Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
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136 JOHN BERKMAN<br />
conditional abandonment. However, many others simply fail to<br />
consider the implications of what they are doing in commissioning<br />
the creation of embryos in vitro. Finally, others may fully<br />
intend to implant all of their embryos, but through illness,<br />
death, or other misfortune simply become unable to fulfill the<br />
responsibilities they undertook.<br />
One can imagine untimely circumstances leading to a decision<br />
to give up one’s embryo for adoption similar to those that<br />
could be expected to lead to a regular adoption. In certain circumstances<br />
the decision by a biological parent to offer embryos<br />
up for adoption would not necessarily be any more an act of illicit<br />
abandonment than that of a birth mother who for a variety of<br />
reasons decides to give up her child for adoption. While in certain<br />
instances one would act in a gravely wrong manner to hand<br />
over one’s frozen embryos (or one’s birth child) to another couple<br />
for adoption, the wrongfulness does not lie in an “in-principle”<br />
requirement upon all those who procreate children to raise<br />
them.<br />
Finally, there is also the question of the woman who finds<br />
out after conception that her endometrium is unfit for implantation.<br />
If she flushed out her pre-implanted embryo, froze it, and<br />
looked for someone to gestate it, would that be acceptable?<br />
Mary Geach presents this case as something which would be<br />
wrong to do. 38 However, she assumes that the woman who<br />
would gestate the baby would pledge to return the child to the<br />
genetic mother at birth. Of course, that would be surrogacy.<br />
However, this is not the last word with this case. For<br />
instance, what if the woman engages in embryo flushing and<br />
freezes the embryo, not so that someone can gestate the embryo<br />
for her, but so that she can give it up for adoption? What if, like<br />
the mother of Moses, she will go to extraordinary means to give<br />
37 DV, II, A, 3. This line is repeated almost verbatim at DV III.<br />
38 This case can be found in Geach (1999), 341. Another analogous case<br />
is that of the rape victim, who, while recognizing the humanity of the<br />
embryo inside her, does not want to gestate and raise the child. Is it morally<br />
wrong for her, not wanting to abort the embryo, to have an embryo flush and<br />
cryopreservation done, and seek a person willing to adopt the child? Issues<br />
of self-defense complicate this example.