Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
130 JOHN BERKMAN birth. On this view, the appropriate (albeit limited) analogy for the woman’s decision to gestate an embryo is to be drawn, not with the decision to participate in an act of sexual intercourse, but rather with the decision to nurture a child by nursing. Of course, this possibility of separating genetic motherhood from gestational motherhood is fundamentally new. This paper can only gesture towards a few of the many implications that can be drawn about either the good or bad implications of this new possibility. However, it can at least be noted that at present, greater significance, morally speaking, is typically given to genetic parenthood, but the opportunity is presented at this point in time to reevaluate this prevalent assumption. In the current debate regarding the adoption of frozen embryos, it is typical to equate (or almost equate) genetic parenthood with parenthood per se. Of course, in the normal and ideal course of events the genetic, gestational, and “raising” elements of parenthood all go together. But since it is now clear that genetic and gestational “motherhood” can be separated, why is it so readily assumed that providing an ovum qualifies one as the mother of a child, even after the created embryo has been implanted in the womb of another woman? On the contrary, a woman’s consenting to gestate a child, to give a child life that it otherwise could not have, can certainly be argued to be at least as biologically significant in terms of what is necessary for the child to actually be born. And if one does separate the act of consent to the creation of an embryo and the act of consent to gestate a child, it can certainly be argued that the latter is more morally significant in terms of a choice to become a human mother. While this is a subject that will require much more evaluation, it is certainly possible to make a case that, by the very act of gestation, the woman becomes the child’s mother in the most important and profound sense. The unquestioned priority that is typically given to the genetic element of parenthood must begin to be questioned. 30 30 On the one hand, it is no doubt a very good thing to recognize the natural bond between children and their biological parents, so that e.g. nationstates or other governmental institutions cannot wrest control of children
THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 131 (iii) May a Couple Who Have Commissioned Embryos Through IVF Freeze them for the Purpose of Later Implantation? Having argued that the decision of a couple to adopt an embryo neither constitutes surrogacy (they are not contracted to give the child up at birth), nor constitutes an act incompatible with the virtue of chastity, we now examine the objection that in some instances the decision to implant an embryo in one particular kind of situation would constitute wrongful participation in IVF-ET. One recent proponent of embryo adoption in some instances has concluded that, according to DV, a couple in the middle of the IVF-ET process, who have already created and perhaps cryopreserved numerous embryos, have no morally acceptable course of action with regard to their frozen embryos. They continue to do wrong even if they seek eventually to gestate the rest of their embryos. Geoffrey Surtees writes: In other words, for those who choose the methods of in vitro fertilization, it is in fact true that there are no licit means of handling the “spares” begotten from the IVF procedure: this is because any action the parties choose to adopt with respect to the “spares” would be to deny the fundamental rights of the embryo(s) to enjoy gestation and birth in his natural mother; and, after birth, to be raised and educated by the same. Even if the couple were to envision giving up their spares for adoption, this too would be wrong, and for the same reason: it would deny the children the parental love they are by natural justice entitled to from their original parents. It is never licit to reject one’s own child; and it is a further injustice to give [the embryo] over to the “absurd fate” of spending the rest of his existence confined in deep freeze, all the while susceptible to experimentations and further inhumane treatment. 31 from their parents without very strong reason (e.g. child abuse, serious neglect, and so forth). On the other hand, in a world where children have been orphaned through a variety of tragic circumstances (including abandonment), those who commit themselves to the raising of a child through adoption are in the most important sense the true parents of that child. 31 Surtees (1996), 8.
