Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 123
ly be appropriate to seek to transfer an embryo lodged in the fallopian
tube (i.e. in an ectopic pregnancy) to the lining of the
uterus. Furthermore, it would seem morally unproblematic if it
were technically possible to temporarily remove an embryo
from the uterine lining while a woman received, e.g., radiation
therapy for cervical cancer, and then transfer it back to the
uterus to continue its gestation. 16 Such interventions in the normal
process of gestation when done for the unambiguous good
of the embryo are not called into question in the tradition.
Such a conclusion regarding interventions on behalf of the
embryo are not at all surprising, for DV’s fundamental principle
for reflection upon the treatment of embryos, invoked repeatedly
at key points, is: “Human life must be absolutely respected
and protected from the moment of conception.” 17 Although DV
argues that it is wrong in principle to create embryos in vitro,
once created an embryo “must be treated as a person” and thus
“tended and cared for, to the extent possible, in the same way as
any other human being.” 18 On the basis of this principle, one fol-
16 These are largely imaginary scenarios. However, there is at least one
recorded case where it has been claimed that an embryo has been successfully
transferred from the fallopian tube to the lining of the uterus. It is certainly
possible that such transfers will become increasingly common as medical
techniques continue to develop.
17 DV, I, 1. DV quotes this sentence from the Holy See, Charter of the
Rights of the Family, 4: L’Osservatore Romano, 25 November 1983.
18 DV I, 1. The fifth section is to be read in the context of the first section,
which articulates more generally the respect due to human embryos.
The first section begins by stating “The human being must be respected – as a
person – from the very first instant of his existence.” It then goes on to note
that it is aware “of the current debates concerning the beginning of human
life … and concerning the identity of the human person,” and that while “no
experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to the recognition
of a spiritual soul … how could a human individual not be a human person?”
The section concludes by claiming that “[t]he human being is to be respected
and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore
from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among
which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being
to life. This doctrinal reminder provides the fundamental criterion for the
solution of the various problems posed by the development of the biomedical
sciences in this field: since the embryo must be treated as a person, it