Rousseau_contrat-social

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If we bear in mind that the election of rulers is a function of government, and not of Sovereignty, we shall see why the lot is the method more natural to democracy, in which the administration is better in proportion as the number of its acts is small. In every real democracy, magistracy is not an advantage, but a burdensome charge which cannot justly be imposed on one individual rather than another. The law alone can lay the charge on him on whom the lot falls. For, the conditions being then the same for all, and the choice not depending on any human will, there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law. In an aristocracy, the prince chooses the prince, the government is preserved by itself, and voting is rightly ordered. The instance of the election of the Doge of Venice confirms, instead of destroying, this distinction; the mixed form suits a mixed government. For it is an error to take the government of Venice for a real aristocracy. If the people has no share in the government, the nobility is itself the people. A host of poor Barnabotes never gets near any magistracy, and its nobility consists merely in the empty title of Excellency, and in the right to sit in the Great Council. As this Great Council is as numerous as our General Council at Geneva, its illustrious members have no more privileges than our plain citizens. It is indisputable that, apart from the extreme disparity between the two republics, the bourgeoisie of Geneva is exactly equivalent to the patriciate of Venice; our natives and inhabitants correspond to the townsmen and the people of Venice; our peasants correspond to the subjects on the mainland; and, however that republic be regarded, if its size be left out of account, its government is no more aristocratic than our own. The whole difference is that, having no life-ruler, we do not, like Venice, need to use the lot. Election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference who was chosen. But I have already said that a real 86
democracy is only an ideal. When choice and lot are combined, positions that require special talents, such as military posts, should be filled by the former; the latter does for cases, such as judicial offices, in which good sense, justice, and integrity are enough, because in a State that is well constituted, these qualities are common to all the citizens. Neither lot nor vote has any place in monarchical government. The monarch being by right sole prince and only magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to none but him. When the Abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed that the Councils of the King of France should be multiplied, and their members elected by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government. I should now speak of the methods of giving and counting opinions in the assembly of the people; but perhaps an account of this aspect of the Roman constitution will more forcibly illustrate all the rules I could lay down. It is worth the while of a judicious reader to follow in some detail the working of public and private affairs in a Council consisting of two hundred thousand men. 4. THE ROMAN COMITIA WE are without well-certified records of the first period of Rome's existence; it even appears very probable that most of the stories told about it are fables; indeed, generally speaking, the most instructive part of the history of peoples, that which deals with their foundation, is what we have least of. Experience teaches us every day what causes lead to the revolutions of empires; but, as no new peoples are now formed, we have almost nothing beyond conjecture to go upon in explaining how they were created. The customs we find established show at least that these customs had an origin. The traditions that go back to those origins, that have the greatest authorities behind them, and that are confirmed by the strongest proofs, should pass for the most certain. These are the rules 87
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y Jean Jacques Rousseau THE SOCIAL
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THE most ancient of all societies,
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not of will -- at the most, an act
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indemnity is possible. Such a renun
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master, except to obey him as far a
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fundamental problem of which the So
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others, provided the contract is no
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distinguish natural liberty, which
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ulers of men than as masters of a c
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offers no opposition. In such a cas
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the general will; the latter consid
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guide us. Indeed, as soon as a ques
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fight battles at the peril of their
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leads. But I feel my heart protesti
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laws, no matter what the form of it
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into its constitution; it is an ind
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philosophy or the blind spirit of f
Page 35 and 36: constitution of a State to be at it
Page 37 and 38: 10. THE PEOPLE (continued) A BODY p
Page 39 and 40: for a man to bear; one which can do
Page 41 and 42: their influence, the constitution w
Page 43 and 44: We have seen that the legislative p
Page 45 and 46: When I say the relation increases,
Page 47 and 48: assemblies, councils, power and del
Page 49 and 50: and as the absolute force of the go
Page 51 and 52: of distribution. Sparta always had
Page 53 and 54: But, for want of the necessary dist
Page 55 and 56: Sovereign each in his own departmen
Page 57 and 58: We found, on general grounds, that
Page 59 and 60: Everything conspires to take away f
Page 61 and 62: Simple government is better in itse
Page 63 and 64: labour, should remain desert and un
Page 65 and 66: clothes; where they clothe themselv
Page 67 and 68: citizens increase and multiply most
Page 69 and 70: SUCH is the natural and inevitable
Page 71 and 72: Macedonian and the Frankish, had si
Page 73 and 74: the body politic and the curb on th
Page 75 and 76: functions of the people, and that i
Page 77 and 78: It has been held that this act of e
Page 79 and 80: egular. It is impossible to set up
Page 81 and 82: BOOK IV 1. THAT THE GENERAL WILL IS
Page 83 and 84: 2. VOTING IT may be seen, from the
Page 85: still reside in the majority: when
Page 89 and 90: divided into fifteen cantons. Subse
Page 91 and 92: included the rich, the last the poo
Page 93 and 94: a matter of policy. Thus, the comit
Page 95 and 96: and passed their plebiscita. The se
Page 97 and 98: 5. THE TRIBUNATE WHEN an exact prop
Page 99 and 100: space of time which circumstances s
Page 101 and 102: Instead, the senate contented itsel
Page 103 and 104: Romans, and still more by the Laced
Page 105 and 106: Finally, when, along with their emp
Page 107 and 108: particular, may also be divided int
Page 109 and 110: does his duty, indeed, but does it
Page 111 and 112: Sovereign’s business to take cogn
Page 113 and 114: same Cato wrote to his son telling
Page 115 and 116: otherwise his laws would not have b
Page 117 and 118: flourished have been too much admir
Page 119 and 120: history then confirms, instead of i
Page 121 and 122: of sacrilege, and not the conquest
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Rousseau_contrat-social

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