ENFORCEMENT

Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement
SECTION 3
Effectively policing a continuous high-volume
of shipments requires a well-developed, layered
risk management approach that includes enhanced
identification efforts prior to arrival and augmented
authentication and interdiction techniques at the POE,
followed by tailored investigative procedures designed
to protect rights holders’ IP, the health and safety of
consumers, and other important national interests.
Enhanced coordination between agencies at various
levels of government, both foreign and domestic, as
well as public-private collaboration and data-sharing,
are also essential elements of an effective enforcement
agenda, and are discussed in Section IV of the
Strategic Plan.
1.Employ an “All-Threats” Approach to
Cargo Screening.
Intellectual Property enforcement is often regarded
as a trade matter and not as a national security threat
for cargo screening purposes. While trade concerns
are indeed materially present in the importation of
counterfeit goods, the failure to regard such goods as
also posing a security threat undermines enforcement
efforts in a number of ways.
Security initiatives such as the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and the Importer Security Filing (ISF) and
Additional Carrier Requirements, often referred to as
“10+2,” employ a “single-threat” approach to cargo
screening. This means that a single threat is the focus
of the search, and any other actual or potential threats
discovered in the course of the search for that threat
may go unreported when discovered.
CSI, for example, is an initiative where CBP officers
abroad work with host customs administrations to
identify maritime containers used to deliver weapons
illicitly. CSI results in prescreening of over 80 percent of
all maritime containerized cargo bound for U.S. ports.
The ISF initiative, on the other hand, requires carriers of
cargo to transmit electronically data about shipments
prior to lading, allowing CBP to target containers that
pose an elevated risk of transporting illicit weapons.
In both cases, CBP officers are bound by established
arrangements and regulations, and may be unable to
act upon any additional illicit IPR intelligence that is
identified in the process of screening the cargo. As a
result, dangerous counterfeits that pose serious risks
to U.S. health, safety, and national security may be
identified by CBP officers but, because they are subject
to the arrangements governing CSI and ISF, the contents
may not be acted upon without being subject to
additional screening or confiscation by CBP personnel.
An “all-threats” approach to cargo screening
would reflect the reality, discussed in detail in Section
I of this Plan, that trade in counterfeit and pirated
goods increasingly presents a clear threat to national
security by undermining legitimate markets, financing
transnational criminal organizations, endangering the
health and safety of consumers, exploiting labor, and
harming the environment. Shifting from the current
“single-threat” approach to an “all-threats” approach to
cargo screening would present opportunities to increase
the efficiency and effectiveness of CBP screening
operations. It would reduce screening redundancies.
This would also empower CBP officers to act upon
any relevant intelligence gathered in the course of a
permissible cargo screening to further screen, exclude,
or seize cargo, as appropriate, under the full spectrum
of U.S. law.
ACTION NO. 3.1: Consider opportunities
to utilize an “all-threats” approach in cargo
screening programs. CBP will assess opportunities
for existing cargo screening programs, including
CSI and ISF, to evaluate a shipment concurrently
for threats to national security, IPR violations, and
other issues as appropriate.
2. Combat the Domestic Assembly and Finishing
of Counterfeit Goods.
When law enforcement entities take action against
certain illicit methods and tactics, criminals tend to
migrate to and exploit other methods. In part, this
reflects that more aggressive policy actions and
enforcement measures increase the risk of detection and
seizure, raising the counterfeiter’s costs. Put differently,
the illicit trader is continually conducting both a risk and
cost-benefit analysis to determine the best course of
action to evade detection and maximize profits.
As a result of rising seizures at U.S. POE and other
factors, law enforcement is reporting an increase in
“domestic production and assembly” of counterfeit
products, that is, the practice of shipping unbranded
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