The China Venture
The China Venture The China Venture
Chinese insist on cutting edge technology. If the technology proves to be too advanced for the Chinese recipient, employees may mishandle the equipment due to lack of sufficient training, which could badly damage the foreign suppliers reputation. According to Confucian philosophy copying is a legitimate and clever way of learning; moral scruples do not exist. For an SME whose major asset is proprietary technology, it is imperative to control and to protect its technology from unauthorised use, copying and dissemination. Holding back key components (delivering them as bla ck box) is one defensive strategy. SMEs involved with rapidly evolving high-technology face probably less risk when transferring their top end technology to China. Once the Chinese fully master this technology, a succeeding technology generation has already been developed. Thus the risk of creating a competitor is minimal. Although Chinese Patent and Licensing Laws are of Western standard, law enforcement is still very weak (Kloth 1996). Dissemination of delivered technology is almost beyond control of a foreign SME; it happens that a process technology license is given for one manufacturing plant, that fees for this plant are paid regularly but that the technology is used in similar facilities without gratification and notification of the licensor. The risk of creating a competitor on the world market is inherent to process and product technology transfer. Chinese Licensing Laws do not permit any geographical restriction of the sales area of the products deriving from licensed or bought technology. Minimum sales prices are forbidden, giving the Chinese way to conquer established markets with dumping price strategies. However, it seems that only the largest Chinese firms have the experience and management resources to become a serious competitor on the world market. As Paul reflected on his China venture, he realised the wisdom of Mr. Zheng in his dealings with the Chinese partner. Mr. Zheng’s good business relationships with the Chinese partners involved not only the provision of a foreign market for Chinese goods, but also the essential help and advice which he gives to them in terms of improvement to the products as well as the introduction of various appropriate technologies to the Chinese partner. When appropriate, Mr. Zheng has even helped the Chinese partners source for technology in Europe. Paul began to realise the reasons for the strengths and depths of Mr. Zheng’s relationships with his 124
Chinese partners. He also began to realise why he could not seem to make any headway with his Chinese partners once Mr. Zheng is gone. Without extra “technology service” which Mr. Zheng is providing, the strategic partnership may not be too attractive to the Chinese partners. “Technology service” was never part of the formal agreement to co-operate in the existing trading arrangements. Similarly, the often necessary inspection and assembly activities relating to the trading activities were also never specified in any written agreement with Chinese partners. These anomalies according to Paul’s past perception would now appear to be central to the business relationships Mr. Zheng had developed and critical to their maintenance over the longer term. Paul continued to read on about the cultural factors relating to the negotiations for a Joint Venture in China. Brigitta Joho and Jürgen Müller wrote: 3.4 Negotiating for a Joint Venture: Strategic Considerations (by Brigitta Joho and Jürgen Müller) For many people in the West, China is not only geographically but also culturally very far away. Although modern communication technology gave us a closer link to the Asian world, this region still seems further away than for example Australia. The completely different culture is one major aspect. It is therefore no wonder that companies use Joint Ventures as a first step to enter the Chinese market. The way to a successful Joint Venture is long and full of problems. The missing language ability is certainly not the biggest obstacle, but the lack of intercultural competence, social and economic knowledge and experience. The keys to a successful European–Chinese Joint Venture lie in a very good preparation for the Chinese culture and for any problem which could await the investor, as well as the ability to use the opportunities provided by an intercultural partnership. This paper tries to highlight the main differences between German and Swiss values and customs on one side, and Chinese on the other. To illustrate these differences we proceed in the following way: In a first step we build the foundation for our paper, by giving a rough overview about the meaning of culture in its three different levels and their functions. In the next section we present a more theoretical approach to the Chinese way of doing business, and in the last part we summarise the experiences gathered through the inte rviews with different companies. Finally, we would give some recommendations on how to do business in China. 125
