Kritik am Buch „The Shadow Of The Dalai Lama ... - Neues von Shi De

events are forgotten.
There are, however, several factions facing off in the dawning struggle for Buddha’s control of China.
For example, some of the influential Japanese Buddhist sects who trace their origins to parent
monasteries in China see the Tibetan clergy as an arch-enemy. This too has its historical causes. In the
13 th century and under the protection of the great Mongolian rulers (of the Yuan dynasty), the lamas
had the temples of the Chinese Buddhist Lotus sect in southern China razed to the ground. In reaction
the latter organized a guerilla army of farmers and were successful in shaking off foreign control,
sending the Tibetans home, and establishing the Ming dynasty (1368). “This tradition of religious
rebellion”, Yoichi Clark Shimatsu writes, “did not disappear under communism. Rather, it continued
under an ideological guise. Mao Zedong's utopian vision that drove both the Cultural Revolution and
the suppression of intellectuals in Tiananmen Square bears a striking resemblance with the populist
Buddhist policies of Emperor Zhu Yuanthang, founder of the Ming Dynasty and himself a Lotus Sect
Buddhist priest” (Shimatsu, HPI 009).
Many Japanese Buddhists see a new “worldly” utopia in a combination of Maoist populism, the
continuation of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, and the familiar values of (non-Tibetan)
Buddhism. At a meeting of the Soka Gokkai sect it was pointed out that the first name of the Chinese
Premier Li Peng was “Roc”, the name of the mythic giant bird that protected the Buddha. Li Peng
answered allegorically that in present-day China the Buddha “is the people and I consider myself the
guardian of the people” (Shimatsu, HPI 009). Representatives of Soka Gokkai also interpreted the
relationship between Shoko Asahara and the Dalai Lama as a jointly planned attack on the pro-
Chinese politics of the sect.
Like the Tibetans in exile , the Chinese know that power lies in the hands of the elites. These will
decide which direction future developments take. It is doubtful whether the issue of national
sovereignty will play any role at all among the Tibetan clergy should they be permitted to advance
into China with the toleration and support of the state. Since the murder of King Langdarma, Tibetan
history teaches us, the interests of monastic priests and not those of the people are preeminent in
political decisions. This was likewise true in reverse for the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese ruling
elite will in the future also decide according to power-political criteria which religious path they will
pursue: “Beijing clearly looks to a Buddhist revival to fill the spiritual void in the Asian heartland so
long as it does not challenge the nominally secular authorities. Such a revival could provide the major
impetus into the Pacific century. Like all utopias, it could also be fraught with disaster” (Shimatsu,
HPI 009).
The West, which has not reflected upon the potential for violence in Tantric/Tibetan Buddhism or
rather has not even recognized it, sees — blind as it is — a pacifist and salvational deed by the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama in the spread of Lamaism in China. The White House Tibet expert, Melvyn
Goldstein, all but demands of the Kundun that he return to Tibet. In this he is probably voicing the
unofficial opinion of the American government: “If he [the Dalai Lama] really wants to achieve
something,” says Goldstein, “he has to stop attacking China on the international stage, he has to return
and publicly accept the sovereignty over his home country” (Spiegel 16/1998, p. 118).
Everything indicates that this will soon happen, and indeed at first under conditions dictated by the
Chinese. In his critique of the film Kundun, the journalist Tobias Kniebe writes that, “As little real
power as this man [the Dalai Lama] may have at the moment — as a symbol he is unassailable and