Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
196 TODD A. SALZMAN principles. Man’s conscience itself gives ever more emphatic voice to these principles.” 76 In response to GRISEZ’S point, revisionism has recourse to AQUINAS’ Summa Theologiae. RICHARD MCCORMICK and JOHN MA- HONEY note that AQUINAS distinguishes between the first principles of natural law and secondary precepts or certain detailed proximate conclusions that flow from those principles. 77 Whereas the first principles of natural law cannot change and are, therefore, absolute, the characteristics of the secondary precepts or application of the first principles are, in the words of MC- CORMICK, “provisionality, flexibility and contingency.” 78 In contemporary theological terminology, we could say that these secondary precepts are material norms that relate to rightness and wrongness and are subject to change, clarification, and evolution in light of their ongoing dialogue with the signs of the times (e.g., history, culture, and tradition). The BGT recognizes AQUINAS’ distinction between principles and their application as well. It further recognizes that revisionism cites this article from AQUINAS “to support their view that one must decide in each case whether a received moral norm must be fulfilled or is overridden by other considerations.” 79 In response to revisionism’s use of AQUINAS, GRISEZ notes the following. First, while it may be the case that AQUINAS’ statement may be true “with respect to most specific norms,” he does teach, “that there are norms that do not admit of exception.” 80 Second, he posits that THOMAS’ assertion, drawn from ARISTOTLE’S physics distinguishing between what is universal and absolute versus what is contingent and changing, is fallacious. It is based on a misperception of the existential, moral domain and the natural world. 76 Documents 292, par. 79. See GRISEZ, “Infallibility and Specific Moral Norms” 274. 77 AQUINAS, S.T., I-II, q. 94, aa. 4-5. MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 150-51; and JOHN MAHONEY, Making of Moral Theology 189-90. 78 MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 151. 79 GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 268. 80 Ibid. 269.
THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 197 The whole morally significant content of one’s action must be intelligible, since one is responsible only for what one understands. For this reason, proposals one adopts by choice never are morally particularized by unique, unrepeatable, material, contingent factors. The really unique aspects of one’s action make no difference whatsoever to the morality of what one does. 81 FINNIS also acknowledges revisionism’s use of this passage from AQUINAS. He asserts that revisionism makes “much play” with this statement to show “that derived moral norms, since they involve contingent particulars, hold not universally but only generally (ut in pluribus), subject to exceptions (ut in paucioribus).” 82 FINNIS points out, however, that while many positive norms admit of exceptions, there are negative absolute norms that apply “always and everywhere without exceptions.” 83 What can be said of this seemingly interminable debate between revisionism and the BGT and their conflicting interpretation of tradition as to whether or not the ordinary magisterium has taught infallibly specific natural law norms that belong to the secondary object of infallibility? There are at least three methodological differences that shape each school’s hermeneutical lens for interpreting tradition. The first entails what each school considers to be the moral realm. In their responses to revisionists, neither GRISEZ nor FINNIS (who specifically cites FUCHS’ article, which we discussed earlier) consider the distinction of moral truths, i.e., goodness and truths of salvation or rightness and the fulfillment of human well-being. The distinction between these terms and the norms that correspond to each reflect a more foundational view of the moral realm itself. Many revisionists evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an act in terms of the human person adequately considered and how the act impacts its dimensions, aside from the subjective motivation or moral goodness of the agent choosing the act. 84 81 Ibid. (emphasis added). 82 FINNIS, Moral Absolutes 90. 83 Ibid. 91. See also, GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 269. 84 See LOUIS JANSSENS, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations,” Louvain Studies 8 (1980) 3-29.
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THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 197<br />
The whole morally significant content of one’s action must be<br />
intelligible, since one is responsible only for what one understands.<br />
For this reason, <strong>propos</strong>als one adopts by choice never are morally<br />
particularized by unique, unrepeatable, material, contingent factors.<br />
The really unique aspects of one’s action make no difference<br />
whatsoever to the morality of what one does. 81<br />
FINNIS also acknowledges revisionism’s use of this passage<br />
from AQUINAS. He asserts that revisionism makes “much play”<br />
with this statement to show “that derived moral norms, since<br />
they involve contingent particulars, hold not universally but only<br />
generally (ut in pluribus), subject to exceptions (ut in paucioribus).”<br />
82 FINNIS points out, however, that while many positive<br />
norms admit of exceptions, there are negative absolute norms<br />
that apply “always and everywhere without exceptions.” 83<br />
What can be said of this seemingly interminable debate between<br />
revisionism and the BGT and their conflicting interpretation<br />
of tradition as to whether or not the ordinary magisterium<br />
has taught infallibly specific natural law norms that belong to<br />
the secondary object of infallibility? There are at least three<br />
methodological differences that shape each school’s hermeneutical<br />
lens for interpreting tradition. The first entails what each<br />
school considers to be the moral realm. In their responses to revisionists,<br />
neither GRISEZ nor FINNIS (who specifically cites FUCHS’<br />
article, which we discussed earlier) consider the distinction of<br />
moral truths, i.e., goodness and truths of salvation or rightness<br />
and the fulfillment of human well-being. The distinction between<br />
these terms and the norms that correspond to each reflect<br />
a more foundational view of the moral realm itself.<br />
Many revisionists evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an<br />
act in terms of the human person adequately considered and<br />
how the act impacts its dimensions, aside from the subjective<br />
motivation or moral goodness of the agent choosing the act. 84<br />
81 Ibid. (emphasis added).<br />
82<br />
FINNIS, Moral Absolutes 90.<br />
83 Ibid. 91. See also, GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 269.<br />
84 See LOUIS JANSSENS, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations,”<br />
Louvain Studies 8 (1980) 3-29.