MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...

MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ... MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...

10.12.2012 Views

Th e potential of microinsurance for social protection sector workers), donations, donor grants and a signifi cant government subsidy fi nanced by a special levy of of 2.5 per cent cent on the sale of selected goods. In In districts without any mutual health insurance scheme scheme cooperating with NHIF, the GovernGovern- ment itself established a mutual mutual health insurance insurance scheme. Ghana thus provides an example of microinsurance schemes operating both as an alternative to the public social insurance scheme and being linked with it for mutual advantage. In In 2008, 2008, the district health health insurance schemes affi liated with with the NHIF NHIF cov- cov- cov- ered 42 per cent of the urban and 36 per cent of the rural population. Poor households in particular refrained from enrolling in the system because contribution rates appeared to be too expensive. For this same reason, only about 20 for- merly independent mutual health insurance schemes had linked themselves to the NHIF by 2007. Most others continued to off er much smaller benefi t pack- ages at much lower contribution rates. It should be noted, however, that these independent schemes covered an even smaller share of the population: 1.3 per cent in urban areas and 0.9 per cent in rural areas. Nevertheless, the long-term solvency of of the NHIF is is at risk. Th ree-quarters ree-quarters of its spending is covered by the Government, while only a quarter is covered by member contributions. One reason for this is that only 38 per cent of all mem- bers actually pay their premiums. Children and very poor households are covered at no charge. In addition, the administration costs of the affi liated mutual health insurance schemes are rising, partly because the readiness of their members to manage their schemes for free vanished once they had to use uniform benefi t packages and conditions imposed by the State. Sources: Adapted from Gehrke, 2009; Lethourmy, 2010; Brugiavini and Pace, 2010. Fourth, as a complement to social insurance: microinsurance can be crucial even where social insurance schemes cover the most serious risks faced by households. Th is is particularly true where social insurance only covers a part of the costs incurred due to the negative shocks associated with these risks. Viet Nam’s social security organization, for example, runs an attractive voluntary social health insurance scheme for workers in the informal economy. Having said this, the scheme only reimburses health treatment costs and not the transportation costs incurred for a visit to a hospital. Hence, the package off ered is almost worthless for poor households in remote rural areas because of high transportation costs. Th e Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, Insurance and Social Aff airs (MOLISA) has therefore decided to support – in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) – poor rural communities in setting up social risk funds that provide, among other things, compensation to their members for health transportation costs (see Box 2.2). 55

Th e potential of microinsurance for social protection<br />

sector workers), donations, donor grants and a signifi cant government subsidy<br />

fi nanced by a special levy of of 2.5 per cent cent on the sale of selected goods. In In districts<br />

without any mutual health insurance scheme scheme cooperating with NHIF, the GovernGovern- ment itself established a mutual mutual health insurance insurance scheme.<br />

Ghana thus provides an example of microinsurance schemes operating both<br />

as an alternative to the public social insurance scheme and being linked with it<br />

for mutual advantage.<br />

In In 2008, 2008, the district health health insurance schemes affi liated with with the NHIF NHIF cov- cov- cov-<br />

ered 42 per cent of the urban and 36 per cent of the rural population. Poor<br />

households in particular refrained from enrolling in the system because contribution<br />

rates appeared to be too expensive. For this same reason, only about 20 for-<br />

merly independent mutual health insurance schemes had linked themselves to<br />

the NHIF by 2007. Most others continued to off er much smaller benefi t pack-<br />

ages at much lower contribution rates. It should be noted, however, that these<br />

independent schemes covered an even smaller share of the population: 1.3 per<br />

cent in urban areas and 0.9 per cent in rural areas.<br />

Nevertheless, the long-term solvency of of the NHIF is is at risk. Th ree-quarters ree-quarters of<br />

its spending is covered by the Government, while only a quarter is covered by<br />

member contributions. One reason for this is that only 38 per cent of all mem-<br />

bers actually pay their premiums. Children and very poor households are covered<br />

at no charge. In addition, the administration costs of the affi liated mutual health<br />

insurance schemes are rising, partly because the readiness of their members to<br />

manage their schemes for free vanished once they had to use uniform benefi t<br />

packages and conditions imposed by the State.<br />

Sources: Adapted from Gehrke, 2009; Lethourmy, 2010; Brugiavini and Pace, 2010.<br />

Fourth, as a complement to social insurance: microinsurance can be<br />

crucial even where social insurance schemes cover the most serious risks faced by<br />

households. Th is is particularly true where social insurance only covers a part of<br />

the costs incurred due to the negative shocks associated with these risks. Viet<br />

Nam’s social security organization, for example, runs an attractive voluntary<br />

social health insurance scheme for workers in the informal economy. Having<br />

said this, the scheme only reimburses health treatment costs and not the transportation<br />

costs incurred for a visit to a hospital. Hence, the package off ered is<br />

almost worthless for poor households in remote rural areas because of high<br />

transportation costs. Th e Vietnamese Ministry of <strong>Labour</strong>, Insurance and Social<br />

Aff airs (MOLISA) has therefore decided to support – in cooperation with the<br />

Deutsche Gesellschaft für <strong>International</strong>e Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) – poor rural<br />

communities in setting up social risk funds that provide, among other things,<br />

compensation to their members for health transportation costs (see Box 2.2).<br />

55

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