NIGERIA

INTRODUCTION NIGERIA 1 

NIGERIA 

Fractured and Forgotten 

DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLENCE ALONG RELIGIOUS FAULT LINES 

Copyright © 2016 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative. All Rights Reserved.

2 NIGERIA INTRODUCTION 


If immediate action is not taken, religious minorities in northern Nigeria will 

continue to face policies and practices that seek to remove their very presence, 

while the violence of Boko Haram and Fulani militants will further compound 

one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. 



Table of Contents 

4-9 

10-17 

18-19 

20-37 

20-22 

23-24 

24-33 

33-37 

38-56 

41-56 

57-78 

58-59 

59-60 

60-62 

63-64 

65-66 

66-68 

69-74 

74-78 

79-81 

82-85 

Introduction 

Recommendations 

Acknowledgements 

Foundation 

Discrimination Throughout Northern Nigeria 

Discrimination and Underdevelopment in Northern Nigeria 

Discrimination within Northern Nigeria against Religious Minorities 

Defining the Roots of this Foundational Discrimination 

Boko Haram: An Explosion of Violence 

The Four Stages of Boko Haram Development 

Fulani Militants: Threatening to Engulf the Middle Belt 

Introduction to the Fulani 

Accelerating Inter-Communal Violence in the Middle Belt 

Case Study: Kadarako, Nasarawa State 

Case Study: Sho, Plateau State 

Case Study: Jol, Plateau State 

Case Study: Agatu, Benue State 

Fulani Militants in the Middle Belt: Rationales for an Escalating Trend 

The Devastating and Potential Impact of Fulani Militants to Fracture Nigeria 

Conclusion 

Endnotes 

The 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative (21CWI) is a Christian 

human rights organization empowering a global movement to 

advance religious freedom. 



What is unfolding in northern and central Nigeria is one of the gravest current 

humanitarian crises in the world. 



Introduction 

Nigeria is a country on the verge of fracturing along religious fault 

lines. Ethnic and religious minorities in northern Nigeria are largely 

forgotten as they face systemic and systematic discrimination. 

Muslim and Christian communities in northeastern Nigeria are 

profoundly and negatively impacted by the terrorist violence 

pursued by Boko Haram. In the Middle Belt, Fulani militant attacks 

are significantly escalating with the net effect that in the name of 

creating grazing territory largely Christian Local Government Areas 

are being targeted and destroyed. If immediate action is not taken, 

religious minorities in northern Nigeria will continue to face policies 

and practices that seek to remove their very presence, while the 

violence of Boko Haram in the northeast will further compound 

one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. At the same 

time, the accelerating aggression of Fulani militants in the Middle 

Belt is threatening the heart of the country, creating one of the 

most significant security risks in West Africa, and solidifying 

religion as a primary identifier which will further destabilize and 

fracture Nigeria. 

MAP OF AFRICA 

TUNISIA 

? 

WHAT IS BOKO HARAM? 

Boko Haram is an Islamic 

extremist group based in 

northeastern Nigeria with 

allegiance to the Islamic State. 

Since 2011, Boko Haram has 

killed over 15,000, displaced 

2.1 million from their homes, 

and was ranked as the world’s 

deadliest terror group by the 

Global Terrorism Index in 2015. 

i 

SOKOTO 

Boko Haram Aggression 

in Nigeria 

MOROCCO 

KATSINA 

JIGAWA 

YOBE 

BORNO 

ALGERIA 

LYBIA 

EGYPT 

KEBBI 

ZAMFARA 

KANO 

KADUNA 

BAUCHI 

GOMBE 

MAURITANIA 

SENEGAL 

GAMBIA 

GUINEA GUINEA 

BISSAU 

SIERRA 

LEONE 

LIBERIA 

COTE 

D’IVOIRE 

MALI 

BURKINA 

FASO 

GHANA 

TOGO 

NIGER 


BENIN 

CAMEROON 

GABON 

EQUATORIAL 

GUINEA 

CHAD 

CENTRAL 

AFRICAN 

REPUBLIC 

CONGO 

ZAIRE 

SUDAN 

RWANDA 

BURUNDI 

ETHIOPIA 

UGANDA 

KENYA 

TANZANIA 

DJIBOUTI 

SOMALIA 

COMORES 

NIGER 

KWARA 

OYO 

OSUN EKITI 

OGUN ONDO 

EDO 

LAOS 

DELTA 

BAYEISA 

PLATEAU 

FCT 

NASARAWA 

TARABA 

KOGI 

BENUE 

ENUGU 

EBONYL 

IMO CROSS ANAMBRA 

RIVERS 

ABIA 

ADAMAWA 

Boka Haram 

Agression 

ANGOLA 

ZAMBIA 

MALAWI 

ZIMBABWE 

NAMBIA 

BOTSWANA 

MOZAMBIQUE 

MADAGASCAR 

SOUTH 

AFRICA 

SWAZILAND 

LESOTHO 



? 

WHAT IS AN IDP? 

An IDP is an internally displaced 

person, who is forced to flee his 

or her home but who remains 

within his or her country’s 

borders. They are often referred 

to as refugees, although they 

do not fall within the current 

legal definition of a refugee. 

2,152,000 

Displaced People in 

Nigeria 

2,000 

women, boys and girls 

have been abducted 

by Boko Haram since 

2012 

Though Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, most of the 

country’s GDP is earned in the oil rich south. Northern and 

central Nigeria are currently facing one of the most significant 

humanitarian crises in the world. According to the Internal 

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), as of December 2015, 

there are 2,152,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 

Nigeria – the third highest figure in Africa and the seventh in the 

world. 1 However, the reality is far more dire as the majority of 

Nigerian IDPs seek refuge with family or in makeshift camps that 

are not formally recognized or counted. As one leading United 

Nations (UN) expert concluded based upon her own analysis: 

outside of these formal numbers, there are an additional three-tofive 

million IDPs in Nigeria for a total of five-to-seven million IDPs. 2 

Nigeria is therefore currently home to more IDPs than any other 

country in Africa and perhaps second only to Syria globally. 

Furthermore, between 55-70 percent of the displaced in Nigeria 

are living outside of the limited number of officially sanctioned 

areas, and as a result, receive almost no humanitarian assistance. 

These IDPs, whether they are in the majority and living outside 

of officially designated areas or as part of the minority within one 

of these locations, face a high degree of volatility including: threats 

to their life and freedom of movement; violence against women 

and children; limited participation in public affairs; lack of 

adequate and safe shelter; food insecurity; minimal access to 

health services; and virtually no access to education. 3 This is in 

addition to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) estimate that there are 160,943 refugees and asylum 

seekers from Nigeria. 4 

As of April 2016, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 14.8 million people in northeastern 

Nigeria are impacted by this ongoing crisis, more than five million 

need active protection services in order to create a safe and secure 

environment, and two-and-a-half million children under the 

age of five and pregnant and lactating women need assistance. 5 

Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, as many as 

2,000 women, boys and girls have been abducted by Boko Haram 

since 2012. 6 Thousands of children have been denied the opportunity 

to continue their education, a reality that will reverberate with 

significant repercussions for an entire generation. Since 2009, in 

northeastern Nigeria, 611 teachers have been intentionally killed 

and 19,000 additional teachers have fled for their lives, while 910 



schools have been destroyed and another 1,500 schools forced to 

close, leaving close to one million school-age children with almost 

no opportunity for education. 7 

People of faith and centers of faith have also been deliberately 

targeted. More Muslims have been displaced than any other faith 

group due to the actions of Boko Haram. Between 2000 and 2014, 

more than 13,000 churches were abandoned, closed or destroyed 

in northern and central Nigeria. 8 

What is unfolding in northern and central Nigeria is one of the 

gravest current humanitarian crises in the world, with millions 

affected, thousands killed, insecurity rampant, children ravaged 

by malnutrition, one of the world’s highest populations of IDPs, 

schools closed, houses of worship destroyed and entire communities 

burned to the ground in scorched-earth attacks. Moreover, 

the threat posed by Fulani militants in the Middle Belt is escalating 

into one of the most significant security concern in West Africa. 

Much of the western media attention has focused on the actions 

of Boko Haram in part because in the past five years, 15,486 

deaths have been uniquely attributed to this group. 9 However, 

Boko Haram, or the Islamic State of West Africa Province as the 

group refers to itself following its pledge of allegiance to the 

Islamic State, is far from the only threat to the unity of Nigeria. 

The episodic violence pursued by Boko Haram underscores a far 

deeper reality felt by religious minorities throughout northern 

Nigeria: systemic discrimination. Many religious minorities 

perceive Boko Haram as but the latest outgrowth of violence and 

organized attempts to ensure that their very presence will be 

removed from the area. 

Disturbingly, patterns set by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government, 

and the international community in response to the crisis of 

northeastern Nigeria are being replayed in the Middle Belt. Fulani 

militants are specifically targeting select communities because 

of their religious identity or potential economic benefit. Over the 

past two years, the Nigerian government has tended to sideline 

this conflict and often failed to provide meaningful security for 

affected communities. The international community has been 

slow to respond to the escalating emergency in the Middle Belt 

where Fulani militants are now classified by the Global Terrorism 

Index as the fourth most lethal terrorist group by numbers killed. 10 

In 2013, Fulani militants killed 63 individuals while in 2014 they 

160,943 

refugees and asylum 

seekers from Nigeria. 

? 

WHO ARE FULANI MILITANTS? 

The term “Fulani” refers not 

just to a terrorist group, but 

to a whole ethnicity, not all 

of whom are terrorists. This 

diffuse group of 20 million 

people, mostly pastoral nomads 

(the largest such group in the 

world) typically speak Fula as 

their first tongue and practice 

Islam. They came onto the 

world stage in a serious way 

in 1804 in what is now Nigeria 

and Cameroon, when a Fulani 

preacher launched a holy war 

against local rivals, creating the 

Sokoto Empire. 



2,500,000 

children under the age 

of five and pregnant 

and lactating women 

need assistance. 

more than 

13,000 

churches abandoned, 

closed or destroyed 

in northern and 

central Nigeria 

1,850% 

increase in murders 

by Fulani militants 

in one year 

killed 1,229, a rapidly accelerating trend they have continued to 

maintain. 11 These attacks are increasingly encroaching on territory 

around Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria. If immediate action, 

including changed policy approaches, is not pursued, the 

degenerating situation in the Middle Belt will likely intensify with 

the possibility of further engulfing Nigeria as a whole. 

At the most basic level, an unwillingness to ensure religious 

freedom for people of all faiths, equitable development across 

the country, and to hold accountable actors who violate the rule 

of law, have created a foundation that gives rise to a culture of 

violence personified first in Boko Haram and more recently in the 

Fulani militants. Boko Haram loosely followed a four stage development 

that went from: 

(1) nascent movement building upon local grievances and lack of 

good governance, 

(2) lack of proper engagement by the Nigerian government in an 

atmosphere of impunity, 

(3) hardening of organizational ideology and religious identification 

with increasingly aggressive acts of destruction, to a 

(4) full-scale conflict impacting millions to a degree that is now 

forcing the Nigerian government and international community 

to more robustly seek resolution. 

Following a similar pattern, Fulani militants in the Middle Belt 

rapidly progressed through the first two stages and are currently 

in the third stage. Without intervention, the crisis in the Middle 

Belt will continue to escalate. Further destabilization in Nigeria has 

clear implications for the country as well as for the West African 

region as a whole including countries such as Benin, Chad, 

Cameroon, Mali, and Niger. Although approaches to Boko Haram 

are currently characterized by neutralization and restoration, there 

is an opportunity within the Middle Belt for decisive approaches 

working towards prevention and de-escalation before this reaches 

a full-scale level four conflict. While the pattern unfolding in the 

Middle Belt may be similar, should the situation with the Fulani 

militants further deteriorate the impact will be on the footsteps 

of the capital of one of the most influential countries in Africa, 

and could create an arch of failed states stretching from Libya to 

Chad, Mali and down to Nigeria. This need not be the case, but the 

potential is very real. 

In sum, a foundation of discrimination against religious minorities 



The resulting 

humanitarian 

crisis in Nigeria 

An intervention 

is required NOW, 

running across 

all three elements 

of the problem. 

The chance for an 

earlier / easier 

intervention 

was missed HERE. 

Boko Haram 

Fulani 

Development plan similar to Boko Haram 

Existing Foundation For Discrimination 

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 

has long existed throughout northern Nigeria that has been 

compounded by intentional actions undertaken by northern elite, 

missteps by the Nigerian government, and a lack of coordinated 

response from the international community. This has created the 

precipitous conditions that allowed for the emergence of a 

far-reaching conflict that is currently accelerating due to the 

politics of religion and identity in an environment of impunity and 

an increase of sophisticated arms. This matrix has unleashed 

devastating consequences, and until root causes are properly 

addressed, has the potential to continue. 

While perhaps religion was not an initial root cause, religious 

identity is being politicized and is quickly crystalizing into a key 

factor pushing Nigeria to the edge of fracturing along religious 

fault lines. With the 2015 induction of President Buhari, opportunity 

exists to address underlying foundational issues, to continue 

to pursue containment and rehabilitation in relation to Boko 

Haram, to work to prevent further escalation by Fulani militants in 

the Middle Belt, and for the international community to stand with 

Nigeria. 

611 

teachers intentionally 

killed 

19,000 

teachers have fled 

for their lives 

1,500 

schools forced to 

close 

950,000 

school-age children 

with almost no 

opportunity for 

education 

President Buhari 

Muhammadu Buhari is 

the President of Nigeria, in office 

since 2015. He is a retired Major 

General in the Nigerian Army and 

was previously Head of State of 

Nigeria. 


10 NIGERIA RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendations 

To the U.S. Government 

The United States is one of the world’s most important partners 

for Nigeria, and retains tremendous clout that can be further 

leveraged on behalf of establishing peace. 21st Century Wilberforce 

Initiative (21CWI) recommends the following policy approaches: 

1. Create a Special Envoy for Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. 

Ensure that this office is appropriately staffed and resourced 

to serve as the key interlocutor, building multi-stakeholder 

engagement and addressing the wide range of complex realities 

involving refugees, IDPs, economic development, security, 

justice and peacebuilding. 

2. Working with the U.S. Institute of Peace and other relevant 

stakeholders, insist on the development of a comprehensive 

roadmap to peace that will address: 

(1) Economic and infrastructure development within 

northern Nigeria and the discrimination and marginalization 

that occurs against religious minorities within the north; 

(2) Initiating an investigative peace process perhaps 

modeled around a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

so that all communities, all ethnicities, and people of 

all religious persuasions are able to seek appropriate 

redress regarding their local experiences, doing so in 

a manner that will help all Nigerians understand and 

respond to the multi-faceted nature of the reality on the 

ground; 

(3) Containing and ending the terrorist actions of Boko 

Haram; 

(4) Negotiating with Boko Haram militants a path forward 

that honors calls for justice with reintegration into the 

community; 

(5) Establishing a clear plan for humanitarian assistance 

and rehabilitation including greater accountability, policy 

development, and reach throughout all IDP communities; 

(6) Developing a robust approach related to Fulani militants 

inclusive of equitable disarmament, transparent 

response to impacted and displaced communities, and 


RECOMMENDATIONS NIGERIA 11 

While the pattern unfolding in the Middle Belt may be similar, should the 

situation with the Fulani militants further deteriorate the impact will be on 

the footsteps of the capital of one of the most influential countries in Africa, 

and could create an arch of failed states stretching from Libya to Chad, Mali 

and down to Nigeria. 



policy provisions around farming and grazing rights; 

(7) Establishing Nigerian police forces throughout the entire 

country, especially in communities impacted by ethnoreligious 

violence, and ensuring these individuals are 

adequately trained and held accountable; 

(8) Designing programs related to religious freedom and 

rule of law that can be deployed throughout the country 

and ensuring that all citizens have a fair opportunity to 

participate in the political process; 

(9) Ending policies and practices of impunity; and 

(10) Working to ensure the full establishment of the rule of 

law, religious freedom, conceptions of national citizenship, 

the federal constitution, and the maturation of 

institutions of governance. 

The USG should insist that a comprehensive roadmap to 

peace is developed by June 2017 and fully implemented thereafter 

with direct measures of inducement and accountability 

attached to the development and implementation of this plan. 

The humanitarian crisis in Nigeria is dire. 

Spiegel Online 



3. Strengthen the USAID offices of the Office of U.S. Foreign 

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Transition 

Initiatives (OTI) as they relate to Nigeria in order to ensure 

that the humanitarian crisis is as vigorously engaged as the 

situation warrants and addresses the full range of humanitarian 

needs from short-term relief to psychological care for 

victimized women. 

4. Work alongside the Nigeria House of Assembly to establish a 

Religious Freedom Caucus modeled after the one found in the 

U.S. House of Representatives. This would help address and 

reverse religious fault lines and ensure the full implementation 

of religious freedom for people of all faith or no faith. 

5. Support the full and transparent establishment of the 

Atrocities Prevention Board which would be well-positioned 

to track and recommend approaches related to the 

ethno-religious interchange driving multiple components of 

the conflict in Nigeria, especially in relation to the Fulani 

militants in the Middle Belt. 

6. Formally request a U.S. Government Accountability Office 

research project into all humanitarian assistance funding given 

to Nigeria to ensure that resources allocated for education in 

northern Nigeria are used in schools where the curriculum, 

policies and practices are impartial towards all individuals 

regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion. 

7. Pursue through the United Nations: 

(1) the establishment and implementation of a Nigerian 

comprehensive roadmap to peace, and 

(2) the designation of the crisis as an L3 humanitarian crisis. 

To the United Nations 

1. A visit by the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and the 

Special Rapporteur of IDPs to Nigeria with a formal report to 

the Security Council that includes an action plan on: 

(1) protection of communities and people, 

(2) their empowerment in the political process, and 

(3) development of long-term stability and reintegration. 

2. Categorization of the crisis in Nigeria as an L3 humanitarian crisis. 



Terrorism has disrupted education for thousands of Nigerian children. 

To the Nigerian Government 

1. Establish a comprehensive roadmap to peace directed by a 

high ranking member of the Nigerian Government and inclusive of 

multiple community, grassroots and regional stakeholders. 

2. Develop a robust program for multi-sector education on behalf 

of religious freedom, human rights and the rule of law that 

contains elements such as: 

(1) establishing a unit of study focused on religious freedom 

within all public schools, 



(2) building a coalition among businesses leaders throughout 

Nigeria who commit to hire and work according to 

principles of religious freedom and the rule of law, and 

(3) training within Local Government Areas on constitutional 

rights and religious freedom. 

3. Expand the activities and support offered by the National 

Emergency Management Agency to ensure that all IDPs 

receive support, especially as the vast majority currently 

receive virtually no humanitarian assistance. 

4. Create a mechanism that would allow families in the northeast 

and Middle Belt to register the data of their missing. 

5. Fully secure the Nigerian border and establish ranches 

throughout northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt for Fulani 

pastoralists. This must be done in a way that is fully transparent, 

discontinues transnational migratory patterns, takes into 

account the full history of particular contexts, and – when 

necessary – offers fair and just compensation for those who 

may experience rezoning. 

6. End the two-tiered system of “indigenous” and “settler” rights. 

7. End or reverse legislation, such as that currently in the Plateau 

State, which seeks to unnecessarily regulate religion and the 

free exercise thereof. 

8. Establish within the Nigeria House of Assembly a Religious 

Freedom Caucus modeled after the one found in the U.S. 

