <strong>of</strong> the Open Door. Mindful <strong>of</strong> this fact,<br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government upon its entry into World War I <strong>of</strong>fered repeated<br />
assurances that it did not intend to violate the integrity <strong>of</strong><br />
China. Wilson, however, remained cautiously watchful. Then, in January<br />
1915, Tokyo laid the infamous Twenty-One Demands before<br />
Chinese President Yuan Shih-kai, Wilson’s secretary <strong>of</strong> state,<br />
William Jennings Bryan, refused to recognize their legitimacy.<br />
After the crisis surrounding the Twenty-One Demands had been<br />
defused—not altogether satisfactorily—Wilson had to engage in a serious<br />
rethink <strong>of</strong> his policy toward <strong>Japan</strong>. Wilson’s growing realization<br />
by 1916 that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> would enter the war in Europe<br />
carried with it the implication that American military intervention in<br />
the Far East was less a possibility than it had ever been. The following<br />
question thus arose: how best to contain <strong>Japan</strong>ese ambitions? At<br />
the same time, it was in the interests <strong>of</strong> the anti-German alliance to<br />
smooth relations with the <strong>Japan</strong>ese (who, after all, were fighting on<br />
the side <strong>of</strong> their alliance partners, the British). Wilson’s energies visà-vis<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> subsequently revolved around an effort to construct<br />
friendly relations with <strong>Japan</strong>, while acting to prevent <strong>Japan</strong>ese hegemony<br />
in the Far East. It was in such a climate that the Lansing–Ishii<br />
Agreement emerged. Furthermore, reversing his administration’s<br />
earlier rejection <strong>of</strong> American participation in an international banking<br />
consortium in China, Wilson reasoned that the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> could<br />
outspend the <strong>Japan</strong>ese. As he stated in 1916, Americans were now the
262 • WORLD WAR II<br />
“creditors <strong>of</strong> the world,” and they were in a position to “determine to<br />
a large extent who is to be financed and who is not to be financed.”<br />
This delicate diplomatic strategy <strong>of</strong> courting <strong>Japan</strong>ese friendship<br />
while concurrently seeking to contain <strong>Japan</strong> was brought into full relief<br />
by the Siberian Intervention. Following the Bolshevik Revolution,<br />
Wilson agreed to participate in a joint American–<strong>Japan</strong>ese occupation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Siberia, ever mindful that an American presence in the<br />
region could serve to limit the extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese influence.<br />
In the end result, Wilson’s inability to disentangle his <strong>Japan</strong> policy<br />
from the reality <strong>of</strong> power politics contributed to his downfall. At the<br />
Paris Peace Conference, his approval <strong>of</strong> the transfer <strong>of</strong> Chinese territory<br />
(previously held by the Germans) to <strong>Japan</strong> seemed an abandonment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the idealistic war aims that he had so eloquently and so<br />
frequently proclaimed. Certainly, the U.S. Senate saw it this way, and<br />
refused to ratify the treaty. The American people evidently agreed.<br />
Although Wilson did not run for reelection in 1920, his successor,<br />
James M. Cox, was soundly defeated by the Republican candidate,<br />
Warren G. Harding.<br />
WORLD WAR II (1939–1945). German troops on 1 September 1939<br />
invaded Poland. Two days later, Great Britain and France—albeit reluctantly—declared<br />
war on Germany. World War II had begun.<br />
For its part, <strong>Japan</strong> was embroiled in war with China. It was, moreover,<br />
allied to Germany by means <strong>of</strong> the Anti-Comintern Pact. It<br />
nonetheless viewed the opening <strong>of</strong> World War II with circumspection.<br />
Nonplussed by Germany’s recent actions in concluding a nonaggression<br />
treaty with the Soviet Union—the very nation that the Anti-<br />
Comintern Pact targeted—Tokyo chose to remain alo<strong>of</strong> from the<br />
fighting in Europe.<br />
All that changed following the success with which the German<br />
blitzkrieg met in the spring <strong>of</strong> 1940. Tokyo began to conceive <strong>of</strong> an alliance<br />
relationship with Germany as the means by which it might expand<br />
into the resource-rich regions <strong>of</strong> Southeast Asia, which had been<br />
rendered defenseless by Germany’s war against their colonial masters.<br />
At this time, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke publicly announced<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s intention to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity<br />
Sphere, which he indicated would incorporate both French Indochina<br />
and the Dutch East Indies. The <strong>Japan</strong>ese–German–Italian Tripartite
WORLD WAR II • 263<br />
Pact was signed in September 1940, and, almost simultaneously,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese troops advanced into northern French Indochina.<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> did not, however, formally enter World War II until it attacked<br />
Pearl Harbor in December 1941. To be sure, its troops in the<br />
interim remained in the quagmire <strong>of</strong> their own making in China, and,<br />
in July 1941, advanced throughout the French Indochina peninsula in<br />
its entirety.<br />
The months after it entered the conflict were spectacularly successful<br />
for <strong>Japan</strong>. It ousted the colonial powers from the Malay<br />
peninsula, Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and<br />
the Philippines, all the while threatening Australia, the British in India,<br />
and the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet. It also launched an ideological<br />
<strong>of</strong>fensive that espoused the notion <strong>of</strong> an Asian crusade against the<br />
West. According to this pan-Asian reasoning, <strong>Japan</strong> was the selfappointed<br />
“liberator” <strong>of</strong> the region from the yoke <strong>of</strong> Western imperialism.<br />
This ideological <strong>of</strong>fensive was successful ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it gave<br />
