The China Venture

The China Venture The China Venture

11.12.2012 Views

Chinese insist on cutting edge technology. If the technology proves to be too advanced for the Chinese recipient, employees may mishandle the equipment due to lack of sufficient training, which could badly damage the foreign suppliers reputation. According to Confucian philosophy copying is a legitimate and clever way of learning; moral scruples do not exist. For an SME whose major asset is proprietary technology, it is imperative to control and to protect its technology from unauthorised use, copying and dissemination. Holding back key components (delivering them as bla ck box) is one defensive strategy. SMEs involved with rapidly evolving high-technology face probably less risk when transferring their top end technology to China. Once the Chinese fully master this technology, a succeeding technology generation has already been developed. Thus the risk of creating a competitor is minimal. Although Chinese Patent and Licensing Laws are of Western standard, law enforcement is still very weak (Kloth 1996). Dissemination of delivered technology is almost beyond control of a foreign SME; it happens that a process technology license is given for one manufacturing plant, that fees for this plant are paid regularly but that the technology is used in similar facilities without gratification and notification of the licensor. The risk of creating a competitor on the world market is inherent to process and product technology transfer. Chinese Licensing Laws do not permit any geographical restriction of the sales area of the products deriving from licensed or bought technology. Minimum sales prices are forbidden, giving the Chinese way to conquer established markets with dumping price strategies. However, it seems that only the largest Chinese firms have the experience and management resources to become a serious competitor on the world market. As Paul reflected on his China venture, he realised the wisdom of Mr. Zheng in his dealings with the Chinese partner. Mr. Zheng’s good business relationships with the Chinese partners involved not only the provision of a foreign market for Chinese goods, but also the essential help and advice which he gives to them in terms of improvement to the products as well as the introduction of various appropriate technologies to the Chinese partner. When appropriate, Mr. Zheng has even helped the Chinese partners source for technology in Europe. Paul began to realise the reasons for the strengths and depths of Mr. Zheng’s relationships with his 124

Chinese partners. He also began to realise why he could not seem to make any headway with his Chinese partners once Mr. Zheng is gone. Without extra “technology service” which Mr. Zheng is providing, the strategic partnership may not be too attractive to the Chinese partners. “Technology service” was never part of the formal agreement to co-operate in the existing trading arrangements. Similarly, the often necessary inspection and assembly activities relating to the trading activities were also never specified in any written agreement with Chinese partners. These anomalies according to Paul’s past perception would now appear to be central to the business relationships Mr. Zheng had developed and critical to their maintenance over the longer term. Paul continued to read on about the cultural factors relating to the negotiations for a Joint Venture in China. Brigitta Joho and Jürgen Müller wrote: 3.4 Negotiating for a Joint Venture: Strategic Considerations (by Brigitta Joho and Jürgen Müller) For many people in the West, China is not only geographically but also culturally very far away. Although modern communication technology gave us a closer link to the Asian world, this region still seems further away than for example Australia. The completely different culture is one major aspect. It is therefore no wonder that companies use Joint Ventures as a first step to enter the Chinese market. The way to a successful Joint Venture is long and full of problems. The missing language ability is certainly not the biggest obstacle, but the lack of intercultural competence, social and economic knowledge and experience. The keys to a successful European–Chinese Joint Venture lie in a very good preparation for the Chinese culture and for any problem which could await the investor, as well as the ability to use the opportunities provided by an intercultural partnership. This paper tries to highlight the main differences between German and Swiss values and customs on one side, and Chinese on the other. To illustrate these differences we proceed in the following way: In a first step we build the foundation for our paper, by giving a rough overview about the meaning of culture in its three different levels and their functions. In the next section we present a more theoretical approach to the Chinese way of doing business, and in the last part we summarise the experiences gathered through the inte rviews with different companies. Finally, we would give some recommendations on how to do business in China. 125

Chinese insist on cutting edge technology. If the technology proves to be too advanced for the<br />

Chinese recipient, employees may mishandle the equipment due to lack of sufficient training,<br />

which could badly damage the foreign suppliers reputation.<br />

According to Confucian philosophy copying is a legitimate and clever way of learning; moral<br />

scruples do not exist. For an SME whose major asset is proprietary technology, it is<br />

imperative to control and to protect its technology from unauthorised use, copying and<br />

dissemination. Holding back key components (delivering them as bla ck box) is one defensive<br />

strategy. SMEs involved with rapidly evolving high-technology face probably less risk when<br />

transferring their top end technology to <strong>China</strong>. Once the Chinese fully master this technology,<br />

a succeeding technology generation has already been developed. Thus the risk of creating a<br />

competitor is minimal.<br />

Although Chinese Patent and Licensing Laws are of Western standard, law enforcement is<br />

still very weak (Kloth 1996). Dissemination of delivered technology is almost beyond control<br />

of a foreign SME; it happens that a process technology license is given for one manufacturing<br />

plant, that fees for this plant are paid regularly but that the technology is used in similar<br />

facilities without gratification and notification of the licensor.<br />

<strong>The</strong> risk of creating a competitor on the world market is inherent to process and product<br />

technology transfer. Chinese Licensing Laws do not permit any geographical restriction of the<br />

sales area of the products deriving from licensed or bought technology. Minimum sales prices<br />

are forbidden, giving the Chinese way to conquer established markets with dumping price<br />

strategies. However, it seems that only the largest Chinese firms have the experience and<br />

management resources to become a serious competitor on the world market.<br />

As Paul reflected on his <strong>China</strong> venture, he realised the wisdom of Mr. Zheng in his dealings<br />

with the Chinese partner. Mr. Zheng’s good business relationships with the Chinese partners<br />

involved not only the provision of a foreign market for Chinese goods, but also the essential<br />

help and advice which he gives to them in terms of improvement to the products as well as the<br />

introduction of various appropriate technologies to the Chinese partner. When appropriate,<br />

Mr. Zheng has even helped the Chinese partners source for technology in Europe. Paul began<br />

to realise the reasons for the strengths and depths of Mr. Zheng’s relationships with his<br />

124

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