Euradwaste '08 - EU Bookshop - Europa
Euradwaste '08 - EU Bookshop - Europa Euradwaste '08 - EU Bookshop - Europa
elease, strong radiation, pressure rebuilding, etc.) after repository closure; as long as this safety function is effective, no release of radionuclides from the waste form can occur; slow release: after container failure, groundwater comes in contact with the conditioned waste and degradation of the waste matrix and leaching of radionuclides will start; various physicochemical processes, such as corrosion resistance of the waste matrix, precipitation, sorption or co-precipitation will strongly limit radionuclide releases into the buffer; retardation: radionuclides dissolved in the groundwater in contact with the waste will start to migrate through the buffer and the host formation; because of the very low hydraulic conductivity of bentonite and clay of the host formation (in the case of disposal in clay), groundwater flow in the repository's barriers is about negligible and radionuclide transport will be mainly diffusive; furthermore, many radionuclides will be sorbed onto minerals of the buffer and the host formation; retardation delays the releases and drastically limits the amounts of radionuclides that are released into the environment per unit of time; many radionuclides will have decayed before reaching an aquifer, from where they can reach the human environment. 2. Methodology The methodology adopted for analysing the impact of advanced fuel cycle scenarios on geological disposal consisted of two steps: (1) an analysis of the adaptations needed to accommodate the new waste streams in the disposal concept, and (2) an assessment of the radiological consequences of the radioactive waste repository. It was first verified whether the available repository concepts are applicable for the disposal of the main high-level and long-lived waste types arising from the advanced fuel cycles. Several waste characteristics were taken into consideration such as volume, composition, thermal output, gamma and neutron emission, retrievability aspects, and criticality; it appeared that the MOX SF arising from fuel cycle A2 is the most difficult-to-handle waste type in the Red-Impact waste inventory. Variants of the disposal concepts allowing the accommodation of MOX SF have already been developed by the waste agencies. Consequently, the HLW types arising from the advanced fuel cycles do not require considerable adaptations to the available repository concepts, but the dimensions of the disposal galleries can be adjusted to the thermal output of the new heat-generating waste types. The analyses reported in Section 3.1 will thus focus on the influence of the thermal output of the HLW and SF on the dimensions of the geological repository. The second step of the analyses consists in an assessment of the radiological impact of the geological disposal of SF, HLW, and intermediate-level waste (ILW) arising from the considered fuel cycles. In a safety assessment of a geological repository a representative set of possible evolution scenarios is considered. The assessments made in the framework of the Red-Impact project focused on the radiological consequences in the case of the expected evolution scenario (this scenario is also called normal evolution or reference scenario, and is associated with radionuclide transport in groundwater); this scenario assumes that the engineered and natural barriers of the repository system will function as expected. Additionally, in order to illustrate the impact of the reduction of the actinide inventory of the waste, we also considered a variant human intrusion scenario - this assumes that a geotechnical worker handles a core taken from a borehole drilled through the repository and that the core contains fragments of the disposed waste. 144
3. Results 3.1 Impact of the thermal output of the waste on the repository's dimensions The minimum lengths of the galleries for disposal of SF and HLW are derived from heat dissipation calculations by ensuring that the temperature limitations are respected; in the disposal concepts considered in this study these are that the temperature has to remain below 100 °C in the bentonite buffer for granite and at the interface between the gallery liner and the host formation for clay. As the thermal output of the ILW canisters is negligible, the length of the ILW galleries is determined by the number and size of the disposal containers. An overview of the estimated lengths of the SF and HLW disposal galleries is given in Table 1. Table 1: Estimated lengths of the SF and HLW disposal galleries Fuel cycle scenario Granite A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 SF + HLW gallery length (m/TWhe) 8.89 11.12 5.52 3.63 4.49 relative SF + HLW gallery length Clay (-) 1.00 1.25 0.62 0.41 0.51 allowable thermal output (50 a) (W/m) 353 332-376 365 379 379 SF + HLW gallery length (m/TWhe) 5.92 5.74 3.48 1.88 2.89 relative SF + HLW gallery length (-) 1.00 0.97 0.59 0.32 0.49 3.2 Evaluation of the radiological impact in the case of the reference scenario The dose to a member of the reference group in the case of the reference scenario, which is associated with radionuclide transport in groundwater, was calculated by making a number of simplifying assumptions. For granite it was assumed that the canisters will fail between 1300 and 10 000 years, and that waste matrix lifetimes