Rousseau_contrat-social
how often will nature and fortune conspire to give him a crown? And, if royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what is to be hoped from a series of men brought up to reign? It is, then, wanton self-deception to confuse royal government with government by a good king. To see such government as it is in itself, we must consider it as it is under princes who are incompetent or wicked: for either they will come to the throne wicked or incompetent, or the throne will make them so. These difficulties have not escaped our writers, who, all the same, are not troubled by them. The remedy, they say, is to obey without a murmur: God sends bad kings in His wrath, and they must be borne as the scourges of Heaven. Such talk is doubtless edifying; but it would be more in place in a pulpit than in a political book. What are we to think of a doctor who promises miracles, and whose whole art is to exhort the sufferer to patience? We know for ourselves that we must put up with a bad government when it is there; the question is how to find a good one. 7. MIXED GOVERNMENTS STRICTLY speaking, there is no such thing as a simple government. An isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government must have a head. There is therefore, in the distribution of the executive power, always a gradation from the greater to the lesser number, with the difference that sometimes the greater number is dependent on the smaller, and sometimes the smaller on the greater. Sometimes the distribution is equal, when either the constituent parts are in mutual dependence, as in the government of England, or the authority of each section is independent, but imperfect, as in Poland. This last form is bad; for it secures no unity in the government, and the State is left without a bond of union. Is a simple or a mixed government the better? Political writers are always debating the question, which must be answered as we have already answered a question about all forms of government. 60
Simple government is better in itself, just because it is simple. But when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the legislative power, i.e., when the prince is more closely related to the Sovereign than the people to the prince, this lack of proportion must be cured by the division of the government; for all the parts have then no less authority over the subjects, while their division makes them all together less strong against the Sovereign. The same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of intermediate magistrates, who leave the government entire, and have the effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective rights. Government is then not mixed, but moderated. The opposite disadvantages may be similarly cured, and, when the government is too lax, tribunals may be set up to concentrate it. This is done in all democracies. In the first case, the government is divided to make it weak; in the second, to make it strong: for the maxima of both strength and weakness are found in simple governments, while the mixed forms result in a mean strength. 8. THAT ALL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT DO NOT SUIT ALL COUNTRIES LIBERTY, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples. The more this principle, laid down by Montesquieu,[E2] is considered, the more its truth is felt; the more it is combated, the more chance is given to confirm it by new proofs. In all the governments that there are, the public person consumes without producing. Whence then does it get what it consumes? From the labour of its members. The necessities of the public are supplied out of the superfluities of individuals. It follows that the civil State can subsist only so long as men’s labour brings them a return greater than their needs. The amount of this excess is not the same in all countries. In some it is considerable, in others middling, in yet others nil, in some even negative. The relation of product to subsistence depends on the 61
- Page 9 and 10: master, except to obey him as far a
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how often will nature and fortune conspire to give him a crown? And, if<br />
royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what is to be<br />
hoped from a series of men brought up to reign? It is, then, wanton<br />
self-deception to confuse royal government with government by a good<br />
king. To see such government as it is in itself, we must consider it as<br />
it is under princes who are incompetent or wicked: for either they will<br />
come to the throne wicked or incompetent, or the throne will make them<br />
so.<br />
These difficulties have not escaped our writers, who, all the same, are<br />
not troubled by them. The remedy, they say, is to obey without a murmur:<br />
God sends bad kings in His wrath, and they must be borne as the scourges<br />
of Heaven. Such talk is doubtless edifying; but it would be more in<br />
place in a pulpit than in a political book. What are we to think of a<br />
doctor who promises miracles, and whose whole art is to exhort the<br />
sufferer to patience? We know for ourselves that we must put up with a<br />
bad government when it is there; the question is how to find a good one.<br />
7. MIXED GOVERNMENTS<br />
STRICTLY speaking, there is no such thing as a simple government. An<br />
isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government<br />
must have a head. There is therefore, in the distribution of the<br />
executive power, always a gradation from the greater to the lesser<br />
number, with the difference that sometimes the greater number is<br />
dependent on the smaller, and sometimes the smaller on the greater.<br />
Sometimes the distribution is equal, when either the constituent parts<br />
are in mutual dependence, as in the government of England, or the<br />
authority of each section is independent, but imperfect, as in Poland.<br />
This last form is bad; for it secures no unity in the government, and<br />
the State is left without a bond of union.<br />
Is a simple or a mixed government the better? Political writers are<br />
always debating the question, which must be answered as we have already<br />
answered a question about all forms of government.<br />
60