House of Representatives in order to help address and reverse 

religious fault lines and ensure the full implementation of 

religious freedom for people of all faiths or no faith. 

9. Enhance Nigerian security forces by: 

(1) ensuring that civilian protection is at the heart of all 

security operations, and 

(2) establishing mobile police units throughout northern 

Nigeria and the Middle Belt beginning with communities 

that have been repeatedly targeted. 

10. Strengthen the rule of law by ending a culture of impunity and 

ensuring that the judicial system holds accountable all those 

who participate in violence within a system of fair due process. 



To Denominations, Churches and 

Individuals in the United States, 

Nigeria, and Around the World 

Denominations at their Next Annual Gathering 

1. Issue a statement, pass a resolution or release an appropriate 

corollary that raises awareness about the situation unfolding in 

Nigeria, standing in solidarity with the many suffering through 

one of the worst humanitarian crises, and calling on leaders to 

work to build holistic peace and reconciliation. 

2. Include a keynote, workshop, or breakout session that builds 

awareness among constituents, trains key leaders, and 

mobilizes members and communities of worship around 

advocacy engagement and broad-based commitment to 

“Stand with Nigeria.” 

3. Utilize media outlets for the next six months including 

newspapers, blogs, radio, Bible study curriculum, and social 

media engagement to ensure that at this critical time, people 

of faith are aware, praying for, and standing with Nigeria. 

4. Increase humanitarian assistance and ensure that all activities 

within Nigeria include training and aid that addresses and 

furthers religious freedom. 

Churches and Individuals 

1. Designate a Stand with Nigeria Sunday in the next six months 

that would include a dedicated time of prayer, a sermon and a 

call to action. 

2. Build a relationship with a Nigerian congregation in your area 

and participate in a joint time of prayer, listening, relationship 

building and practical engagement. 

3. Contact your denomination and ask its leadership to: 

(1) pass a resolution, 

(2) host a workshop, 

(3) strategically utilize media outlets, and 

(4) increase humanitarian assistance. 



Imam Muhamad Ashafa of the Interfaith Mediation Center in Kaduna, Nigeria 

4. Contact your members of Congress and ask them to 

“Stand with Nigeria” by: 

(1) reading the report, and 

(2) implementing the above policy recommendations. 

5. Utilize your media outlets and commit over the next six 

months to: 

(1) highlight these realities in your church newsletter, 

(2) write one guest editorial to your local newspaper, and 

(3) post once a month on your social media platforms. 

6. Incorporate a one-time special offering dedicated to the 

“Stand with Nigeria” project and transformative change that 

will restore hope to millions. 

7. Participate in a Pray for Nigeria campaign and pray every day 

for one full week for an end to violent attacks, rehabilitation 

and reintegration for those who are suffering, and for peace, 

justice and reconciliation to flow through Nigeria. 

8. Invite one other church, family member or close associate to 

join with you in order to help launch a movement that stretches 

around the world on behalf of those who are suffering. 


18 NIGERIA ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Acknowledgments 

21CWI’s executive team speaks to Kadarako villagers in Nigeria. 

520 

attended meetings, 

interviews and report 

opportunities hosted 

by 21CWI in Nigeria 

The 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative (21CWI) is a Christian 

human rights organization empowering a global movement to 

advance religious freedom as a universal right through advocacy, 

capacity building and technology. From February 20 – March 1, 

2016, a 21CWI team traveled to Nigeria to document the impact of 

violence and marginalization on the situation of human rights and 

religious freedom in northern and central Nigeria, and to listen 

to and learn from a wide range of actors pointing to approaches 

that are building reconciliation and reversing trends that threaten 

to fracture Nigeria along religious fault lines. The delegation was 

led by 21CWI Founder and President Randel Everett and included 

Senior Distinguished Fellow former Congressman Frank R. Wolf, 

Executive Vice President Elijah M. Brown, and Director of Strategic 

Communications Lou Ann Sabatier. 21CWI worked with various 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS NIGERIA 19 

Nigerian partners including the Stefanos Foundation that tirelessly 

helped 21CWI interview numerous individuals, collecting hundreds 

of pages of written documentation and more than twenty 

hours of video testimony. 

The team traveled to multiple sites in the states of Bauchi, 

Nasarawa, Plateau, and to Abuja, and met with representatives 

from the states of Adamawa, Benue, Borno, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, 

and Sokoto. The team traveled past dozens of villages that had 

been burned to the ground and met with both Christian and 

Muslim victims of massacres perpetrated by Boko Haram and 

Fulani militants. This included at one point listening to the report 

of leaders at a location less than three miles from an active 

conflict zone. Altogether, meetings, interviews and report opportunities 

hosted by 21CWI in Nigeria were attended by more than 

520 individuals including members of communities impacted by 

marginalization, malnourishment and violence, grassroots tribal 

and religious leaders, missionaries, NGO leaders, families and 

activists whose loved ones were kidnapped from the Government 

Secondary School in the town of Chibok, national Christian 

denominational leaders, both a member and former member of 

the National Assembly of Nigeria, a leading military official, 

members of the office of the Vice President of Nigeria, and the 

United States Ambassador to Nigeria. Over the past six months, 

both in preparation for and as a result of the research trip, 21CWI 

has sought to triangulate information through ongoing dialogue 

with Nigerian partners, Congressional leaders and their staff, 

various officials within the U.S. Department of State, former U.S. 

Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell, multiple NGOs, members 

of the U.S. International Religious Freedom Roundtable, and 

individuals associated with the work of the UN in Nigeria. 

#StandwithNigeria 

KEBBI 

KWARA 

OYO 

OGUN 

LAOS 

i 

OSUN 

SOKOTO 

ONDO 

BAYEISA 

INFORMATION 

States 21CWI visited or 

met people from 

ZAMFARA 

NIGER 

EKITI 

EDO 

DELTA 

RIVERS 

KATSINA 

KADUNA 

FCT 

KOGI 

ENUGU 

IMO 

ABIA 

KANO 

NASARAWA 

BENUE 

CROSS 

RIVERS 

JIGAWA 

BAUCHI 

PLATEAU 

TARABA 

EBONYL 

ANAMBRA 

YOBE 

GOMBE 

ADAMAWA 

BORNO 

States 21CWI 

visited, or met 

people from 

For security purposes, many of the names of specific interview 

participants have been changed or withheld. 

The situation in Nigeria is complex and multi-faceted and requires an 

ongoing diligence to balanced nuance and a rigorous commitment to 

pursuing hard realities beyond rhetoric and surface-level analysis. 

21CWI is at the beginning of this journey. We are grateful for the 

opportunity to partner with you, and we encourage you to 

visit the Nigeria advocacy and mobilization website at 

www.StandwithNigeria.org, where you can find videos, pictures, this 

report and action packs. In the midst of a nation poised to fracture 

along religious fault lines we can work together and #StandwithNigeria. 


20 NIGERIA FOUNDATION 

Foundation: 

Discrimination Throughout 

Northern Nigeria 

Usman dan Fodio 

Shaihu Usman dan 

Fodio, born Usuman 

Foduye, was a religious teacher, 

writer and Islamic promoter, and 

the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. 

Born: 1754, Nigeria; Died: 

1817, Sokoto, Nigeria 

There is a long and ancient history of politics and kingdombuilding 

in northeastern Nigeria that includes a series of Hausa 

city-states that reached their zenith in the eighteenth century. 12 

Legend attributes the development of these city-states to an Arab 

migration that began in Baghdad and ended in northeastern 

Nigeria. Though these city-states and the territory they controlled 

were heavily influenced by Islam, significant portions of both 

northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt remained religiously-speaking 

relatively untouched. 

Beginning with the actions of Usman dan Fodio, the early 

nineteenth century was characterized by efforts to revive and 

restore a more pure practice of Islam and to create a unified 

northern society organized around Islam called the Sokoto 

Caliphate. The introduction of British colonialism had a profound 

impact on the development of Nigeria. While the British ended 

the Sokoto Caliphate, it could not remove the impulses behind 

this endeavor. The vestiges of these impulses today remain a 

powerful motivator for many northern elite, individuals whose 

wealth and power enable them to hold significant sway over 

much of the education, government and media outlets in the 

north. 

Though some scholars believe that Catholic missionaries may 

have attempted to establish Christianity in northern Nigeria 

between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, more substantive 

efforts did not occur until the end of the nineteenth and the 

first half of the twentieth centuries primarily due to the efforts 

of the Sudan Interior Mission, Sudan United Mission and the 

Roman Catholic Mission. Initially, the majority of Christians 

were southern Nigerians who had migrated to urban centers 

in northern Nigeria. However, over time many smaller communities 

and indigenous minority ethnicities throughout northern 

Nigeria and the Middle Belt who had long resisted efforts of 

Islamization on both religious and political grounds adopted 

Christianity. 


FOUNDATION NIGERIA 21 

The situation in Nigeria is complex and multi-faceted and requires an ongoing 

diligence to balanced nuance and a rigorous commitment to pursuing hard 

realities beyond rhetoric and surface-level analysis. 



TIMELINE 

Brief Historical Overview 

of Nigeria 

Excerpted from 

Encyclopedia Britannica 

500 BCE 

Earliest known archeological 

evidence of an organized society 

known as the Nok culture 

800 CE 

North African Arab writers first 

note the Kingdom of Kanem in 

what is now Nigeria 

1000-1400 

Influential Kingdom of Ife 

reaches its height 

Late 1400s 

Portuguese explorers sailing 

down the west coast of Africa 

make the first known European 

contact with the region 

1804 

Usman dan Fodio successfully 

launches what will become the 

Sokoto Caliphate 

1868 

Lagos becomes a separate 

colony under British control 

1903 

British conquest of northern 

Fulani-Hausa emirates completed 

1914 

British Protectorates of Southern 

and Northern Nigeria joined to 

form modern Nigeria 

The long and complicated history of intermingling 

religion, politics, and identity within 

northern and central Nigeria reverberates 

today in four primary ways: 

(1) efforts by northern elite to utilize religion 

as a means of extending power and 

control on behalf of establishing a 

unified northern society, 

(2) the aspiration of some Muslim adherents 

to participate in efforts that they perceive 

will restore a more simplified and pure 

form of Islam, 

(3) a holdover and misguided belief held 

throughout Nigeria that the majority of 

Christians in northern Nigeria are really 

Nigerian Independence 

in 1960 

immigrant settlers from the south and that if this imposed and 

interloping group were removed, all that would remain would 

be individuals who want to participate in a process of greater 

Islamization, and 

(4) ongoing resistance by minority religious and indigenous ethnic 

communities who want to avoid this domination, maintain their 

own identity, and seek to appeal today to rights prescribed in 

the federal constitution and the implementation of rule of law. 

When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it was an amalgamated 

country with political loyalties that tended to be defined along 

ethnic and religious lines. Nigeria’s constitution has further 

complicated issues by accepting all Nigerians as citizens, but 

ascribing rights on the basis of whether or not an individual is 

classified as “indigenous” or as a “settler.” Indigenes are 

granted rights such as “unhindered access to education and 

employment opportunities, land, political participations or 

even right to produce the chief or head of the community” 

while those who are not so designated simply do not. 13 

Denied these rights, those labeled a “settler” have a permanent 

second-class status. 

Today the twelve states in the north and eight states in the Middle 

Belt are Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, 

Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, 

Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara and FCT Abuja. 

This foundation of discrimination has only grown over the past fifty 

years and found expression in the following two headlined ways. 



POVERTY: STATES SHOWING % LIVING IN ABSOLUTE POVERTY 

SOKOTO 

TIMELINE 

(continuted) 

KEBBI 

ZAMFARA 

KATSINA 

JIGAWA 

KANO 

KADUNA 

BAUCHI 

YOBE 

GOMBE 

BORNO 

1960 

Independence from British rule 

on October 1 

KWARA 

OYO 

OGUN 

LAOS 

OSUN 

ONDO 

BAYEISA 

NIGER 

EKITI 

EDO 

DELTA 

RIVERS 

FCT 

KOGI 

ENUGU 

IMO 

ABIA 

NASARAWA 

BENUE 

CROSS 

RIVERS 

PLATEAU 

TARABA 

EBONYL 

ANAMBRA 

ADAMAWA 

0-29.9% 

30-49.9% 

50-59.9% 

60-69.9% 

70-79.9% 

Discrimination and Underdevelopment 

in Northern Nigeria 

In 1914, the British colonial government combined northern and 

southern Nigeria, but continued to administer the two regions as 

if they were separate. Northern Nigeria was administered through 

“Indirect Rule,” which tended to maintain the power of the traditional 

structures and authorities who were predominantly Muslim. 

In the latter half of the twentieth century it was southern Nigeria, 

however, that would reap long-term benefits from greater investments 

in education and infrastructure developments that were 

made during the time of colonialism. 

This has led to a disparity between northern Nigeria and the rest 

of the country. Considered a “Lower Middle Income” country as a 

whole, 14 “in the North, 72 percent of people live in poverty, compared 

to 27 percent in the South and 35 percent in the Niger 

Delta.” 15 Much of the economic growth in Nigeria is related to oil, 

telecommunications and banking, all of which are primarily located 

in the south, leaving those within northern Nigeria increasingly 

excluded from the primary engines of economic advancement. 

The past fifty years have also seen significant Christian growth. In 

1953, 45 percent of the Nigerian population was Muslim, 21 percent 

was Christian, and 33% belonged to other religions, such as 

80+% 

1967-1970 

Biafra Civil War as southern 

Nigerian states attempt to secede 

with massive humanitarian 

consequence and significant 

political, economic, ethnic, cultural 

and religious tensions 

1970-1999 

Series of governing military 

juntas including by General 

Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985) 

1999 

Relatively free elections held, 

new constitution ratified, 

Presidential system created 

2002 

Boko Haram founded as a political 

and civic organization in the north 

2009 

Abu Shekau takes control of 

Boko Haram and initiates a 

more violent & militant approach 

2014 

Fulani militants escalate attacks 

in the Middle Belt 

2015 

General Buhari elected as 

President and replaces Goodluck 

Jonathan in elections widely seen 

as free and fair 



72% 

vs 

27% 

in the north 

in the south 

live in poverty 

Christians form more than 

50% 

of the population in six 

northern and Middle Belt 

states 

in all northern & 

Middle Belt states 

are 

30% Christians 

64% are 

Muslim 

8% other 

African 

Religions 

African Traditional Religions. 16 By 2010, the Christian population 

had grown to 80.5 million and 51 percent of the total population, 

while the percentage of adherents to Islam remained relatively 

flat. 17 There are now more Christians in Nigeria than in any other 

African country and more Christians in Nigeria than in any Western 

European country. This has caused alarm among many northern 

Muslims in general and the elite in particular who tout the fact 

that Nigeria has the largest Muslim population in Africa and the 

fifth largest Muslim population in the world. 18 

Declining economic prospects, weakened political control at the 

federal level, ongoing lack of infrastructure development, and 

depressed education and vocation opportunities in combination 

with the growing clout of Christianity within the nation has fueled 

a narrative and a context within northern Nigeria that they are 

suffering regional discrimination at the hands of the nation. 

Though these realties are rightly and well recognized by many, 

they are only one side to the foundation of discrimination that 

exists in relation to northern Nigeria. 

Discrimination within Northern 

Nigeria against Religious Minorities 

For generations, many northern Muslim elite have believed 

they bear a responsibility to consolidate an Islamic society in 

the north and to extend that society southward until it eventually 

encapsulates all of Nigeria. There have always been ethnic 

communities in the north and across most of the Middle Belt that 

have resisted this effort. Nonetheless, many northern Muslims 

blame colonialism as the disruptor in this process, and since 

independence, have reengaged these efforts. This was the 

approach embraced by Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was the highly 

influential and leading politician of the north at the time of 

independence and in the immediate years after. Eleven days 

after Nigerian independence, the Parrot Newspaper quoted him 

as saying: 

The new nation called Nigeria should be an Estate of our great grandfather 

Usman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We use 

the minorities in the north as willing tools and the south as a conquered 

territory and never allow them to rule over us and never allow them to have 

control over their future. 19 



There were efforts, all of which were rebuffed, in the 1970s, late 

1980s and early 1990s to add sharia to the federal constitution. 

Realizing that a national solution was increasingly unlikely, on 

January 27, 2000, Ahmed Sani, the governor of Zamfara, the state 

not inconsequentially with the lowest percentage of Christians 

in the north, unilaterally and officially announced that sharia 

legislation would apply to all aspects of personal and judicial 

law. By 2002, all twelve of the northern states had adopted 

sharia as the reigning judicial principle. This has accelerated 

a trend of fortifying religious identification as a primary 

interlocutor and as a means of discrimination and persecution. 

Religious minorities in the north have been particularly negatively 

impacted by these developments. 

Discrimination against non-Muslims is widespread throughout 

northern Nigeria, which has increasingly led to politics of identity. 

One of the most oft repeated narratives is that Christianity in this 

region is a tiny minority of the population and primarily composed 

of southern “settlers” who have migrated to the north. However, 

this is not necessarily the case. 

Recent research for the first time systematically catalogued the 

church records for every major Christian denomination in northern 

Nigeria and the Middle Belt and reached the following conclusions: 

• In six northern and Middle Belt states, Christians comprise 

greater than 50 percent of the total population: Adamawa, 

Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba; 

• In 158 of the 417 Local Government Areas, Christians comprise 

greater than 50 percent of the total population; 

• Altogether there are more than 30 million Christians comprising 

30 percent of the total population of the northern and Middle 

Belt states, in comparison to 64 percent adhering to Islam 

and 8 percent participating in African Traditional Religions. 20 

Sir Ahmadu Bello 

Sir Ahmadu Bello KBE 

was a Nigerian politician 

who was the first and only 

premier of the Northern Nigeria 

region. He also held the title of 

Sardauna of Sokoto. 

80,500,000 

people, or 

51% 

of the Nigerian population 

are Christians 

Nigeria has the largest 

Muslim population in 

Africa and the fifth largest 

Muslim population in the 

world. 

While in some states such as in Zamfara, where Christians compose 

only 2.3 percent of the total population, one-out-of-three 

Nigerians in the north are Christian, and in some areas, they are 

the absolute majority. Despite these numerical realities, the 

primary narrative which is often repeated and believed by northern 

elite, southern Nigerians, the Nigerian media as well as the 

international community is that there are relatively few Christians 

and that any discrimination that they may experience is isolated, 

numerically inconsequential, and more a result of the fact that 

these are southern migrant “settlers” not part of the “indigenous” 



false 

narrative 

The Number of Christians 

in Northern and Middle 

Belt States is Numerically 

Insignificant 

One of the primary narratives which is 

often repeated and seemingly believed 

by northern elite, southern Nigerians, the 

Nigerian media as well as the international 

community is that there are relatively few 

Christians in the northern and Middle Belt 

states. Any discrimination that adherents 

to Christianity experience is isolated, 

numerically inconsequential, and more a 

result of the fact that these are southern 

migrant “settlers” not part of the “indigenous” 

communities. This narrative is not only 

false, it gives cover to widely adopted 

policies that significantly discriminate, 

negatively impact, and occasionally erupts 

into violence against millions of individuals. 