are 72 000 years for HLW, 10 million years for uranium oxide SF and 1 million years for MOX SF. For clay the canister lifetime was assumed to be 2000 years, and the waste matrix lifetimes 100 000 years for HLW and 200 000 years for SF. For granite sorption on the buffer and on minerals of the host formation was taken into account, whereas for clay sorption on the buffer was neglected. The calculated doses, normalised per produced electricity, are shown in Figs. 3 and 4 for a repository in granite and clay respectively. The radiotoxicity released from the repository into the environment was also calculated. Table 2 compares the radiotoxicity released over a 10 million years period with the initial radiotoxicity in the disposed waste. In most recent safety cases, a time cut-off of 1 million years is used; however for the purpose of Red-Impact it was considered more appropriate to consider a longer time scale of 10 million years to illustrate that also at the very long-term no considerable change in the radiological impact has to be expected from P&T. Table 2: Comparison between initial radiotoxicity in the disposed SF and HLW (50 years cooling prior to disposal) and the radiotoxicity released from the geological repository into the environment over a 10 million years period. Fuel cycle Initial radiotoxicity (50 Released radiotoxicity (10 a) Ma) Containment factor (Sv/TWhe) (Sv/TWhe) (-) 145
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elease, strong radiation, pressure rebuilding, etc.) after repository closure; as long as this safety<br />
function is effective, no release of radionuclides from the waste form can occur;<br />
slow release: after container failure, groundwater comes in contact with the conditioned waste<br />
and degradation of the waste matrix and leaching of radionuclides will start; various physicochemical<br />
processes, such as corrosion resistance of the waste matrix, precipitation, sorption or<br />
co-precipitation will strongly limit radionuclide releases into the buffer;<br />
retardation: radionuclides dissolved in the groundwater in contact with the waste will start to<br />
migrate through the buffer and the host formation; because of the very low hydraulic conductivity<br />
of bentonite and clay of the host formation (in the case of disposal in clay), groundwater<br />
flow in the repository's barriers is about negligible and radionuclide transport will be mainly<br />
diffusive; furthermore, many radionuclides will be sorbed onto minerals of the buffer and the<br />
host formation; retardation delays the releases and drastically limits the amounts of radionuclides<br />
that are released into the environment per unit of time; many radionuclides will have decayed<br />
before reaching an aquifer, from where they can reach the human environment.<br />
2. Methodology<br />
The methodology adopted for analysing the impact of advanced fuel cycle scenarios on geological<br />
disposal consisted of two steps: (1) an analysis of the adaptations needed to accommodate the new<br />
waste streams in the disposal concept, and (2) an assessment of the radiological consequences of the<br />
radioactive waste repository.<br />
It was first verified whether the available repository concepts are applicable for the disposal of the<br />
main high-level and long-lived waste types arising from the advanced fuel cycles. Several waste<br />
characteristics were taken into consideration such as volume, composition, thermal output, gamma<br />
and neutron emission, retrievability aspects, and criticality; it appeared that the MOX SF arising<br />
from fuel cycle A2 is the most difficult-to-handle waste type in the Red-Impact waste inventory.<br />
Variants of the disposal concepts allowing the accommodation of MOX SF have already been developed<br />
by the waste agencies. Consequently, the HLW types arising from the advanced fuel cycles<br />
do not require considerable adaptations to the available repository concepts, but the dimensions of<br />
the disposal galleries can be adjusted to the thermal output of the new heat-generating waste types.<br />
The analyses reported in Section 3.1 will thus focus on the influence of the thermal output of the<br />
HLW and SF on the dimensions of the geological repository.<br />
The second step of the analyses consists in an assessment of the radiological impact of the geological<br />
disposal of SF, HLW, and intermediate-level waste (ILW) arising from the considered fuel cycles.<br />
In a safety assessment of a geological repository a representative set of possible evolution scenarios<br />
is considered. The assessments made in the framework of the Red-Impact project focused on<br />
the radiological consequences in the case of the expected evolution scenario (this scenario is also<br />
called normal evolution or reference scenario, and is associated with radionuclide transport in<br />
groundwater); this scenario assumes that the engineered and natural barriers of the repository system<br />
will function as expected. Additionally, in order to illustrate the impact of the reduction of the<br />
actinide inventory of the waste, we also considered a variant human intrusion scenario - this assumes<br />
that a geotechnical worker handles a core taken from a borehole drilled through the repository<br />
and that the core contains fragments of the disposed waste.<br />
144