rise to revolutionary movements throughout the region that after the<br />
war militated against a return to Western colonial rule. At the same<br />
time, the wide gap between <strong>Japan</strong>’s pr<strong>of</strong>essed ideals and its policies—it<br />
clearly prioritized access to the region’s natural resources<br />
over and above independence for those colonies it had recently “liberated”—ensured<br />
that its efforts to win the hearts and minds <strong>of</strong> the region’s<br />
peoples were largely in vain.<br />
Far more damaging to <strong>Japan</strong>’s chances <strong>of</strong> attaining its objectives<br />
in World War II, however, was its inability to turn back the American<br />
counter<strong>of</strong>fensive. This counter<strong>of</strong>fensive met with its first notable<br />
success in the Battle <strong>of</strong> Midway in June 1942, when the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese navy was handed a stinging defeat at the hands <strong>of</strong> its<br />
American counterpart. Thereafter, <strong>Japan</strong> sought in vain to maintain<br />
a defensive posture against an increasingly virulent American counterattack,<br />
and, in September 1943, delineated an “absolute sphere <strong>of</strong><br />
Imperial defense,” which nominated the Kurile and Bonin Islands,<br />
the inner South Pacific, western New Guinea, and Burma as the line<br />
from which <strong>Japan</strong> would not retreat. It was to no avail. The <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, buttressed by its immense industrial strength, was, by this<br />
time, irrepressible. This was brought home with startling clarity<br />
when, in mid-June 1944, American forces undertook an invasion <strong>of</strong><br />
Saipan, an island well within <strong>Japan</strong>’s sphere <strong>of</strong> defense. Saipan’s
264 • YALTA CONFERENCE<br />
fall rendered Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki’s position untenable, and<br />
he was replaced in July 1944 by General Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso’s<br />
cabinet fell in April 1945, coinciding rather neatly with the death <strong>of</strong><br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Germany surrendered in May<br />
1945 (Italy had surrendered in September 1943), and most major<br />
urban centers in <strong>Japan</strong> were subjected to American aerial attack.<br />
The Battle <strong>of</strong> Okinawa, which began in April 1945, ended in June<br />
1945 in total defeat for the <strong>Japan</strong>ese forces. It was, at this point,<br />
quite clear that <strong>Japan</strong> had been defeated, yet Tokyo was unable to<br />
make the political decision to surrender. The Emperor on 15 August<br />
1945 finally announced his nation’s surrender, after Hiroshima and<br />
Nagasaki had been subjected to the world’s first—and, to date,<br />
only—atomic attacks and after the Soviet Union had discarded its<br />
neutrality to enter the war against <strong>Japan</strong>. See also ABSOLUTE<br />
SPHERE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE; AMERICA FIRST COM-<br />
MITTEE; ATLANTIC CONFERENCE; ATOMIC BOMB AT-<br />
TACKS; BURMA ROAD; CAIRO CONFERENCE; DOOLITTLE<br />
RAID; HORNBECK, STANLEY; HULL, CORDELL; INTERNA-<br />
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST; IN-<br />
TERNMENT; JAPANESE–AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS; JOHN<br />
DOE ASSOCIATES; KONOE–ROOSEVELT SUMMIT MEET-<br />
ING; LEND LEASE; MAGIC; NOMURA–GREW CONVERSA-<br />
TIONS; POTSDAM DECLARATION; SAN FRANCISCO<br />
PEACE TREATY; SINO–JAPANESE WAR; SOUTHWARD<br />
ADVANCE; SOVIET–JAPANESE NEUTRALITY TREATY;<br />
TOKYO FIREBOMBING; UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER;<br />
YAMAMOTO, ISOROKU.<br />
– Y –<br />
YALTA CONFERENCE. From 4–11 February 1945, <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston<br />
Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin met at Yalta in the Russian<br />
Crimea. Coming at a time when the Allies’ war against Germany and<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> was drawing to a close—Italy had surrendered in 1943—the<br />
conferees discussed, among other things, the terms <strong>of</strong> Soviet Russia’s<br />
entry into the war against <strong>Japan</strong>. Both the U.S. and British governments<br />
had long been convinced that Soviet military intervention in
YAMAKAWA, SUTEMATSU • 265<br />
the Far East was essential if <strong>Japan</strong> were to be defeated in a timely<br />
fashion. Roosevelt and Churchill thus sought—and duly received—a<br />
reiteration <strong>of</strong> Stalin’s earlier promise that the Red Army would enter<br />
the war against <strong>Japan</strong> after Germany’s defeat. There was, <strong>of</strong> course,<br />
a political price to pay for Soviet intervention, but one that Roosevelt<br />
was willing to pay. In short, the conferees agreed that the Soviet<br />
Union would recover the Kurile Islands, southern Sakhalin, and obtain<br />
a naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria. Dairen would become<br />
an internationalized port, and the Soviets would exercise joint control<br />
with China over the Manchurian railways. Outer Mongolia’s status as<br />
a Soviet puppet state was also recognized. For his part, Stalin indicated<br />
that he would support Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese<br />
government—not Mao Tse-tung’s Communists—in the forthcoming<br />
effort to unify China.<br />
No single act <strong>of</strong> Roosevelt’s presidency has been more harshly<br />
criticized than his actions at Yalta. After all, the territorial agreements<br />
as they pertained to the Far East appeared to betray the selfsame<br />
Open Door principles for which the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> was fighting<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>. Yet, on the assumption that Soviet military intervention<br />
might save the lives <strong>of</strong> countless American soldiers, would another<br />
president in Roosevelt’s place have refused it? See also WORLD<br />
WAR II.<br />
YAMAGATA, ARITOMO (1838–1922). Regarded as the “father <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army,” Yamagata was a samurai from Choshu who<br />
strongly supported the imperial restoration movement that overthrew<br />
the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868. He played a key role in establishing<br />
and developing <strong>Japan</strong>’s army using Western strategies, tactics,<br />
