FALSE HOPE
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sought out programs, counseling, and any opportunity to<br />
rebuild his relationship with his family. 309 Mr. Parkhurst has<br />
now developed a relationship with both of his parents, who<br />
wrote to the parole board in support of his release. His sister<br />
has offered her home to him when he is finally released. 310<br />
Mr. Parkhurst turned to education, completing his GED,<br />
associate degree, and bachelor’s degree through Adams State<br />
University, as well as additional courses through a Brown<br />
University program. 311 He is now working on his master’s<br />
degree. Not only has Mr. Parkhurst pursued education for<br />
himself, but his parole packet is filled with letters of support<br />
from college and community programs discussing his commitment<br />
to supporting other prisoners in achieving education.<br />
Much of Mr. Parkhurst’s time in prison has been spent<br />
training service dogs for people with disabilities through the<br />
facility’s dog training program. (One of the dogs he trained,<br />
Rescue, was placed with a survivor of the Boston Marathon<br />
bombing. 312 ) Mr. Parkhurst is also an avid artist and has<br />
developed art and related materials for Rhode Island reentry<br />
programs, domestic violence groups, and other trainings<br />
and programs for at-risk youth. 313<br />
Mr. Parkhurst served 21 years before he first came up for parole<br />
in 2014. The parole board commended him on his program<br />
participation, but it denied him “due to the seriousness<br />
of the offense” and set his next hearing for 2023—nine years<br />
later. 314 Having now spent 23 years in prison and completed<br />
all available programming, it is unclear what more Mr.<br />
Parkhurst is expected to do to. “I have the most support I’ve<br />
ever had,” observes Mr. Parkhurst, who says he understands<br />
that he deserved prison for his offense but wants a chance<br />
to be productive in the community: “The main witnesses in<br />
the case have completed victim/offender reconciliation with<br />
me. My remorse and regret are genuine; my mind and spirit<br />
are still positive and intact. . . . At some point, if not already,<br />
prison will do more harm than good for me.” 315<br />
Brian Stack is a 56-year-old white male prisoner serving a<br />
life sentence in Utah for the murder of a police officer a few<br />
weeks after Mr. Stack turned 18 years old. Mr. Stack was last<br />
reviewed in 2006, after he had served almost 28 years in prison.<br />
By that time he had earned his GED, associate degree,<br />
and a Bachelor of Science degree; had participated as a student<br />
and a facilitator in several institutional rehabilitation<br />
programs; and had numerous letters of support from community<br />
members and former counselors and caseworkers,<br />
In most states, there is<br />
virtually no review of parole<br />
denials.<br />
as well as a letter of forgiveness from the victim’s widow. 316<br />
The Utah parole board denied Mr. Stack parole and scheduled<br />
his next hearing for December 2018—12 years after his<br />
2006 review. 317<br />
Proposing their reforms to parole release policies, legal<br />
scholars Edward Rhine, Joan Petersilia, and Kevin Reitz<br />
suggest states curb the power of parole boards over sentence<br />
length by restricting the amount of time beyond<br />
the court-imposed minimum sentence that parole boards<br />
control. 318 Such limits could also encourage parole boards to<br />
think of the minimum sentence not as a starting point but as<br />
a meaningful limit absent continued need for incarceration.<br />
D. LACK OF JUDICIAL REVIEW /<br />
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT<br />
In addition to the lack of strict and enforceable guidance for<br />
parole decision-making, there is little oversight, transparency,<br />
or review of those decisions. According to the ACLU’s research,<br />
approximately eight states currently have some form<br />
of administrative procedure for reviewing the parole board’s<br />
initial decision to deny parole under any circumstances. 319 This<br />
review, however, is very limited and often means reconsideration<br />
by the same individuals who made the prior decision to<br />
deny parole. In Texas, for example, a prisoner may receive a<br />
“special review” by a different panel only if (1) a parole board<br />
member requests it or (2) a prisoner cites information that<br />
was not available at the time of the parole review. 320 Prisoners<br />
in Massachusetts and New York described their frustration<br />
that the appeal went back to the board instead of to a fresh set<br />
of independent eyes.<br />
In most states, there is virtually no administrative review,<br />
and parole denials can be reviewed in court based only on a<br />
“gross abuse of discretion” standard. In light of the significant<br />
