Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

58 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
killing the inhabitants of the country (as was the case with
Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and, perhaps most
recently, Washington in 2001) which would clearly make it
morally wrong. It is claimed that the action does not “foreseeably”
entail the deaths of non-combatants. But we could now
add that such deaths of non-combatants could have been foreseeable
in the light of recent experience of the use of similar tactics
in recent wars, and in view of the type of attacks that were
planned. 64
Did the action “avoidably” include the loss of non-combatants?
Could the losses incurred not have been avoided, at least
to a greater degree than they were, by other tactics than a broad
campaign of high level aerial bombardment? 65 It is estimated
that the non-combatant losses were “… 1000-1300 civilian
deaths due to aerial bombardment; a minimum of 3000 civilian
deaths attributable to the impact of the bombing campaign and
war on the nation’s refugee and famine crises.” 66 How does one
calculate whether some 4000 deaths are proportionate or disproportionate
to “the military effect properly sought”? No one
has suggested that the due proportion should be calculated in
relation to the number of civilians killed on September 11 th . As
stated in the text cited, the proportion must be assessed in terms
of the “military” effect proposed. Suppose we accept that this
effect was the removal of those forces and persons likely to make
another, similar attack on the U.S.A., or another country. But
how is it possible to determine who these people are, and how
would the determination be carried out? Perhaps some intelligible
form of calculation might be possible. But we are told that
the war is to involve a “long hall” aimed at eliminating “terrorism.”
Does this involve the removal from power of every national
leader who is deemed to pose a threat to national security?
How many leaders does this involve? How many countries will
be attacked as Afghanistan was? How can any such assessment
reasonably be made, when the end itself is so ill defined? Even
64 CONETTA, “Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties?” p. 2.
65 CONETTA, “Strange Victory,” p. 5.
66 CONETTA, “Strange Victory,” p. 4.