and materials during the Meiji Era. He served in a number <strong>of</strong> government<br />
positions throughout his long career, including Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Foreign Affairs, Minister <strong>of</strong> Military Affairs, and twice as Prime<br />
Minister. See also ITO, HIROBUMI; MEIJI RESTORATION.<br />
YAMAKAWA, SUTEMATSU (ALSO KNOWN AS BARONESS<br />
OYAMA; 1860–1919). From an Aizu samurai family, she was one<br />
<strong>of</strong> five young women chosen to accompany the Iwakura Mission in<br />
1871. She and the other <strong>Japan</strong>ese girls (Umeko Tsuda, Shigeko Nagai,<br />
Ryo Yoshimasa, and Tei Ueda) lived with American host families<br />
and attended American schools. Yamakawa lived with the Bacon
266 • YAMAMOTO, ISOROKU<br />
family, and became close friends with Alice Mabel Bacon. In 1878,<br />
Yamakawa and Shigeko Nagai entered Vassar College in Poughkeepsie,<br />
New York. Yamakawa graduated in 1882 with honors, becoming<br />
the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese woman to graduate from an American university.<br />
Yamakawa, who married General Iwao Oyama soon after her<br />
graduation from Vassar College, <strong>of</strong>ten worked to improve educational<br />
opportunities for <strong>Japan</strong>ese women in the late 19th and early<br />
20th centuries.<br />
YAMAMOTO, ISOROKU (1884–1943). As the architect <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and as commander-inchief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Combined Fleet throughout the first half <strong>of</strong> World War II,<br />
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto remains one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>’s best-known<br />
wartime leaders. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1904 and<br />
first came into contact with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in 1908. From April<br />
1919, he began a two-year period <strong>of</strong> study at Harvard University, and<br />
revisited the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> on an inspection tour in 1923–1924. He<br />
again returned to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in December 1925, having been appointed<br />
naval attaché to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese embassy in Washington. He remained<br />
in this post for two years.<br />
Yamamoto’s experiences in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> left him with two<br />
firm convictions. First, naval power depended as much on abundant<br />
sources <strong>of</strong> oil as it did on the traditional indices <strong>of</strong> naval strength,<br />
such as the quality and size <strong>of</strong> a fleet. This, in turn, informed Yamamoto’s<br />
belief that <strong>Japan</strong> could not hope to defeat the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
in war because the latter was matchless in terms <strong>of</strong> its abundant oil<br />
reserves. Yamamoto’s second conviction revolved around the novel<br />
concept that naval aviation would play a decisive role in any future<br />
conflict. Through the 1920s, 1930s, and beyond, he thus stressed that<br />
carrier-based aircraft represented the future <strong>of</strong> naval warfare.<br />
Rear Admiral Yamamoto was a delegate to the First London<br />
Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1930. He revealed himself through the course<br />
<strong>of</strong> the conference to be antithetical to the naval limitation system that<br />
allotted <strong>Japan</strong> an inferior ratio vis-à-vis the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and Great<br />
Britain. He soon dropped his opposition to the naval limitation system,<br />
however, believing that it prevented a potentially ruinous naval<br />
armaments race, which <strong>Japan</strong> could not hope to win. He was <strong>Japan</strong>’s<br />
chief delegate to the Second London Naval Conference <strong>of</strong> 1935,
YONAI, MITSUMASA • 267<br />
where—contrary to his own beliefs—he carried out his government’s<br />
instructions in demanding parity between <strong>Japan</strong>, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>,<br />
and Great Britain. It was at this conference that the era <strong>of</strong> naval limitation<br />
came to an end.<br />
Appointed vice navy minister in 1936, Yamamoto steadfastly supported<br />
Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai’s blunt opposition to the<br />
conclusion <strong>of</strong> an alliance relationship with Nazi Germany. He was<br />
subsequently appointed commander-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the Combined Fleet<br />
in August 1939, in which position he convinced an unenthusiastic<br />
Navy General Staff to accept his strategy for an attack on Pearl Harbor.<br />
He remained in this post until his plane was shot down by enemy<br />
fire in April 1943.<br />
YATOI. Meaning “foreign expert,” yatoi or the more honorific, oyatoi,<br />
usually refers to foreigners hired by the Meiji government<br />
or by local <strong>Japan</strong>ese governments. Especially during the 1870s,<br />
many yatoi were hired to assist in establishing government, educational,<br />
and economic institutions. Among Americans hired as yatoi<br />
by the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government were William Smith Clark, David<br />
Murray, and Horace Capron. See also BACON, ALICE MABEL;<br />
BROWN, SAMUEL ROBBINS; FENELOSSA, ERNEST;<br />
GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOTT; HEPBURN, JAMES CURTIS;<br />
HOUSE, EDWARD; KIDDER, MARY EDDY; LEGENDRE,<br />
CHARLES W.; MORSE, EDWARD; VERBECK, GUIDO.<br />
YOKOI, SHONAN (1809–1869). A renowned philosopher and political<br />
adviser from Kumamoto, Yokoi advocated opening <strong>Japan</strong> to international<br />
trade and Western scientific ideas during the 1850s and<br />
1860s. His nephews, Sahei and Daihei Yokoi, briefly studied at Rutgers<br />
College in New Jersey in the late 1860s. At the time, his advocacy<br />
<strong>of</strong> “opening” <strong>Japan</strong> to the West was controversial and he was assassinated<br />
in 1869. See also MEIJI RESTORATION; REVERE THE<br />
EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BARBARIAN; SAKUMA, SHOZAN.<br />
YONAI, MITSUMASA (1880–1948). An admiral who served as both<br />
navy minister and prime minister in the late 1930s and early 1940s,<br />
Mitsumasa Yonai was a man <strong>of</strong> courage and determination. Through<br />
the late 1930s, he stubbornly opposed the conclusion <strong>of</strong> an alliance
