phainomena

Recommendations

Info

PHAINOMENA XXV/98-99 THE HORIZONS OF EMBODIMENT Leib that is taken to be the “original prototype” or “originary norm” (Urnorm) 218 (Hua 1: 154); but if this is the case, then how are we supposed to be motivated 9 by passive association to extend our empathy to anomalous bodies, i.e. to all the other living organisms apart from man and (perhaps) higher animals? Indeed, given the striking dis-similarity of most, if not all, non-human living beings (potted plants in particular!), how are we supposed to relate to their anomalous animated bodies? One way out of this predicament would be to try and broaden the possible scope of intercorporeal pairing by implementing two enhancement strategies, both of which take us beyond Husserl’s original work. The first strategy consists in clarifying the notion of analogy. As Kant once remarked, analogy is not an issue of imperfect similarity or likeness, but rather an issue of perfect similarity or proportional equality. In other words, analogy holds between two entities whose relations are, in some significant respect, proportionally equivalent, even though they are otherwise completely unlike one another: “By means of such an analogy I can therefore provide a concept of a relation to things that are absolutely unknown to me. E.g., the promotion of the happiness of the children = a is to the love of the parents = b as the welfare of humankind = c is to the unknown in God = x, which we call love: not as if this unknown had the least similarity with any human inclination, but because we can posit the relation between God’s love and the world to be similar to that which things in the world have to one another. (Kant 2004: 109, our emphasis)” This example, reminiscent as it is of the traditional role attributed to analogy in the Scholastic era, might sound a little awkward when transferred into a biological context, but it does a perfect job in illustrating the general function 9 The term “motivation” plays an important part in Husserl’s theory of perception. Its use stands in stark contrast to natural causal theories of perception in that it puts emphasis on “a form of spiritual causation“, which is said to be enfolding between the object and the subject of experience: “We do not just causally interact with objects in the world but we deliberately turn our attention towards them, they ’motivate’ our interest: ’The room’s stale air (which I experience as such) stimulates me to open the window’ [Hua 5: 229]” (Moran 2012: 32).
PETER GAITSCH & SEBASTJAN VÖRÖS that analogy is supposed to fulfill, i.e. allowing us to expand and deepen our grasp of the epistemically transcendent or the “absolutely unknown”. For it would seem that, in relation to the anomalous living bodies such as that of the plant, we find ourselves in a similarly embarrassing situation. Kant’s clarification helps us to get out of the “epistemic rut” by distinguishing between somatic analogy and the simple registering of organismic similarities. In fact, Husserl himself seems to be adopting a similar view when he suggests that we are capable of recognizing anomalous modifications to the human Leib if these stand in certain proportional relations to our own lived body as an Urnorm – as, e.g., when we are confronted with sense organs which are phenomenally completely foreign to us (say, the antennae of an insect), but serve the same orientation function as our organs (Hua 15: 626). Put differently, I can hold that the foreign organism’s relation to its sense organs is the same as mine is to my sense organs without thereby laying claim to a phenomenal similarity between our sense organs. In fact, in a truly Kantian spirit, Husserl emphasizes the ever-abiding foreignness, an unsurpassable distance, which comes to full fruition in our empathy towards anomalous bodies. Namely, in order for me to enter the pertinent relation of co-resonance with the other body it is not necessary for the act of empathy to end in fulfillment; instead it can remain an empty form, without thereby losing its distinct experiential character (Hua 14: 479, 526). This is why Husserl conceives of (intercorporeal) pairing as “congruence at a distance (Deckung in Distanz)” (ibid.: 531, our translation). With this in mind, we are entitled to the belief that the human Urnorm, which is the basis for intercorporeal pairing, is not “a kind of matrix that I rely and draw on when understanding others”, but rather “a necessary contrast foil on the basis of which others can be experienced as others” (Zahavi 2012b: 240). In other words, “my self-experience doesn’t constitute the [positive] model; rather it is that against which the other’s difference can reveal itself ” (ibid). Hence, the difference between my Leib serving as a matrix and my Leib serving as a contrast foil allows us to distinguish between naive and critical forms of anthropomorphism. Naive anthropomorphism draws analogies between myself and the alien entity based on our similarities (likenesses) and thus tries to tame the other by subsuming it to the modes of embodiment that I am most familiar and intimate with. Critical anthropomorphism, on the other hand, draws analogies between myself and the 219
Page 1 and 2:
phainomena THE HORIZONS OF EMBODIME
Page 3:
THE HORIZONS OF EMBODIMENT Corporea
Page 6 and 7:
PHAINOMENA XXV/98-99 THE HORIZONS O
Page 8 and 9:
Page 10 and 11:
Page 12 and 13:
Page 14 and 15:
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169: PHAINOMENA XXV/98-99 THE HORIZONS O
Page 202 and 203: 202
Page 260 and 261: 260 PHAINOMENA XXV/98-99
Page 268:
Page 271 and 272:
e-ISSN 2232-6650 UDK 1 PHAINOMENA R
show all

phainomena

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?