Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
Avant-propos - Studia Moralia
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126 JOHN BERKMAN<br />
In line with the definition of surrogacy offered in DV, the<br />
essence of surrogacy lies in the woman’s willingness to gestate a<br />
child on behalf of others. 22 Thus, in the situation in which a<br />
woman arranges to have an embryo implanted in her womb, and<br />
does so without a prior arrangement to give up the child to a specific<br />
couple upon delivery, she is not acting as a surrogate mother,<br />
strictly speaking. Whatever other criticisms may or may not<br />
be directed at what is being done, the woman is not, according to<br />
the definition offered by Donum vitae, a surrogate mother. 23<br />
When evaluated in a broader context, surrogacy can also be<br />
seen to contribute to the denigration of the moral significance of<br />
gestation, including that of the good and natural bond that<br />
develops between mother and child in the gestational period.<br />
While the contemporary discussion of IVF-ET, surrogacy, and<br />
embryo adoption seems to see little or no moral significance in<br />
the unique act of human gestation, it is what – in a profound<br />
sense – makes a woman a mother. In the next section on embryo<br />
adoption and the virtue of chastity, more will be said about the<br />
moral significance of gestation.<br />
(ii) Is Embryo Adoption Contrary to the Virtue of Chastity?<br />
If embryo adoption is not a case of surrogacy strictly speaking,<br />
some see it as analogous to surrogacy in that it involves a<br />
woman in actions that are incompatible with the nature of the<br />
marital commitment among Catholics. For example, Mary<br />
Geach has described embryo adoption as a “technological<br />
impregnation,” and concluded that it is wrong because all forms<br />
22 A religious form of surrogacy is illustrated in Margaret Atwood’s The<br />
Handmaid’s Tale.<br />
23 It may be argued that DV has an inadequate definition of surrogacy.<br />
It is certainly debatable as to whether a woman’s decision to “rescue” and<br />
“foster” a child to birth, with a general intention to give the child up for<br />
adoption, is a form of surrogacy. If this appeared to be done with a goal of<br />
financial gain, this would seem to reveal something about the nature of the<br />
woman’s intentions that would make the action closer to, if not in fact, a<br />
form of surrogacy.