These policies of discrimination and latent 

public support is one of the core causative 

factors that has created a climate conducive 

to the emergence of Boko Haram, 

undermines human rights and the rule of 

law, and is essential to address if justice 

and reintegration beyond the violence 

of terrorism is to be established and the 

fracture of Nigeria along religious fault 

lines reversed. 

communities. This narrative is not only false, it gives cover to 

widely adopted policies and practices that significantly discriminate 

and negatively impact Christians, and occasionally erupts into 

violence against millions of individuals. This widespread publicly 

supported discrimination is a core factor to having created a 

climate that is conducive to the emergence of Boko Haram and 

undermines human rights and the rule of law. This foundational 

discrimination is essential to address if justice and reintegration 

beyond the violence of terrorism is to be established and the 

fracture of Nigeria along religious fault lines reversed. 

Christians throughout the northern states, and not just those in 

the areas in the northeast most directly impacted by the violence 

of Boko Haram, report the implementation of widespread policies 

and practices that negatively impact their lives. These include: 

Limited Education Opportunities 

• Parents forced to change the names of their children to 

Muslim names or face a prohibition on enrolling their children 

in schools; 

• Increased school fees for Christian families; 

• Abuse or mistreatment of Christians while they are at school 

and on the school premises; 

• Refusal or restrictions within the public schools on the teaching of 

Christian Religious Knowledge while fully including and requiring 

the teaching of Islamic Religious Knowledge for all students. 

This 19-year-old from Borno, Nigeria fled to an IDP camp in 

January 2015 after Boko Haram attacked his village. 



Limited Vocation Opportunities and 

Negative Economic Impact 

• Christians fired from government and public school positions; 

• Goods in local markets sold to Christians at a higher cost; 

• Local markets preventing Christians from renting market space 

or otherwise selling their goods; 

• Confiscation of Christian property; 

• Eviction when landlords learn of a family’s Christian identity; 

• Refusal of Muslim business owners to hire Christian employees. 

Restrictions on Religious Freedom 

• Refusal to sell land for church construction, while permits are 

issued for the construction of mosques in areas that are 

predominantly Christian; 

• Burning and destruction of churches; 

• Christian cemeteries vandalized with Christians then prohibited 

from cleaning them up; 

• Significant repercussions when Fulani and Hausa convert from 

Islam; 

• Abduction of Christian women leading to forced marriage to 

Muslim men; 

• Forced conversions to Islam. 

Negative Physical Ramifications 

• Abuse or mistreatment of Christians while they are on public 

streets; 

• Health-care denied to Christians; 

• Violent community and mob attacks on Christians after political 

elections or non-related international events such as the 

cartoon drawing of the Prophet Muhammad in Denmark. 

Denied Community Services and Rights 

• Restricted community development such as fewer water 

boreholes and fewer medical facilities in rural, predominantly 

Christian areas; 

• Denied, limited or fraudulent election participation; 

• Government security briefings that intentionally exclude 

representatives of the Christian community; 

• Refusal to station police or other security forces in predominantly 

Christian areas even when local community members 

report information about impending attacks. 

Representatives from Adamawa State described how time and 

again their identity as Christians made them second-class citizens. 



“It is very hard for me 

to forgive them, but 

because of Christ I have 

forgiven them.” 

One individual detailed how in his local village, 80 percent of the 

community is Christian, yet during every local election cycle, the 

Christian representative loses while the Muslim representative 

wins. In Kano State, some individuals reported that when they 

went to purchase land, they had to sign a document indicating 

that they would not build a church on that land before the 

transaction could be completed. In Sokoto, a group of believers 

in the Evangelical Church of West Africa denomination had been 

utilizing a particular church building for more than one hundred 

years. When they tried to renew their certificate of occupancy, the 

certificate was denied and the government claimed the building 

in order to turn it into a center of Islamic study. In Benue State, a 

woman described a 1995 conflict in the state capital of Makurdi 

at the conclusion of which only Christians were arrested while 

Muslims were allowed to go free. This woman and twenty-one 

others, were held in a local prison for nearly a year, and each time 

they were taken to the court, bystanders openly mocked them for 

their Christian faith. 

Church that Boko Haram destroyed. 



Across northern Nigeria, at times individuals must change their 

names or otherwise pursue other coping strategies to hide their 

Christian identity to secure safety and a livelihood. In general, 

Christians throughout northern Nigeria are under-represented 

in key institutions such as the government, media and education 

that would otherwise have the potential for pursuing transformative 

change. 

Despite tremendous challenges, many continue to express a 

firm commitment to their faith. One individual from Sokoto State 

described, “It is very hard for me to forgive them, but because of 

Christ I have forgiven them.” Another from Kano State highlighted 

that he believed his faith required him to continue to demonstrate 

love and that “even now I am helping some of the children of the 

people who have hurt me.” 

Openly they say that 

everyone has the right to 

worship freely, but that 

is not the case at the 

local level. 

Daniel, Nasarawa State 

Additional research is needed to determine the breadth by which 

each one of these realities can be found throughout northern 

Nigeria. What is clear is that discrimination is more widespread 

and has far more negative consequences than is often believed. 

Moreover, the individuals interviewed during this process almost 

always began their narratives with the reality of this discrimination 

before, where relevant, moving on to describe more episodic 

violence perpetrated by Boko Haram or Fulani militants. In other 

words, just as considering the general economic malaise within 

northern Nigeria is essential, it is also imperative to address the 

ongoing policies and practices that intentionally target and seek 

to disempower minority Christian communities if reconciliation, 

rehabilitation, and ongoing equitable infrastructure development 

are going to be legitimately established. 

Corroborating these individual personal experiences, Ambassador 

John Campbell, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria 

from 2004-2007 observes, “In general, traditional society, not just 

radical jihadis, discriminates against Christians, and the few Fulani 

converts to Christianity may be murdered, often by members of 

their own families.” 21 

Some have pointed to the surprise announcement in 1986 that 

Nigeria was registered as the forty-sixth member nation of what 

is known today as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 

as proof that there exists an intentional effort to maximize a 

narrative of Islamic predominance while minimizing the livedexperience 

of other religious adherents. The decision to join the 



OIC remains shrouded in secrecy and throughout the 1980s and 

1990s generated riots and violence and hardened religious fault 

lines as Muslims hailed the decision and Christians decried the 

action as a violation of the “secular” status of the country. Reflecting 

on this development one expert presciently noted prior to 

the emergence of Boko Haram, “one can feel the pulse of the twin 

Islamic symbols of Shari’a and OIC, dangerously ignored, like some 

explosives, awaiting either detonation or defusing.” 22 

Efforts to use legislation to limit religious expansion and regulate 

religious content, especially the teachings and actions of 

evangelical Christians, remain ongoing within northern Nigeria 

and the Middle Belt. For example, the Kaduna State House 

Assembly recently introduced a bill attempting to repeal and 

replace the Religious Preaching Law of 1984. The proposed bill, 

which has been condemned by a number of Christian 

organizations within Nigeria, would in part: 

Former Ambassador 

John Campbell 

John Campbell is the 

Ralph Bunche senior 

fellow for Africa policy studies at 

the Council on Foreign Relations 

(CFR) in New York. His book, 

Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. 

clearly explains the crisis in 

NIgeria. He writes the blog “Africa 

in Transition” and edits the 

Nigeria Security Tracker. 

• Restrict licensing of preachers to two bodies which would nullify all 

religious bodies outside of those two groups who may choose for religious 

reasons to not participate in those bodies or who may be unfairly 

denied participatory access within those bodies; 

• Confine to certain locations the playing of “all cassettes, CDs, Flash 

drives or any other communication gadgets containing religious recordings.” 

For example, people of faith would be legally restricted from 

listening to any religious teaching, music or audio Scripture within their 

own car or while they are in any public setting, even if they are accessing 

the device through private headphones; 

• Create a blanket prohibition that would make illegal any recording that 

includes “abusive language... against any person or religious organization 

or religious leader (past or present)” as defined solely by the State; 

• Make it virtually illegal for any individual of any religion to share their 

faith with any other individual unless the person who is sharing is officially 

licensed to preach by the government. 

While the intent of this law may be positive, it will have a severe, 

negative impact on all religious communities and perhaps most 

especially on the 46.7 percent of Kaduna State’s population that 

is Christian. The net effect of this law will be to criminalize many 

activities that could lead to the further expansion of the Christian 

community while maintaining the primacy of Islam as the 



majoritarian religion. Dr. Francis Daria, the President of the Northern 

Nigeria Union of Seventh Day Adventist Church, called for the 

Kaduna State House Assembly to reject this proposed bill on the 

grounds that it contradicts the freedom of religion guaranteed 

in Section 38 of the federal constitution and further noting: “As 

a democratically-elected government, we expect respect for our 

fundamental human rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, and 

not the fear of discrimination and repression that will follow if the 

Bill becomes law.” 23 There is a very real possibility that if this law is 

passed, it will be quickly replicated throughout northern Nigeria, 

which would allow various state governments to regulate religious 

activities and continue to maintain efforts that have the effect 

of preserving one religion over and against other religions, all of 

which contributes to a fracture along religious fault lines. It also 

fits into a broader pattern of northern elite who seek to control 

and use religion as a means of furthering their own perspectives 

and agendas. As has been observed, “one of the basic roots of 

religious conflict in Nigeria is the manner in which the religious 

traditions in the country have interacted and the way they have 

been manipulated for selfish interests.” 24 

However, perhaps the most readily observable factor underscoring 

the reality that this foundation of discrimination is solidifying 

into a context of violent reaction along religious fault lines are 

the surges of episodic violence that have increasingly erupted in 

northern and Middle Belt states. 

Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that between 1994 and 2013, 

there were multiple violent and brutal attacks that cumulatively 

left thousands of Christians and Muslims dead particularly in 

Jos and the surrounding Plateau State environs. 25 Large-scale 

conflicts, often instigated as a reprisal for previous grievances, 

occurred in 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, and three times in 2010 

(January, March, and December). Christians and Muslims were 

responsible for contributing to the atrocities and indiscriminate 

killings, often solely motivated by an individual’s religious or ethnic 

identity. Even into 2011 there were reports of “silent killings” 

where men discovered in the “wrong” neighborhood disappeared 

and their bodies seldom recovered for burial. 26 Following one of 

these attacks, Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama noted: 

There is a need for advocacy 

for good laws, 

for equality and fairness, 

justice and security, and 

the protection of lives 

and property. Such advocacy 

according to the 

federal laws of the land 

is very important. 

ECWA Minister in Plateau 

State 

We were taken aback by the turn of events in Jos. We thought it was political, 

but from all indications it is not so. We were surprised at the way some 

of our churches and properIty were attacked and some of our faithful and 



Village burned out twice by Boko Haram. 

clergy killed. The attacks were carefully planned and executed. The questions 

that bog our minds are why were churches and clergy attacked and killed? 

Why were politicians and political party offices not attacked if it were a political 

conflict? Why were the business premises and property of innocent civilians 

destroyed? We strongly feel that it was not political, but pre-meditated 

act[s] under the guise of elections. 27 

As of 2013, despite the arrest of many suspects, not a single 

individual was tried or sentenced, which further contributes to a 

climate of impunity that undermines the rule of law. 

This same HRW report further details inter-communal violence in 

Kaduna State in 1987, 1992, 2000 and the horrific post-election violence 

in 2011. 28 These incidents often involved mobs of Christian 

and Muslim youth openly attacking adherents of the other religion 

in frequently brutal and intimate fashion. Particularly in relation to 

the post-election violence in 2011, more Muslims were killed while 

the Christian community saw significantly more churches burned. 

Similar to the violence that occurred in Plateau State, virtually no 

one in Kaduna State has ever been held responsible. 



Outside of these major incidents there have been smaller, violent 

outbursts throughout northern Nigeria. The regularity and scope 

have increased since 2009, when Abu Shekau took over Boko Haram 

and more completely embraced violence as a tool of political and 

religious expediency. 

Both Christians and Muslims have at times instigated, retaliated 

or otherwise participated in violent assaults attacking participants 

in the other religious community, and this has contributed to a 

destabilized context primed for escalating aggression and fracture. 

While individuals from all faiths must be held accountable for 

their acts of violence, it is clear that religious minorities have more 

often been the recipients rather than the instigators and have 

experienced far more damaging effects. 

Archbishop Ignatius 

Kaigama 

Ignatius Kaigama 

of Jos and President 

of the Bishops’ Conference of 

Nigeria has been elected the new 

president of The Regional Episcopal 

Conference of West 

Africa (RECOWA) and The 

Regional Episcopal Conference 

of Francophone West Africa 

(CERAO). 

Defining the Roots of this 

Foundational Discrimination 

Boko Haram and the Fulani militants emerged out of a context 

ripe for their development. It is true that northern Nigeria has 

experienced economic discrimination and under-development in 

comparison to southern Nigeria as is well-noted by Ambassador 

Campbell: 

In the North, there is a multifaceted Islamic revival underway, incorporating 

elements from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Pakistan, as well as Iran. 

The context is increasing poverty, especially in relation to the growing prosperity 

of other regions in Nigeria, and a general perception of the political 

marginalization of the North within the Nigerian federation. 29 

However, to focus solely on this marginalization is to miss how 

northern elite have further instituted policies and practices of 

discrimination targeting religious minorities within their region. 

There is a false narrative frequently promoted and seldom 

questioned regarding the primacy of Islam within northern Nigeria. 

Underneath this narrative is a highly fluid situation, the changing 

dynamics of which have increasingly left northern elite perceiving 

that their identity, their position and their religion is under threat. 

There is a vested interest in continuing to maintain this particular 

narrative while instituting wide-ranging policies and practices of 

discrimination that over time will make this perceived reality true in 

fact. 



Boko Haram is understood 

to mean, “Western 

Civilization is forbidden.” 

1. Northern 

Perception of 

Injustice 

FOUNDATION GIVING 

RISE TO ORGANIZATIONS 

WILLING TO EXPLICITLY 

EMBRACE VIOLENCE TO 

ACHIEVE THEIR AGENDA. 

6. Environment of 

Impunity Undermining 

the Rule of Law 

2. Northern Elite 

Positional Power 

and Willingness 

to Utilize Religion 

to Political Ends 

3. Historical Legacy 

and Mandate to 

Extend Islam 

4. Islamic Revival 

and Transition 

from Sufi to 

Salafist 

Interpretations 

5. Longstanding 

Resistance of 

Religious Minority 

Communities Even 

as Their Size and 

Position is Denied 

This ongoing foundation of discrimination involves the 

interlocking of six distinct roots. 

Root 1: Northern Perception of Injustice. 

Within northern Nigeria, there is a widespread perception that as 

a region, it is experiencing economic injustice, intentionally limited 

infrastructure development, and education that is simultaneously 

not as strong as what exists elsewhere in the country and filled 

with “western” values inconsistent with traditional Muslim practices. 

There is a further perception that many of the current actions 

of southern politicians and certain elements of the security 

forces are conspiring to further marginalize the region as a whole 

and Muslims in particular from their rightful national place within 

Nigeria. 

Root 2: Northern Elite Positional Power and Willingness 

to Utilize Religion to Political Ends. 

While the religious, political, and economic dynamics are in flux, 

many elite Muslims feel as if their identity, position, power and 

religion are under threat. There are those willing to take whatever 

steps are necessary in order to ensure their ongoing hegemony of 

power and preferred status even if this means politicizing religion 

and condoning violence in the name of religion against minorities. 

While this may be effective in the immediacy of politics, it unleashes 



within society a culture of violence that cannot be controlled and 

that will ultimately negatively impact those in the majoritarian religion 

as some will be deemed “not religious enough.” It will further 

make an integrated context of peace more difficult to build. In 

fact this has already been occurring as Boko Haram has adopted 

an approach of takfiri which is the accusation of apostasy by one 

Muslim against another Muslim. 

Root 3: Historical Legacy and Mandate to Extend Islam. 

Islam has a long history of social and political organizing in Nigeria. 

There are many Muslims who believe that they are part of a living 

historical legacy and mandate to consolidate northern Nigeria into 

a Muslim society and then extend that project into the Middle Belt 

and beyond. This is why large numbers of Muslims have supported 

the implementation of sharia law, the ongoing continuation of 

Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the support 

and public enforcement of wide-spread policies and practices that 

target and discriminate against religious minorities. 

Root 4: Islamic Revival and Transition from Sufi to 

Salafist Interpretations. 

The past several decades have seen a revival within many Islamic 

communities throughout northern Nigeria. It is certain that outside 

support and funding has contributed to this development, though 

to what extent is unclear and additional research is needed. 

Historically, the majority of Muslims in northern Nigeria held to 

Sufi interpretations of Islam, which has historically lent itself to 

peaceful co-existence with individuals of other faiths. This ongoing 

Islamic revival in northern Nigeria is manifested in a shift towards 

Salafist interpretations, which emphasize stricter implementation 

of sharia and more simplified and “pure” practices of Islam as a 

return to the forms of expression used around the time of the 

Prophet Muhammad. As one expert has remarked: 

Religious conflict frequently takes the form of a civil war within Islam. Radical 

reformers in what is now Nigeria have long taken a takfiri approach to Muslim 

leaders they deem un-just, declaring them “non-Muslim” even when the 

individual rulers themselves claim to be Muslims. Hence, “Salafi” reformers 

pit themselves against “Sufis” who dominate the traditional Nigerian Muslim 

elites. Some “Salafi” reformers wish to establish a pure Islamic state characterized 

by the strict application of sharia. This has potent appeal in a period 

of increasing personal and community poverty at the grassroots. 30 



This shift to Salafism helps explain why a country that has had 

both Muslims and Christians, sometimes living as neighbors within 

the same community for hundreds of years, has not experienced 

this level of violence in the past, why religious identity is hardening, 

and why at least some Nigerian Muslims are willing to employ 

violence against both Christians and fellow Muslims who are seen 

as morally culpable given their perceived dettachment to “correct” 

forms of practice. Aminu Mohammed Umar describes: 

Despite its early violent history, the Sufi version of Islam practiced in Northern 

Nigeria transformed into a conservative, tolerant, and peaceful religion. This 

situation remained until the recent spread of Wahhabi-Salafi Islam. Through the 

influence of countries like Saudi Arabia and multitudes of Islamic charities, the 

Wahhabi tradition of Islam has slowly and steadily crept into Northern Nigeria. 

As a result of contacts with newly established Islamic school as well as contacts 

through scholarship programs to study in Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and 

other Muslim countries across the world, the Salafi, Shia, and other versions 

of Islam, often with more radical ideologies, gained acceptance in the region. 

Boko Haram is one such radical sect which is considered an evolution of previous 

violent sects in that region. 31 

This battle for the character of Islam within Nigeria has substantive 

ramifications for the country, for the region, for the reestablishment 

of peace, and perhaps most keenly and immediately, for the 

religious minorities within northern Nigeria. 

Root 5: Longstanding Resistance by Religious Minority 

Communities Even as Their Size and Position is Denied. 

For more than one hundred years, some ethnic and religious 

minority communities have resisted attempts at conversion to 

Islam and incorporation into a Muslim-infused societal project. 

Today the size of these minorities are often either under-played or 

dismissed under the “settler” rubric. Many of these individuals feel 

marginalized by their neighbors in the north, abandoned by the 

federal government and co-religionists to the south, and ignored 

by the broader international community. It is as if many outside 

of this region simply do not want to acknowledge or address the 

significant discrimination occurring within northern Nigeria. This 

has created a climate that allowed more violent forms of expression 

to fester and grow. Today many in these communities appeal 

to a political vision defined by the full implementation of the 

federal constitution, rule of law, the strengthening of institutions 

of governance, and freedom of religion. 



In the interim, many continue to robustly maintain their faith while 

embracing one of two approaches: 

(1) privately practicing their religion while utilizing public coping 

strategies in order to navigate the pervasive discrimination 

they face and secure life and livelihood, or 

(2) forming armed vigilante groups in the absence of the protection 

that could be provided by police or other security forces to 

defend their communities against encroaching violence. 

