Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
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254 MARTIN MCKEEVER<br />
es his vision is none other than the history of Western culture<br />
and the history of salvation. From within these intertwined histories<br />
the Pope believes it is possible to arrive at a metaphysics<br />
of goodness which can provide the necessary objectivity and<br />
foundations for a contemporary morality.<br />
It we compare Bauman’s narrative with this one, a number<br />
of factors emerge which help us understand why his vision of<br />
morality is so different from that of Fides et ratio. One of the<br />
most obvious of these is the comparative brevity of Bauman’s<br />
narrative. At times he writes as if ethics, and indeed the world in<br />
general, began with modernity. There is scant reference to the<br />
centuries of moral reflection which precede the Enlightenment.<br />
A second characteristic of his narrative is the manner in<br />
which it divides history into epochs, most particularly those of<br />
modernity and postmodernity. Like many postmodernist authors,<br />
Bauman’s thought is defined in terms of what he wishes<br />
to reject, that is to say modernity. He does not explicitly suggest<br />
that in 1789, or 1871, or 1918, or 1945, or 1968 the world, or<br />
even the “western world”, suddenly stopped being modern and<br />
became postmodern. While avoiding such a preposterously<br />
crude idea, he does nonetheless suggest that we have moved into<br />
a new form of culture called postmodernity, without ever explaining<br />
what has happened to modernity, not to mention those<br />
forms of culture which existed before modernity. The primary<br />
problem here is not simply the vague chronological and thematic<br />
parameters but the reduction of history to a succession of<br />
epochs, which does not do justice to the complex relationship<br />
between past and present. Finally, we may note in passing the<br />
stridently “secular” nature of Bauman’s narrative. As John Milbank<br />
6 has argued so forcefully, the option of narrating history in<br />
terms of secular reason is not a neutral, self-evident and “objective”<br />
choice, but is itself a form of rationality which will shape<br />
and often predetermine the course of one’s narrative.<br />
As regards the first tenet, therefore, there is a limited convergence<br />
between Bauman and John Paul II on the excesses of<br />
5 MILBANK, J. Theology and Social Theory, Beyond Secular Reason. (Oxford:<br />
Blackwell Publishers, 1990).