ENFORCEMENT
eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res
eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res
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Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator<br />
Over the past two decades, the supply of counterfeit<br />
goods has proliferated, and shifted away from so-called<br />
“underground” or secondary markets (e.g., street corners,<br />
flea markets) to primary markets, including e-commerce<br />
platforms, corporate and government supply chains,<br />
traditional retail stores, and other marketplaces where<br />
consumers generally pay retail prices and feel confident<br />
that they are purchasing genuine goods. 43 Where<br />
consumers once were able to identify counterfeit<br />
products by relying on “red flag” indicators—such as<br />
suspicious location of the seller, sales condition, atypical<br />
pricing, or poor quality packaging—consumers are now<br />
increasingly exposed to counterfeit products in settings<br />
and under conditions where the articles appear genuine. 44<br />
In the primary market, including within the online<br />
environment, counterfeit goods so closely resemble the<br />
genuine articles that the two are often indistinguishable<br />
to the consumer. 45<br />
Given the complex nature of counterfeiting<br />
operations, successful interdiction of smuggled<br />
counterfeit goods is difficult and takes time. During that<br />
time, the international supply chains are vulnerable. As<br />
bad actors continue to adapt to a changing commercial<br />
environment, counterfeit activity in all sectors poses risks<br />
to industries and governments around the world.<br />
As with the copyright piracy examples discussed<br />
above, entities engaged in the trade of fake goods<br />
similarly employ a range of intricate methods to<br />
drive illicit profits and to attempt to evade detection.<br />
The complexity of the networks involved in the<br />
manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and sale of fake<br />
goods has made IP enforcement difficult. Nonetheless,<br />
the consequences of detection are sufficiently great<br />
that traders of illicit products in the form of counterfeit<br />
goods take calculated measures to reduce risks. Below<br />
is a description of a variety of methods syndicates<br />
use to facilitate the trade of illicit goods in the form of<br />
counterfeit products at various points along the supply<br />
chain, from manufacturing to final sale.<br />
Manufacturing<br />
To reduce the risk of having their contraband seized,<br />
counterfeiters conduct “just in time” production,<br />
minimizing inventories, while storing any finished products<br />
ready for shipment in remote warehouses registered<br />
to front (sham) companies. 46 Counterfeiters and illicit<br />
traders, often with the tacit consent of local government<br />
FIG. 11: Example of False Covering.<br />
officials, take advantage of “safe haven”-like conditions to<br />
manufacture and source a wide variety of fake products.<br />
During manufacture, counterfeit goods are often<br />
disguised by covering over the well-known logo with<br />
a peel-away patch or outer covering in order to make<br />
it look like a product produced by a lesser-known<br />
manufacturer (FIG. 11); by using decoy boxes; or<br />
shipping the “blank” product separate and apart from<br />
the branded labels, hang tags and similar articles, so that<br />
they can be “finished” in the country of consumption,<br />
after clearance through customs. 47<br />
Source/Provenance Economies.<br />
A small handful of “provenance economies” constitute<br />
the largest suppliers of counterfeit products to the<br />
U.S. and European Union (EU) economies. Counterfeit<br />
products originating from the People’s Republic of<br />
China and Hong Kong (often as a transit route for<br />
Chinese goods) constitute 87 percent (by dollar value)<br />
of all goods seized by CBP. 48 Customs authorities<br />
in the European Union have reported similarly high<br />
percentages, with 79 percent of seized goods (by value)<br />
FIG. 12: Fiscal year 2015 IPR Seizure Statistics.<br />
Source: CBP, Office of Trade (2016)<br />
SECTION 1<br />
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