268 • YONAI, MITSUMASA<br />
relationship with Germany, and, in the endgame <strong>of</strong> war, was a powerful<br />
force for surrender within the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government.<br />
In a service whose elite <strong>of</strong>ficer corps was drawn from highranking<br />
graduates <strong>of</strong> the Naval Academy, Yonai was somewhat <strong>of</strong> an<br />
anomaly. He graduated 68th (from a class total <strong>of</strong> 125) in his Naval<br />
Academy class <strong>of</strong> 1901. He participated in the Russo–<strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
War, and, from 1915, served as naval attaché to the <strong>Japan</strong>ese embassy<br />
in Petrograd. Over the ensuing years, he was appointed commander<br />
<strong>of</strong> the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and commander-inchief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka Naval Districts. In<br />
December 1936, he rose to commander-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the Combined<br />
Fleet, although he left the post in February 1937 to take up his duties<br />
as navy minister. He was promoted to admiral in April that year. Following<br />
the outbreak <strong>of</strong> the Sino–<strong>Japan</strong>ese War in July 1937, Navy<br />
Minister Yonai sought to keep the fighting localized. To this end, he<br />
opposed the establishment <strong>of</strong> Imperial Headquarters, although he was<br />
unsuccessful in this endeavor.<br />
Throughout much <strong>of</strong> his time as navy minister, Yonai squared <strong>of</strong>f<br />
against the incessant calls <strong>of</strong> the army for an alliance relationship<br />
with Nazi Germany. Although his subordinates were by no means<br />
unanimous in their approval <strong>of</strong> this policy, Yonai received inestimable<br />
support from his vice navy minister, Isoroku Yamamoto.<br />
Yonai’s basic premise in refusing to give his assent to the alliance<br />
was simple: tying <strong>Japan</strong> to America’s quasi-enemy in Europe raised<br />
the risk <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American war. As <strong>Japan</strong> could not hope to<br />
emerge victorious from war with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, it was prudent to<br />
avoid measures that gave rise to that possibility.<br />
In January 1940, Yonai was appointed prime minister, and soon<br />
thereafter Adolf Hitler’s armies overran Western Europe. Insistent on<br />
the necessity <strong>of</strong> an alliance relationship with Germany—and convinced<br />
that such was not possible so long as Yonai remained as prime<br />
minister—the <strong>Japan</strong>ese army in July 1940 brought about the fall <strong>of</strong><br />
Yonai’s cabinet.<br />
In July 1944, Yonai was again appointed navy minister in the cabinet<br />
succeeding that <strong>of</strong> General Hideki Tōjō. He remained in that<br />
post in the cabinet <strong>of</strong> Admiral Kantarō Suzuki, in which position he<br />
squared <strong>of</strong>f against the army minister, as well as the army and navy<br />
chiefs <strong>of</strong> staff to emphasize the necessity <strong>of</strong> surrender.
YOSHIDA LETTER • 269<br />
YOSHIDA DOCTRINE. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida established<br />
this doctrine, which became a consistent <strong>Japan</strong>ese post–World War<br />
II political philosophy. The Yoshida Doctrine consists <strong>of</strong> three primary<br />
principles. First, <strong>Japan</strong> is on the Western side in the Cold War<br />
and makes <strong>Japan</strong>’s alliance with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> its basis <strong>of</strong> diplomacy.<br />
Second, in terms <strong>of</strong> national security, <strong>Japan</strong> depends on the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> and limits its defense forces to its minimum. Third,<br />
<strong>Japan</strong> emphasizes economic diplomacy. In order to gain independence<br />
as soon as possible, Yoshida was confirmed that this is the most practical<br />
way for <strong>Japan</strong>. Both the Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato administrations<br />
in the 1960s firmly inherited Yoshida’s philosophy and established<br />
it as <strong>Japan</strong>’s mainstream policy. See also DEFENSE.<br />
YOSHIDA, KIYONARI (1845–1891). From Satsuma, Yoshida was<br />
an early <strong>Japan</strong>ese university student in England and the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong>, and later held a number <strong>of</strong> posts in the Meiji government, including<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>’s minister to the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> in the late 1870s. While<br />
in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> as a student in the late 1860s, Yoshida attended<br />
Monson Academy in Massachusetts and Rutgers College in New<br />
Jersey. He also lived with the Brotherhood <strong>of</strong> the New Life in upstate<br />
New York from 1867 to 1868. Later, as <strong>Japan</strong>’s minister to the<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>, he helped plan former President Ulysses S. Grant’s<br />
visit to <strong>Japan</strong> in 1879.<br />
YOSHIDA LETTER. The Yoshida Letter, written by Prime Minister<br />
Shigeru Yoshida and sent to U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State John Foster<br />
Dulles in December 1951, informed the U.S. government that <strong>Japan</strong><br />
would recognize the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan as<br />
the <strong>of</strong>ficial government <strong>of</strong> China. As representatives from China to<br />
the 1952 San Francisco Peace Conference, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
wanted to invite the Nationalist Chinese government, whereas Great<br />
Britain preferred the victorious communists who had taken control <strong>of</strong><br />
the People’s Republic <strong>of</strong> China (PRC). Because the two Western<br />
powers could not agree on which representative to invite, neither the<br />
PRC nor the Nationalist Chinese government attended the San Francisco<br />
conference. The effect <strong>of</strong> this on <strong>Japan</strong> is that it was left on its<br />
own to decide which <strong>of</strong> the two competing Chinese political organizations<br />
it would engage in concluding a Sino–<strong>Japan</strong> peace treaty.
