6. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 3 February 1954 42,44,47 Lady Godiva reactor; bare 235 U sphere; control rod incorrectly operated; single excursion; insignificant exposures. 7. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 12 February 1957 47,48,49,50,51,52 Lady Godiva reactor; bare 235 U sphere; added reflection; single excursion; insignificant exposures. These two excursions occurred in the Lady Godiva assembly, an unreflected metal reactor fabricated in three principal sections that when assembled formed a sphere. Figure 48 shows Godiva in the scrammed state. The central section was fixed in position by small tubular steel supports, while the upper and lower sections were retractable by means <strong>of</strong> pneumatic cylinders, thus providing two independent scram mechanisms. The critical mass was about 54 kg <strong>of</strong> uranium enriched to 93.7% 235 U. It was operated remotely from a distance <strong>of</strong> 1/4 mile. The first accidental excursion occurred during preparations for a scheduled prompt burst, part <strong>of</strong> a program to measure the parameters associated with excursions. Normally, a burst was initiated by establishing delayed criticality. This was accomplished by adjusting control rods, lifting the top section to reduce reactivity and allow decay <strong>of</strong> the neutron population, and lowering the top section into position and rapidly inserting a burst rod worth slightly more than 1 $. A power excursion typically creating about 10 16 fissions in 100 µs followed; in 40 ms the system would be scrammed safely. Because the only source <strong>of</strong> neutrons was spontaneous fission, it was customary to assemble to an excess reactivity <strong>of</strong> about 70 ¢ to generate sufficient neutrons to determine the settings for delayed criticality in a reasonable time. This accidental excursion was caused, apparently, because additional reactivity was inserted by error after assembly to 70 ¢, but before a fission chain started. The excursion yield was 5.6 × 10 16 fissions, about six times the yield <strong>of</strong> the average burst. There was no radiation hazard, contamination, personnel exposures to radiation, or significant damage to the major uranium parts. One piece was slightly warped and required remachining. Several light steel supporting members were bent or broken (Figure 49). The second accidental excursion occurred during preparations for an experiment in which Godiva was to provide a pulse <strong>of</strong> fast neutrons. Again, the burst occurred during assembly to establish, in this case, a fiducial point at about 80 ¢ excess reactivity. Control rods were to be adjusted on the basis <strong>of</strong> this period. The extra reactivity is thought to have been contributed 80 by a large mass <strong>of</strong> graphite and polyethylene that was to be irradiated. This mass had just been moved close to Godiva, and either the change in reflection was underestimated or the material slumped further toward Godiva. The burst yield was 1.2 × 10 17 fissions, about 12 times the standard excursion. The uranium metal was severely oxidized, warped, and apparently had been plastic near the center. The central burst rod was nearly ruptured and, at its center, must have been within 100°C <strong>of</strong> the uranium melting temperature. Figure 50 shows several <strong>of</strong> the pieces. External damage was limited to the supporting structure; radioactive contamination consisted <strong>of</strong> oxide scale; cleanup proceeded rapidly. Repair <strong>of</strong> Lady Godiva was not practical; therefore construction <strong>of</strong> Godiva II 59 specifically designed for burst operation, was accelerated. Despite the severity <strong>of</strong> the excursion, operating personnel received no significant radiation exposures because <strong>of</strong> the large distance between the reactor and the control room. The behavior <strong>of</strong> the Godiva system during superprompt critical power excursions is well understood both experimentally and theoretically. 47,51,52 Lady Godiva experienced well over 1,000 safe, controlled bursts. A coupled hydrodynamics-neutronics code describes the behavior <strong>of</strong> the system adequately. The first excursion (5.6 × 10 16 fissions) must have had a period <strong>of</strong> 6.4 seconds, equivalent to a reactivity excess over prompt criticality <strong>of</strong> 15 ¢. The excess reactivity <strong>of</strong> the larger excursion (1.2 × 10 17 fissions) was 21 ¢ above prompt criticality, corresponding to a period <strong>of</strong> 4.7 µs. The fission yield <strong>of</strong> 1.2 × 10 17 in the second accident is equivalent to the energy contained in 1.7 lb <strong>of</strong> high explosive (HE), but the damage was much less than would have been caused by that quantity <strong>of</strong> HE. The above mentioned code can predict the fraction <strong>of</strong> fission energy converted to kinetic energy; in this case, only about 1.4% <strong>of</strong> the energy, equivalent to 0.024 pounds <strong>of</strong> HE, was available as kinetic energy to do damage. The damage was consistent with this figure, and it is evident that most <strong>of</strong> the fission energy was deposited as heat.
Figure 48. The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Lady Godiva assembly (unreflected enriched-uranium sphere) in the scrammed configuration. 81
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LA-13638 Approved for public releas
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A Review of Criticality Accidents 2
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PREFACE This document is the second
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Tom Jones was invaluable in generat
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C. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
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FIGURES 1. Chronology of process cr
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51. MSKS and assembly involved in t
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A REVIEW OF CRITICALITY ACCIDENTS A
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3 Black Sea Baltic Sea Obninsk Norw
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North Atlantic Ocean Irish Sea Wind
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1. Mayak Production Association, 15
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time of the accident. However, the
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determined by a radiation control p
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consequences of this accident, the
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Figure 10. Drum in which the 1958 Y
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The entire plutonium process area h
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7. Mayak Production Association, 5
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During the next shift, radiation sa
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9. Siberian Chemical Combine, 14 Ju
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The accident investigation determin
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10. Hanford Works, 7 April 1962 18,
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11. Mayak Production Association, 7
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13. Siberian Chemical Combine, 2 De
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15. Electrostal Machine Building Pl
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17. Mayak Production Association, 1
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19. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
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21. Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrat
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This report has been reproduced dir