Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

Avant-propos - Studia Moralia Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

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194 TODD A. SALZMAN goodness alone. It is used with rightness only in an analogous sense. That is, “‘moral’ in its proper and formal sense refers only to persons and their free attitudes and decisions, but, because personal moral goodness contains concern for the well-being of the human world as its moral task, it urges ‘right’ activity within this world; and only because of this relationship between personal goodness and material rightness, this rightness is also called moral rightness.” 71 Truths of salvation pertain to moral goodness whereas material norms indicate right or wrong behavior. According to FUCHS and other revisionist theologians, 72 only the former can be considered as the proper object of the secondary object of infallibility and are within the infallible competence of the magisterium to teach. To defend this assertion FUCHS has recourse to Scripture, tradition, and magisterial documents. The upshot of his argument is three-fold. First, these sources reveal that, whereas the magisterium can teach infallibly on questions of natural law that are revealed, it has not taught infallibly on non-revealed questions of natural law (e.g., contraception). Second, there is agreement among theologians that the competence of the magisterium to guide the Church community is promised by the Holy Spirit. There is disagreement, however, on the nature of this competence and how it applies to questions of right/wrongness and material norms. MCCORMICK, for example, notes “one can be competent without being infallibly competent.” In comparison to pre-Vatican II magisterial teachings, MCCORMICK demonstrates that the documents of Vatican II and many subsequent magisterial teachings have clearly limited the nature of the magisterium’s competence to judge in the area of rightness/wrongness. 73 Finally, FUCHS and other revisionists 71 Ibid. 52. See also, JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., who has written extensively on the goodness/rightness distinction in moral theology: Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992); “Distinguishing Charity as Goodness and Prudence as Rightness: A Key to Thomas’s Secunda Pars,” Thomist 56 (1992) 389-411; and “What is Good and What is Right? A New Distinction in Moral Theology,” Church 5 (1989) 22-28. 72 SULLIVAN, “Secondary Object”, n. 60; MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 98-99. 73 See MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 96-100, 147-62.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 195 would classify norms such as those prohibiting contraception, masturbation, reproductive technologies, etc., as moral truths that pertain to material norms of rightness and wrongness, not truths of salvation that pertain to moral goodness. As such, they cannot be considered as the proper object of infallible teaching. One of the texts that FUCHS and many other revisionists cite to justify their argument against the plausibility of teaching nonrevealed infallible natural law norms is Gaudium et Spes, paragraph 33: “The Church guards the heritage of God’s Word and draws from it religious and moral principles, without always having at hand the solution to particular problems.” 74 Religious and moral principles relate to truths of salvation and moral goodness, whereas solutions to particular problems relate to material norms and rightness/wrongness. The BGT gives two responses to revisionism’s use of this and similar texts to argue its position. In his response to revisionists who make “some play” with this and similar texts to deny that absolute specific moral norms exist, JOHN FINNIS asserts that revisionists have committed a non sequitur by overlooking the distinction between “not every” and “not any.” In doing so, they move from “‘The church cannot give a specific answer to every moral question’ to ‘The church cannot teach with definitive authority any specific moral norm.’” 75 In his references, he cites SULLIVAN, FUCHS, and GERARD HUGHES, S.J., as theologians who have repeatedly committed this non sequitur. According to FINNIS, then, revisionists have taken great liberty in their hermeneutic of passages from Vatican II to deny that some specific moral norms have been taught infallibly by the magisterium. GRISEZ has another response to revisionism. In his response, he cites a passage from Gaudium et Spes that substantiates that there are some specific moral norms whose truth precludes substantial revision: “Contemplating this melancholy state of humanity, the Council wishes to recall first of all the permanent binding force of universal natural law and its all-embracing 74 WALTER M. ABBOTT, S.J., Documents of Vatican II (New York: America Press, 1966) 232 (emphasis added), see also, n. 90. 75 FINNIS, Moral Absolutes 92.

194 TODD A. SALZMAN<br />

goodness alone. It is used with rightness only in an analogous<br />

sense. That is, “‘moral’ in its proper and formal sense refers only<br />

to persons and their free attitudes and decisions, but, because<br />

personal moral goodness contains concern for the well-being of<br />

the human world as its moral task, it urges ‘right’ activity within<br />

this world; and only because of this relationship between personal<br />

goodness and material rightness, this rightness is also<br />

called moral rightness.” 71 Truths of salvation pertain to moral<br />

goodness whereas material norms indicate right or wrong behavior.<br />

According to FUCHS and other revisionist theologians, 72<br />

only the former can be considered as the proper object of the<br />

secondary object of infallibility and are within the infallible<br />

competence of the magisterium to teach.<br />

To defend this assertion FUCHS has recourse to Scripture, tradition,<br />

and magisterial documents. The upshot of his argument<br />

is three-fold. First, these sources reveal that, whereas the magisterium<br />

can teach infallibly on questions of natural law that are<br />

revealed, it has not taught infallibly on non-revealed questions<br />

of natural law (e.g., contraception). Second, there is agreement<br />

among theologians that the competence of the magisterium to<br />

guide the Church community is promised by the Holy Spirit.<br />

There is disagreement, however, on the nature of this competence<br />

and how it applies to questions of right/wrongness and<br />

material norms. MCCORMICK, for example, notes “one can be<br />

competent without being infallibly competent.” In comparison<br />

to pre-Vatican II magisterial teachings, MCCORMICK demonstrates<br />

that the documents of Vatican II and many subsequent<br />

magisterial teachings have clearly limited the nature of the<br />

magisterium’s competence to judge in the area of<br />

rightness/wrongness. 73 Finally, FUCHS and other revisionists<br />

71 Ibid. 52. See also, JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., who has written extensively<br />

on the goodness/rightness distinction in moral theology: Goodness and<br />

Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Washington, D.C.:<br />

Georgetown University Press, 1992); “Distinguishing Charity as Goodness<br />

and Prudence as Rightness: A Key to Thomas’s Secunda Pars,” Thomist 56<br />

(1992) 389-411; and “What is Good and What is Right? A New Distinction<br />

in Moral Theology,” Church 5 (1989) 22-28.<br />

72 SULLIVAN, “Secondary Object”, n. 60; MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 98-99.<br />

73 See MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 96-100, 147-62.

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