270 • YOSHIDA, SHIGERU<br />
Because <strong>Japan</strong> believed that the mainland Chinese market would<br />
play an important role in its postwar economic recovery, Prime Minister<br />
Yoshida did not wish to antagonize the PRC by breaking <strong>of</strong>f relations.<br />
However, when Chinese communist forces entered Korea to<br />
engage U.S. troops during the Korean War, the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> intensified<br />
its existing embargo <strong>of</strong> China and advocated policies that were<br />
hostile to the communists running the PRC. On the pretext <strong>of</strong> securing<br />
U.S. Senate ratification <strong>of</strong> the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> State Dulles places strong demands on the <strong>Japan</strong>ese government<br />
to sever diplomatic relations with the PRC. Forced to choose<br />
sides, Prime Minister Yoshida sent what became known as the<br />
Yoshida Letter to Dulles, which contained <strong>Japan</strong>’s promise to normalize<br />
diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese government<br />
based in Taiwan. In March 1952, the <strong>Japan</strong>–China Peace Treaty was<br />
signed between <strong>Japan</strong> and Taiwan. See also TREATY OF PEACE<br />
BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA.<br />
YOSHIDA, SHIGERU (1878–1967). Shigeru Yoshida was a diplomat<br />
and one <strong>of</strong> the most prominent politicians in postwar <strong>Japan</strong>. He was<br />
born in Tokyo and was adopted by Kenzo Yoshida, a businessman,<br />
when he was three years old. After graduating from the Law Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Tokyo Imperial University, he became a diplomat.<br />
He served as minister <strong>of</strong> foreign affairs in the Naruhiko Higashikuni<br />
and Kiju - ro - Shidehara cabinets. The president <strong>of</strong> the Liberal<br />
Party, Ichiro Hatoyama, was the victim <strong>of</strong> a purge just before he<br />
was about to be appointed as prime minister. So Hatoyama asked<br />
Shigeru Yoshida to become prcesident in his stead. He was appointed<br />
prime minister in May 1946, and he formed the first Yoshida Cabinet,<br />
which lasted from 22 May 1946 to 24 May 1947. Yoshida was<br />
the very last person to become prime minister without first being a<br />
Diet member. Although Yoshida promoted the Economic Stabilization<br />
Board and the Priority Production System, he was not enthusiastic<br />
about the direction <strong>of</strong> the economic planning encouraged by<br />
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).<br />
After the Tetsu Katayama and Hitoshi Ashida Cabinets, Yoshida<br />
formed the second Yoshida Cabinet (15 October 1948 to 16 February<br />
1949). The Liberal Party won a landslide victory at the general election<br />
and Yoshida formed the third Yoshida Cabinet (16 February 1949
YOSHIDA, SHOIN • 271<br />
to 30 October 1952). Yoshida made positive responses to changes to<br />
U.S. occupation policies around 1947, especially to the Dodge Line,<br />
an austere fiscal policy established in February 1949. Yoshida determined<br />
the route for the postwar <strong>Japan</strong>ese economic policy that turned<br />
economic recovery into economic growth. Yoshida concluded the<br />
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the <strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty<br />
on 8 September 1951.<br />
Yoshida formed the fourth Yoshida Cabinet (30 October 1952 to 21<br />
May 1953). At this time, he was criticized for concluding the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>–U.S. Security Treaty. The anti-Yoshida movement grew gradually.<br />
At a Lower House Budget Committee meeting held on 28 February<br />
1953, Yoshida used <strong>of</strong>fensive language to Eiichi Nishimura, a<br />
representative from the <strong>Japan</strong> Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP proposed<br />
a disciplinary motion against Yoshida, and it was passed on 2<br />
March 1953. Moreover, a no-confidence motion against the cabinet<br />
was submitted, and it was passed on 14 March 1953. Yoshida dissolved<br />
the Lower House and a general election for the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives<br />
was held on 19 April 1953. The Liberal Party lost more<br />
than 40 seats, but Yoshida organized the fifth Yoshida Cabinet (21<br />
May 1953 to 10 December 1954), although this was a minority government.<br />
The anti-Yoshida movement gained influence and on 7 December<br />
1954, Yoshida finally resigned as prime minister and as president<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Liberal Party. On 14 October 1963, Yoshida decided to<br />
withdraw from politics by declaring that he would not run in the next<br />
general election. Yoshida died on 20 October 1967 and the <strong>Japan</strong>ese<br />
government accorded him a state funeral for the first time in postwar<br />
history at the Budokan, Tokyo on 31 October 1967.<br />
Yoshida’s philosophy was to make use <strong>of</strong> economic technocrats for<br />
economic revival in the postwar era. Joining the Western military<br />
bloc, Yoshida depended on the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for <strong>Japan</strong>’s security.<br />
Yoshida gradually adopted U.S. requests for <strong>Japan</strong>’s remilitarization;<br />
at the same time, he used the connection with the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> for<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese economic revival.<br />
YOSHIDA, SHOIN (1830–1859). A samurai from Choshu domain,<br />
Yoshida was a student <strong>of</strong> Shozan Sakuma and proponent <strong>of</strong> the philosophy<br />
<strong>of</strong> combining “Eastern ethics” with “Western science” to<br />
protect <strong>Japan</strong> from the West. Yoshida also became a strong supporter
272 • YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION (YMCA) IN JAPAN<br />
<strong>of</strong> the movement to “restore” the emperor to his rightful place as the<br />
head <strong>of</strong> government. After being arrested by the Tokugawa shogunate<br />
(bakufu) for trying to stow away on one <strong>of</strong> Commodore<br />
Matthew Perry’s ships in 1854, Yoshida was placed under house<br />
confinement. Nevertheless, a number <strong>of</strong> young Choshu samurai studied<br />
with him who would later overthrow the Tokugawa bakufu.<br />
Yoshida was executed by the Tokugawa bakufu in 1859 for his role<br />
in planning the assassination <strong>of</strong> a government <strong>of</strong>ficial.<br />
YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION (YMCA) IN JAPAN.<br />
The first YMCA in <strong>Japan</strong> started in Tokyo in 1880, with the second established<br />
two years later in Osaka. As <strong>of</strong> 2000, there were more than<br />
100,000 members <strong>of</strong> the YMCA in <strong>Japan</strong>. See also CHRISTIANITY IN<br />
JAPAN.<br />
– Z –<br />
ZAIBATSU. Literally, “financial combines,” most were established or<br />
significantly developed because <strong>of</strong> close relationships with government<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials during the Meiji Era. The most well-known zaibatsu<br />
are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Most were dissolved<br />
or dramatically downsized during the Occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>. See also<br />
SHIBUSAWA, EIICHI.
