phainomena

PETER KAISER
being merely a terminological consideration, to argue that consciousness as
such entails a primitive form of self-awareness might indeed prove “to make
the strongest case possible for the existence of prelinguistic and nonconceptual
forms of self-awareness” (Zahavi 2002: 18).
Therefore, in addition to DeGrazia’s (Bodily) Self-Awareness Arguments, the
phenomenological analysis can consistently support and substantiate his – and
indeed anybody else’s – case for considering the most basic forms of “mere”
bodily awareness as entailing pre-reflective self-awareness.
I hope that this may serve to demonstrate that there is a good chance that
the resources to be found both in analytical approaches to animal cognition as
well as in phenomenological conceptions of embodiment and self-awareness
can substantially contribute to the philosophy of animal minds. In terms of
prospects for future research, I opt for optimism. Taking bodily self-awareness
in animals seriously is a significant starting point in order to broaden the
horizons of embodiment for future investigations into corporeality in animals.
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9. Bibliography
Allen, Colin (1999): “Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-
Monitoring as an Empirical Approach”, Erkenntnis 51, 33–40.
Allen, Colin and Bekoff, Marc (2013): “Animal Minds, Cognitive Ethology,
and Ethics”, in: Animal Minds & Animal Ethics. Connecting Two Separate Fields,
Klaus Petrus and Markus Wild (eds.), 249–268. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Anderson, Alun and Kacelnik, Alex (2004): “Don’t call me Bird-Brain”, New
Scientist 12, 46–47.
Andrews, Kristin (2015): The Animal Mind. An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Animal Cognition, London, New York: Routledge.
Baker, Lynne R. (2012): “From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness”,
Grazer Philosophische Studien 84, 19–38.
Baker, Lynne R. (2013): Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, José Luis (1998): The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.