A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The 22 criticality accidents that occurred during process operations are each described in one to several pages, accompanied by schematics and photographs when available. These are the accidents that are directly relevant to process criticality safety. In all cases the level of detail is sufficient to understand the physical conditions. The neutronic, physical, radiological, and human consequences of the accidents are presented. Causes are included for those accidents for which this information was reported in the original documentation or was available from those with first hand knowledge. As supplements to the descriptions, two new sections have been added to Part I of this revision. The first new section presents the results of simplified re– constructions of the physical and neutronic aspects of each accident. These re–constructions are compared to known conditions for criticality. In addition, the energy releases, both the first spike and the total excursion yield, are discussed with respect to expected values based on data from the SILENE, CRAC, and KEWB experiments. 4,5,6 Complementing this section is Appendix B that contains diagrams of the vessels in which the 22 accidents occurred and tables showing the parameters (fissile mass, volume, etc.) of the simplified re–constructions. In the second new section, observations and lessons learned, extracted from a thorough review of all of the accidents, are presented. This process was necessarily subjective since in many cases there were obvious 2 I. PROCESS ACCIDENTS Figure 1. Chronology of process criticality accidents. operator actions that were directly related to the accident, but seldom were the operator’s thoughts reported. This summary of lessons learned should prove valuable as a training tool. It may also assist management by providing insight into major risk contributors thus helping to reduce risks and to prevent accidnts. A chronology of the accidents that occurred in process facilities is provided in Figure 1. Below are listed highlights of these 22 process accidents. • 21 occurred with the fissile material in solutions or slurries. • One occurred with metal ingots. • None occurred with powders. • 18 occurred in manned, unshielded facilities. • 9 fatalities resulted. • 3 survivors had limbs amputated. • No accidents occurred in transportation. • No accidents occurred while fissile material was being stored. • No equipment was damaged. • Only one accident resulted in measurable fission product contamination (slightly above natural levels) beyond the plant boundary. • Only one accident resulted in measurable exposures (well below allowable worker annual exposures) to members of the public. Russian Federation United States United Kingdom Japan 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 A. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTIONS The 22 accident descriptions are presented chronologically in this report without regard to country. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 are provided to orient the reader as to the accident locations in the Russian Federation, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, respectively. The capital cities are also included, as well as Obninsk in Russia, where no accidents have occurred but where the Russian coeditors of this report work at the IPPE. The IPPE houses the regulatory body that oversees the four production sites (Mayak, Tomsk-7, Electrostal, and Novosibirsk), where the process accidents occurred.
3 Black Sea Baltic Sea Obninsk Norwegian Sea Moscow Electrostal Mayak Tomsk Novosibirsk Sea of Okhotsk Figure 2. Map of the Russian Federation showing the sites of the process criticality accidents, the capital, Moscow, and Obinisk, the location of the regulating authority, IPPE. Sea of Japan Bering Sea
Page 1 and 2: LA-13638 Approved for public releas
Page 3 and 4: A Review of Criticality Accidents 2
Page 5 and 6: PREFACE This document is the second
Page 7 and 8: Tom Jones was invaluable in generat
Page 9 and 10: C. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Page 11 and 12: FIGURES 1. Chronology of process cr
Page 13 and 14: 51. MSKS and assembly involved in t
Page 15: A REVIEW OF CRITICALITY ACCIDENTS A
Page 19 and 20: North Atlantic Ocean Irish Sea Wind
Page 21 and 22: 1. Mayak Production Association, 15
Page 23 and 24: time of the accident. However, the
Page 25 and 26: determined by a radiation control p
Page 27 and 28: consequences of this accident, the
Page 29 and 30: Figure 10. Drum in which the 1958 Y
Page 31 and 32: The entire plutonium process area h
Page 35 and 36: During the next shift, radiation sa
Page 37 and 38: 9. Siberian Chemical Combine, 14 Ju
Page 39 and 40: The accident investigation determin
Page 41 and 42: 10. Hanford Works, 7 April 1962 18,
Page 43 and 44: heater and stirrer were turned off
Page 45 and 46: vessel 64-A was added. The dissolut
Page 47 and 48: additional reflection afforded by t
Page 49 and 50: 15. Electrostal Machine Building Pl
Page 53 and 54: ased on a radiation survey, that th
Page 55 and 56: 0.5 m 0.5 m 0.5 m 0.5 m 3.0 m 1.4 m
Page 57 and 58: The investigation identified severa
Page 59 and 60: 19. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
Page 61 and 62: 20. Siberian Chemical Combine, 13 D
Page 63 and 64: To Glovebox 6 7 8 6 From Glovebox 6
Page 65 and 66: on a 0.4 m square pitch grid. The b
Page 67 and 68:
competing reactivity effects proved
Page 69 and 70:
Figure 35. The precipitation vessel
Page 71 and 72:
B. PHYSICAL AND NEUTRONIC CHARACTER
Page 73 and 74:
Material Fissile Mass: Fissile mass
Page 75 and 76:
235 U Spherical Critical Mass (kg)
Page 77 and 78:
Table 10. Accident Fission Energy R
Page 79 and 80:
• Accidents in shielded facilitie
Page 81 and 82:
• Senior management should be awa
Page 83 and 84:
Table 11. Reactor and Critical Expe
Page 85 and 86:
3. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2
Page 87 and 88:
5. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 3
Page 89 and 90:
eflector of 236 kg when he noticed
Page 91 and 92:
3. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Page 93 and 94:
At the equatorial plane, the two ha
Page 95 and 96:
Figure 48. The Los Alamos Scientifi
Page 97 and 98:
Figure 50. Burst rod and several se
Page 99 and 100:
On 11 March 1963, the facility chie
Page 101 and 102:
13. Chelyabinsk-70, 5 April 1968 57
Page 103 and 104:
14. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 6 Sept
Page 105 and 106:
completed the construction of the l
Page 107 and 108:
C. MODERATED METAL OR OXIDE SYSTEMS
Page 109 and 110:
63,65,66, 67 4. Chalk River Laborat
Page 111 and 112:
7. Centre dÉtudes Nucleaires de Sa
Page 113 and 114:
a technician prescribing the loadin
Page 115 and 116:
the room to drain the water out of
Page 117 and 118:
In the final experiment, the critic
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
III. POWER EXCURSIONS AND QUENCHING
Page 123 and 124:
Figure 64. Energy model computation
Page 125 and 126:
References 1. Stratton, W. R. A Rev
Page 127 and 128:
50. Paxton, H. C. “Godiva Wrecked
Page 129 and 130:
92. Stone, R. S., H. P. Sleeper, Jr
Page 131 and 132:
criticality accident: The release o
Page 133 and 134:
prompt criticality: State of a fiss
Page 135 and 136:
1. Mayak Production Association, 15
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
9. Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
13. Siberian Chemical Combine, 2 De
Page 149 and 150:
15. Electrostal Machine Building Pl
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
19. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
Page 155 and 156:
21. Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrat
Page 157 and 158:
This report has been reproduced dir
show all

A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?