ENFORCEMENT
eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res
eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
• Advertising Best Practices § which have continued<br />
to evolve over the past few years, strive to protect<br />
the integrity of the digital advertising system as well<br />
as third-party content and brands by preventing<br />
the flow of advertising dollars to websites that are<br />
engaged in illicit activity, including content theft<br />
and counterfeiting. Building on pledges made by<br />
the advertising community in recent years, a new<br />
voluntary initiative has been launched to further<br />
reduce advertising revenue from illicit sites. **<br />
Through this and other industry-led initiatives,<br />
many of the world’s largest brand advertisers and<br />
agencies have committed to taking aggressive<br />
steps to keep their digital ads off infringing sites<br />
and to better ensure that their brands will not be<br />
associated with illicit activity. ††<br />
These and other collaborations and initiatives<br />
operate with a sense of purpose to promote a<br />
marketplace that provides an enhanced level of<br />
protection to consumers and legitimate businesses.<br />
One advantage of voluntary initiatives is their ability<br />
to adapt quickly to changes in the rapidly-evolving<br />
marketplace and craft agreements and initiatives that<br />
are responsive to marketplace developments. By making<br />
it more difficult for illicit actors to operate without<br />
consequence, these and other initiatives are improving<br />
the marketplace.<br />
§<br />
Id. Since the issuance of the Joint Strategic Plan, leading ad networks<br />
announced in July 2013 certain “Best Practices Guidelines for Ad Networks<br />
to Address Piracy and Counterfeiting,” and the Interactive Advertising Bureau<br />
(IAB) updated its “Network and Exchange Quality Assurance Guidelines”<br />
to include a ban on selling ad inventory on “copyright infringement” sites.<br />
In June 2014, the IAB also announced its Trustworthy Digital Supply Chain<br />
Initiative, identifying fighting online piracy as one of its five objectives, along<br />
with eliminating fraudulent traffic, combatting malware, and promoting brand<br />
safety. See IAB, “Winning the War on Crime in the Supply Chain,” available<br />
at http://www.iab.net/iablog/2014/06/Trustworthy-Digital-Supply-Chain.html.<br />
**<br />
The Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG) was created by the American<br />
Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), Association of National Advertisers<br />
(ANA), and Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) to work collaboratively with<br />
companies throughout the digital ad supply chain, and combat ad-supported<br />
Internet piracy. See TAG, http://www.tagtoday.net/aboutus/.<br />
††<br />
See TAG, “Largest Brands And Agencies Take TAG Pledge To Fight Ad-<br />
Supported Piracy For All Digital Ads,” (December 2015), accessed from<br />
https://www.tagtoday.net/largest-brands-and-agencies-take-tag-pledge-tofight-ad-supported-piracy-for-all-digital-ads/<br />
(noting that many of the world’s<br />
largest brand advertisers and agencies have pledged to require their ad<br />
partners “to take aggressive steps to help fight the $2.4 billion lost to pirate<br />
sites each year”).<br />
*<br />
To learn more about evidence-based approaches, see The White House,<br />
“2017 Budget of the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives,<br />
Chapter 7: Building the Capacity to Produce and Use Evidence,”<br />
accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/<br />
fy2017/assets/ap_7_evidence.pdf.<br />
How Will Solutions be Evaluated and Success<br />
Measured?<br />
The Federal Government must strive to implement<br />
results-oriented strategies that measure success by<br />
documenting progress. The Federal Government must<br />
improve agency efficiencies and resource allocations,<br />
employ administrative and policy levers to drive more<br />
effective evidence-based IP enforcement practices, and<br />
enhance public understanding of the dimensions of the<br />
issues.<br />
Good government programs use a broad range of<br />
analytical and management tools, which collectively<br />
comprise an “evidence infrastructure,” to learn what<br />
works (and what does not), for whom and under<br />
what circumstances it works (or does not), as well as<br />
to improve results. Evidence can be quantitative or<br />
qualitative and may come from a variety of sources,<br />
including performance measurement, evaluations,<br />
statistical studies, retrospective reviews, and other data<br />
analytics and research. *<br />
In the IP enforcement environment, there are<br />
a number of challenges to measuring progress in<br />
minimizing illicit trade in counterfeit and pirated goods,<br />
large-scale commercial infringement of copyrights,<br />
trade secret misappropriation, and other acts of IP<br />
infringement. Attempts to approach the appraisal<br />
from a quantitative fashion—that is, by statistics or<br />
mathematical techniques—remain important, but can<br />
be limiting.<br />
For example, IP misappropriation and other illicit<br />
activities are dynamic in nature, rapidly changing and<br />
taking different forms, resulting in measurement data<br />
that is often of no prospective use by the time it can<br />
be collected. With respect to the data itself, there is<br />
a need to make more data from the government and<br />
private sectors available in order to enhance analysis<br />
of the state of the marketplace. Additionally, the<br />
multidimensional nature of illicit IPR-based activities<br />
complicates marketplace assessments. For example,<br />
is an increase in product seizure numbers indicative<br />
of higher performance in targeting and interdiction<br />
of counterfeit goods; or the result of a higher volume<br />
of illicit trade in counterfeit goods; or due to the<br />
ineffectiveness of other “upstream” initiatives to<br />
reduce illicit trade in the first instance; or all of<br />
the above?<br />
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