Kritik am Buch „The Shadow Of The Dalai Lama ... - Neues von Shi De

government another. Both parties refused to recognize the other’s boy. However, under great political
pressure the Chinese were finally able to prevail. The Tenth Panchen Lama was then brought up
under their influence. After the Dalai Lama had fled in 1959, the Chinese appointed the hierarch from
Tashilunpho as Tibet’s nominal head of state. However, he only exercised this office in a very limited
manner and sometimes he allowed to be carried away to make declarations of solidarity with the Dalai
Lama. This earned him years of house arrest and a ban on public appearances. Even if the Tibetans in
exile now promote such statements as patriotic confessions, by and large the Tenth Panchen Lama
played either his own or Beijing’s part. In 1978 he broke the vow of celibacy imposed upon him by
the Gelugpa order, marrying a Chinese woman and having a daughter with her.
Shortly before his death he actively participated in the capitalist economic policies of the Deng
Xiaoping era and founded the Kangchen in Tibet in 1987. This was a powerful umbrella organization
that controlled a number of companies and businesses, distributed international development funds for
Tibet, and exported Tibetan products. The neocapitalist business elite collected in the Kangchen was
for the most part recruited from old Tibetan noble families and were opposed to the politics of the
Dalai Lama, whilst from the other side they enjoyed the supportive benevolence of Beijing.
As far as the Tibetan protest movement of recent years is concerned, the Tenth Panchen Lama tried to
exert a conciliatory influence upon the revolting monks, but regretted that they would not listen to
him. “We insist upon re-educating the majority of monks and nuns who become guilty of minor
crimes [i.e., resistance against the Chinese authorities]" he announced publicly and went on, “But we
will show no pity to those who have stirred up unrest” (MacInnes, 1993, p. 282).
In 1989 the tenth incarnation of the Amitabha died. The Chinese made the funeral celebrations into a
grandiose event of state [!] that was broadcast nationally on radio and television. They invited the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama to the burial which took place in Beijing, but did not want him to visit Tibet
afterwards. For this reason the Kundun declined. At the same time the Tibetans in exile announced
that the Panchen Lama had been poisoned.
The political power play entered a spectacular new round in the search for the eleventh incarnation.
At first it seemed as if the two parties (the Chinese and the Tibetans in exile) would cooperate. But
then there were two candidates: one proposed by the Kundun and one by Beijing. The latter was
enthroned in Tashi Lunpho. A thoroughly power-conscious group of pro-Chinese lamas carried out
the ceremonies, whilst the claimant designated by the Dalai Lama was sent home to his parents amid
protests from the world public. At first, Dharamsala spoke of a murder, and then a kidnapping of the
boy.
All of this may be considered an expression of the running battle between the Tibetans and the
Chinese, yet even for the Tibetans in exile it is a surprise how much worth the Chinese laid on the
magic procedure of the rebirth myth and why they elevated it to become an affair of state, especially
since the upbringing of the Dalai Lama’s candidate would likewise have lain in their hands. They
probably decided on this course out of primarily pragmatic political considerations, but the magic
religious system possesses a dynamic of its own and can captivate those who use it unknowingly. A
Lamaization of China with or without the Dalai Lama is certainly a historical possibility. In October
1995 for example, the young Karmapa was guest of honor at the national day celebrations in Beijing
and had talks with important heads of the Chinese government. The national press reported in detail
on the subsequent journey through China which was organized for the young hierarch by the state. He