phainomena

Ključne besede: telesno samo-zavedanje, predrefleksivno samozavedanje,
samo-zavest, živalski um, živalska zavest.
Toma Strle
Embodied, Enacted and Experienced Decision-Making
In this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary
approaches to understanding and researching decision-making – endorsing
the goals and core presuppositions of traditional cognitive science – provide
a limited account of decision-making at best. Firstly, they falsely presuppose
that decision-makers are mostly making some sort of calculation regarding
objective states of a pregiven world, independent from decision-makers.
Secondly, even though the majority of approaches admit subjectivity into the
picture of decision-making, they mostly try to avoid it or objectify it. Thirdly,
the interactive history of decision-makers with their environment and the role
of the body are in large part left out of research designs and explanations of
decision-making.
Even though there has been a surge of proposals of embodying decisionmaking
in recent years, they do not take the theses of embodied cognition far
(or seriously) enough (at least from the perspective of the enactivist view of
embodied cognition) – they, for instance, do not take the lived (experienced)
body, experience of decision-makers, or sense-making as central to decisionmaking.
Borrowing and extending the ideas from (neuro)phenomenology
and enactivism, I will argue that decision-making is best understood from
the perspective of what sense and meaning situations, decisions, and the
process of decision-making have from and in the (experiential) perspective of
decision-makers. As a consequence, I will further claim that decision-making
science must begin researching the experience of decision-makers rigorously
and systematically if it is to understand the phenomenon in a less limited and
a more meaningful way.
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Keywords: decision-making, embodied cognition, enactivism, experience,
(neuro)phenomenology, sense-making.