- Page 85 and 86: • stipulates that advanced techno
- Page 87 and 88: Government approval. Foreign invest
- Page 89 and 90: Co-operative Joint Venture Status P
- Page 91 and 92: Reflecting on these points the foll
- Page 93 and 94: Success Factors concerning Products
- Page 95 and 96: Success Factors concerning Company
- Page 97 and 98: high-technology are eligible for th
- Page 99 and 100: Available Distribution Channels A m
- Page 101 and 102: Available Distribution Channels Mar
- Page 103 and 104: Available Distribution Channels Mar
- Page 105 and 106: Illustrative Case Studies The follo
- Page 107 and 108: Available Distribution Channels Mar
- Page 109 and 110: Which Aspects should SME's Focus on
- Page 111 and 112: Strategy No. 1: Have Cash A comfort
- Page 113 and 114: expenses have a detrimental effect
- Page 115 and 116: As a conclusion, network oriented m
- Page 117 and 118: 3.2.13 Case Study: Swisstec, Lyss 3
- Page 119 and 120: factor which makes the foreign firm
- Page 121 and 122: developed within the SME, its impac
- Page 123 and 124: 3.3.1.3 The Role of Technology Mana
- Page 125 and 126: Indirect export and direct export a
- Page 127 and 128: maintenance or the use of establish
- Page 129 and 130: Government Central Exploiting Sales
- Page 131 and 132: in the most advanced provinces and
- Page 133 and 134: network through which the products
- Page 135: Siemens or Motorola, they may have
- Page 139 and 140: orders. However, a country may also
- Page 141 and 142: Germany/Switzerland China democrati
- Page 143 and 144: 3.4.2.4 Conversation at the first m
- Page 145 and 146: only after a certain time and even
- Page 147 and 148: 3.4.3 Experiences of European Compa
- Page 149 and 150: ones who atte nded a course. They s
- Page 151 and 152: Another Chinese tactic is, as menti
- Page 153 and 154: 4. Post-Entry Strategic Considerati
- Page 155 and 156: and the other one in China. The com
- Page 157 and 158: experience in operating production
- Page 159 and 160: In these two cases, the companies m
- Page 161 and 162: 5. References Aharoni, Y. (1966): T
- Page 163 and 164: Dony, A. G. (1998): Market Entry St
- Page 165 and 166: Islam, I. / Chowdhury, A. (1997): A
- Page 167 and 168: Madura, J. (1993): International Fi
- Page 169 and 170: Semkow, B. W. (ed.) (1995): China F
- Page 171 and 172: 6. Appendix 6.1 Fact Sheet People
Chinese insist on cutting edge technology. If the technology proves to be too advanced for the<br />
Chinese recipient, employees may mishandle the equipment due to lack of sufficient training,<br />
which could badly damage the foreign suppliers reputation.<br />
According to Confucian philosophy copying is a legitimate and clever way of learning; moral<br />
scruples do not exist. For an SME whose major asset is proprietary technology, it is<br />
imperative to control and to protect its technology from unauthorised use, copying and<br />
dissemination. Holding back key components (delivering them as bla ck box) is one defensive<br />
strategy. SMEs involved with rapidly evolving high-technology face probably less risk when<br />
transferring their top end technology to <strong>China</strong>. Once the Chinese fully master this technology,<br />
a succeeding technology generation has already been developed. Thus the risk of creating a<br />
competitor is minimal.<br />
Although Chinese Patent and Licensing Laws are of Western standard, law enforcement is<br />
still very weak (Kloth 1996). Dissemination of delivered technology is almost beyond control<br />
of a foreign SME; it happens that a process technology license is given for one manufacturing<br />
plant, that fees for this plant are paid regularly but that the technology is used in similar<br />
facilities without gratification and notification of the licensor.<br />
<strong>The</strong> risk of creating a competitor on the world market is inherent to process and product<br />
technology transfer. Chinese Licensing Laws do not permit any geographical restriction of the<br />
sales area of the products deriving from licensed or bought technology. Minimum sales prices<br />
are forbidden, giving the Chinese way to conquer established markets with dumping price<br />
strategies. However, it seems that only the largest Chinese firms have the experience and<br />
management resources to become a serious competitor on the world market.<br />
As Paul reflected on his <strong>China</strong> venture, he realised the wisdom of Mr. Zheng in his dealings<br />
with the Chinese partner. Mr. Zheng’s good business relationships with the Chinese partners<br />
involved not only the provision of a foreign market for Chinese goods, but also the essential<br />
help and advice which he gives to them in terms of improvement to the products as well as the<br />
introduction of various appropriate technologies to the Chinese partner. When appropriate,<br />
Mr. Zheng has even helped the Chinese partners source for technology in Europe. Paul began<br />
to realise the reasons for the strengths and depths of Mr. Zheng’s relationships with his<br />
124