Appendix A<br />
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Presidents and<br />
Secretaries <strong>of</strong> State 1789–2005<br />
President Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
George Washington Thomas Jefferson<br />
1789–1797 March 1790–December 1793<br />
Edmund Randolph<br />
January 1794–August 1795<br />
Timothy Pickering<br />
December 1795–March 1797<br />
John Adams Timothy Pickering<br />
1797–1801 March 1797–May 1800<br />
John Marshall<br />
June 1800–February 1801<br />
Thomas Jefferson James Madison<br />
1801–1809 May 1801–March 1809<br />
James Madison Robert Smith<br />
1809–1817 March 1809–April 1811<br />
James Monroe<br />
April 1811–September 1814<br />
February 1815–March 1817<br />
James Monroe John Quincy Adams<br />
1817–1825 September 1817–March 1825<br />
John Quincy Adams Henry Clay<br />
1825–1829 March 1825–March 1829<br />
Andrew Jackson Martin Van Buren<br />
1829–1837 March 1829–March 1831<br />
Edward Livingston<br />
May 1831–May 1833<br />
Louis McLane<br />
May 1831–May 1833<br />
John Forsyth<br />
July 1834–March 1837<br />
Martin Van Buren John Forsyth<br />
1837–1841 March 1837–March 1841<br />
William Henry Harrison Daniel Webster<br />
1841 March 1841<br />
(continued)<br />
273
274 • APPENDIX A<br />
President Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
John Tyler Daniel Webster<br />
1841–1845 April 1841–May 1843<br />
Abel P. Upshur<br />
July 1843–February 1844<br />
John C. Calhoun<br />
April 1844–March 1845<br />
James Polk James Buchanan<br />
1845–1849 March 1845–March 1849<br />
Zachary Taylor John M. Clayton<br />
1849–1850 March 1849–July 1850<br />
Millard Fillmore Daniel Webster<br />
1850–1853 July 1850–October 1852<br />
Edward Everett<br />
November 1852–March 1853<br />
Franklin Pierce William L. Marcy<br />
1853–1857 March 1853–March 1857<br />
James Buchanan Lewis Cass<br />
1857–1861 March 1857–December 1860<br />
Jeremiah S. Black<br />
December 1860–March 1861<br />
Abraham Lincoln William H. Seward<br />
1861–1865 March 1861–April 1865<br />
Andrew Johnson William H. Seward<br />
1865–1869 April 1865–March 1869<br />
Ulysses S. Grant Elihu B. Washburne<br />
1869–1877 March 1869<br />
Hamilton Fish<br />
March 1869–March 1877<br />
Rutherford B. Hayes William M. Evarts<br />
1877–1881 March 1877–March 1881<br />
James Garfield James G. Blaine<br />
1881 March 1881–December 1881<br />
Chester Arthur Frederick T. Frelinghuysen<br />
1881–1885 December 1881–March 1885<br />
Grover Cleveland Thomas F. Bayard<br />
1885–1889 March 1885–March 1889<br />
Benjamin Harrison James G. Blaine<br />
1889–1893 March 1889–June 1892<br />
John W. Foster<br />
June 1892–February 1893<br />
Grover Cleveland Walter Q. Gresham<br />
1893–1897 March 1893–May 1895<br />
Richard Olney<br />
June 1895–March 1897
UNITED STATES PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE 1789–2005 • 275<br />
President Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
William McKinley John Sherman<br />
1897–1901 March 1897–April 1898<br />
William R. Day<br />
April 1898–September 1901<br />
John Hay<br />
September 1898–September 1901<br />
Theodore Roosevelt John Hay<br />
1901–1909 September 1901–July 1905<br />
Elihu Root<br />
July 1905–January 1909<br />
Robert Bacon<br />
January 1909–March 1909<br />
William H. Taft Philander C. Knox<br />
1909–1913 March 1909–March 1913<br />
Woodrow Wilson William Jennings Bryan<br />
1913–1921 March 1913–June 1915<br />
Robert Lansing<br />
June 1915–February 1920<br />
Bainbridge Colby<br />
March 1920–March 1921<br />
Warren Harding Charles Evans Hughes<br />
1921–1923 March 1921–March 1923<br />
Calvin Coolidge Charles Evans Hughes<br />
1923–1929 March 1923–March 1925<br />
Frank B. Kellogg<br />
March 1925–March 1929<br />
Herbert Hoover Henry L. Stimson<br />
1929–1933 March 1929–March 1933<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt Cordell Hull<br />
1933–1945 March 1933–November 1944<br />
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.<br />
December 1944–June 1945<br />
Harry Truman James F. Byrnes<br />
1945–1953 July 1945–January 1947<br />
George C. Marshall<br />
January 1947–January 1949<br />
Dean G. Acheson<br />
January 1949–January 1953<br />
Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles<br />
1953–1961 January 1953–April 1959<br />
Christian A. Herter<br />
April 1959–January 1961<br />
(continued)
276 • APPENDIX A<br />
President Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
John F. Kennedy Dean Rusk<br />
1961–1963 January 1961–November 1963<br />
Lyndon Johnson Dean Rusk<br />
1963–1969 November 1963–January 1969<br />
Richard Nixon William P. Rogers<br />
1969–1974 January 1969–September 1973<br />
Henry A. Kissinger<br />
September 1973–August 1974<br />
Gerald Ford Henry A. Kissinger<br />
1974–1977 August 1974–January 1977<br />
Jimmy Carter Cyrus Vance<br />
1977–1981 January 1977–April 1980<br />
Edmund Muskie<br />
May 1980–July 1981<br />
Ronald Reagan Alexander Haig, Jr.<br />
1981–1989 January 1981–July 1982<br />
George P. Shultz<br />
July 1982–January 1989<br />
George H.W. Bush James A. Baker, III<br />
1989–1993 January 1989–August 1992<br />
Lawrence S. Eagleburger<br />
December 1992–January 1993*<br />
William J. Clinton Warren M. Christopher<br />
1993–2001 January 1993–January 1997<br />
Madeleine Albright<br />
January 1997–January 2001<br />
George W. Bush Colin L. Powell<br />
2001– January 2001–January 2005<br />
Condoleezza Rice<br />
January 2005–<br />
*Served as acting secretary <strong>of</strong> state, August–December 1992.
