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MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...

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316 Insurance and the low-income market<br />

scape of informal mechanisms, national security schemes and microinsurance<br />

providers might make it necessary to fi nd a niche for a specifi c product. Th e next<br />

section of this chapter compares various products at country level and illustrates<br />

the importance of looking at a product in relation to its alternatives.<br />

15.3 Setting benchmarks: Informal mechanisms and social security schemes<br />

Informal mechanisms and social security schemes provide benchmarks to assess<br />

the value of microinsurance in the context of other risk management options.<br />

Low-income households use a multitude of informal mechanisms such as burial<br />

societies, savings or self-help groups to manage life, health and property risks.<br />

Th rough group risk-sharing mechanisms, households participate in an important<br />

social function nested within well-defi ned communities that allow risk-pooling<br />

without much fraud, moral hazard or adverse selection. However, as described by<br />

Dercon (2005) and Morduch (1999), they have many weaknesses. Th ey can only<br />

handle idiosyncratic risks, and not covariant risks that aff ect entire communities<br />

(e.g. fl ooding). Th ey are best suited for small disbursements for frequent events.<br />

Only well-structured groups, often managed by a remunerated committee, are<br />

able to respond to larger losses, but these are rare and found mostly in urban areas.<br />

Low-income households tend to patch various strategies together because<br />

none can provide enough funds on their own to cover large losses. Households<br />

compensate by participating in multiple group schemes, or, in the event of an<br />

emergency, they deplete their savings, sell assets at low prices, or take one or<br />

more small loans from moneylenders or MFIs. Th ese activities often involve high<br />

costs (Cohen and Sebstad, 2005; Collins et al., 2009).<br />

Th e PACE client value assessment in Kenya on the use of informal risk management<br />

arrangements (see Box 15.6) confi rms that they off er partial cover at a<br />

high price. Informal risk-sharing mechanisms in Kenya score low on product<br />

benefi ts and cost, high on access, and medium on experience.<br />

Box 15.6 Client value from informal risk-sharing mechanisms in Kenya<br />

In Kenya, “welfare groups” of 20 to 60 members are a popular, self-managed way<br />

to respond to life, and to a certain extent, health risks. Th ey are better organized in<br />

urban areas, where members regularly contribute KES 200 to KES 400 (US$2.20 to<br />

US$4.40) per month to receive a KES 20 000 to KES 50 000 (US$222 to US$555)<br />

payout in the event of the death of the member or a family member. In the event of<br />

major illness, members are requested to contribute ex-post from KES 100 to KES 500<br />

(US$1.10 to to US$5.50), which results in lump sums of KES 5 000 to KES 30 000<br />

(US$55 to US$333) to cover health bills. In rural areas the ex-ante collections are

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