A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents
A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents
A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents
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15. Electrostal Machine Building Plant, 3 November 1965<br />
Uranium oxide slurry, U(6.5), in a vacuum system vessel; single excursion; insignificant exposures.<br />
This accident occurred in Building 242 that housed<br />
a production scale operation for the conversion <strong>of</strong><br />
uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide. The plant<br />
operated on four 6–hour shifts per day. Between<br />
23 September 1964 and 19 October 1965, the facility<br />
had been converting 2% enriched material. However,<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the need to provide fuel for two newly<br />
commissioned uranium–graphite power reactors at the<br />
Beloyarskaya Nuclear Power Plant, it was necessary to<br />
begin processing 6.5% enrichment material. To<br />
perform this change over, the process was shutdown on<br />
19 October 1965. During the following three days, the<br />
entire system was thoroughly cleaned out. The<br />
conversion process was restarted with the higher<br />
enriched material on 22 October 1965. The criticality<br />
accident occurred 12 days later.<br />
Figure 20 is a layout <strong>of</strong> the Building 242 uranium<br />
hexafluoride to uranium oxide conversion system and<br />
associated vacuum system. The uranium hexafluoride<br />
was burned in a hydrogen–air atmosphere in the<br />
conversion hopper. The resulting uranium oxides were<br />
collected at the bottom <strong>of</strong> the conversion hopper and<br />
then transferred by vacuum to the accumulation<br />
hopper. The vacuum system was then switched <strong>of</strong>f and<br />
the oxides were loaded into geometrically favorable<br />
20 l vessels by gravity. The vessels were then transferred<br />
from Building 242 to another location where the<br />
oxides underwent defluorination and complete<br />
reduction to UO 2 in a rotating calcination furnace.<br />
The vacuum system was located one floor level<br />
below the conversion system. To prevent oxide from<br />
entering the vacuum system, two filters were located in<br />
the vacuum line connecting the accumulation hopper to<br />
the (liquid ring) vacuum pump. Both the primary and<br />
the secondary filters used Lavsan, a fluorinated plastic<br />
material woven into a cloth–like fabric. Written<br />
procedures required that personnel on each shift open<br />
and visually inspect the secondary filter. This inspection<br />
was performed to ascertain the level <strong>of</strong> oxide<br />
accumulation and to look for mechanical defects in the<br />
Lavsan itself. If the operator was unable to see through<br />
the Lavsan <strong>of</strong> the secondary filter, in addition to<br />
replacing it, he was also required to open and visually<br />
inspect the primary filter. Procedures also required<br />
personnel on each shift to have a sample <strong>of</strong> the vacuum<br />
system water analyzed for uranium content. Sample<br />
assay results were usually available about 1.5 hours<br />
after the sample was taken. There was no nondestructive<br />
assay equipment in place or routinely used to<br />
determine if uranium oxide was accumulating in the<br />
vacuum system.<br />
The components <strong>of</strong> the vacuum system were a<br />
vacuum pump, a water pump, a vacuum supply vessel<br />
(where the accident occurred), and a shell–and–tube<br />
heat exchanger. The vacuum supply vessel was a<br />
vertical axis, right circular cylinder, with a diameter <strong>of</strong><br />
650 mm and a height <strong>of</strong> 900 mm (~300 l). The vessel<br />
was equipped with a water level glass site gauge.<br />
On 3 November 1965 at 11:10, the criticality<br />
accident alarm system sounded in Building 242. All<br />
personnel in Building 242 immediately evacuated. The<br />
alarm systems <strong>of</strong> the adjacent buildings did not<br />
activate. The facility’s chief physicist made the first re–<br />
entry into Building 242 about 50 minutes after the<br />
building had been evacuated. Using a portable gamma–<br />
ray detector, he quickly determined that an accident<br />
had occurred in the vacuum supply vessel. At this time<br />
he recorded a gamma exposure rate <strong>of</strong> 3.6 R/h at a<br />
distance <strong>of</strong> 1.5 m from the surface <strong>of</strong> the vessel.<br />
Recovery operations, performed by operations<br />
personnel under the direction <strong>of</strong> a health physicist,<br />
were conducted in a manner that minimized the<br />
likelihood <strong>of</strong> causing additional excursions. A long rod<br />
Conversion<br />
Hopper<br />
First Floor<br />
Ground Floor<br />
Primary<br />
Filter<br />
Vacuum Supply<br />
Vessel<br />
Heat<br />
Exchanger<br />
Accumulation<br />
Hopper<br />
20 Vessel<br />
Secondary<br />
Filter<br />
Vacuum<br />
Line<br />
Seal Water<br />
Pump<br />
Vacuum<br />
Pump<br />
Figure 20. Layout <strong>of</strong> UF 6 to uranium oxide conversion<br />
equipment and associated vacuum system.<br />
35