Appendix B<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese Prime Ministers<br />
Name Took Office Left Office<br />
1. Ito, Hirobumi 22 December 1885 30 April 1888<br />
2. Kuroda, Kiyotaka 30 April 1888 25 October 1889<br />
*<br />
3. Yamagata, Aritomo 24 December 1889 6 May 1891<br />
4. Matsukata, Masayoshi 6 May 1891 8 August 1892<br />
5. Ito, Hirobumi<br />
2nd term 8 August 1892 31 August 1896<br />
**<br />
6. Matsukata, Masayoshi 18 September 1896 12 January 1898<br />
2nd term<br />
7. Ito, Hirobumi<br />
3rd term 12 January 1898 30 June 1898<br />
8. Okuma, Shigenobu 30 June 1898 8 November 1898<br />
9. Yamagata, Aritomo<br />
2nd term 8 November 1898 19 October 1900<br />
10. Ito, Hirobumi 19 October 1900 10 May 1901<br />
4th term<br />
***<br />
11. Katsura, Taro 2 June 1901 7 January 1906<br />
12. Saionji, Kinmochi 7 January 1906 14 July 1908<br />
13. Katsura, Taro<br />
2nd term 14 July 1908 30 August 1911<br />
14. Saionji, Kinmochi<br />
2nd term 30 August 1911 21 December 1912<br />
15. Katsura, Taro<br />
3rd term 21 December 1912 20 February 1913<br />
16. Yamamoto, Gonnohyoe 20 February 1913 16 April 1914<br />
17. Okuma, Shigenobu<br />
2nd term 16 April 1914 9 October 1916<br />
18. Terauchi, Masatake 9 October 1916 29 September 1918<br />
19. Hara, Takashi 29 September 1918 4 November 1921<br />
277<br />
(continued)
278 • APPENDIX B<br />
Name Took Office Left Office<br />
****<br />
20. Takahashi, Korekiyo 13 November 1921 12 June 1922<br />
21. Kato, Tomosaburo 12 June 1922 24 August 1923<br />
*****<br />
22. Yamamoto, Gonnohyoe<br />
2nd term 2 September 1923 7 January 1924<br />
23. Kiyoura, Keigo 7 January 1924 11 June 1924<br />
24. Kato, Takaaki 11 June 1924 28 January 1926<br />
******<br />
25. Wakatsuki, Reijiro 30 January 1926 20 April 1927<br />
26. Tanaka, Giichi 20 April 1927 2 July 1929<br />
27. Hamaguchi, Osachi 2 July 1929 14 April 1931<br />
28. Wakatsuki, Reijiro<br />
2nd term 14 April 1931 13 December 1931<br />
29. Inukai, Tsuyoshi 13 December 1931 16 May 1932<br />
*******<br />
30. Saito, Makoto 26 May 1932 8 July 1934<br />
31. Okada, Keisuke 8 July 1934 9 March 1936<br />
32. Hirota, Koki 9 March 1936 2 February 1937<br />
33. Hayashi, Senjuro 2 February 1937 4 June 1937<br />
34. Konoe, Fumimaro 4 June 1937 5 January 1939<br />
35. Hiranuma, Kiichiro 5 January 1939 30 August 1939<br />
36. Abe, Nobuyuki 30 August 1939 16 January 1940<br />
37. Yonai, Mitsumasa 16 January 1940 22 July 1940<br />
38. Konoe, Fumimaro<br />
2nd term 22 July 1940 18 July 1941<br />
39. Konoe, Fumimaro<br />
3rd term 18 July 1941 18 October 1941<br />
40. Tojo, Hideki 18 October 1941 22 July 1944<br />
41. Koiso, Kuniaki 22 July 1944 7 April 1945<br />
42. Suzuki, Kantaro 7 April 1945 17 August 1945<br />
43. Higashikuni, Naruhiko 17 August 1945 9 October 1945<br />
44. Shidehara, Kijuro 9 October 1945 22 May 1946<br />
45. Yoshida, Shigeru 22 May 1946 24 May 1947<br />
46. Katayama, Tetsu 24 May 1947 10 March 1948<br />
47. Ashida, Hitoshi 10 March 1948 15 October 1948<br />
48. Yoshida, Shigeru<br />
2nd term 15 October 1948 16 February 1949<br />
49. Yoshida, Shigeru<br />
3rd term 16 February 1949 30 October 1952<br />
50. Yoshida, Shigeru<br />
4th term 30 October 1952 21 May 1953<br />
51. Yoshida, Shigeru<br />
5th term 21 May 1953 10 December 1954
JAPANESE PRIME MINISTERS • 279<br />
Name Took Office Left Office<br />
52. Hatoyama, Ichiro- 53. Hatoyama, Ichiro<br />
10 December 1954 19 March 1955<br />
-<br />
2nd term<br />
54. Hatoyama, Ichiro<br />
19 March 1955 22 November 1955<br />
-<br />
3rd term 22 November 1955 23 December 1956<br />
55. Ishibashi, Tanzan 23 December 1956 25 February 1957<br />
56. Kishi, Nobusuke<br />
57. Kishi, Nobusuke<br />
25 February 1957 12 June 1958<br />
2nd term 12 June 1958 19 July 1960<br />
58. Ikeda, Hayato<br />
59. Ikeda, Hayato<br />
19 July 1960 8 December 1960<br />
2nd term<br />
60. Ikeda, Hayato<br />
8 December 1960 9 December 1963<br />
3rd term 9 December 1963 9 November 1964<br />
61. Sato, Eisaku<br />
62. Sato, Eisaku<br />
9 November 1964 17 February 1967<br />
2nd term<br />
63. Sato, Eisaku<br />
17 February 1967 14 January 1970<br />
3rd term 14 January 1970 7 July 1972<br />
64. Tanaka, Kakuei<br />
65. Tanaka, Kakuei<br />
7 July 1972 22 December 1972<br />
2nd term 22 December 1972 9 December 1974<br />
66. Miki, Takeo 9 December 1974 24 December 1976<br />
67. Fukuda, Takeo 24 December 1976 7 December 1978<br />
68. Ohira, Masayoshi<br />
69. Ohira, Masayoshi<br />
7 December 1978 9 November 1979<br />
2nd term<br />
********<br />
9 November 1979 12 June 1980<br />
