MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...
MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ... MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...
352 Insurance and the low-income market risks these families face, such as repatriation, remittance protection, 4 work accidents and unemployment. 17.2 Framework: Th e 3Hs of migration-linked insurance Th ree types of models have emerged to address the microinsurance needs of migrants and their families. Dubbed the 3Hs in Magnoni et al. (2010), these models are the Host country model, the Home country model and the Hybrid model (see Table 17.1). Th e defi ning characteristic of each of these models is where the risk-taking entity or insurer is based. In the Host country model, the insurer is located in the country to which the migrant has immigrated. Programmes of this type are best placed to insure the migrants themselves and may also have the potential to reach greater scale as they can easily serve migrants from multiple countries of origin. Th e Host country model typically does not insure the migrant’s family back home, but may indirectly off er security to migrants’ families. For example, SegurCaixa’s repatriation and accidental death insurance provides families with a cash benefi t that can ease the shock of losing remittance income in the event of a death or accident (see Box 17.1). Box 17.1 SegurCaixa’s repatriation and accidental death insurance SeguraCaixa, an affi liate of La Caixa, one of the largest cooperatives in Spain, off ers some of the few migration-linked insurance products to reach a reasonable scale. In 2008, 66 000 legal migrants, mostly coming from Africa and Latin America, were insured with SegurCaixa Repatriación, which pays a lump sum upon death of the migrant and repatriation of the migrant’s body, and 14 000 were covered by SegurIngreso, which pays a lump sum upon death of the migrant and regular monthly income to the family for fi ve years following death. Monthly premiums start at €7 (US$10). Sources: www.laCaixa.es and SegurCaixa Holding Annual Report, 2008. In the Home country model, the risk-taking entity is located in the migrant’s country of origin. Th e insured can be the migrant and/or the migrant’s family depending on the product and distribution channel. 4 Such products should consider the unique needs of those most likely to be left behind. For example, Magnoni et al. (2010) found that most family members back home are parents and in-laws, suggesting that health insurance related to the problems of ageing populations might be more appropriate for this community.
Formalizing the informal insurance inherent in migration Risk-taking entities have a presence in both the home and the host country in the Hybrid model. Th is model is able to insure both the migrant in the host country and the migrant’s family in the home country more easily than either the Home or Host model. Although the Hybrid model has many advantages, to date few insurers have attempted to serve the low-income market using such an approach. Table 17.1 General characteristics of the 3H models Model Insured Mitigates risk for: Need for an intermediary Leverages remittances Insurer is in the migrant’s Host country Insurer is in in the migrant’s migrant’s Home country Hybrid: Hybrid: insurer is in both the host and home country Migrant Migrant and migrant’s family (depending on product) Migrant’s family (most likely) or migrant (prior to departure) Migrant and/or migrant’s family Migrant (indirectly) and migrant’s family (directly) Migrant and/or migrant’s family Possibly for marketing purposes Defi nitely if targeting migrants; possibly if tar- geting migrant’s family Unlikely Very possible Possibly for marketing or Possible money transfers 17.3 Legal and regulatory challenges Legal and regulatory restrictions pose one of the most signifi cant constraints to selling insurance to migrants and their families across borders as insurers are generally not licensed in both the home and host country. Th e constraints vary depending on the host and home country, whether the migrant and/or family members in the home country are benefi ciaries of the policies, and the location of the insurance company. Th ese constraints are often under-researched or underestimated, yet are one of the main factors preventing the launch of programmes. Th is section provides an overview of the types of regulations aff ecting migration-linked microinsurance products. Choice of law. Th e fi rst challenge in any cross-border transaction is to determine which jurisdiction’s law applies. For migration-linked products, where insurance is sold by a foreign company and/or some or all benefi ciaries are located abroad, it may not be clear which country’s insurance law should apply. In general, parties can choose the law that governs a contract between them, but the issue is largely untested in respect of cross-border insurance sales. Scope of regulation. Regardless of which country’s law applies to the insurance contract itself, the parties must comply with the insurance laws of all countries in which they conduct activities. Insurance is typically governed at a national level by 353
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352 Insurance and the low-income market<br />
risks these families face, such as repatriation, remittance protection, 4 work accidents<br />
and unemployment.<br />
17.2 Framework: Th e 3Hs of migration-linked insurance<br />
Th ree types of models have emerged to address the microinsurance needs of<br />
migrants and their families. Dubbed the 3Hs in Magnoni et al. (2010), these<br />
models are the Host country model, the Home country model and the Hybrid<br />
model (see Table 17.1). Th e defi ning characteristic of each of these models is where<br />
the risk-taking entity or insurer is based.<br />
In the Host country model, the insurer is located in the country to which the<br />
migrant has immigrated. Programmes of this type are best placed to insure the<br />
migrants themselves and may also have the potential to reach greater scale as they<br />
can easily serve migrants from multiple countries of origin. Th e Host country<br />
model typically does not insure the migrant’s family back home, but may indirectly<br />
off er security to migrants’ families. For example, SegurCaixa’s repatriation<br />
and accidental death insurance provides families with a cash benefi t that can ease<br />
the shock of losing remittance income in the event of a death or accident (see Box<br />
17.1).<br />
Box 17.1 SegurCaixa’s repatriation and accidental death insurance<br />
SeguraCaixa, an affi liate of La Caixa, one of the largest cooperatives in Spain,<br />
off ers some of the few migration-linked insurance products to reach a reasonable<br />
scale. In 2008, 66 000 legal migrants, mostly coming from Africa and Latin<br />
America, were insured with SegurCaixa Repatriación, which pays a lump sum<br />
upon death of the migrant and repatriation of the migrant’s body, and 14 000<br />
were covered by SegurIngreso, which pays a lump sum upon death of the<br />
migrant and regular monthly income to the family for fi ve years following death.<br />
Monthly premiums start at €7 (US$10).<br />
Sources: www.laCaixa.es and SegurCaixa Holding Annual Report, 2008.<br />
In the Home country model, the risk-taking entity is located in the migrant’s<br />
country of origin. Th e insured can be the migrant and/or the migrant’s family<br />
depending on the product and distribution channel.<br />
4 Such products should consider the unique needs of those most likely to be left behind. For example,<br />
Magnoni et al. (2010) found that most family members back home are parents and in-laws, suggesting<br />
that health insurance related to the problems of ageing populations might be more appropriate for<br />
this community.