When perceived as necessary, these vigilante groups at times 

proactively and reactively respond to aggression. In both of the 

highlighted approaches, religious identity is increasingly hardening 

and contributing to the possibility of further fracture. 

Root 6: Environment of Impunity Undermining the 

Rule of Law. 

In the midst of numerous episodes of violence, legal responsibility 

and culpability have been rare even as gross violations of human 

rights have occurred, communities have been burned, places of 

worship destroyed and individuals brutally murdered. Violence 

within a context of impunity begets violence. An inability, or perhaps 

more likely and more dangerously, a political unwillingness to 

hold accountable those who are undermining the institutions 

of the State and the rule of law, have created a climate where 

actors perceive that they are free to do whatever seems right to 

themselves and to their community. 

This is to say that Boko Haram and the broader episodes of 

violence in northern and central Nigeria find much of their epicenter 

in the longstanding discrimination and impunity that has 

rampantly occurred throughout northern Nigeria and that has 

produced identities increasingly understood through the prism 

of religion. Woven together by six distinct roots, addressing this 

foundation of discrimination is essential for the peaceful rehabilitation 

of northern Nigeria, creating a context that will not produce 

a violent manifestation post-Boko Haram, and reversing further 

fracturing. Unfortunately, at present these foundational causative 

issues are being largely ignored and the hardening of religious 

fault lines has quickened since the adoption of sharia in 2002 and 

further accelerated since 2009 and Boko Haram’s embrace of 

violence. 

Nigeria Constitution (1998) 

Section 38 

Chapter IV, 

“Foundational Rights” 

(1) Every person shall be entitled to 

freedom of thought, conscience and 

religion, including freedom to change 

his religion or belief, and freedom 

(either alone or in community with 

others, and in public or in private) to 

manifest and propagate his religion 

or belief in worship, teaching, practice 

and observance. 

(2) No person attending any place of 

education shall be required to receive 

religious instruction or to take part in 

or attend any religious ceremony or 

observance if such instruction ceremony 

or observance relates to a religion other 

than his own, or religion not approved 

by his parent or guardian. 

(3) No religious community or 

denomination shall be prevented 

from providing religious instruction 

for pupils of that community or 

denomination in any place of 

education maintained wholly by 

that community or denomination. 

(4) Nothing in this section shall 

entitle any person to form, take part 

in the activity or be a member of a 

secret society. 


38 NIGERIA BOKO HARAM 

Boko Haram cannot be 

properly understood 

apart from the economic 

deprivation of northeastern 

Nigeria, nor 

from the context of 

impunity and social and 

religious discrimination 

that occurs within the 

country’s north. 

Boko Haram: 

An Explosion of Violence 

Boko Haram’s explosion of violence has shocked Nigeria and 

launched a group ingrained in the deep poverty of rural northeastern 

Nigeria into the mainstream attention of the international 

community. Though Boko Haram is properly 

understood as emerging from a distinct foundation of discrimination 

rather than as a sole causative factor, the sheer brutality 

of the terrorist group threatens to overshadow this foundation 

and frequently generates analysis focused solely on the eradication 

of the organization rather than altering the context that gave 

it rise. Boko Haram cannot be properly understood apart from the 

economic deprivation of northeastern Nigeria, nor from the context 

of impunity and social and religious discrimination that occurs 

within the country’s north. 

Without question, Boko Haram has created one of the worse 

humanitarian crises in the world: millions impacted, thousands 

slaughtered, one of the greatest IDP concentrations in the world, 

communities razed, women and children abducted and abused, 

educational opportunities eradicated and entire economies virtually 

ground to a halt in certain areas. Northeastern Nigeria has 

been spiraling into ever greater destabilization and humanitarian 

tragedy as the Nigerian government and the international community 

have been slow to respond. 

This affects individuals such as Arit from Adamawa State. On 

May 7, 2014, Boko Haram swept through her small village in 

northeastern Nigeria, killing 22 people. Arit, along with other 

survivors, believed that Boko Haram would not return and that 

the situation would improve. However, in June, when the planting 

season began, Boko Haram terrorists returned, destroyed 

the crops, killed youth working in the farmlands and confiscated 

the community’s cows. Arit and others from the village ran to 

the nearby mountains to seek refuge in caves. Some who were 

physically unable to climb the rocks and reach the safety of the 

caves were captured and forcibly converted to Islam. Those who 

resisted were killed. 

For two months, Arit and the others with her hid in the caves with 

only some venturing out in the evenings to scavenge and beg. 


BOKO HARAM NIGERIA 39 

Mother from Adamawa State who survived Boko Haram attack. 

Without any outside assistance, this was the sole source of food 

those in hiding had for the duration of this period. Fear and anxiety 

ravaged Arit during those two months as five of her seven children 

had been separated from her in the rush to reach the caves 

and she did not know if they were dead or alive. 

On August 28, 2014, Arit and others attempted to return to 

their farms in hopes of rebuilding. Multiple gunshots met them. 

Once again, she fled to the caves. This time she remained for 

only three days before reaching the depressing realization that 

her community was now fully under the control of Boko Haram 

Arit’s hope is to 

eventually return to her 

home village and start 

life anew. She implored, 

“I covet your prayers... 

I desire your prayers so 

that I can be strong 

and take care of my 

children.” 



TIMELINE 

Brief Historical Overview 

of Boko Haram 

Excerpted from 

Encyclopedia Britannica 

2002 

Mohammad Yusuf founds Boko 

Haram, originally called Jama’atu 

Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad 

2009 

Boko Haram began shift towards 

a more militant approach 

July 30, 2009 

Mohammad Yusuf killed in an 

extra-judicial action by Nigerian 

security forces 

Fall 2009 

Abubakar Shekau assumes 

leadership of Boko Haram 

August 2011 

Boko Haram bombed UN 

headquarters in Abuja killing 23 

and injuring more than 100 

May 2013 

President Goodluck Jonathan 

declared a state of emergency 

for the entirety of Borno, 

Adamawa and Yobe States 

November 2013 

United States Government 

designates Boko Haram as a 

Foreign Terrorist Organization 

April 2014 

Boko Haram captures the 

Government Secondary School of 

Chibok and kidnaps 276 girls 

March 2015 

Boko Haram pledges allegiance 

to the Islamic State and changes 

its name to the Islamic State of 

West Africa Province 

March 2016 

Boko Haram reaffirms its 

allegiance to the Islamic State 

and that return in the immediate future was not a possibility. 

She prayed and prayed that God would enable her to find her 

children. Not finding them in a refugee camp in Cameroon, she 

moved to a displaced area in Nigeria where she learned that her 

children were in Yola. 

When she arrived in Yola her hope was rewarded when she saw 

the remaining five of her children in the distance. As they ran 

towards an emotional embrace, the youngest among them cried, 

“could this be mom?” This young child was three years old. 

Arit described that it was God’s grace that kept her alive during this 

time and that had given her the money to search for her children 

and to resettle in a new area. Her hope is to eventually return to 

her home village and start life anew. She implored, “I covet your 

prayers... I desire your prayers so that I can be strong and take 

care of my children.” 

At the time of this interview, it had been twenty-months since 

she had last seen her husband. She still did not know if he had 

survived the attack or if he had died. 

Arit was far from the only individual who described being forced to 

live in caves and subsist off the most meagre of resources. Lolade, 

her husband and two children lived in Borno State and were also 

forced to flee their village and live in mountain caves. In late 2014, 

they attempted to leave the mountain and flee as refugees to 

Cameroon, but along the route they were separated, and Boko 

Haram captured Lolade and her children. As captives, they were 

held in a high-walled compound with approximately twenty other 

women. When Boko Haram successfully raided villages for food, 

they fed the women and children; and when they had not, the 

women, children and the fighters alike fasted. Some of the women 

gave birth to children while they were held captive and the members 

of Boko Haram assigned those children Muslim names. The 

mothers, however, would secretly give and use an alternate 

name of their choosing and that could be publicly continued 

should an end to the imprisonment become a possibility. 

For two months, Lolade and her children were held in this 

condition. Each night the women were locked into the house 

around 5:00 p.m., where they would remain until 10:00 a.m. when 

they would be permitted to collect firewood, leaves and water. 

One night, she and the other women held in this particular house 



sensed an opportunity, and Lolade placed one of her children on 

her back and one on her shoulders, climbed over a wall and ran. 

Eighteen escaped. 

When asked what she might wish to communicate to people 

in the United States about her ordeal, Lolade replied without 

hesitation, “I pray that God should not allow this kind of situation 

to come into the West.” 

The person who initially captured and imprisoned Lolade was a 

childhood friend from her home village with whom she had grown 

up and whom she knew very well. 

Destroyed communities, separated families, violent endings and 

the struggle to survive in the midst of caves, famine, insecurity and 

deplorable conditions characterize the areas impacted by Boko 

Haram. This is not, however, how the group initially started. Boko 

Haram loosely followed a four stage development. 

The Four Stages of Boko Haram 

Development 

1 

Stage One: Nascent Movement Building. 

The first stage was a nascent movement that built 

upon local grievances and lack of good governance. 

Islamist cleric Mohammad Yusuf founded Boko 

Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno 

State. Yusuf was a trained Salafist who was part of 

the revivalist movement encouraging a shift away 

from Sufism. Initially the group called itself Jama’atu 

Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad or “people committed 

to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings 

and jihad,” thus underscoring that religion has always 

been one of the motivators for those who have participated in 

this group. Yusuf wanted to build an Islamic community, but does 

not seem to have initially favored a militant approach. Rather, 

he was concerned, with the underdevelopment he witnessed 

within his state and that he blamed on the corrupting influence 

of non-Muslims, most especially the impact of Western values on 

Nigeria. For example, he could point to the fact that literacy in Borno 

State is estimated at 46 percent for boys and 34 percent for 

girls, while in the southern state of Imo both boys and girls have 

a literacy rate of more than 98 percent. 32 Initially, Boko Haram 



false 

narrative 

Boko Haram’s Connections 

to International Islamic 

Terrorist Networks 

In March 2015, the leadership of 

Boko Haram publicly pledged itself as a 

provincial vassalage of the Islamic State 

based in Raqqa, Syria. This was not, 

however, the first time that Boko Haram 

had sought alignment with a broader 

international terrorist network. Boko 

Haram had also sought affiliation with 

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

and Al-Shabab. Boko Haram seems to 

be a terrorist organization motivated 

by religious and economic impulses, 

organized as a criminal enterprise, and 

in search of integration into a broader 

international narrative of Islamic 

resurgence, an ambition they aim to 

satisfy through the sheer brazenness 

and barbarity of their attacks and 

pledged allegiance to a well-recognized 

network. 

The Islamic State is a natural fit, 

as it has consistently pressed religious 

minorities within its control to the edge 

of extinction and has engaged in genocide 

according to both the European 

Parliament and U.S. Secretary of State 

John Kerry. In March 2016, Boko Haram 

once again affirmed their pledge to the 

Islamic State. 

Despite these public affirmations, 

the likelihood of coordination between 

these two organizations is limited at 

best. This linkage is maintained because 

it is to the political and theological 

advantage of both organizations, at least 

continued on page 43 

was something of a para-government assistance group “offering 

help paying the bills; support for the unemployed, widows, and 

children; and a sense of belonging that filled the gap left by the 

absent state.” 33 

The name “Boko Haram,” which seems to have been given to the 

group by residents of Maiduguri, has proved difficult to translate 

into English and is most often rendered “Western education 

is sin.” 34 It is perhaps more properly understood as “Western 

civilization is forbidden.” This is the meaning that Boko Haram 

member Mallam Sanni Umary voices: 

Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ as the infidel 

media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means ‘Western Civilization 

is forbidden.’ The difference is that while the first gives the impression 

that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is 

Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of 

Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education 

but is not determined by Western education. In this case we are talking of 

Western ways of life which include: constitutional provision as it relates to, 

for instance, the rights and privileges of women, the idea of homosexuality, 

lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape 

of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like 

Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others 

that are opposed to Islamic civilization. 35 

In other words, Boko Haram initially emerged in the midst of 

real poverty, but viewed the lack of development through a very 

conservative religious lens and sought to address and rectify the 

situation by building a community that practiced a more robust 

and pure form of Islam according to their understanding. Yusuf 

seems to have drawn support from a slightly older generation who 

wanted to participate with him in a revivalist movement that built 

upon the historical legacy of northeastern Nigeria and which they 

were certain would lead to a better future. Over the next seven 

years, the group slowly became more militant, as encounters with 

Muslims who resisted their message and a state apparatus leery 

of its social services forced the group to defend its actions with 

theological pronouncements and the maintenance of funding 

for expanded engagement. July 2009 would cause the seeds for 

violence sown during this time to surface and alter the direction of 

the organization. 


two organizations may be maturing. 



We had a grand plan 

to Islamize Nigeria 

starting with the North. 

We felt that a lot of 

Muslims are not practicing 

the religion faithfully as 

they should. 

Thus, “the cohesion of the group was therefore always illusory, 

and only artificially maintained by Shekau’s intimidating authoritarianism.” 

38 Where Yusuf had drawn support from an older 

generation, Shekau’s base of support was from a younger generation 

of 20-30-year-olds who were more inclined to militant 

activism in order to establish a Muslim society – one, that could be 

achieved only when religious minorities were removed as well as 

all Muslims who did not adhere to their particular interpretation. 

As Abu Qaqa, Boko Haram Spokesman, said elsewhere: 

We had a grand plan to Islamize Nigeria starting with the North. We felt that 

a lot of Muslims are not practicing the religion faithfully as they should. Part 

of the plan was to reduce the powers of the Sultan to traditional rulership 

functions only, while all religious authority would be vested with our leader 

who would be based in Yobe. 39 

A YOUNGER GENERATION 

20-30 

Yusuf drew support from 

an older generation, 

Shekau’s base of support 

20-30-year-olds inclined 

to militant activism 

Though additional research is needed to add clarification, it seems 

as if the group maintains a loose core and functions more along 

the lines of independent cells utilizing their own standards and 

rules of engagement. Unlike the Islamic State, Boko Haram in 

function, not in theology, operates closer to that of a criminal 

organization than that a state or governing institution. 

The link between Boko Haram and other terrorist movements 

remains unclear. As has been widely reported, in March 2015 

Boko Haram officially pledged its loyalty to the Islamic State and 

reflected this commitment by adopting the name the Islamic 

Boko Haram members 



State of West Africa Province. It is likely that at least some of the 

members of Boko Haram ascribe to the theology and ideology of 

the Islamic State, that there may have been some military training 

and perhaps weapons accruement, but it is unlikely any true 

strategic and tactical coordination exists between the two organizations. 

40 There is, however, the real possibility that this could 

change. Should Boko Haram become more desperate and more 

asymmetrical in its attacks, or alternatively should the situation of 

the Islamic State significantly alter, intentional links between the 

two could mature. That this remains a possibility is evidenced by 

the fact that on April 7, a weapons convoy carrying small-caliber 

weapons, machine guns and rifles was intercepted in Chad. U.S. 

military officials believe the weapons were en route from Islamic 

State fighters in Libya to Boko Haram. 41 This is in addition to the 

arrest of four imams in Kaolack, Senegal in February on charges 

related to money laundering and financing terrorism for Boko 

Haram. 42 In May, perhaps as a sign of growing collaboration, the 

UN Security Council expressed “alarm at Boko Haram’s linkages 

with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as 

Da’esh).” 43 

4 

Stage Four: Full-Scale Conflict Impacting 

Millions. 

2013 marks something of a turning point, as it was 

in May of that year that Nigerian President Goodluck 

Jonathan declared a state of emergency across the 

entirety of the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, 

all of which had been significantly impacted by Boko 

Haram. In November 2013, the U.S. listed Boko 

Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 44 Having 

escalated into a full-scale conflict, Boko Haram 

was impacting millions of individuals spread through 

multiple states in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram increasingly 

functioned as a decentralized organization with independent 

units and their own operating procedures. This approach has not 

generated the ability of Boko Haram to hold and maintain distinct 

territory for long periods of time, but has created a movement 

able to inflict fear and widespread devastation. Decentralization 

has made locating Boko Haram and its members challenging, 

leaves those who have suffered with ongoing traumatic feelings of 

insecurity given the oft repeated pattern of Boko Haram returning 

to a given area once security forces have departed, and will likely 

prove rehabilitation difficult given that there have often been personal 

dimensions as units have attacked areas from which they 



themselves emerged. As Al-Jazeera reported: 

i 

INFORMATION 

Map of Boko Haram 

Aggression 

[Boko Haram] is believed to have a number of factions with differing aims, 

including some with political links. The group initially claimed to be fighting 

for the creation of an Islamic state in the north, but a range of demands by 

different people have since been issued. Criminal gangs are also believed to 

SOKOTO 

KATSINA 

JIGAWA 

YOBE 

BORNO 

have carried out violence under the guise of Boko Haram. Conspiracy theories 

abound as well. 45 

KEBBI 

KWARA 

ZAMFARA 

NIGER 

KANO 

KADUNA 

BAUCHI 

PLATEAU 

FCT 

GOMBE 

ADAMAWA 

The BBC has also reported on the growing nature of the conflict 

with 2013 as a turning point: 

OYO 

OGUN 

OSUN EKITI 

ONDO 

EDO 

NASARAWA 

KOGI 

BENUE 

ENUGU 

TARABA 

Boko Haram’s trademark was originally the use of gunmen on motorbikes, 

killing police, politicians and anyone who criticised it, including clerics 

LAOS 

DELTA 

BAYEISA 

IMO 

ABIA 

CROSS 

RIVERS 

EBONYL 

ANAMBRA 

Boka Haram 

Agression 

from other Muslim traditions and Christian preachers. The group has also 

staged more audacious attacks in northern and central Nigeria, including 

bombing churches, bus ranks, bars, military barracks and even the police 

and UN headquarters in the capital, Abuja. Amid growing concern about 

the escalating violence, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of 

emergency in May 2013 in the three northern states where Boko Haram 

was strongest - Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 46 

Violence continued to occur throughout 2015 as noted by the 

most recent United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF) report: 

While Boko Haram lost territory, it reverted to asymmetrical attacks and 

expanded its violence into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. During the reporting 

period, terrorists attacked at least 30 houses of worship and religious 

ceremonies in the Lake Chad Basin area, including suicide bombings during 

Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, and Ashura. Boko Haram also attacked markets, 

internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and small villages, which were 

completely destroyed. Human rights groups and escaped Boko Haram 

abductees report that Christians under Boko Haram control were forced to 

convert or die, and that Muslim abductees were required to attend Quranic 

schools to learn the group’s extreme interpretation of Islam. 47 

One of the hallmarks of Boko Haram has been its rampant 

utilization of gender based violence. Boko Haram has abducted 

2,000 women, boys and girls. Some of the women and girls have 

been forced into “marriages” with members of Boko Haram while 

others have been used for cooking and the maintenance of life 

within militant camps, trained in the creation and deployment of 



bombs, or even used in suicide missions. This includes an incident 

in February 2016 when three females were disguised as IDPs 

and sent to an IDP camp around 6:30 a.m. 48 Two of the females 

detonated their bombs and killed at least fifty-eight and injured 

another seventy-eight. The third realized that her family were 

staying in that particular IDP camp and refused to engage her 

explosives lest she kill or harm a member of her family who by 

happenstance might be nearby. In 2015, women participated in 

39 of the 89 Boko Haram suicide bombings or in almost 44% of 

the time. 49 

Displaced women within government-run IDP camps report that 

sexual violence is not uncommon, that survival sex is a reality to 

address food insecurity, and that there are almost no procedures 

in place to identify and provide services to women and girls who 

have escaped or been rescued from Boko Haram. 50 Even once 

they are released, Boko Haram “wives” continue to face suspicion 

that they may have been brainwashed to secretly support the 

agenda of Boko Haram and may be functioning as a sleeper-cell 

poised to strike. There is also a disturbing narrative among some 

who believe that the children born to these individuals have a 

genetic predisposition to terrorism; a stigma that threatens to 

mark these children for life. 

