Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

120 JOHN BERKMAN
embryos are not being given an opportunity to be gestated by a
human mother, they are being exposed to an “absurd fate.” For
such embryos are destined to destruction, either immediately, or
after being used for experimental purposes.
That is the broad context of Donum vitae I, 5. But what of
the reference to the embryos “not transferred into the body of
the mother”? Here the difficulty arises from confusion between
a descriptive declaration and a prescriptive claim. Whereas
some interpret the passage as having a prescriptive intent (i.e.
prohibiting the transfer of embryos), the sentence in fact presumes
that the embryos being discussed are not being (as
opposed to “should not be”) transferred into the body of a
woman. 11 In other words, the point of this section is to assert
that if there is not a human womb to gestate the embryo, there
is no morally licit means by which the embryo can be gestated.
What alternatives to implanting embryos in the wombs of
human mothers does the document have in mind? In the sentence
immediately following the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence,
DV rejects “attempts or plans for fertilization between
human and animal gametes and the gestation of human
embryos in the uterus[es] of animals, or the hypothesis or project
of constructing artificial uteruses for the human embryo.” 12
10 DV does refer explicitly at two points to issues surrounding the cryopreservation
of human embryos. In the context of a discussion of experimental
manipulations of the embryo, DV condemns the act of freezing
embryos (DV I, 6). DV’s only explicit reference to frozen embryos refers to
those which are not transferred into the genital tracts of the woman and
which are “utiliz[ed] for different purposes to the detriment of their integrity
and life,” i.e. frozen for non-therapeutic experimental purposes (DV, II).
Also, when DV calls for legislation prohibiting “embryo banks” (DV, III), the
embryos being kept in such banks are presumably cryopreserved, and presumably
kept in such banks to be made available for experimental purposes.
11 DV uses the term “mother,” but it is unclear what that term signifies,
for once ET takes place, the woman is a mother or mother-to-be, whether or
not she is also the biological mother, a surrogate mother, a gestational mother,
and/or an adoptive mother.
12 A few sentences later, DV articulates its objection to the cryopreservation
of human embryos. Situated as it is in this particular context, this
objection should not be taken to be a general objection to the cryopreserva-