MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...
MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ... MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...
338 Insurance and the low-income market – Selling assets: Another strategy for coping with risk involves selling assets, such as gold, land and housing, or income-generating assets, such as business equipment or livestock. – Starting or increasing income-generating activities: Members of poor households may also take up or increase income-generating activities to earn extra money to cope with financial shocks (Ezemenari et al., 2002). Frequently it is a severe financial shock that pushes women, and in some cases their children, into the labour force. A recent study of women sex workers in western Kenya disturbingly reveals that they are nearly 20 per cent more likely to supply riskier, betterpaid sex on days when a family member, particularly a child, falls sick as a way to cope with health-related expenses (Robinson and Yeh, 2009). – Participating in informal reciprocal social relationships: Informal social relationships can also help poor families cope with financial shocks. In Kenya, women use harambees (which translates to “pool together”), where women come together to cover the cost of financial shocks, such as a death in the family. Similarly, a study in Nepal found that when someone dies, community members typically donate small amounts of money and food, which families use during the 13-day mourning period (Simkhada et al., 2000). 16.2.3 Consequences of risk strategies Though many risk strategies that poor households use provide some protection, even together they are often inadequate to fully cover the costs associated with financial shocks (Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008; Cohen and Sebstad, 2009). Moreover, these strategies often have adverse secondary implications for women and their families. Inadequacies While WWB research suggests that poor women are keen to save and can save around 10 to 15 per cent of their net monthly income, the amount is rarely enough to cover more than basic emergencies and some health-related costs. Savings can also be ineffective when the security of those savings is in question, as is often the case with informal savings where the threat of theft, fraud or pressure from other family members to spend counteracts their ability to serve as an effective coping mechanism. Research in Uganda found that 22 per cent of savings are lost in informal savings schemes compared to a loss rate of just 3.5 per cent in the formal sector (Wright and Mutesasira, 2001). Since women are more likely to use informal savings mechanisms, this risk affects them disproportionately (WWB, 2003). Furthermore, saving through ROSCAs can be unhelpful when a number of members require money at the same time or when a member facing a financial
Microinsurance that works for women shock is not due to receive her payout (WWB, 2006d). Other informal reciprocal social relationships are also unable to provide full cover for many risks. In the earlier example from Nepal, contributions from community members were found to cover only 25 per cent of the costs associated with the death of a family member (Simkhada et al., 2000). Social relationships may also provide little protection from covariant risks, such as natural disasters or health epidemics, because others may be facing similar problems, limiting their ability to help. Adverse secondary implications Several risk strategies, while sometimes effective in the short term, can lead to enduring adverse secondary implications, perpetuating a cycle of poverty for poor women and their households. Allocating business profits to savings instead of investment, for example, is one of the main reasons for women’s businesses failing to grow to the same extent as men’s businesses (Murray, 2008). Accumulating precautionary savings can also limit expenditure on other vital needs such as housing or education. Other risk-averse business practices, such as diversification into a number of smaller businesses, may reduce the impact of any one business failing, yet limit each business’s chance of succeeding. These risk-averse choices cause poor women to forgo some profitable opportunities that might have helped them break the cycle of poverty (Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008). When a woman copes with shocks by selling productive assets such as livestock or equipment, she may be forced to accept a below-market price out of desperation. Regardless, she wipes out her ability to earn income from the assets in the future. Similarly, pulling children out of school may reduce immediate household costs and free up children’s time to work, but it causes a serious loss to children’s development and severely curtails their long-term earning potential. Reducing food intake and medical expenses similarly can have a serious health impact on the household. Research from the recent economic crisis indicates that women and girls suffer disproportionately from these cutbacks (Institute of Development Studies, 2009). Borrowing may help to smooth financial needs in the short term, but may lead to long-term indebtedness (Simkhada et al., 2000). Defaulting on existing loans may free up short-term cash, but may result in a future loss of access to finance. Figure 16.2 illustrates how many of the aforementioned risk strategies can fail the woman who employs them (Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008). 339
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338 Insurance and the low-income market<br />
– Selling assets: Another strategy for coping with risk involves selling assets, such<br />
as gold, land and housing, or income-generating assets, such as business equipment<br />
or livestock.<br />
– Starting or increasing income-generating activities: Members of poor households<br />
may also take up or increase income-generating activities to earn extra<br />
money to cope with financial shocks (Ezemenari et al., 2002). Frequently it is a<br />
severe financial shock that pushes women, and in some cases their children, into<br />
the labour force. A recent study of women sex workers in western Kenya disturbingly<br />
reveals that they are nearly 20 per cent more likely to supply riskier, betterpaid<br />
sex on days when a family member, particularly a child, falls sick as a way to<br />
cope with health-related expenses (Robinson and Yeh, 2009).<br />
– Participating in informal reciprocal social relationships: Informal social relationships<br />
can also help poor families cope with financial shocks. In Kenya,<br />
women use harambees (which translates to “pool together”), where women come<br />
together to cover the cost of financial shocks, such as a death in the family.<br />
Similarly, a study in Nepal found that when someone dies, community members<br />
typically donate small amounts of money and food, which families use during<br />
the 13-day mourning period (Simkhada et al., 2000).<br />
16.2.3 Consequences of risk strategies<br />
Though many risk strategies that poor households use provide some protection,<br />
even together they are often inadequate to fully cover the costs associated with<br />
financial shocks (Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008; Cohen and Sebstad, 2009).<br />
Moreover, these strategies often have adverse secondary implications for women<br />
and their families.<br />
Inadequacies<br />
While WWB research suggests that poor women are keen to save and can save<br />
around 10 to 15 per cent of their net monthly income, the amount is rarely<br />
enough to cover more than basic emergencies and some health-related costs. Savings<br />
can also be ineffective when the security of those savings is in question, as is<br />
often the case with informal savings where the threat of theft, fraud or pressure<br />
from other family members to spend counteracts their ability to serve as an effective<br />
coping mechanism. Research in Uganda found that 22 per cent of savings are<br />
lost in informal savings schemes compared to a loss rate of just 3.5 per cent in the<br />
formal sector (Wright and Mutesasira, 2001). Since women are more likely to use<br />
informal savings mechanisms, this risk affects them disproportionately (WWB,<br />
20<strong>03</strong>).<br />
Furthermore, saving through ROSCAs can be unhelpful when a number of<br />
members require money at the same time or when a member facing a financial