Another trademark of Boko Haram has been the intentional 

targeting of schools, teachers and students. Since 2009, in 

northeastern Nigeria, 611 teachers have been killed and 19,000 

more have fled for their lives. 910 schools have been destroyed, 

and a further 1,500 schools forced to close, leaving an estimated 

950,000 school-age children with almost no opportunity for 

education. The most well-publicized incident has been the attack 

on the Government Secondary School in the town of Chibok that 

resulted in the kidnapping of 276 girls. 

2,000 

women, boys and girls 

have been abducted 

by Boko Haram since 

2012 

44% 

of Boko Haram suicide 

bombings were made 

by women, 39 of 89 

attacks 

However, this has not been the only mass school-kidnapping. 

Although it has received far less international attention and been 

denied by some within the Nigerian government, on November 

24, 2014, Boko Haram attacked Damasak in Borno State where 

“the insurgents quickly occupied Zanna Mobarti Primary School, 

shutting the gates and locking more than 300 students, ages 7 to 

17, inside, according to a teacher at the school ... The Boko Haram 

militants then used the school as a military base, bringing scores 

of other women and children abducted across the town there as 

captives.” 51 When soldiers from Chad and Niger advanced on the 

town in March 2015, Boko Haram fled with 300 children and an 

estimated 100 women and left 470 dead. 


Photo from footage Boka Hara 

Fifteen of the over 200 missing Chibok girls. Photo from footage Boka Hara 

Profile: The Abduction of 276 Girls from the 

Government Secondary School, Chibok 

The abduction of 276 girls from the Government Secondary 

School in the town of Chibok officially began during the 

night of Monday, April 14, 2014. But in some respects it 

actually started on the Friday before. 

There had been attacks in the area, and in previous instances 

students at the school ran and hid in the forest. But on 

the Friday before, April 11, the principal called for a school 

assembly and announced that should a threat emerge all of 

the girls were to gather at a certain assembly point and wait 

for the military to arrive. 

As the shots of gunfire rang out that Monday night, the 

girls did as instructed, gathering at the assembly point and 

waiting for the military. Curiously, relatives of the principal 

were not present on that Monday, nor was the security 

guard, one of the only Muslim staff at the school which was 

almost entirely populated with Christian students. 

The first men through the gate of the school were wearing 

military uniforms and the girls welcomed them, believing 

they were their rescuers. But as more and more men 

arrived and began chanting, “Allahu Akbar,” meaning “God 

is great,” a sinking realization settled. The girls were forced 

to cover their heads and marched for two hours. Several 

who have escaped have reported that some community 

members in the area gathered at the road and cheered as 

the girls were marched past them. Eventually the group 

reached several lorries where the girls were loaded on the 

back. 

The lorries drove through the night of April 15 deeper into 

the Sambisa Forest with additional Boko Haram motorcycles 

trailing behind. Several who escaped reported that the 

driver of their lorry whispered that he was also Chibok, had 

been pressed into this service, did not know where they 

were headed but that he would slow down from time to 

time so that some of the girls could jump and run for safety. 

In the morning when the guards realized that some of the 

girls had escaped, they threatened to kill the driver but no 

one else present knew how to drive that particular vehicle. 

Altogether 57 girls escaped either by jumping or later from 

the forest. Boko Haram released a video on the two year 

anniversary of this abduction to prove that at least some of 

the students remain in their captivity. Despite tremendous 

international outcry, two years later, 219 girls remain 

missing presumably kept hidden deep within the Sambisa 

Forest. Many blame the Nigerian government for their 

unwillingness to acknowledge the breadth of the abduction 

or to receive international assistance that could have 

helped locate the girls. The principal now lives in Maiduguri 

and is said by relatives to have acquired new and additional 

property. 



The destruction unleashed by Boko Haram is massive and widespread. 

Citing a leaked World Bank Report, the BBC notes the 

devastation and destruction in Borno State, where the rampant 

abuses have been most profoundly felt: 

950,000 

30 percent of 3.2 million private houses 

5,335 buildings 

1,630 water sources 

1,205 administrative buildings 

726 power sub-stations and distribution lines 

201 health centers 

76 police stations 

35 electricity offices 

14 prison buildings. 52 

Given the scope of Boko Haram’s activities, one of the open questions 

is to what degree is the group voluntarily supported by individuals 

within northeastern Nigeria? While this cannot be known exactly, 

John Campbell points to a Pew Research survey indicating that 

perhaps as much as 10 percent of Muslims in Nigeria support the 

actions of Boko Haram. 53 What is perhaps more clear is that there 

have been a number of volunteer recruits who have joined the ranks 

of Boko Haram, and they have done so for a variety of reasons. 

school-age children with 

almost no opportunity 

for education 

611 

teachers killed 

19K 

teachers have 

fled for their 

lives 

READ MORE 

ONLINE 

Where are the 

girls today? 

Muslim resident of IDP camp near Abuja, Nigeria 



Recent research has highlighted: 

When military advanced upon 

the Zanna Mobarti Primary 

School in March 2015, 

Boko Haram fled with 

300 children 

100 women 

470 

and left 

dead 

Some of the people are 

planning on going back 

home and seeking 

revenge. Even some 

of the young boys and 

youth are planning on 

returning to their home 

area and seeking 

revenge. If this trauma 

healing is not done then 

there will be significant 

social unrest in the 

future. 

Director of an “Unofficial” 

IDP Camp in Plateau State 

that had registered 4,000 

individuals 

1. There is no single demographic profile of a Boko Haram member; 

2. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment; 

3. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through 

business support; 

4. Some women freely choose to join Boko Haram for the opportunity 

to gain more education through the study of the Quran, as part of 

their own theological conviction, or as a means of achieving higher 

status; 

5. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance 

of Boko Haram. 54 

In the midst of these challenging dynamics in many instances the 

Nigerian security forces – which include the Nigerian armed forces, 

police forces, and self-defense groups such as the Civilian Joint 

Task Force – exacerbated the situation. One individual described: 

No one knowns for sure who the enemy is. Boko Haram will attack the people 

and leave. Then the military will come and also arrest people. When the 

people try to cooperate with the military, Boko Haram will attack them again. 

Now the military thinks civilians are Boko Haram. Civilians think some military 

are Boko Haram. They are afraid to give information to anyone. Even the 

[Civilian Joint Task Force] has started acting like [it’s] the military sometimes, 

and abusing the people. We really don’t know who the enemy is now. 55 

In some respects, it was the lack of security or the gross abuse 

of security forces in northeastern Nigeria that contributed to the 

foundation of discrimination that helped kindle Boko Haram. 

Although most civilians would now identify Boko Haram as the 

primary threat to security in the region, this does not mean that 

there has been a widespread embrace of the government security 

forces. Rather, the Center for Civilians for Conflict notes: 

Nigeria’s security forces have fallen short in three major ways. They have: 1) 

failed to protect vulnerable communities from violence; 2) failed to prevent 

collateral damage during counter-Boko Haram operations; and 3) directly 

targeted civilians with unlawful detention, harassment, destruction of property, 

sexual violence, indiscriminate targeting of certain groups (e.g. young 

men), torture, and excessive use of force causing injury and death. These 

patterns of harm are a direct result of several factors. Most important among 

them, Nigeria’s overall strategy to combat violent extremism lacks sufficient 

attention to mitigating the drivers of the conflict and incorporating non- 



military approaches to civilian security. This leaves the military as the sole 

provider of solutions to problems it cannot solve. 56 

In other words, while civilians, especially religious minorities, decry 

the lack of security at the local level, many remain suspicious of 

the Nigerian security forces. One former UN official described, 

“To the Nigerian Army there are only four types of people in 

northeastern Nigeria: Boko Haram, Boko Haram sympathizers, 

Boko Haram abductees, and people the army has freed from the 

control of Boko Haram.” 57 In effect, the Nigerian army seems to 

have made a decision to describe their efforts in northeastern 

Nigeria as a process of liberating communities from the control 

of Boko Haram. This is a significant political and media coup, as in 

recent days the military has been able to claim largescale victories 

with significant numbers released. However, the reality is often 

somewhat murkier, as Boko Haram tends to be active in an area 

without necessarily holding the territory in a classic sense. This 

enables the Nigerian security forces to claim a more decisive victory 

than what is often the case, especially if Boko Haram fighters are 

left to reenter the area once the security forces have departed. 

The villagers themselves may be somewhat ambivalent. On the 

one hand, Boko Haram forces might move through the area, on 

occasion causing civilian destruction before withdrawing, while 

in other instances, it is the Nigerian security forces following 

the same pattern. Moreover, there are reports that at times the 

Nigerian security forces have actually burned down villages in the 

name of setting that community free from Boko Haram and then 

escorting the members of the community to IDP camps. 58 

As John Campbell has written: 

In April 2012 the federal government granted emergency powers to the 

security forces to counter Boko Haram. The heavy security presence in these 

areas has become dysfunctional. There was a downward spiral, with soldiers 

resorting to brutality amongst an increasingly hostile population ... In the 

past, millenarian Islamic movements had burned themselves out, often under 

military pressure. But there was no sign that this process was under way ... 

On the other hand, Boko Haram did not seem to be consolidating. Instead, it 

appeared to be a grassroots revolution but without a political infrastructure 

and mostly fed by popular rage with a dose of Islamic fervor. And the military 

appeared incapable of controlling it. 59 

In relation to religious 

freedom, what people 

fail to know is that the 

Chibok community is 

mixed with 70 percent of 

the population Christian 

in a state where the 

population around them 

is 80 percent Muslim. 

So you have a Christian 

minority in a larger 

Christian county that is 

within a larger Muslim 

state. Up to this time the 

Chibok community had 

lived side by side with 

the larger community 

in peace. And when the 

girls were kidnapped 

even Muslims mourned 

the loss. 

Imam Muhammad Ashafa 

Even when a member of Boko Haram is captured, it remains 

unclear as to what legal charges are normally applied or judicial 



false 

narrative 

The Military is Making 

Significant Advancements 

in Containing Boko Haram 

Inaugurated as President in May 

2015, President Buhari noted his intention 

to eradicate Boko Haram, and in 

December 2015, publicly claimed that 

the terrorist organization had been 

“technically defeated.” In the first few 

months of 2016 the Nigerian army 

claimed that 800 Boko Haram fighters 

had voluntarily surrendered and 11,595 

civilian hostages had been rescued. 

(Morgan Winsor, “Nigerian Military Says 

800 Boko Haram Fighters Have Surrendered,” 

International Business Times 

[March 8, 2016]) 

However, on the ground, the 

situation remains largely unaltered. At 

this stage these claims should be best 

understood as political rhetoric which 

is not without its own merit as a tool for 

galvanizing support, shifting momentum 

and undercutting the narrative 

Boko Haram wants to maintain. Though 

valuable, it is still not a substitute for 

actual progress. This is especially the 

case since there have been widespread 

reports that security forces have 

committed human rights violations. This 

includes a claim by Amnesty International 

that between December 12-14, 2015, 

the Nigerian army slaughtered and 

secretly buried 347 members of a Shi’ite 

religious group in the northern city of 

Zaria in Kaduna State. This is in conjunction 

with an assertion by a former 

UN official who described that Nigerian 


Boko Haram poster inside Jos prison 

sentencing guidelines or processes utilized. In other words, the 

means by which the Nigerian government seeks to rehabilitate 

and reintegrate former members of Boko Haram into society 

remains somewhat speculative. In her book Boko Haram: Nigeria’s 

Islamist Insurgency, Virginia Comolli noted that despite repeated 

efforts and false starts, she was unable to interview an individual in 

prison on charges related to their participation in Boko Haram. 60 

This mirrors the experience of 21CWI, whose team was initially 

given permission to visit a prisoner, but then denied entrance. 

When one of the officials at a major prison was asked how many 

of the inmates were being held for crimes associated with Boko 

Haram, he responded, “two.” He further elaborated that the crime 

listed for most of these individuals was “causing trouble” because, 

as he quickly added, “we do not want to embarrass them.” 

There are reports that at the Giwa Barracks Detention Center in 

Maiduguri, there is a “ten-fold increase in the number of detainees 

in these cells rising from 25 in 2015 to 250 in early 2016,” and 

with squalid conditions so unsanitary that since the start of 2016, 

out of the approximate 1,200 detainees, 149 people have died 

including 11 children under the age of six. 61 

In the wake of the destruction by Boko Haram and the actions and 

missteps of the Nigerian security forces, local communities find 

themselves holding the pieces and wondering how to rebuild. In 

fact, there is an understandable but disconcerting trend among 

some of the youth, particularly within the communities of religious 

minorities, to outline a vision of their future in terms of military 

engagement and revenge against Boko Haram and those ascribing 

to its stated ideology. 



More Muslims have been displaced and killed than either 

Christians or practitioners of African Traditional Religion. 

Given their minority status, in some areas Christian communities 

have been virtually eliminated. The process of rehabilitation and 

rebuilding will require years of intentional engagement, especially 

given the fact that the violence has been repetitive and ruthless. 

This is well illustrated in the experience of Amadi from Bauchi State. 

The attack occurred on April 27, 2011 and began around 1:00 

a.m. The family was Christian and had begun preparing for Easter. 

Amadi was asleep when she awoke to gunshots fired outside 

her home. Her husband and children were out of town, so 

Amadi grabbed her handbag and mobile to flee to the home of a 

neighbor. She never made it there. As she was running she heard 

a gunshot, and the pain in her leg told her that she had been hit. 

The attackers broke into her home and found her sitting there 

having been shot in the leg. They rushed at her with machetes 

raised and swung to slash her head but she raised her hand to 

block the weapon. The wound has never fully healed, and even 

today she is unable to use that hand. 

She fell forward to the ground, and using machetes, they attacked 

again. Both her head and her back were ripped open. No words 

were exchanged during the attack, though Amadi heard shouted 

throughout, “Allahu Akbar,” which means “God is great.” When they 

had finished, they rushed out and Amadi began to hear the voices 

of neighbors and eventually someone from the military. Bleeding 

profusely and in a terrible condition, she was taken to the hospital 

in town. 

At the time she was six months pregnant. When she arrived at 

the hospital she asked the doctor if he could hear the baby moving, 

and after checking, he answered with a heart stopping and 

straightforward report of “no.” At that point Amadi said that she 

lost her mind and did not know what was happening. 

Two days later she was transferred to the city of Bauchi so that 

she could receive better medical treatment. She spent the initial 

five days in intensive care where they had to first “flush” out the 

six-month old baby who had been killed and then the placenta. 

Amadi spent the next four months in that hospital slowly recovering. 

Today she is still unable to work or to exert significant physical 

activity due to the loss of functionality in her hand and reduced 

mobility in the leg that was shot. 

continued from page 52 

security forces will sometimes claim 

to have liberated an area claimed by 

Boko Haram only in the most tenuous 

sense. As proof of their military success 

they may even point to a village that 

they themselves burned and escort the 

villagers to a refugee or IDP camp. 

One indicator that the situation on 

the ground has not significantly changed 

is that according to the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 

only 8.86 percent of IDPs repatriated in 

its most recent count. Even this dismal 

number is undoubtedly inflated given 

that the UNHCR undercounts the total 

IDP population by several million. 

“To the Nigerian Army 

there are only four types 

of people in northeastern 

Nigeria: Boko Haram, 

Boko Haram sympathizers, 

Boko Haram abductees, 

and people the army has 

freed from the control of 

Boko Haram.” 

A former UN official 



No words were exchanged 

during the attack, 

though Amadi heard 

shouted throughout, 

“Allahu Akbar,” which 

means “God is great.” 

Young mother who fled village after Boko Haram attack. 

in 2013, Fulani militants 

killed 

63 

in 2014, they killed 

1,229 

500 

killed 

by armed men with guns, 

bows and machetes 

in the Agatu attack 

This kind of experience is replicated many times over. While 

recovery from this kind of violence is challenge enough, it is 

compounded if the deeper foundation of discrimination is not 

also addressed. Many Christian religious minorities believe that 

northern Muslim elite and some within the state governments, 

who may or may not be supportive of Boko Haram, are nonetheless 

using the instability of the situation to further extend 

an Islamic political hegemony that will outlast the end of hostilities 

related to Boko Haram. 

As proof, multiple participants spoke of ongoing political 

disenfranchisement that they believe they were experiencing 

because of their Christian identification. As already noted, 

Christians have long believed that there are some within state 

governments who manipulate results in order to ensure that 

Muslims remain in key positions. One individual in southern 

Bauchi State described how his particular village of 5,000 

is virtually entirely Christian. Despite legal requirements to 

provide local voting, there is not one polling station in the entire 

community. The closest polling station is in the next community 

three miles away, but the sole connecting road is firmly controlled 

by Boko Haram, thus effectively leaving this Christian community 

virtually excluded from the political process and further marginalized. 

He concluded his testimony by imploring, “Please free us ... 

Make us part of the Nigerian government.” 

Another individual from a different community in southern Bauchi 

State described his experience. His particular community was 


comprised of about 10,000 and was the hub for a local area of 

twenty villages that had roughly another 10,000 people. The 

majority of these 20,000 are Christian. In March 2011, the outlying 

twenty villages were attacked and destroyed, creating an overnight 

influx of about 10,000 people. During this attack that destroyed 

twenty villages and displaced 10,000, 818 homes were burned, 

153 were killed, 200 wounded and 32 churches destroyed. Since 

that time, no one from the government or from IDP humanitarian 

organizations has offered any help or assistance. In fact, 

when the Local Government Area formed a committee to resettle 

those affected by Boko Haram, this entire community with 10,000 

Christian IDPs was excluded. Moreover, since 2011, the area that 

had been occupied by the twenty villages has been rezoned into 

dedicated grazing territory preventing the possibility of resettlement 

and virtually eradicating the history and existence of those 

Christian communities. He lamented: 


818 

homes burned 

153 

killed 

10,000 

Christian IDPs were excluded 

from Local Government aid, 

southern Bauchi State. 

We have been left to the mercy of God ... The issue of resettling Christian IDPs 

is an issue for us. A lot of money has come in for resettling IDPs, but Christians 

are exempted from this. They are not included in the process. Are we not part 

of Nigeria? ... Why the marginalization? Why are we being silenced? 

The Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria rekindled the dangerous religious fault 

lines existing in Nigeria. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian 

society, and the divisive religious sensitivity, the quick degeneration of the 

situation perhaps was inevitable. The Islamic fundamentalists tried to forcibly 

impose a religious ideology on a constitutionally recognized secular society 

which was not their first attempt, but so far it is the most brutal. The move 

by Boko Haram widened the scope of Islamic revivalism which serves as 

a mobilization tool for many of its adherents. Boko Haram challenges the 

legitimacy of the Nigerian state in the course of promoting Islamic revivalism 

and further indicts the government as ineffective in securing and preserving 

the lives and properties of Nigerians. 62 

The emergence of Boko Haram has been a source of significant 

disruption within Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram 

is an outgrowth of a foundation of discrimination, both in terms of 

exclusion of the northern region within the main economic growth 

of the Nigerian federation, and in relation to policies and practices 

within the north that favored one religion over others and created 

a climate for adherents of increasingly violent expressions of that 

religion to exert themselves. One security expert on the region 

observed: 



John Campbell notes, “Family, ethnic, and religious identities are 

trumping a sense of national allegiance in large part because the 

state no longer addresses the basic concerns and needs of people.” 63 

In the midst of this strained system, religious identification is 

hardening into a reality that can further fracture Nigeria. 

While everyone has been impacted, religious minorities have carried 

a unique burden, and many fear that because the broader 

foundation of discrimination that they have faced for many years 

has not been altered, there will be those who will use the present 

flux and instability to further institutionalize a marginalization of 

the Christian community within the northern region. Unfortunately, 

this pattern of intentional disempowerment, especially around 

issues of consolidating control over land that can be zoned for 

grazing, is being repeated in the Middle Belt. 

Christian family who fled the north to escape violence and discrimination. 


FULANI MILITANTS NIGERIA 57 

Fulani Militants: 

Threatening to Engulf the Middle Belt 

Where ongoing discrimination and the violence of Boko Haram 

have helped produce one of the most severe humanitarian crises 

in the world, Fulani militants are contributing to one of the gravest 

security threats. In 2013, Fulani militants killed 63 individuals; in 

2014, they killed 1,229, a rapidly accelerating trend they have 

continued to maintain. 64 In that time, the Fulani militants went 

from being unlisted on the Global Terrorism Index to inclusion as 

the fourth most deadly group in the world. 

If this pattern continues, the undermining of the Middle Belt 

becomes a distinct possibility with an increasing likelihood that 

Abuja itself will be directly pulled into the fray, igniting a religious 

and ethnic war. Should this kind of violence engulf the capital and 

its environs, the economic and security impact would ripple across 

Africa and beyond. This doomsday scenario is not a foregone 

inevitability. However, significant engagement, redirected policy efforts 

and focused attention are necessary in order to prevent the 

fracture of Nigeria along religious fault lines. 

i Fulani 

MOROCCO 

ALGERIA 

LYBIA 

DJIBOUTI 

MAURITANIA 

MALI NIGER CHAD 

SUDAN 

SENEGAL 

GAMBIA 

BURKINA 

FASO 

ETHIOPIA 

GUINEA GUINEA 

NIGERIA CENTRAL SOUTH 

BISSAU 

AFRICAN SUDAN 

REPUBLIC 

SIERRA 

UGANDA 

LEONE 

BENIN 

KENYA 

LIBERIA 

RWANDA 

TOGO 

GABON 

BURUNDI 

COTE 

EQUATORIAL 

D’IVOIRE 

DR CONGO 

TANZANIA 

GUINEA 

COMORES 

GHANA 

Fulani presence 

across Africa 

Presence 

Across Africa 

TUNISIA 

CAMEROON 

CONGO 

ANGOLA 

EGYPT 

ZAMBIA 

ZIMBABWE 

NAMBIA 

BOTSWANA 

SOUTH 

AFRICA 

MALAWI 

MOZAMBIQUE 

SWAZILAND 

LESOTHO 

SOMALIA 

MADAGASCAR 

The seriousness of this threat, the reality that it is being largely 

ignored, and the potential that this violence has to fracture the 

nation into a spiraling ethno-religious war and land grab was 

highlighted in recent briefing notes issued by the office of the 

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 

Although the increasing competition for natural resources between farming 

and herders communities has led to many incidents in the past, Monday’s 

[April 25, 2016] attack appears to be among the most serious in recent years. 

The exact number of victims remains unknown but local sources say that at 

least 40 people may have been killed during what appears as a well-prepared 

raid carried out by some 500 men armed with guns, bows and machetes in 

the Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area. Many houses and a church were also 

set on fire by attackers. 

We welcome the announcement by the Nigerian authorities that they 

have launched an investigation and also dispatched additional security 

forces to the area. However we are very concerned by reports that advance 

warning of a potential attack in the area had been received by the 

authorities, and was not effectively acted on. 

READ MORE 

ONLINE 

Nigeria Fulani Militants 


58 NIGERIA FULANI MILITANTS 

false 

narrative 

This Conflict is Simply a 

Continuation of Longstanding 

Farmer-Pastoralist Tensions 

Characterization of the violence in 

the Middle Belt as intercommunal conflict 

along the lines of traditional antagonism 

between farmers and pastoralists is 

common, historically grounded and on 

the surface plausible. However, recent 

developments demand a new analysis to 

in part account for the significant uptick 

in violence since 2014. 

Without question, cattle rustling 

exists within the Middle Belt to the 

detriment of Fulani pastoralists. However, 

the attacks of the past two years cannot 

be construed as simple reprisals when 

multiple, credible reports from across 

the region describe assaults that include 

supply helicopters, raids launched from 

multiple boats, machine guns mounted 


30,000,000 

Fulani in West Africa 

18,000,000 

Fulani in Nigeria 

We are also worried by the complete impunity enjoyed so far by perpetrators 

of previous attacks, including ones in Benue State in February. This 

attack reportedly led to the destruction of entire villages in 13 different Local 

Government Areas, killed more than 300 people, and displaced more than 

20,000 others. 

We call on the Nigerian Government to guarantee the security of all its 

citizens in full respect of international and national human rights standards 

and to ensure that justice is done for the very serious human rights violations 

which have been taking place. Holding perpetrators to account is all the 

more crucial as some communities under threat are now suggesting taking 

justice into their own hands. 65 

Introduction to the Fulani 

The Fulani, also called the Fulbe or Peul, are a largely pastoral 

nomadic group found in nineteen different countries, but most 

predominantly in West Africa. There are more than 30 million Fulani 

in West Africa, with the largest groupings in Nigeria (18 million), 

Guinea (5 million), Cameroon (2 million), Mali (1 million), Niger (1 

million) and Senegal (1 million). 66 While there is growing pressure 

on Fulani to settle, and certainly many have done so, for centuries, 

Fulani have grazed cattle over a wide range of territory throughout 

western Africa. 67 As the environmental conditions of the Sahel 

have deteriorated, Fulani herdsmen have been forced to slowly 

migrate southward and westward in search of grazing pastures. 

The term “Fulani” was perhaps first used by Hausa with whom 

there has been considerable intermingling in Nigeria leading many 

to describe the pair in an almost singular fashion of Hausa-Fulani. 

98 percent of all Fulani are Muslim and collectively are the largest 

pastoral nomadic group in the world. 

It is important to note that the focus within this report is on 

Fulani militants and not the Fulani as a whole, many of whom 

do not participate in acts of aggression, maintain fairly peaceful 

coexistence with local communities and non-Fulani neighbors, and 

may or may not support violence in the furtherance of political or 

religious goals. 



continued from page 58 

Fulani herdsman in the Middle Belt 

Accelerating Inter-Communal 

Violence in the Middle Belt 

Tensions and conflict have long existed between Muslim, pastoralist 

Fulani and the predominantly agrarian, Christian communities 

throughout the Middle Belt. Flare-ups have occurred due to grazing 

patterns that impinge on farming land, cattle rustling, and the 

intermingling of cultures, peoples and communities. However, to a 

large extent there has been relative peace and stability for generations. 

This has slowly been changing, especially since the adoption 

of sharia by northern states and the outbreak of violence in Jos in 

2010, the effects of which were felt throughout Plateau State and 

were interpreted by many Christians and Muslims alike through 

the lens of religion. 

Since 2014 there has been a precipitous acceleration of conflict 

primarily driven by Fulani militants attacking predominantly 

Christian Local Government Areas with sophisticated weapons in 

an environment of impunity. This acceleration has transformed 

the nature and the scope of the violence beyond a narrative of 

traditional conflict, although the maintenance of this narrative is 

politically useful to shield what would otherwise be analyzed as 

efforts by the Fulani to ensure a hegemony of power, control over 

on vehicles, AK47s, scorched earth 

policies that level entire communities, 

and sustained offensives that last for 

months in particular locations without 

governmental intervention. Moreover, 

Fulani militant attacks seem to almost 

singularly concentrate on Local 

Government Areas that are predominantly 

composed of Christians while 

bypassing Muslim areas. 

There is a history in Nigeria of avoidance 

and seeking to minimize or otherwise 

dismiss a growing security threat until 

the situation has degenerated into a fullscale 

humanitarian crisis. 

In this case, should the situation 

continue on its current precipitous track, 

the potential implications are quite serious 

due to the proximity of the conflict 

to the national capital and the possibility 

of lighting an ethno-religious war that 

could fracture Nigeria as a whole. 

98% 

of all Fulani are Muslim 

and collectively are the 

largest pastoral nomadic 

group in the world. 



i 

Map of Sharia Law in 

Nigeria 

larger areas of land, and the violent expansion of one religion over 

others. If this acceleration in the frequency and the force behind 

these attacks continues, it will further fracture Nigeria along 

religious fault lines with devastating consequences at individual, 

communal and national levels. 

KEBBI 

SOKOTO 

ZAMFARA 

KATSINA 

KANO 

JIGAWA 

YOBE 

BORNO 

Several case studies are illustrative. 

KADUNA 

BAUCHI 

GOMBE 

NIGER 

KWARA 

ADAMAWA 

PLATEAU 

FCT 

OYO 

NASARAWA 

TARABA 

OSUN EKITI 

KOGI 

BENUE 

OGUN ONDO 

EDO ENUGU 

LAOS 

EBONYL 

IMO CROSS ANAMBRA 

DELTA 

RIVERS 

BAYEISA 

ABIA 

RIVERS 

Sharia Law 

in Nigeria 

Case Study: 

Kadarako, Nasarawa State 

Kadarako is a small village in Nasarawa State, predominantly 

but not solely comprised of Christians. The majority of the small 

communities within its greater hinterlands are Christian. The 

entire area has experienced regular violence since 2013. As 

one individual noted: 

Kadarako is a town under siege. We would not be able to see anybody here 

today alive if not for their determination and courage. 

The result of the sustained offensives is that a number of IDPs 

from the broader area have resettled in Kadarako. One such 

individual had been a denominational leader overseeing a number 

of churches in nearby Wase. In 2013, a group of Fulani militants 

attacked Wase and in his words: 

We had to run for our dear lives. They vandalized the church. They killed many of 

our pastors. They killed many of our members. They burned. They raped. They 

enslaved some of our children. Up to now some people do not know where 

their children are. I thought the world, especially the Europeans who were the 

ones who brought the Gospel to us, had abandoned us to the Islamists. 

He certainly believed that his hometown was attacked because 

many were Christians, and that this attack was a direct outgrowth 

of a longstanding foundation of discrimination that was escalating 

into ever more lethal violence. As evidence, he noted that in 1987, 

a Muslim was appointed to the local council while no Christians 

have been included in the local government since that time, even 

though the majority of the local population is Christian. This further 

illustrates that at least within the northern and Middle Belts 

of Nigeria, religious fault lines and religious identification are hardening 

even if in many cases the primary causative factor is more 



Christian villagers continue to worship in the face of persecution. 

political than theological in nature. In many cases the categories 

of “Muslim” and “Christian” are being politicized, at which point it 

becomes difficult if not impossible to fully defuse an intermingling 

of religion and politics. In other words, the initial causative factors 

may or may not have emerged from religion, but continuous conflict 

is driving the infusion of religion which in the end heightens 

communal and national fracturing. 

Another individual from the Kadarako environs shared her story. 

On May 2, 2015, a convoy of cars showed up in her village, killed 

her husband, and left her as a widow with a fifteen year old son 

and a thirteen year old girl. Her response: 

If there was a way for the Nigerian government to not allow Muslims to force 

people into their religion so that we are able to live peacefully, continue with 

our normal lives, and worship our true God, then I would be grateful. 

Local government leaders described multiple years of political 

discrimination, limited infrastructure development of their 

community, and violent attacks by Fulani militants without the 

addition of any security forces or legal accountability for those 

who had participated in the destruction of property and lives. 

Reflecting on the limited development the community had 



experienced but stated in a manner with far widespread ramifications, 

the local chief noted: 

? 

WHO ARE THE TAROK 

The Tarok are an agrarian 

society in the hills and on the 

plains southeast of Plateau 

State in Nigeria. 

It is as if the government does not know the real problem that is going on 

here. It is as if they do not care about what is going on here. 

He further described that when they had experienced attacks at 

the hands of Fulani militants – incursions that left members of the 

community dead and numerous homes burned – state government 

sent no emergency relief supplies. Further adding to this community’s 

suspicion, aggressors in several attacks had participated while 

wearing a military uniform. The chief believed that the reason their 

community had seen its infrastructure suppressed and multiple attacks 

was precisely due to their ethnicity and religion: 

They hate the Tarok because the Tarok refuses [Islam]. We said that we embrace 

Christianity. They said, ‘no, even if it is by force you must accept Islam.’ 

Another village elder implored, “We need your assistance to safeguard 

our integrity.” 

Grave sites are commonplace in these villages. 



Case Study: Sho, Plateau State 

Sho is a community under siege. Located only 2.5 miles from 

Barkin Ladi in Plateau State, Sho is strategically positioned 

because it is close to a major town, situated on the banks of a 

river, and good for both farming and grazing. Fulani nomads first 

appeared in the area in the 1950s and were initially welcomed by 

the community. Over time, however, their numbers grew, as did 

their demands and acts of aggression. October 14, 1999 marked a 

turning point with the first murder: a young man gunned down by 

a Fulani pastoralist. 

While there have been attacks since, the aggression has become 

particularly sharp since 2014. This included an attack in July 2015 

that killed fourteen individuals traveling on the road between Sho 

and Barkin Ladi. This attack seemed particularly intentional as the 

group included the President of the Community and the school 

principal, an event which caused the male village elder describing 

the attack to pause, and overcome with grief, cry. In the recent past, 

armed with AK47s, Fulani militants have burned or cut down crops 

just before harvest season, and in the past two years, members 

of the community have been prevented from fully planting. 

In fact, one of the only reasons this community of about 10,000 

has been able to survive during the intermittent siege of the 

past two years is because it has been able to strategically take 

advantage of hiding in a number of caves located on the outskirts 

of the community. Both the pace and the impact of the attacks are 

increasing. 

The most recent death at the time of writing was a teenager killed 

in December 2015 when he ventured out of some caves to look 

for a Christmas gift. 

In 2015, there were four attacks in July, four attacks in August and 

eight attacks in September. Those killed in 2015 left behind 154 

dependents, the majority of whom were female and under the age 

of eighteen. In these sixteen separate attacks, 266 farmers were 

negatively impacted with more than 262 acres of farmland destroyed. 

Crisis Victims in Sho 68 

Crisis Victims in Sho 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

TOTAL 

2 

1 

4 

2 

1 

2 

27 

39 

TOTAL KILLED 39 

262 

acres of farmland 

destroyed 

When interviewed in early 2016, near the end of the dry season 

and after having lost yet another harvest, the elders reported 

that many families were hiding in caves and living off of grass. 



The only way to safely travel the 2.5 miles from Sho to Barkin Ladi 

is when the community pays to rent a personal armored vehicle. 

This small community is effectively cutoff from wider interaction 

and has lost all expectation that the government will do anything 

to intervene. In fact, its real fear is that the government will rezone 

the area around their community as designated grazing land and 

effectively remove their history and any remaining hope to rebuild 

and reestablish meaningful communities and livelihoods. 

Barely hanging on, this small community is representative of what 

is repeatedly occurring throughout the Middle Belt and threatens 

to fracture Nigeria along religious and ethnic lines. Plateau State is 

particularly affected, as one observer described: 

A thorough reframing of a once-localized conflict over indigene rights into a 

religious crisis of regional and national dimension has taken place. Ten years 

of violent confrontations and the extreme brutality of 2010’s massacres 

around Jos left many residents traumatized. Religious identities have become 

strongly polarized and one-sided conflict narratives internalized. Despite 

numerous peace efforts, tensions on the Plateau are at their worst today. 69 

With a sense of irony, one of the elders highlighted that in the 

local language, Sho means, “peace” and is part of the traditional 

greeting used by people in the area. To restate, within the Middle 

Belt and primarily at the hands of the Fulani militants, “peace” is 

literally under siege. 

Community elder greets Congressman Wolf. 



Case Study: Jol, Plateau State 

In the region of Birkin Ladi and Sho, Jol is a small community 

of about 5,000, though local leaders acknowledge that number 

is hard to verify given the number of IDPs both entering and 

exiting the community. Similar to other areas in Plateau State 

and the Middle Belt more broadly, Jol has experienced a rising 

tide of violence related to Fulani militants advancing on a 

predominantly Christian, farming village that has no government 

support or intervention. 

As one of the community leaders from Jol expressed: 

Our means of livelihood are agriculture and tin mining. As a result of these 

acts of violence and terrorism in both broad daylight and at nighttime, we 

have been denied the right to our economy. 

In 2015 alone 

1.9 

million 

$ 

USD of destruction of 

churches, crops, homes 

in Jol by Fulani 

The security personnel are very much aware of what we are facing. The 

cattle will be moved and then the next thing you will hear are gunshots 

of an attack. Altogether we have lost 9 hamlets that are part of the 

Jol Community. The problem is the radicalization of security personnel. The 

attackers will attack where security personnel are stationed. But they will do 

nothing until the houses are burned down. And then the security personnel 

will fire their guns in the air, and then claim the attack was from non-military. 

In our community we have [many] IDPs, but we have not received any help 

except for some mats that we have received. In the areas where the people 

have left because of displacement, the Fulani move in, take over that area, 

and settle down, and it becomes a place for the terrorists. 

In 2014 a helicopter landed in a Fulani dominated area. We reported it to 

the security personnel, but they denied it. However, we saw that it landed 

at midnight and left at 4:00 a.m., and after that attacks occurred. The Fulani 

people have killed our women and killed members of our community in front 

of the security personnel. There is a complicity and a conspiracy. 

Individuals from the community confirmed in written testimony 

that in some hamlets, Fulani militants had razed the community, 

illegally erected new structures, and assigned a new Fulani name 

to the town. Members of Jol worry that this alteration of demographic 

and cartographic realities on the ground will leave the 

IDPs from that area permanently displaced and further marginalize 

their ethnicity and those holding to Christianity. 



Crisis Victims in Sho 70 

Jol Crisis 

2001 

killed 

21 

dependents of 

victims 

1028 

houses 

destroyed 

148 

hectres of crops 

destroyed 

N/A 

2010 

7 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

2011 

14 

328 

42 

982 

2012 

15 

266 

29 

3 

2013 

27 

688 

97 

190 

2014 

10 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

2015 

15 

376 

49 

256 

TOTAL 

109 

2686 

365 

1431 

430,000 

In 2015 alone, in the area of Jol two additional churches were 

attacked and damaged, and the community estimated that 

the combined destruction of the churches, crops, homes and 

materials totaled more than 385.5 million Naira or the equivalent 

of $1.9 million USD. Throughout the year, Fulani militants attacked 

with highly sophisticated weapons, including machine guns 

mounted to the back of Special Task Force vehicles, handheld 

machine guns and a variety of explosive devices. 

people affected by 

attacks between 2011 

and 2014 in Benue. 

