phainomena

Peter Kaiser
TAKING BODILY SELF-AWARENESS
IN ANIMALS SERIOUSLY
1. Introduction
57
The current debates on embodiment, consciousness, and bodily self-/
awareness are partly characterized by insightful convergences of analytically
and phenomenologically influenced approaches, therefore allowing for a
better, refined understanding of the phenomena themselves. 1 After far too
long a period of the unfortunate division of analytic and so-called continental
philosophy, the contributions of an ever increasing “intradisciplinary”
philosophical debate have possibly been as important as the interdisciplinary
exchange within the cognitive sciences and philosophy (Depraz/Gallagher
2002, Gallagher/Zahavi 2008).
In recent years there has also been a growing interest in philosophy of
animal minds and animal cognition, “one of the most exciting areas in the
cognitive sciences” (Shettleworth 2010: v). Yet, the role of embodiment and
bodily awareness, let alone bodily self-awareness in nonhuman animals has
1 Since almost all authors are using the terms “self-awareness” and “self-consciousness”
interchangeably, I will follow this convention throughout the paper, giving some
preference to the former concept.