discretionary authority of parole boards in many states,<br />
an abuse of discretion standard is almost insurmountable<br />
for the prisoner. In some states, judicial review is granted<br />
only on constitutional grounds during post-conviction reviews.<br />
321 When granted, courts tend to emphasize the parole<br />
board’s “absolute” or “near absolute” discretion under the<br />
state statutes. 322<br />
When courts have been called upon to examine state parole<br />
boards’ procedures, they have almost universally declined to<br />
censure boards for their lack of guidance or to confine their<br />
discretionary authority. Instead, Bierschbach writes, courts<br />
“afford parole only the most anemic procedural due process<br />
protections. Parole release decisions require the most<br />
minimal opportunity to be heard, the barest statement of<br />
reasons, and the weakest evidentiary support on appellate<br />
review.” 323 Laura Cohen, a law professor who also represents<br />
prisoners in parole proceedings, writes that “the combination<br />
of highly subjective decisional standards and limited<br />
reviewability affords parole board members virtual carte<br />
blanche to deny release for almost any reason, as long as they<br />
mouth the correct statutory language in doing so.” 324<br />
Not only do courts rely on the fact that most authorizing<br />
statutes give the parole board huge discretion in what to<br />
consider and how to conduct a review, they also tend to allow<br />
parole boards to ignore what guidance and procedures do<br />
exist, including the tools parole boards develop themselves.<br />
For example, in 1988, several prisoners in Georgia filed a<br />
pro se lawsuit, claiming that the parole board had violated<br />
their rights to due process and equal protection by departing<br />
from its own release calculations. 325 The court, finding for<br />
the parole board and pointing to its discretionary authority,<br />
held that “the Georgia statutes actually create a presumption<br />
against parole.” 326 Dissenting from this decision, Senior<br />
Circuit Judge Thomas Clark recognized why due process is<br />
so important in the parole decision-making process:<br />
Due process protects prisoners entitled to parole<br />
consideration from decisions of a paroling authority<br />
mistakenly made, infected by discrimination or<br />
lack of equal protection, resulting from bribery or<br />
political influence, or from some other unjustifiable<br />
cause. Due process provides protection from unaccountable<br />
arbitrary action on the part of government<br />
(invisible people), which is what this country<br />
is all about. 327<br />
The huge amount of authority placed in the hands of (so<br />
few) parole board members, as suggested by Judge Clark, is<br />
particularly problematic given the lack of transparency in<br />
these boards and that the individuals making release decisions<br />
are not generally regulated or supervised.<br />
E. PAROLE GRANT RATES<br />
The lack of fair procedures and transparency in the system,<br />
along with the primary focus on the seriousness of the offense,<br />
has dire consequences for who and how many people<br />
are approved for parole. Parole grant rates vary dramatically<br />
across the United States. Due to the states’ move to<br />
determinate sentencing, states with a relatively low number<br />
of parole-eligible prisoners still approved few people for<br />
release on parole, suggesting that the problem is not solely<br />
an overburdened parole process.<br />
In Florida, which essentially eliminated parole in 1983 for<br />
new sentences and moved to a determinate sentencing<br />
model, only 23 of the 4,626 parole-eligible prisoners (0.5<br />
percent) were granted parole in FY 2013-2014. 328 According<br />
to the Florida Commission on Offender Review, in 2015,<br />
366 individuals in Florida were serving a parole-eligible life<br />
sentence for an offense committed when they were under<br />
18 years of age. 329 Two (0.5 percent) were granted parole. 330<br />
In the same year, 1,897 individuals were serving a parole-eligible<br />
life sentence for an offense committed between the<br />
ages of 18-25; four (0.2 percent) were granted parole. 331 Also<br />
in 2015, 73 individuals who were 25 or younger at the time<br />
of their offense were serving sentences of 50 years or more<br />
and were reviewed for parole. Ten (13.7 percent) of those<br />
individuals were granted parole, three of whom were under<br />
age 18 at the time of their offense. 332<br />
In 2015, Ohio’s parole board, which also has authority over<br />
individuals serving an indeterminate sentence for an offense<br />
committed before July 1, 1996, decided 1,130 parole cases<br />
44 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION <strong>FALSE</strong> <strong>HOPE</strong>: HOW PAROLE SYSTEMS FAIL YOUTH SERVING EXTREME SENTENCES<br />
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