Case Study: Agatu, Benue State 

Mainly constituted of the Idoma people, Agatu is one of the nine 

Local Government Areas in the southern senatorial zone of 

Nigeria’s “Food Basket,” Benue State. 

The assault on Agatu on February 22, 2016 was not the first time that 

an attack occurred in this area. World Watch Monitor summarizes: 



But researchers at the Self-Worth Development Initiative, a local Makurdi 

NGO, say the public doesn’t realize just how bad the devastation has 

been. Their research revealed that nine Local Government Areas in the 

state had been impacted in the 2014 attacks – 80 percent of the Agatu 

Local Government Area, and for the Guma Local Government Area, 10 

out of 10 wards. More than 50,000 people were displaced from Agatu, 

which represented about 10 percent of the 430,000 people affected by attacks 

between 2011 and 2014 in Benue. 

These figures describe a humanitarian crisis akin to Boko Haram’s insurgency 

in the northeast. The striking hostility of the attackers toward churches, school, 

homes and farms is another indication that the terror group and the nomads 

share similar methods and even a common ideology – except that the Fulani 

take no prisoners. 

But here is how the nomads are different, and possibly more problematic. 

They are a tribe and not a terror group. This means they can’t simply be outlawed 

and treated as a terrorist organization. This also means government 

response has been muted compared to its declared war on Boko Haram. 71 

This most recent offensive, thought part of a broader pattern and 

context, was noteworthy for its duration and scope of impact. At 

some point after midday, at least two flat-bottom boats sailed up 

the Benue River to launch a full-scale attack on Agatu. A YouTube 

video posted by SBM Intelligence, a socio-political consulting firm 

in Nigeria, purports to be filmed “by one of the attackers. The 

same man took part in the Logo attack two weeks later where he 

was killed and the video was found on a mobile phone retrieved 

from his body.” 72 SBM Intelligence further notes: 

The men in the video spoke Fulfude, Hausa, Gurma and Zarma, the last two 

being languages indigenous to Nigeria’s northern neighbor, the Republic 

of Niger. This lends weight to the belief that a lot of these attacks are being 

carried out by people foreign to Nigeria, and questions the ability of our 

security services to police our country, given how far inland this river crossing 

took place. The distance between the suspected crossing point and the 

nearest border crossing in Katsina is 802 km [498 miles]. 73 

There were issues 

related to boundaries 

and tribal conflict 

before but they were 

manageable. But now 

the guerrilla insurgency 

is beyond what we are 

able to do and with their 

attacks at nights it has 

been out of control. 

Director of an 

“Unofficial” IDP Camp 

Housing 371 Individuals 

The boats landed around 3:00 p.m. and immediately launched 

an attack. According to an eyewitness, the militants approached 

him and were about to shoot him when he began shouting that 

he was a Muslim. The attacker demanded that he quote from the 

Quran, which the individual did and pointed to a small mosque as 

his normal place of worship. At this point the individual and those 



in that immediate vicinity were spared, and the Fulani repositioned 

to attack a different area of the community. The attack lasted two 

days and multiple eyewitnesses confirmed that at some point on 

Monday evening a helicopter landed and resupplied the militants. 

One individual from the area lamented, “Someone is sleeping in 

my bed and I would rather burn down my house than to have that 

person sleeping in my bed.” Another, a local prince and a retired 

army corporal decried: 

The federal government has not made any pronouncement. The indigenous 

people are helpless and no one is coming to their aid. We are highly disappointed 

with the federal government of Nigeria. I am angered by what has 

happened. I am a victim of what has happened in my own village. Take our 

case to the international community and tell them the plight of our people. 

We are being enslaved in our land. Insurgents are moving in the name of the 

Fulani, and the government does not say anything. 

According to at least one count, between 1997 and 2010 there 

were 18 incidents involving herdsmen and farming communities in 

the Middle Belt while between 2011 and 2015, there were 371. 74 

10 

Agatu villages razed 

500 

killed 

Multiple individuals who are either from Agatu or who traveled to 

the area following this attack report that ten Agatu villages were 

razed and hundreds were killed, as many as 500. 

Although there have been some who questioned the extent to 

which Fulani participated in this attack 75 , in an exclusive interview 

with Premium Times, Saleh Bayeri, the Interim National Secretary of 

Gan Allah Fulani Association specifically claimed Fulani involvement 

and defended the actions of the Fulani militants, noting that this 

“was a reprisal attack by his people against the Agatus” whom he 

accused of rustling 200 cattle and of killing a prominent Fulani 

leader named Ardo Madaki three years prior. 76 

A week after the incident, 11 Members of the Benue Parliamentary 

Caucus in the House of Representatives released a statement 

which read in part: 

A genocide that typical of the Nigerian state has been downplayed or ignored 

until it spirals out of control. After the Agatu mass massacre, a few headlines 

were recorded, a few sympathetic comments in high places but concrete 

moves to stop the killings have not been made. We decry the lukewarm attitude 

of the Federal government towards this ‘jihad’ being waged against our 

people by the herdsmen. 77 



The military is stretched with increasing attacks by the Fulani. 

Fulani Militants in the Middle Belt: 

Rationales for an Escalating Trend 

Karls Tsokar / Guardian [Nigeria] 

There are at least five rationales that help explain the escalating 

violence behind Fulani attacks in the Middle Belt. 

1 

First Rationale: Religion 

and Ethnicity. 

Without question, religion and ethnicity 

factor into the attacks conducted by the 

Fulani militants. As previously noted, one 

eyewitness to the attack in Agatu was 

spared solely because he was a practicing 

Muslim. Many of the Fulani attacks have 

included the destruction of churches. Anthropologist 

Adam Higazi describes: 

There was generally a shift or extension from vigilance against criminality to 

vigilance against attacks by opposing groups or militias defining themselves 

in religious or ethnic terms. The emphasis on social control within religious 

or cultural groups was also prominent in some areas. Hence, vigilantism in 

this context appears not only to have increased but to have also been transformed. 

78 

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) found that 

of all the IDPs in Nigeria, 12.6 percent were displaced due to 

communal clashes, 2.4 percent by natural disasters, and 85 per- 

causes of displacement 

among IDPs in Nigeria 

12.6% 

2.5% 

85% 

communal 

clashes 

natural 

disasters 

result of 

insurgency 

attacks by 

Islamists 



IDP camp near Abuja, Nigeria 

cent “as a result of insurgency attacks by Islamists.” 79 This analysis 

includes the actions of the Fulani in the Middle Belt. Moreover, in 

its 2013-2014 map highlighting causes of internal displacement in 

Nigeria, the IDMC added a new category of “religious violence” and 

noted incidents in Kaduna and Plateau States. 80 Significantly, these 

“religious violence” incidents track, not with Boko Haram, but with 

the actions of the Fulani. In addition, out of the twenty countries 

the IDMC is currently tracking in Sub-Saharan Africa, religious 

violence as a cause for internal displacement is only found in the 

Middle Belt of Nigeria. Though importantly, this is not meant to 

exclude the reality that religion is a factor elsewhere. To return to 

anthropologist Adam Higazi: 

The analysis has shown that group mobilization and violence in the lowlands 

of Plateau State needs to be understood in terms of the constellation of 

factors shaping ethnic and religious interaction and expression. Mobilization 

occurred in a context of insecurity and violent conflict but was defined in the 

relational terms of ethnicity and religion. The actions of vigilantes and militias 

varied according to the dynamics of conflict in particular locations, informed 

by local politics, resource issues and struggles for territory, all of which 

shaped and were shaped by the complex ethnic and religious matrix. 81 

In other words, while it would be a misreading to solely attribute 

these actions to religion, it would be a mistake to neglect the role 

of religion. In a context of insecurity, religious identity is becoming 

politicized and increasingly viewed as intermingled with ethnicity 



and a primary lens of identification. It seems that many Fulani 

militants find a motivation or a justification for their attacks in 

their religious interpretation. This has the real potential to further 

exploit and fracture Nigeria along religious fault lines. 

2 

Second Rationale: Economics and 

the Maintenance of Traditional 

Patterns of Livelihood. 

While religion certainly plays a factor, it is 

comingled with ethnicity and economic 

incentive. Though additional research is 

needed, it seems as if a majority of the 

Local Government Areas attacked by the 

Fulani are intentionally targeted because 

they are both primarily Christian, and 

because they will have the most to offer 

in terms of economic benefit, either due to securing the goods 

in a particular market or more frequently, quality grazing land. 

Although there are many Fulani who have settled throughout 

western Africa, the traditional nomadic pattern continues to be 

the one most revered. In the midst of increasing competition, 

Fulani are taking advantage of an opportunity to shift away from 

traditional patterns of limited integration alongside a farming community, 

to securing land that can be permanently and uniquely 

zoned for grazing. There is a clear economic incentive to continue 

these attacks throughout the Middle Belt, especially as the government 

has helped foster a climate of impunity by thus far showing 

a reluctance to hold militants accountable. 

3 

Third Rationale: Environmental 

Degradation. 

Environmental degradation across the 

Sahara Desert and the Sahel have forced 

Fulani pastoralists on ever more southward 

and westward migratory patterns. This is 

clearly having an impact on the Middle Belt. 

While it is certainly plausible that mercenaries 

and militants from neighboring countries 

are moving into Nigeria, as is frequently 

heard from local impacted communities who claim that those who 

are attacking bear accents or facial markings that differ from the Fulani 

with whom they have interacted in the past, it is also possible that 

at least some of these are Fulani who are forced to move into new 

territory in search of better grazing territory. 



Fourth Rationale: Opportunity 

4 

amidst the Instability Caused by 

Boko Haram. 

The impact of Boko Haram is felt far and 

wide, and until Boko Haram was creating 

the conditions that gave rise to one of the 

worst humanitarian crises in the world, 

both the Nigerian government and the 

international community were slow to 

respond. However, because of Boko Haram’s 

embrace of violence and its self-proclaimed establishment of a 

Caliphate in 2014, almost all security and humanitarian efforts 

have focused uniquely on Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. 

Fulani have been able to exploit this situation by accelerating their 

engagement precisely at a time when attention is focused on 

Boko Haram and the violent narrative they are promulgating. 

5 

The types of guns I recorded in interviews 

included AK47 semi-automatics (the most common), 

MG machine guns, SMGs (sub-machine 

guns), G3 rifles, Mark 4 rifles, single- and double-barrel shotguns, pistols, 

Dane guns (used by hunters) and locally made guns. Weapons were bought 

or supplied by all sides from a variety of local and national sources. Both 

state and military connections were important. Arms acquisition became a 

driving force in the conflicts, particularly in the way it seemed to accentuate 

cattle rustling – a source of funding for the purchase of weapons. Some guns 

were brought into Wase along bush paths from Taraba State, usually hidden 

in sacks of grain, skirting security checkpoints. There was a surfeit of weapons 

in Taraba due to the previous conflicts there between the Tiv and Jukun, 

which continued until 2001. There were also many other routes, Enugu being 

a major supply source. On the Muslim side, the Fulae [Fulani] seem to have 

been the main source of funds for arms purchases, principally because they 

hold readily marketable assets in the form of cattle, some of which they sell if 

they need to raise money. Both sides also claim they captured weapons from 

each other. 82 

Fifth Rationale: Upsurge of Small 

Arms in Civilian Hands in an 

Environment of Impunity. 

Though the research is dated by a few 

years, one scholar describes his experience 

with Fulani in the Middle Belt: 



Additional research is needed into the sources from which Fulani 

militants are acquiring their weapons. Ambassador Daniel Benjamin 

noted in a 2012 Congressional Hearing the very real possibility 

that countries such as Nigeria have been negatively impacted 

by “loose Libyan weapons and the return of refugees and mercenaries 

to their countries of origin across the Sahel.” 83 It certainly 

seems likely that the proliferation of weapons across West Africa 

in failed states such as Libya and Mali, especially given the tribal 

relationships and migratory patterns that exist within the Fulani, 

would have a bearing on Nigeria. It is also possible that perhaps 

on occasion Fulani acquire weapons from Boko Haram or more 

likely, through corruption within the Nigerian security forces. 

A recent Small Arms Survey notes: 

The militarized nature of politics combined with the prevalence of armed 

groups has allowed for an easy marriage between politics and violence. 

Armed groups are not new in Nigeria, but they are increasingly well armed 

and trained, and sophisticated in their tactics. After 2003, armed groups, hired 

for political purposes, were set free without being disarmed and have since 

evolved into economically independent and more politically savvy entities. 84 

Nigeria is very fragile. 

If these 180 million 

are displaced, they will 

overrun Africa, they will 

overrun Europe, and 

business interests in 

the United States will be 

directly and negatively 

impacted. Nigeria is on 

the verge of breaking 

into pieces, and it will 

not be violence free. 

Stephen Enada, Advocate for 

Just Society 

Though the sourcing of weapons is important to reversing the 

trend, multiple interviews and reports note that even in the absence 

of understanding the exact origin, what is clear is that there 

are more small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians 

throughout the Middle Belt. Equally, there has been a well-attested 

growth in the sophistication of the weapons used by Fulani 

militants and – as a consequence – of their lethality and impact. 

While additional research is needed, there have been multiple 

reports from across the Middle Belt of the use of boats, vehicles 

mounted with weapons, automatic machine guns, handheld 

explosive devices and the use of helicopters to resupply Fulani. 

Partly because of this, the state and federal governments have 

been reluctant to insert professional security forces into vulnerable 

areas in the Middle Belt both when there are advance reports 

of an impending assault, or afterwards, to hold accountable those 

who participate in these attacks. This combination is creating an 

open climate of impunity undermining the rule of law, increasing 

the number of deaths, and fostering a highly combustible reality 

that has the potential to fracture the nation along religious and 

ethnic fault lines. The United States Institute of Peace notes: 



The future stability of Nigeria may well lie in the hands of those at the top 

levels of the party system who must be thoughtful and skilled in managing 

the realities of religious identity politics. Even more important, given the 

winner-take-all nature of presidential politics, is the capacity of national leaders 

to manage ethno-religious symbols in a way that promotes unity rather 

than disunity. 85 

Reuters 

The aftermath of a Fulani Militant attack 

The Devastating and Potential Impact 

of Fulani Militants to Fracture Nigeria 

In a loose approximation, the Fulani militants seem to be borrowing 

from the playbook of Boko Haram. The Fulani are using 

the claim, and not always without reason, of cattle rustling and 

limited grazing opportunities as a political rallying cry for participation. 

This movement is being largely ignored by the government, 

minimized or outright denied as evidenced in part that few are 

held accountable and the government refuses to station security 

forces in areas of vulnerability. Over the past two years, this has 

allowed the Fulani to form a strengthened ideological and military 



engagement relatively unhindered. Fulani militants are initiating 

more brazen and rampant acts of aggression, and having thus far 

received little to no deterrents, there is a very real possibility these 

aggressive acts could transition into a full-scale conflict that has 

the potential to impact millions and undermine the nation. 

If there are not significant policy changes and approaches, the 

conflict in the Middle Belt will escalate with the possibility to sweep 

destruction and displacement across the nation. Decisive action is 

needed now in order to ensure that this possibility is turned back 

and that the nation of Nigeria is preserved. 

That this is a growing threat cannot be doubted. Collating multiple 

sources of data, the following chart illustrates how quickly the Fulani 

attacks are spreading across the nation: 

FULANI ATTACKS 

January 2015 2015 Fulani – April Attacks 2016 86 

Within the current 

environment there is 

nothing that would 

inherently stop the 

Fulani from turning 

these aggressive acts of 

destruction into a full-scale 

conflict that will have the 

potential to impact 

millions and undermine 

the nation. 

date of attack 

victims killed 

LGA 

state 

1/27/2015 

1/27/2015 

1/30/2015 

3/15/2015 

4/10/2015 

4/27/2015 

5/11/2015 

5/23/2015 

7/7/2015 

9/1/2015 

9/6/2015 

10/2/2015 

11/5/2015 

11/9/2015 

11/9/2015 

12/1/2015 

12/13/2015 

12/15/2015 

2015 subtotal 

8 

17 

9 

90 

2 

28 

5 

23 

1 

2 

1 

0 

12 

1 

22 

1 

15 

22 

259 

Zangong Kataf 

Agatu 

Logo 

Agatu 

Ethiopie-East 

Guma 

Kwande 

Logo 

Kwande 

Ndokwa West 

Plateau 

Yewa North 

Buruka 

Udi 

Dekina 

Isoko 

Plateau 

Borno 

Kaduna 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Delta 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Delta 

Plateau 

Ogun 

Benue 

Enugu 

Kogi 

Delta 

Plateau 

Borno 

1011 

Fulani murders from 

January 2015 - April 2016 



The scale, spread 

and frequency of the 

attacks, as well as the 

near methodical 

manner in which the 

communities are wiped 

out, pacified and the 

sequence in which they 

are being carried out 

speaks to a higher 

degree of planning and 

organization than the 

government is willing to 

acknowledge. 

SBM Intelligence 

date of attack 

1/1/2016 

1/4/2016 

1/10/2016 

1/17/2016 

1/25/2016 

2/6/2016 

2/7/2016 

2/7/2016 

2/11/2016 

2/24/2016 

2/27/2016 

2/28/2016 

3/3/2016 

3/5/2016 

3/8/2016 

3/8/2016 

3/9/2016 

3/10/2016 

3/11/2016 

3/13/2016 

3/13/2016 

3/13/2016 

3/17/2016 

3/17/2016 

3/19/2016 

3/21/2016 

3/29/2016 

4/4/2016 

4/9/2016 

4/10/2016 

4/13/2016 

4/13/2016 

4/16/2016 

4/18/2016 

4/25/2016 

4/26/2016 

4/27/2016 

2016 Subtotal 

2016 Fulani Attacks 

victims killed 

1 

12 

45 

0 

20 

12 

1 

10 

2 

300 

9 

9 

1 

0 

40 

12 

8 

2 

0 

90 

2 

6 

25 

15 

1 

2 

7 

1 

1 

15 

44 

0 

1 

18 

20 

0 

20 

725 

LGA 

Nkanu East 

Nasarawa 

Agatu 

Wukari 

Adamawa 

Buruku 

Yewa North 

Buruku 

Uzo Uwani 

Agatu 

Wukari 

Agatu 

Logo 

Agatu 

Logo 

Buruku 

Logo 

Agatu 

Senator David Mark 

convoy attacked 

Agatu 

Buruku 

Tarkaa 

Logo 

Buruka 

Udi 

Guma 

Ogba-Egebema-Ndoni 

Tarkaa 

Oktipupa 

Gashaka 

Bali 

Ifedore 

Ayamelum 

Kwande 

Uwani 

Ndokwa 

Uzo-Uwani 

state 

Enugu 

Nasarawa 

Benue 

Taraba 

Adamawa 

Benue 

Ogun 

Benue 

Enugu 

Benue 

Taraba 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Benue 

Enugu 

Benue 

Rivers 

Benue 

Ondo 

Taraba 

Taraba 

Ondo 

Anambra 

Benue 

Enugu 

Delta 

Enugu 



IN THE PAST SIXTEEN MONTHS THERE 

HAVE BEEN 55 SEPARATE FULANI 

ATTACKS IN 14 DIFFERENT STATES 

RESULTING IN OVER ONE THOUSAND 

DEATHS. EVEN THOUGH THE DATA FOR 

2016 ONLY INCLUDES FOUR MONTHS, 

THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A 190% 

INCREASE IN FATALITIES FROM 2015 

TO 2016. BENUE STATE HAS BEEN THE 

MOST IMPACTED, WITH 26 DISTINCT 

ATTACKS LEAVING 738 DEAD. 



