Kritik am Buch „The Shadow Of The Dalai Lama ... - Neues von Shi De

The two Karmapas: Urgyen Trinley Dorje (l) and Thinley Thaye Dorje (r)
But this split among the Kagyupa is useful for the Dalai Lama. Since the dawn of Tibetan history the
Karmapa has been the main opponent of the Kundun and has already been involved in military
conflicts with Lhasa on several occasions. He was his major enemy in the Tibetan civil war described
above.
This rivalry did not end with the flight of both hierarchs from Tibet. From the outset (since the end of
the sixties) the Kagyupa sect have been incomparably more popular in the West than the orthodox
Yellow Hats: the Red Hats were considered to be young, dynamic, uncomplicated, informal, and
cosmopolitan. The unconventional appearances of the Kagyu tulku, Chögyam Trungpa, who in the
seventies completely identified himself with the artistic avant-garde of Europe and America also set
an example for many other masters of the sect. Up until the mid-eighties, Western pupils of Buddhism
in any case preferred the red order. Here, in their view, an autonomous counterforce, independent of
rigid traditions, was emerging, at least this was how the Kagyupas outwardly presented themselves.
They developed into a powerful opponent of the Gelugpa, who likewise attempted to attract
proselytes in the West. Among others, this would be one of the reasons why the Kundun allied
himself with “detested” China in supporting Situ Rinpoche’s candidate, Ugyen Trinley, who is
resident in the Tsurphu monastery on Chinese territory.
But in the meantime the Fourteenth Dalai Lama has succeeded in binding the Kagyupa (Situ and
Gyaltsab lineages) so strongly to himself that it seemed more sensible to place the young Karmapa
under his direct control. At first, Ugyen Trinley appeared to function completely as the Chinese
intended. In October 1995, the former nomadic boy was the guest of honor during the national holiday
celebrations in Beijing and conversed with important Chinese government leaders. The national press
corps reported at length on his subsequent journey through China, organized for the young hierarch
with much pomp and circumstance. He is supposed to have exclaimed “Long live the People’s
Republic of China!”
It is noteworthy that Beijing is attempting less and less to explain the history and basic doctrines of
Tibetan Buddhism and is instead deliberately and with more or less success establishing and
encouraging a “competing Lamaism” or “alternative Lamaism” directed against the politics of the
Dalai Lama. The most powerful incarnation supported by China is undoubtedly the young Eleventh
Panchen Lama, about whom we will come to report later. On January 17, 2000, the South China
Morning Post reported that the Chinese had discovered a reincarnation of Reting Rinpoche who had
died in February 1997. The two-year-old boy was given a Buddhist name and ordained in front oof a
staute in the Jokhang Temple (in Lhasa). The ceremony took place in the presence of Chinese party
officials. Reting Rinpoche is considered to be one of the few lamas who in the event of the Dalai
Lama’s death could assume the regency until his reincarnation came of age. It is obvious that the
“China-friendly Lamaism” is setting a completely new tone in the relationship between the two
powers (China and the Tibetans in exile).
China is waiting for the charismatic leader to die, and the Dalai Lama has had to think seriously about
the issue of succession, not just of his own reincarnation, but also the individual who as regent will
represent his state and religion whilst he is still a minor. The successful and purposeful policy of
integration which the Kundun has been pursuing for years within the context of the individual schools
makes it possible that upon his death a Kagyupa hierarch could also take on the task of representing