Kritik am Buch „The Shadow Of The Dalai Lama ... - Neues von Shi De

After Buddhism became more and more closely linked with the idea of the state following the Ashoka
period, and the “high priests” themselves became “patrons” (secular rulers), the mchod-yon relation
was applied to neighboring countries. That is, states which were not yet really subject to the rule of
the priest-king (e.g., of the Dalai Lama) had to grant him military protection and “alms”. This delicate
relation between the Lamaist Buddhocracy and its neighboring states still plays a significant role in
Chinese-Tibetan politics today, since each of the parties interprets them differently and thus also
derives conflicting rights from it.
The Chinese side has for centuries been of the opinion that the Buddhist church (and the Dalai Lama)
must indeed be paid for their religious activities with “alms”, but only has limited rights in worldly
matters. The Chinese (especially the communists) thus impose a clear division between state and
church and in this point are largely in accord with western conceptions, or they with justification
appeal to the traditional Buddhist separation of sangha (the monastic community) and politics
(Klieger, 1991, p. 24). In contrast, the Tibetans do not just lay claim to complete political authority,
they are also convinced that because of the mchod-yon relation the Chinese are downright obliged to
support them with “alms” and protect them with “weapons”. Even if such a claim is not articulated in
the current political situation it nonetheless remains an essential characteristic of Tibetan
Buddhocracy. [3]
Christiaan Klieger has convincingly demonstrated that these days the entire exile Tibetan economy
functions according to the traditional mchod-yon (priest-patron) principle described above, that is, the
community with the monks at its head is constantly supported by non-Tibetan institutions and
individuals from all over the world with cash, unpaid work, and gifts. The Tibetan economic system
has thus remained “medieval” in emigration as well.
Whether the considerable gifts to the Tibetans in exile are originally intended for religious or
humanitarian projects no longer plays much of a role in their subsequent allocation. „Funds generated
in the West as part of the religious system of donations,” writes Klieger, „are consequently
transformed into political support for the Tibetan state” (Klieger, 1991, p. 21). The formula, which
proceeds from the connection between spiritual and secular power, is accordingly as follows: whoever
supports the politics of the exile Tibetans also patronizes Buddhism as such or, vice versa, whoever
wants to foster Buddhism must support Tibetan politics.
The feigned belief of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama in western democracy
However authoritarian and undemocratic the guiding principles of the Buddhist state are, these days
(and in total contrast to this) the Fourteenth Dalai Lama exclusively professes a belief in a western
democratic model. Now, is the Kundun’s conception of democracy a matter of an seriously intended
reform of the old feudal Tibetan relations, a not yet realized long-term political goal, or simply a
tactical ploy?
Admittedly, since 1961 a kind of parliament exists among the Tibetans in exile in which the
representatives of the various provinces and the four religious schools hold seats as members. But the
“god-king” still remains the highest government official. According to the constitution, he cannot be
stripped of his authority as head of state and as the highest political instance. There has never, Vice
President Thubten Lungring has said, been a majority decision against the Dalai Lama. The latter is
said to have with a smile answered a western journalist who asked him whether it was even possible