- Page 80 and 81: 80 DENNIS J. BILLY Gratian, but als
- Page 82 and 83: 82 DENNIS J. BILLY son’s friendsh
- Page 84 and 85: 84 DENNIS J. BILLY his readers to f
- Page 86 and 87: 86 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI un embr
- Page 88 and 89: 88 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI Classic
- Page 90 and 91: 90 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI perta d
- Page 92 and 93: 92 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI 2. Uso
- Page 94 and 95: 94 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI Una ult
- Page 96 and 97: 96 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI superfi
- Page 98 and 99: 98 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI adulto,
- Page 100 and 101: 100 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI re per
- Page 102 and 103: 102 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI In un
- Page 104 and 105: 104 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI Quanto
- Page 106 and 107: 106 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI umano
- Page 108 and 109: 108 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI dal mo
- Page 110 and 111: 110 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI in con
- Page 112 and 113: 112 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI li aut
- Page 114 and 115: 114 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI in cor
- Page 116 and 117: 116 JOHN BERKMAN moment of its exis
- Page 118 and 119: 118 JOHN BERKMAN Smith concluded fr
- Page 120 and 121: 120 JOHN BERKMAN embryos are not be
- Page 122 and 123: 122 JOHN BERKMAN 2. Is Embryo Adopt
- Page 124 and 125: 124 JOHN BERKMAN lowing DV would ha
- Page 126 and 127: 126 JOHN BERKMAN In line with the d
- Page 128 and 129: 128 JOHN BERKMAN to becoming pregna
- Page 132 and 133: 132 JOHN BERKMAN Thus, according to
- Page 134 and 135: 134 JOHN BERKMAN the claim here inv
- Page 136 and 137: 136 JOHN BERKMAN conditional abando
- Page 138 and 139: 138 JOHN BERKMAN infants and childr
- Page 140 and 141: 140 JOHN BERKMAN [N.B. This documen
- Page 143 and 144: StMor 40 (2002) 143-169 EDMUND KOWA
- Page 145 and 146: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 145
- Page 147 and 148: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 147
- Page 149 and 150: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 149
- Page 151 and 152: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 151
- Page 153 and 154: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 153
- Page 155 and 156: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 155
- Page 157 and 158: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 157
- Page 159 and 160: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 159
- Page 161 and 162: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 161
- Page 163 and 164: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 163
- Page 165 and 166: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 165
- Page 167 and 168: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 167
- Page 169: L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 169
- Page 172 and 173: 172 TODD A. SALZMAN A fundamental d
- Page 174 and 175: 174 TODD A. SALZMAN cerned through
- Page 176 and 177: 176 TODD A. SALZMAN member superior
- Page 178 and 179: 178 TODD A. SALZMAN As I understand
THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 131<br />
(iii) May a Couple Who Have Commissioned Embryos<br />
Through IVF Freeze them for the Purpose of Later Implantation?<br />
Having argued that the decision of a couple to adopt an<br />
embryo neither constitutes surrogacy (they are not contracted to<br />
give the child up at birth), nor constitutes an act incompatible<br />
with the virtue of chastity, we now examine the objection that in<br />
some instances the decision to implant an embryo in one particular<br />
kind of situation would constitute wrongful participation<br />
in IVF-ET. One recent proponent of embryo adoption in some<br />
instances has concluded that, according to DV, a couple in the<br />
middle of the IVF-ET process, who have already created and<br />
perhaps cryopreserved numerous embryos, have no morally<br />
acceptable course of action with regard to their frozen embryos.<br />
They continue to do wrong even if they seek eventually to gestate<br />
the rest of their embryos. Geoffrey Surtees writes:<br />
In other words, for those who choose the methods of in vitro<br />
fertilization, it is in fact true that there are no licit means of handling<br />
the “spares” begotten from the IVF procedure: this is because<br />
any action the parties choose to adopt with respect to the “spares”<br />
would be to deny the fundamental rights of the embryo(s) to enjoy<br />
gestation and birth in his natural mother; and, after birth, to be<br />
raised and educated by the same. Even if the couple were to envision<br />
giving up their spares for adoption, this too would be wrong,<br />
and for the same reason: it would deny the children the parental<br />
love they are by natural justice entitled to from their original parents.<br />
It is never licit to reject one’s own child; and it is a further<br />
injustice to give [the embryo] over to the “absurd fate” of spending<br />
the rest of his existence confined in deep freeze, all the while susceptible<br />
to experimentations and further inhumane treatment. 31<br />
from their parents without very strong reason (e.g. child abuse, serious<br />
neglect, and so forth). On the other hand, in a world where children have<br />
been orphaned through a variety of tragic circumstances (including abandonment),<br />
those who commit themselves to the raising of a child through<br />
adoption are in the most important sense the true parents of that child.<br />
31 Surtees (1996), 8.
Change language