Rousseau_contrat-social
efore age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father’s power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be senators of twenty. There are then three sorts of aristocracy -- natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called. Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular government, all the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy is confined to a few, who become such only by election.[22] By this means uprightness, understanding, experience and all other claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government. Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is unknown or despised. In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own. There is no need to multiply instruments, or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even better. But it must not be forgotten that corporate interest here begins to direct the public power less under the regulation of the general will, and that a further inevitable propensity takes away from the laws part of the executive power. If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should the State be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as it does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that the rulers have to scatter in order to govern it and are able to play the 54
Sovereign each in his own department, and, beginning by making themselves independent, end by becoming masters. But if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues needed by popular government, it demands others which are peculiar to itself; for instance, moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that of the poor; for it seems that thorough-going equality would be out of place, as it was not found even at Sparta. Furthermore, if this form of government carries with it a certain inequality of fortune, this is justifiable in order that as a rule the administration of public affairs may be entrusted to those who are most able to give them their whole time, but not, as Aristotle maintains, in order that the rich may always be put first. On the contrary, it is of importance that an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that the deserts of men offer claims to pre-eminence more important than those of riches. 6. MONARCHY So far, we have considered the prince as a moral and collective person, unified by the force of the laws, and the depositary in the State of the executive power. We have now to consider this power when it is gathered together into the hands of a natural person, a real man, who alone has the right to dispose of it in accordance with the laws. Such a person is called a monarch or king. In contrast with other forms of administration, in which a collective being stands for an individual, in this form an individual stands for a collective being; so that the moral unity that constitutes the prince is at the same time a physical unity, and all the qualities, which in the other case are only with difficulty brought together by the law, are found naturally united. Thus the will of the people, the will of the prince, the public force of the State, and the particular force of the government, all answer to a single motive power; all the springs of the machine are in the same 55
- Page 3 and 4: THE most ancient of all societies,
- Page 5 and 6: not of will -- at the most, an act
- Page 7 and 8: indemnity is possible. Such a renun
- Page 9 and 10: master, except to obey him as far a
- Page 11 and 12: fundamental problem of which the So
- Page 13 and 14: others, provided the contract is no
- Page 15 and 16: distinguish natural liberty, which
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- Page 19 and 20: offers no opposition. In such a cas
- Page 21 and 22: the general will; the latter consid
- Page 23 and 24: guide us. Indeed, as soon as a ques
- Page 25 and 26: fight battles at the peril of their
- Page 27 and 28: leads. But I feel my heart protesti
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- Page 31 and 32: into its constitution; it is an ind
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- Page 43 and 44: We have seen that the legislative p
- Page 45 and 46: When I say the relation increases,
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- Page 49 and 50: and as the absolute force of the go
- Page 51 and 52: of distribution. Sparta always had
- Page 53: But, for want of the necessary dist
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- Page 59 and 60: Everything conspires to take away f
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- Page 71 and 72: Macedonian and the Frankish, had si
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- Page 77 and 78: It has been held that this act of e
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- Page 81 and 82: BOOK IV 1. THAT THE GENERAL WILL IS
- Page 83 and 84: 2. VOTING IT may be seen, from the
- Page 85 and 86: still reside in the majority: when
- Page 87 and 88: democracy is only an ideal. When ch
- Page 89 and 90: divided into fifteen cantons. Subse
- Page 91 and 92: included the rich, the last the poo
- Page 93 and 94: a matter of policy. Thus, the comit
- Page 95 and 96: and passed their plebiscita. The se
- Page 97 and 98: 5. THE TRIBUNATE WHEN an exact prop
- Page 99 and 100: space of time which circumstances s
- Page 101 and 102: Instead, the senate contented itsel
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efore age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission<br />
of the father’s power along with his goods to his children, by creating<br />
patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be<br />
senators of twenty.<br />
There are then three sorts of aristocracy -- natural, elective and<br />
hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst<br />
of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly<br />
so called.<br />
Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two<br />
powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular<br />
government, all the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy<br />
is confined to a few, who become such only by election.[22] By this<br />
means uprightness, understanding, experience and all other claims to<br />
pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise<br />
government.<br />
Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and<br />
carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State<br />
is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude<br />
that is unknown or despised.<br />
In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest<br />
should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its<br />
profit, and not for their own. There is no need to multiply instruments,<br />
or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even<br />
better. But it must not be forgotten that corporate interest here begins<br />
to direct the public power less under the regulation of the general<br />
will, and that a further inevitable propensity takes away from the laws<br />
part of the executive power.<br />
If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should the<br />
State be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the<br />
execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as it<br />
does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that the<br />
rulers have to scatter in order to govern it and are able to play the<br />
54