Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

132 JOHN BERKMAN
Thus, according to Surtees, those who choose to undergo
the IVF-ET treatment are enmeshed in an irresolvable moral difficulty.
Once a couple commissions the embryos, there is no
moral choice they can make with regard to the leftover embryos.
While I will challenge shortly the conclusions drawn in the
above quoted passage, Surtees does draw out some seemingly
logical conclusions in a very puzzling situation. On the logic of
the Catholic tradition discussed thus far, it has been noted that
it is wrong in principle for a couple to commission the creation
of embryos (using either their own gametes or donor gametes)
through IVF. Thus, according to Catholic teaching, there would
seem to be no situation in which a couple could intend a process
by which they would have embryos which are their genetic children
implanted in the womb of the woman. On the other hand,
the adoption of embryos that are unrelated to the couple has not
been ruled out as wrong in principle. If this is indeed the case, it
produces the rather odd consequence that Catholic teaching
seems to allow ET which separates genetic parenthood from
gestational and “raising” parenthood, but prohibits ET that
would maintain the bond between genetic, gestational, and
“raising” parenthood.
Now it can be argued that the situation about which Surtees
is arguing is not in fact a case of embryo adoption, as a couple
cannot “adopt” their own biological children. Rather, it is about
the morality of implanting too many embryos, or relinquishing
one’s embryos for adoption, or freezing one’s embryos. While
this is true, Surtees’ example sheds light on issues relevant to the
question of the morality of embryo adoption that is at the heart
of this essay.
Central to Surtees’ response to this question is his interpretation
of the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence in Donum vitae
which has been extensively discussed in section one of this
paper. According to Surtees, this sentence is directed towards
“persons who have freely adopted by choice the intelligible,
though illicit, proposal of artificial reproduction.” 32 Unfor-
32 See Surtees (1996), 8. He completes that sentence by adding “and,
hence, not at those who would wish to “rescue” these embryos through adoption.”