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MR Microinsurance_2012_03_29.indd - International Labour ...

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Willingness to pay for health microinsurance<br />

affiliation with income-rated premium; 3 and 2) health insurance that is based on<br />

voluntary affiliation with risk-rated premium. 4 Although when subjects were<br />

asked about their willingness to affiliate with either of these insurance products<br />

there was a slight preference for the compulsory affiliation, the mean WTP for<br />

both products was practically the same despite the fact that each household was<br />

presented with both options.<br />

Dror et al. (2007) also examined the sensitivity of WTP to being packaged in<br />

a different way: each third of the sample was offered a different benefit package. 5<br />

In that experiment, there was no difference in WTP for the three packages. This<br />

could be due to the different elicitation method, in which respondents were<br />

offered only one option and were not given a choice between options that they<br />

could compare or prefer. This suggests that WTP can, at least sometimes, be used<br />

as a tool for package design only when the same respondent can choose between<br />

options. This would work when the number of options is relatively small, but<br />

would be impracticable with the very many options that health insurance packages<br />

usually contain. Other methods were developed for benefit package design<br />

that enable respondents to choose from 10 or more options, but this is done<br />

within a finite budget, i.e. without soliciting the respondents’ WTP. The methods<br />

that were applied in the context of CBHI in low-income countries include<br />

simulation exercises (Dror et al., 2007), focus group discussions and structured<br />

interviews (De Allegri et al., 2006). We conclude that the available information<br />

on the impact of package composition on WTP is inconclusive.<br />

3 All households in the district are obliged to pay an annual premium to a local healthcare fund when<br />

crops are sold. The fee is based on the households’ income. The higher the income, the higher the fee.<br />

All members in the household are entitled to free health care at the Communal Health Station or<br />

District Health Centre and free medicine if it is prescribed by a doctor. If care at higher levels is<br />

needed, the insured patient will be supported by an amount based on the cost per bed-day at the<br />

District Health Centre level. The fund will be managed by the Commune People Committee (or<br />

elected representative).<br />

4 Each household can choose to voluntarily pay an annual premium to a local healthcare fund when<br />

crops are sold. The fee is based on the number of people in the household and the fee is higher for<br />

children under five and elderly over 65 because they are expected to use more health care.<br />

5 Version 1 included hospitalization expenses up to INR 5 000 (US$115) per year and person and<br />

reimbursement of costs for prescribed drugs up to INR 1 000 (US$22.50) per year and person; version 2<br />

included hospitalisation expenses up to INR 5 000 (US$115) per year and person and reimbursement<br />

of costs for general practitioners up to INR 1 000 (US$22.50) per year and person; version 3 included<br />

reimbursement of costs for prescribed drugs up to INR 1 000 (US$22.50) per year and person and<br />

reimbursement of costs for general practitioners up to INR 1 000 (US$22.50) per year and per person.<br />

171

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