phainomena

Sebastjan Vörös & Peter Gaitsch
THE HORIZONS OF EMBODIMENT:
Introduction to the Special Issue
1. Enter the body: The corporeal turn in cognitive science
The notion of “embodiment” has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive
science and philosophy of mind. Although almost completely absent up until
three decades ago, it has now become a staple term in contemporary discussions
of the mind, cognition, and consciousness. However, one is immediately
confronted with a seemingly obvious question: why has this “corporeal turn”
(Sheets-Johnstone 2009) stirred up so much commotion? After all, were not all
predominant schools of thought in philosophy of mind and cognitive science
in the 20th century decidedly materialist/physicalist, loyally echoing the daring
words of the infamous materialist philosopher La Mettrie (18th century): “Let
us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe
there is but a single [material] substance differently modified (La Mettrie 1912:
148)”? Were they not all united in the fierce resistance to the dualist idea of
the “ghost in the machine” (Ryle 1949/2000), arguing that mind, cognition,
and consciousness are all reducible to, or instantiated in, our brains and are
therefore ultimately bodily states and/or processes? And if this is indeed the
case, what is so extraordinary about the idea of the “embodied [conscious]
mind” (Varela et al. 1991)?
There are probably several routes one might take in addressing this issue.
Here, we intend to explore just two of them. The first, and more “superficial”,
reason the corporeal turn seems to represent a unique contribution to
contemporary debates is that, unlike its predecessors, it puts the body, alongside
5