Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 133
tunately, Surtees also fails to note adequately the context of that
sentence in DV and mistakenly takes it to be directed towards
couples who seek a pregnancy through “artificial procreation.”
However, this section is in fact directed to researchers, and the
issue of the morality of artificial procreation will not be raised
until the following section of DV. 33
As can be seen from the quote above, Surtees believes that a
couple who have commissioned the creation of more embryos
than can be implanted in the uterus of the woman at the time of
their creation are in a position where there is no morally acceptable
solution. This is because neither of the two alternatives to
their immediate implantation is, according to Surtees, morally
acceptable. It is not permissible either to give them up for adoption
or to cryopreserve them for future implantation.
Let us first examine Surtees’s claim regarding the impermissibility
of cryopreservation. He claims that the couple cannot
choose to cryopreserve an excess embryo because an embryo
has a right to be gestated, and freezing the spare embryo consigns
it to “the ‘absurd fate’ of spending all the rest of his existence
confined in deep freeze, all the while susceptible to experimentation
and further inhumane treatment.” 34 However, while
33 The first mention of artificial procreation comes in the opening lines
of Part 2 of DV, which is entitled “Interventions upon Human Procreation.”
The term “artificial procreation” is the term used by DV to refer to the
combination of the fertilization of an ovum in a test-tube (i.e. in vitro) along
with the transfer of the fertilized ovum (i.e. the embryo) in utero, all of which
is done for the purpose of human procreation other than via the sexual
union of man and woman. Surtees uses a different term – “artificial reproduction”
– and while that term is ambiguous in that it could be a reference
merely to artificial conception, Surtees clearly has in mind what DV calls
artificial procreation, as is evident from the sentences that follow.
Furthermore, Surtees also seems to overlook the descriptive thrust of
DV I, 5, and is thus, like Smith, confused as to what DV means by “spare”
embryos. Whereas DV is referring to those embryos which are destined
never to find a human womb for a home, Surtees thinks “spare” simply
refers to those embryos which are not implanted in what is typically referred
to as the “first” cycle or round of IVF treatment
34 Surtees (1996), 8. Note the oddity of this claim by Surtees, which he
derives from DV I, 6. One could simply say that the cryopreservation will