70. Suzuki, Zenko 17 July 1980 27 November 1982<br />
71. Nakasone, Yasuhiro<br />
72. Nakasone, Yasuhiro<br />
27 November 1982 27 December 1983<br />
2nd term<br />
73. Nakasone, Yasuhiro<br />
27 December 1983 22 July 1986<br />
3rd term 22 July 1986 6 November 1987<br />
74. Takeshita, Noboru 6 November 1987 3 June 1989<br />
75. Uno, Sosuke 3 June 1989 10 August 1989<br />
76. Kaifu, Toshiki<br />
77. Kaifu, Toshiki<br />
10 August 1989 28 February 1990<br />
2nd term 28 February 1990 5 November 1991<br />
78. Miyazawa, Kiichi 5 November 1991 9 August 1993<br />
79. Hosokawa, Morihiro 9 August 1993 28 April 1994<br />
80. Hata, Tsutomu 28 April 1994 30 June 1994<br />
81. Murayama, Tomiichi 30 June 1994 11 January 1996<br />
(continued)
280 • APPENDIX B<br />
Name Took Office Left Office<br />
82. Hashimoto, Ryutaro 11 January 1996 7 November 1996<br />
83. Hashimoto, Ryutaro<br />
2nd term 7 November 1996 30 July 1998<br />
84. Obuchi, Keizo 30 July 1998 5 April 2000<br />
85. Mori, Yoshiro 5 April 2000 4 July 2000<br />
86. Mori, Yoshiro<br />
2nd term 4 July 2000 26 April 2001<br />
87. Koizumi, Junichiro 26 April 2001 19 November 2003<br />
88. Koizumi, Junichiro<br />
2nd term 19 November 2003 21 September 2005<br />
89. Koizumi, Junichiro<br />
3rd term 21 September 2005 (present)<br />
* During this interval, Lord Keeper <strong>of</strong> the Privy Seal Sanjo Sanetomi concurrently held the post <strong>of</strong><br />
prime minister.<br />
** During this interval, Privy Council chairman Kuroda Kiyotaka was the interim prime minister.<br />
*** During this interval, Privy Council chairman Saionji Kinmochi was the interim prime minister.<br />
**** During this interval, Foreign Affairs minister Uchida Yasuya was the interim prime minister.<br />
***** During this interval, Foreign Affairs minister Uchida Yasuya was the interim prime minister.<br />
****** During this interval, Home minister Wakatsuki Reijiro was the interim prime minister.<br />
******* During this interval, Finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo was the interim prime minister.<br />
******** During this interval, Cabinet Secretariat chairman Masayoshi Ito was the interim prime<br />
minister.
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About the Authors<br />
John Van Sant (Ph.D., Univ. <strong>of</strong> Oregon) is associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> history<br />
at the University <strong>of</strong> Alabama–Birmingham (USA). His book, Pacific<br />
Pioneers: <strong>Japan</strong>ese Journeys to America and Hawaii, 1850–1880<br />
(University <strong>of</strong> Illinois Press, 2000) is a transnational and transcultural<br />
examination <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> the first <strong>Japan</strong>ese who lived in the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
He also edited and introduced a new edition <strong>of</strong> Arinori Mori’s Life and<br />
Resources in America (Lexington Books, 2004), an examination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
American political, social, and cultural landscape by <strong>Japan</strong>’s first resident<br />
diplomat in Washington, D.C., and originally published in 1872.<br />
Peter Mauch is a lecturer <strong>of</strong> international history at Ritsumeikan University,<br />
Kyoto, <strong>Japan</strong>. He has recently completed a postdoctoral fellowship<br />
at Kyoto University, and is writing a biography <strong>of</strong> Admiral Nomura<br />
Kichisaburo, entitled, Sailor Diplomat: Nomura Kichisaburo and the<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese–American War. He has published numerous articles detailing<br />
Nomura’s pre- and post–Pacific War efforts to place <strong>Japan</strong>ese–American<br />
relations on a cordial footing.<br />
Yoneyuki Sugita is associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> American history at Osaka<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Foreign Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in 1999 from the<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Wisconsin–Madison. He is the author <strong>of</strong> Pitfall or<br />
Panacea: The Irony <strong>of</strong> US Power in Occupied <strong>Japan</strong>, 1945–1952 (New<br />
York: Routledge, 2003) and Irony <strong>of</strong> Hegemony: The Asia–Pacific War<br />
and US Policy toward East Asia (Kyoto: Sekai Shisosha, 1999) (in<br />
<strong>Japan</strong>ese). He is also co-editor with Richard Jensen and Jon Davidann<br />
<strong>of</strong> Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth<br />
Century (New York: Praeger, 2003).<br />
299