phainomena
PHAINOMENA-98-99_e-verzija
PHAINOMENA-98-99_e-verzija
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PHAINOMENA XXV/98-99<br />
THE HORIZONS OF EMBODIMENT<br />
from animals by a subtle differentia specifica (Toadvine 2007: 26.). 3<br />
2. Interanimality<br />
162<br />
The fundamental role of the lived body (Leib) for enacting intentionality<br />
and intersubjectivity (or as Merleau-Ponty puts it: intercorporeality) has<br />
already been thematized by Husserl. The Leib is not a mere body-object, but a<br />
fundamental starting point, the “zero-point of orientation” (Hua 4: 158), and<br />
the basic “I can” (ibid.: 253) , 4 through which I experience and engage with<br />
all other things and living beings from the very beginning of my ontogenesis.<br />
It is not (de)limited by the skin (and thus not co-extensive with the Körper),<br />
but is rather in a dynamic interdependence with a certain milieu or Umwelt,<br />
as emphasized by Merleau-Ponty (1966: 132–134) drawing on Uexküll. This<br />
milieu is not a lifeless field, but is fused with and co-constituted by living<br />
(bodily) beings – not least animals as part of co-existence. Therefore, the<br />
idea of a discrete, independent subject that enters social relations only<br />
subsequently (as famously propounded by, e.g., Hobbes and Rousseau) is in<br />
sharp contrast with the phenomenological idea of the bodily self.<br />
In what follows, I will further elaborate upon the idea of a bodily self<br />
in a primal interrelation with Others by drawing particularly on Merleau-<br />
Ponty’s concept of intercorporeality (1964: 168) and on his idea of being<br />
located “within” animality instead of vis-à-vis the animals (e.g., Merleau-<br />
Ponty 2003: 227). An interspecies co-existence and being-co-determined-by<br />
the Others precedes not only our conscious decisions to constitute or enter<br />
3 According to Heinämaa (2014), this account can also be found in some of Husserl’s<br />
writings – but only to a certain extent. Animals are part of the co-existence we as humans<br />
are inevitably immersed in, but Husserl always emphasises at the same time the humananimal<br />
contrast that subverts the role of animals in sociality. As Heinämaa points out, in<br />
Husserl animals lack language, knowledge regarding natality and mortality, and they lack<br />
traditionality (ibid.: 139; see also Hua 15: 159, Fn. 1). Thus, they are not to be considered<br />
as co-constituters of the cultural-historical world, but instead as determinants of coexistence<br />
only on a pre-cultural level (Heinämaa 2014: 163).<br />
4 Any perception, any experience is dependent on the lived body and its immanent<br />
kinesthetic potentiality. It is the very condition respectively ability to move, perceive,<br />
and to act.