MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...

Microinsurance that works for women
16.1.1 Women’s attitudes to risk management
Women are keen savers and risk managers. Women typically utilize their earnings
to improve the care and standard of living in their households by either
spending business profits on household expenses or saving them to draw upon in
case of need. This behaviour relates to women’s role as caregivers and suggests
that, if women are providing for the day-to-day needs of the family, it frees up
men’s resources to invest and expand their businesses. In this sense their roles are
interdependent. A Pakistani man reveals: “Women use [their income] in the
house, they think about the children. They save money for the dowry or the
education of the children. That is what women do. Men want to expand their
business” (WWB, 2008c).
Evidence from developed countries suggests that women are more risk-averse
than men in investment (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). However, differences
in risk-aversion may not be biological or innate but rather arise from the traditional
roles within the household and the different degrees of risks that women
and men face. Whether these differences arise from innate preferences or from
gendered contexts, women and men do manage risks differently, and this has
implications for microinsurance product design.
16.1.2 Intra-household relations and risk management
Some households operate with significant joint decision-making and negotiation.
In others, there may be a strong separation of roles, with little discussion or
collaboration, or there may be latent or overt conflict in which some members,
usually women, feel that they are seeking to fulfil their responsibilities in spite of
their spouses. In the latter cases men may offer little assistance, withdraw their
contributions when women earn their own income or make demands on
women’s savings and incomes for their own purposes. In the worst cases, conflict
may lead to domestic violence and divorce.
How a household operates significantly impacts resource allocation to saving
and insurance. Where cooperation is strong, joint decisions to mobilize funds for
insurance may be made more easily. In households where roles are clearly
separated or where there is conflict, these decisions are more likely to be
problematic. In these cases, women who desire to purchase policies that respond
to the needs ascribed to their role – for example, health care for children – may
have to draw on their own, usually lower, levels of income and savings. The very
existence of household conflict may also increase a woman’s desire to buy
insurance and affect the features she chooses. Awareness of such intra-household
gender dynamics will enable the design and delivery of microinsurance products
to be improved.
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