The Fulani militants pose 

a grave security threat to 

Nigeria and West Africa 

today, with 2016 poised 

to be the most deadly 

year on record, and 

every indication that the 

attacks will continue to 

escalate. 

At this time, it seems the Fulani have primarily targeted Local 

Government Areas that are principally, though not singularly, 

Christian. But given the reality that this is a movement of terror 

undergirded by both religious and ethnic overtones, there 

is reason to believe that as the Fulani increasingly perceive they 

have the latitude to pursue their own agenda, that their acts of 

aggression will progressively impinge on non-Fulani Muslims and 

adherents of African Traditional Religions. 

As one intelligence outfit analyzed the attacks pursued by the 

Fulani militants: 

The scale, spread and frequency of the attacks, as well as the near methodical 

manner in which the communities are wiped out, pacified and 

the sequence in which it is being carried out speaks to a higher degree of 

planning and organization than the government is willing to acknowledge. It 

is dangerous to refuse to acknowledge this, as our recent experience with 

Boko Haram has shown. It takes only a little nudge forward for what we see 

as marauders of civilian targets to begin to take on whole army formations. 

By then it will be a lot more difficult to defeat them, at a considerable cost in 

men, finances and logistics to the Nigerian state. 87 

Without minimizing the significance of Boko Haram, addressing 

the Fulani militants will likely prove far more challenging for a variety 

of reasons. First, unlike Boko Haram, the Fulani are primarily 

a tribe and not a terrorist organization and bound more closely 

together through familial and relational ties. Second, Fulani aggression 

does not stem from a set of poor economic and educational 

policies that excluded them from broader monetary advancement, 

but from a mixture of religion, ethnicity and desire to 

preserve a particular way of life that will be difficult to maintain in 

the twenty-first century. It bears repeating that the challenge is 

to isolate and address Fulani engaging in militancy outside of the 

rule of law and not all Fulani or Fulani pastoralists. 

While the impact of Boko Haram has been felt throughout 

the Lake Chad region, if Fulani militants are allowed to either 

destabilize the capital, Abuja, or extend their reach 

into the southern states of Nigeria, the implications of this 

security threat are far more severe. In an extreme situation, 

this could cause both a massive refugee flow whose impact 

would be borne not only in the region but even into Europe, 

and an economic and security disruption that would be felt 

far and wide. 


CONCLUSION NIGERIA 79 

Conclusion 

Nigeria is a country on the verge of fracturing along 

religious fault lines. Three challenges are undermining 

the integrity of the nation: 

1 

Religious minorities throughout northern 

Nigeria often live in forgotten shadows 

and face a substantive level of discrimination 

and social exclusion that is negatively 

impacting millions of individuals. 

This foundation of discrimination is 

sustained by policies and practices that 

are widely accepted as normative and 

inhibit the development of an integrated 

context of peaceful coexistence and 

Religion is much more 

powerful than an atomic 

bomb. Religion is like a 

nuclear power and it can 

be used either positively 

or negatively depending 

on the driver. 

Imam Muhammad Ashafa 


80 NIGERIA CONCLUSION 

shared national, educational and economic pursuit. This is all the 

more relevant given the reality that as a region, northern Nigeria 

is one of the most underdeveloped in the nation, and that far too 

many northerners believe the best means of moving forward is 

not the nurturing of a shared sense of citizenship but a more fullbodied 

embrace of their particular religious interpretations and 

social construct. This foundation of discrimination has produced 

violent episodes for a number of years with Boko Haram just the 

latest, most sustained, and most violent version. With religious 

minorities facing policies and practices that threaten their very existence, 

insecurity and division will continue to fester in northern 

Nigeria until this foundation of discrimination is ameliorated. 

2 

Boko Haram and its culture of violence 

continues, despite recent pronouncements 

to the contrary, throughout 

northeastern Nigeria. The acts of barbarity 

and the depths of suffering many have 

experienced are immense. With malnutrition 

stalking northeastern Nigeria, almost 

a million children are being denied an 

opportunity to pursue an education, and 

perhaps the second largest number of 

IDPs in the world continue to live in desperate circumstances, 

Boko Haram has helped create one of the most severe humanitarian 

crises in the world. Unfortunately, in many respects both the 

Nigerian government and the international community are failing 

to rise to meet this challenge. 

3 

The threat of the Fulani militants has 

steadily grown for a number of years, and 

since 2014, has significantly escalated. 

This emerging security threat is a combustible 

mixture of religion and ethnicity 

and is sowing seeds of destabilization 

throughout the Middle Belt. Following the 

model set by Boko Haram, the conflict 

being primarily pursued by the Fulani 

militants is at the edge of tipping from 

isolated acts of aggression into a full-scale conflict. 


CONCLUSION NIGERIA 81 

Whereas Boko Haram occurred in rural northeastern Nigeria in a 

somewhat isolated and underdeveloped quadrant, the actions of 

the Fulani militants are taking place in the heart of Nigeria and increasingly 

encroaching on the environs of Abuja. Should the capital 

city of the country in Africa that has the largest economy, the 

largest number of Muslims and the largest number of Christians 

succumb to ethnic and religious attacks, or should the country further 

fracture and destabilize, the implications would be felt across 

western Africa and could create an arch of failed states stretching 

from Libya to Chad, Mali and down to Nigeria. This need not be 

the case, but the potential is very real. At the same time, currently 

governed by a Muslim president and a Christian vice president, 

Nigeria also contains the seeds for a country in pursuit of a united 

citizenship with rule of law, religious freedom and cultural plurality 

that itself becomes a model of growth, peace and stability 

throughout the continent of Africa and beyond. 

Fully addressing this complex situation will require a level of 

intentionality and collaboration across multiple sectors and must 

involve the Nigerian government, key stakeholders throughout the 

country, local grassroots representatives, the Nigerian diaspora, 

and international partners. Given the multi-dimensional nature 

of these conflicts, success is highly dependent upon the development 

of a comprehensive roadmap to peace. While multiple models 

exist, perhaps the most pertinent template is that of a Truth 

and Reconciliation Commission or of the more recent Columbia 

Peace Process. 

In this vein President Buhari and his current administration are 

to be acknowledged for the important steps that have been 

taken over the previous twelve months to address internal 

corruption and bring to an end the threat of Boko Haram. There 

is an opportunity to broaden and expand this good foundation 

in order to meaningfully pursue a comprehensive roadmap to 

peace that addresses discrimination, violence and humanitarian 

need. Thus far, President Buhari has provided strong and positive 

leadership and given renewed opportunity for the international 

community to stand with Nigeria at this critical time. 

? 

WHAT IS THE TRUTH 

AND RECONCILIATION 

COMMISSION? The South 

African Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission (TRC) was set up 

by the Government of National 

Unity to help deal with what 

happened under apartheid. 

The conflict during this period 

resulted in massive violence 

and human rights abuses, and 

the TRC helped South Africa 

move forward with forgiveness 

and united purpose. 

Decisive and immediate action, changes in policy, and coordinated 

intentionality are needed in order to prevent Nigeria from fracturing 

along religious fault lines and propel her to emerge as the truly great 

country that beckons and stands well within her grasp. 


82 NIGERIA ENDNOTES 

Endnotes 

1 “Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/figures-analysis 

(accessed May 6, 2016). 

2 Joe Read, Former Director of the Nigeria Country Office for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs, 21CWI Interview, Falls Church, Virginia, April 27, 2016. 

3 “Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 

4 “Nigeria: 2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile – West Africa,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e484f76&submit=GO (accessed May 6, 2016). 

5 “Nigeria: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 15 April 2016),” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nga_humanitarian_dashboard_as_of_april_2016.pdf 


6 “‘Bad Blood’: Perceptions of Children Born of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Women and Girls Associated with 

Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria,” International Alert and United Nations Children’s Fund Nigeria (February 2016), 8. 

7 “‘They Set the Classrooms on Fire: Attacks on Education in Northeast Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch (April 2016), 1. 

8 “Crushed but Not Defeated: The Impact of Persistent Violence of the Church in Northern Nigeria,” Open Doors and 

Christian Association of Nigeria (March 2016), 18. 

9 “Nigeria Security Tracker: Mapping Violence in Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeriasecurity-tracker/p29483 


10 “Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism,” Institute for Economics & Peace 

(November 2015), 38. 

11 “Global Terrorism Index” (November 2015), 22. 

12 Israel Akanji, “Towards a Theology of Conflict Transformation: A Study of Religious Conflict in Contemporary Nigerian 

Society” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh), 208. 

13 Abimbola O. Adesoji and Akin Alao, “Indigeneship and Citizenship in Nigeria: Myths and Realities,” The African Symposium 

8 no. 2 (December 2008), 98. 

14 “Nigeria,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria#cp_wdi (accessed May 6, 2016). 

15 Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations (March 5, 2015), http://www.cfr. 

org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739 (accessed May 6, 2016). 

16 “Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population,” Pew Research Center 

http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/12/Christianity-fullreport-web.pdf (December 2011), 55. 

17 “Global Christianity,” Pew Research Center, 54. 

18 “10 Countries With the Largest Muslim Populations, 2010 and 2050,” Pew Research Center (April 2, 2015), http://www. 

pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/pf_15-04-02_projectionstables74/ (accessed May 6, 2016). 

19 Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto, Parrot Newspaper, (October 12, 1960). 

20 “Crushed but Not Defeated,” Open Doors and Christian Association of Nigeria, 17-18. 

21 John Campbell, “Country Profile: Nigeria,” Tony Blair Faith Foundation, http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/country-profiles/nigeria/situation-report 


22 Israel Akanji, “Towards a Theology of Conflict Transformation,” 240. 

23 Olawale Alabi, “Seventh Day Adventist Church Advises Kaduna State Govt on Religious Preaching Bill,” News Agency of 

Nigeria (April 20, 2016), http://nannewsnigeria.com/seventh-day-adventist-church-advises-kaduna-state-govt-religiouspreaching-bill 


24 Israel Akanji, “Towards a Theology of Conflict Transformation,” 205. 

25 “‘Leave Everything to God’: Accountability for Inter-Communal Violence in Plateau and Kaduna States, Nigeria,” Human 

Rights Watch (December 2013), 41-81. 

26 Jana Krause, “A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria,” Geneva Declaration Secretariat 

(2011), 43. 

27 “Nigeria: ‘Inaccurate Reporting’ Could Fuel Further Violence Against Christians,” Christian Today (December 2, 2008), 

http://www.christiantoday.com/article/nigeria.inaccurate.reporting.could.fuel.further.violence.against.christians/22037. 

htm (accessed May 6, 2016). 


ENDNOTES NIGERIA 83 

28 “Leave Everything to God,” Human Rights Watch, 82-116. 

29 John Campbell, “Country Profile: Nigeria,” Tony Blair Faith Foundation. 

30 John Campbell, “Country Profile: Nigeria,” Tony Blair Faith Foundation. 

31 Aminu Mohammed Umar, “Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis,” (master’s 

thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 17-18. 

32 Hilary Matfess, “Here’s Why So Many People Join Boko Haram, Despite Its Notorious Violence,” Washington Post (April 

26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/26/heres-why-so-many-people-join-bokoharam-despite-its-notorious-violence/ 


33 Matfess, Washington Post. 

34 Frank Chothia, “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC Africa (May 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-13809501 


35 Mallam Sanni Umary,” quoted in “Boko Haram: Investigating the Ideological Background to the Rise of an Islamists 

Militant Organization,” by Stephen Ulph, “Boko Haram: Investigating the Ideological Background to the Rise of an Islamist 

Militant Organisation,” Westminster Institute, https://www.scribd.com/doc/178672818/BOKO-HARAM-Investigating-the- 

Ideological-Background-to-the-Rise-of-an-Islamist-Militant-Organisation (February 2014), 31. 

36 Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations. 

37 Jide Ajani and Kingsley Omonobi, “How N41m Tore Boko Haram Apart – Qaqa,” Vanguard (February 14, 2012), http:// 

www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/how-n41m-tore-boko-haram-apart-qaqa/ (accessed May 6, 2016). 

38 Stephen Ulph, “Boko Haram: Investigating the Ideological Background,” 18. 

39 “Abu Qaqa, Kabiru Sokoto Open Up,” News Ghana (March 8, 2012), http://www.newsghana.com.gh/abu-qaqa-kabirusokoto-open-up/ 


40 “There and Back: Trajectories of North African Foreign Fighters in Syria,” Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No. 3 (July 2015), 

11. 

41 Helene Cooper, “Boko Haram and ISIS are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says,” New York Times (April 20, 2016), http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haram-and-isis-are-collaborating-more-us-military-says.html?_r=0 (accessed 

May 6, 2016). 

42 “Senegal Fears Extremism Amid Imam Arrests, Regional Attacks,” Voice of America (February 8, 2016), http://www. 

voanews.com/content/senegal-fears-extremism-amid-imam-arrests-regional-attacks/3181622.html. 

43 “Security Council Presidential Statement Condemns Boko Haram Terrorist Attacks in Lake Chad Basin, Demanding Immediate 

Halt to Violence, Human Rights Abuses,” United Nations Security Council 7692nd Meeting (PM), (May 13, 2016), 

http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12363.doc.htm (accessed on May 16, 2016). 

44 “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru,” U.S. Department of State (November 13, 2013), http://www.state. 

gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm. 

45 “Profile: Boko Haram,” Al-Jazeera (January 18, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.html 


46 Frank Chothia, “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC Africa (May 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-13809501 

(May 6, 2016). 

47 “United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2016 Annual Report,” United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202016%20Annual%20Report.pdf (April 

2016), 106-107. 

48 Aminu Abubakar, “Female Suicide Bombers Kill 58 in a Nigerian Camp Meant to be a Haven,” CNN (February 11, 2016), 

http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/11/africa/nigeria-suicide-bombing-boko-haram/index.html (accessed May 6, 2016). 

49 Kevin Sieff, “They Were Freedom From Boko Haram’s Rape Camps. But their Nightmare isn’t Over,” Washington Post 

(April 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/they-were-freed-from-boko-harams-rape-camps-but-theirnightmare-isnt-over/2016/04/03/dbf2aab0-e54f-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html 


50 Francisca Vigaud-Walsh, “Nigeria’s Displaced Women and Girls: Humanitarian Community at Odds, Boko Haram’s Survivors 

Forsaken,” Refugee International (April 21, 2016), 8. 

51 “Nigeria: A Year On, No Word on 300 Abducted Children; Government Response to Damasak Attacks Woefully Inadequate,” 

Human Rights Watch (March 29, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/29/nigeria-year-no-word-300-abducted-children 


52 “Letter from Africa: How to Rebuild Nigeria after Boko Haram,” BBC (May 10, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-36191512. 


84 NIGERIA ENDNOTES 

53 John Campbell, “Nigerian Popular Support for Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations: Africa in Transition Blog 

(March 15, 2016), http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2016/03/15/nigerian-popular-support-for-boko-haram/ (accessed May 6, 

2016). 

54 “Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth,” Mercy Corps (April 

2016), https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20 

Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf (accessed May 6, 2016). 

55 Kyle Dietrich, “‘When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy: Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency,” 

Center for Civilians in Conflict http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/NigeriaReport_Web.pdf (October 7, 

2015), 5. 

56 Kyle Dietrich, “‘When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy,” 5-6. 

57 Joe Read, 21CWI Interview. . 

58 Joe Read, 21CWI Interview. 

59 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 141. 

60 Virginia Comolli, Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015). 

61“Nigeria: Babies and Children Dying in Military Detention,” Amnesty International (May 11, 2016), https://www.amnesty. 

org/en/latest/news/2016/05/nigeria-babies-and-children-dying-in-military-detention/ (accessed May 11, 2016). 

62 Aminu Mohammed Umar, “Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect,” 26. 

63 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 165. 

64 “Global Terrorism Index” (November 2015), 22. 

65 Rupert Colville, Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Press Briefing Notes – (1) Mozambique, 

(2) Nigeria,” (April 29, 2016). 

66 “Fulani / Fulbe,” The Joshua Project, https://joshuaproject.net/clusters/173 (accessed May 6, 2016). 

67 “Fulani,” Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Fulani (accessed May 6, 2016). 

68 The included information is based upon written documentation submitted in February 2016 to 21CWI and the Stefanos 

Foundation by the community leaders of Sho. Titled, “Crisis Victim Sho Village,” the report covered 2001-2015 and 

included the name, age, and the date of death for each victim as well as the names and ages for each impacted dependent. 

69 Jana Krause, “A Deadly Cycle,” 10. 

70 The included information is based upon written documentation submitted in February 2016 to 21CWI and the Stefanos 

Foundation by the Jol Community Development Association. In addition to detailing the information summarized 

in the table, this 224-page report includes over 700 pictures of those killed, dependents, property damaged and crops 

destroyed. 

71 “Village Massacres Strain Nigeria Further, as Traditional Nomads Fight Modernization,” World Watch Monitor (March 23, 

2016), https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2016/03/4368789/ (accessed May 6, 2016). 

72 “Boats of Fully Armed Men Crossing the Benue River Enroute the Agatu Attack,” SBM Intelligence, https://www.youtube. 

com/watch?v=BLK60UTqSBo&feature=youtu.be (accessed May 6, 2016). 

73 “Death and the Herdsmen,” SBM Intelligence, http://sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/201604_Herdsmenattacks.pdf, 

(April 28, 2016), 12. 

74 “Death and the Herdsmen,” SBM Intelligence, 5-6. 

75 Samuel Ogundipe, “Sultan Reacts to Benue, Enugu Killings, Says Blaming Fulani Herdsmen ‘Absurd,’” Premium Times 

(May 1, 2016), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/202714-sultan-reacts-to-benue-enugu-killingssays-blaming-fulani-herdsmen-absurd.html 


76 Emmanuel Mayah, Sani Tukur and Hassan Adebayo, “Why We Struck in Agatu – Fulani Herdsmen,” Premium Times 

(March 19, 2016), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/200426-exclusive-struck-agatu-fulani-herdsmen. 

html (accessed May 6, 2016). 

77 “Agatu Genocide: Benue Lawmakers Slam Buhari,” Vanguard (March 19, 2016), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/ 

agatu-genocide-benue-lawmakers-slam-buhari/ (accessed May 6, 2016). 

78 Adam Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central 

Nigeria,” Africa: The Journal of International African Institute Vol. 78, No. 1 (2008): 107. 

79 “Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 


ENDNOTES NIGERIA 85 

80 Map of “Nigeria: Internal Displacement as of December 2014,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://www. 

internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/2014/nigeria-internal-displacement-as-of-december-2014 (accessed 

May 6, 2016). 

81 Higazi, “Social Mobilization,” 132. 

82 Higazi, “Social Mobilization,” 120. 

83 Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, 

“LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa,” Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 

Representatives 112 Congress (April 12, 2012), 31. 

84 “Small Arms Survey 2013: Everyday Dangers,” Small Arms Survey (July 2013), 119. 

85 John Paden, “Religion and Conflict in Nigeria: Countdown to the 2015 Elections,” United States Institute of Peace (February 

2015), 8. 

86 The “Fulani Attacks, January 2015 – April 2016” chart is the result of tabulating multiple sources of public and private 

data. When sources differed on the number of victims killed, the chart opted for the lowest number. Given limitations in 

data collection, varying numerical reports regarding numbers killed, and the need for researchers to complete a more 

systematic analysis, the numbers reflected here almost assuredly underreport the full impact. 

87 “Death and the Herdsmen,” SBM Intelligence, 12. 

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