Rousseau_contrat-social

Simple government is better in itself, just because it is simple. But
when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the
legislative power, i.e., when the prince is more closely related to the
Sovereign than the people to the prince, this lack of proportion must be
cured by the division of the government; for all the parts have then no
less authority over the subjects, while their division makes them all
together less strong against the Sovereign.
The same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of
intermediate magistrates, who leave the government entire, and have the
effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective
rights. Government is then not mixed, but moderated.
The opposite disadvantages may be similarly cured, and, when the
government is too lax, tribunals may be set up to concentrate it. This
is done in all democracies. In the first case, the government is divided
to make it weak; in the second, to make it strong: for the maxima of
both strength and weakness are found in simple governments, while the
mixed forms result in a mean strength.
8. THAT ALL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT DO NOT SUIT ALL COUNTRIES
LIBERTY, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of
all peoples. The more this principle, laid down by Montesquieu,[E2] is
considered, the more its truth is felt; the more it is combated, the
more chance is given to confirm it by new proofs.
In all the governments that there are, the public person consumes
without producing. Whence then does it get what it consumes? From the
labour of its members. The necessities of the public are supplied out of
the superfluities of individuals. It follows that the civil State can
subsist only so long as men’s labour brings them a return greater than
their needs.
The amount of this excess is not the same in all countries. In some it
is considerable, in others middling, in yet others nil, in some even
negative. The relation of product to subsistence depends on the
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