A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents
A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents A Review of Criticality Accidents
The main cause of the accident was the erroneous judgment of the experimenter as to the state of the experimental assembly he was constructing. The accident resulted in virtually no damage to the machinery or equipment in the facility. The experimental cell was not contaminated. The experimenter received estimated absorbed doses of 4,500 rad from neutrons, and 350 rad from gamma-rays. 61, 62, 63 That same day he was transported to a specialized clinic in Moscow, where he died during the night between 19 and 20 June, 1997. No other personnel were injured or received significant exposures. Radiation levels inside the control room and in the vicinity of the building remained at normal levels. The total energy released was estimated to be equivalent to 10 19 fissions. After the accident, experiments with FKBN-2M were stopped to implement safety upgrades to the research operations. 92 Figure 57. Calculated power history for the accident. Figure 58. Removal of the main core of the assembly from the lower copper hemishell reflector. Power (watts) 10 9 10 8 10 7 10 6 10 5 10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1 10 0 10 -2 10 -1 10 0 10 1 10 2 Time (seconds) 10 3 10 4 10 5
C. MODERATED METAL OR OXIDE SYSTEMS 1. Los Alamos, New Mexico, 6 June 194537 Pseudosphere of uranium cubes; water reflected; single excursion; 3 significant exposures. The experiment, designed before the days of remote control, was intended to establish the critical mass of enriched uranium metal surrounded by hydrogenous material. The uranium mass of 35.4 kg (average enrichment 79.2%) was stacked in the form of a pseudosphere constructed of one-half inch cubes and one-half inch. by one-half inch by one inch blocks. The core was in a 6 inch cubical polyethylene box with the void space filled with polyethylene blocks. The whole assembly was placed in a large tank that was then partially filled with water. Unexpectedly, the assembly became critical before water had completely covered the polyethylene box. The situation was aggravated because no scram device was built into the system and the inlet and drain valves were 15 feet apart. Before the system was reduced to a safely subcritical state 5 or 10 seconds later, a total of 3 to 4 ×10 16 fissions occurred. This was an energy release sufficient to raise the average temperature of the metal more than 200°C. Subsequent examination of the polyethylene box showed that it was not watertight. It is probable that water seeped slowly into the uranium assembly as the water level was being raised above the bottom of the box. The additional moderation then caused the supercritical situation that was terminated by boiling of the water within the box and next to the metal cubes. Calculations have provided some insight into this event. Nesting spherical shells of U(79.2) (thickness of 8 mm and total mass of 35.4 kg) were evaluated with *See Appendix A. gaps between shells of 0.5 and 1 mm. Adding water to the gaps increased the multiplication factor by 0.04 for the 1 mm gap, while for the 0.5 mm case, ∆k was found to be about 0.02. These results apply to the assembly fully reflected by water, where the calculated keff was 1.024 and 1.018, respectively. The full water reflector was found to be worth about 0.21 in k. Although the geometry of the calculations represents only a rough approximation of the actual assembly, refinements are probably not justified. Indications are that the uranium cubes were “as cast,” so the actual volume available to the water cannot be known. The characteristics of excursions of large masses of fissile metal in water are, at best, poorly known. A calculation by Hansen has shown that for a 68.5 mm radius 235 U sphere in water, 15% of the fissions occur in the outer 0.5 mm and the fission density in this region is six times that at the center. A spike of 3 × 10 15 fissions would then raise the surface temperature 130°C, while the central regions would remain relatively cool with a temperature rise of only 19°C. The initial spike must have been of this order of magnitude, with the majority of the fissions following at a much lower average power. In this excursion, three people received radiation doses in the amounts of 66, 66, and 7.4 rep.* There was no contamination, and the active material was used again in 3 days. 93
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The main cause <strong>of</strong> the accident was the erroneous<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> the experimenter as to the state <strong>of</strong> the<br />
experimental assembly he was constructing. The<br />
accident resulted in virtually no damage to the machinery<br />
or equipment in the facility. The experimental cell<br />
was not contaminated. The experimenter received<br />
estimated absorbed doses <strong>of</strong> 4,500 rad from neutrons,<br />
and 350 rad from gamma-rays. 61, 62, 63 That same day<br />
he was transported to a specialized clinic in Moscow,<br />
where he died during the night between 19 and<br />
20 June, 1997. No other personnel were injured or<br />
received significant exposures. Radiation levels inside<br />
the control room and in the vicinity <strong>of</strong> the building<br />
remained at normal levels. The total energy released<br />
was estimated to be equivalent to 10 19 fissions. After<br />
the accident, experiments with FKBN-2M were<br />
stopped to implement safety upgrades to the research<br />
operations.<br />
92<br />
Figure 57. Calculated power history for the accident.<br />
Figure 58. Removal <strong>of</strong> the main core <strong>of</strong> the assembly from the lower copper hemishell reflector.<br />
Power (watts)<br />
10 9<br />
10 8<br />
10 7<br />
10 6<br />
10 5<br />
10 4<br />
10 3<br />
10 2<br />
10 1<br />
10 0<br />
10 -2<br />
10 -1<br />
10 0<br />
10 1<br />
10 2<br />
Time (seconds)<br />
10 3<br />
10 4<br />
10 5